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ABSTRACT
The significance of this thesis lies in the fact that it 
reviews the activities of a newly-born organisation, that has 
hardly received an authoritative legal analysis. In addition 
the thesis relies heavily on primary sources in examining the 
internal structure of the organisation.
Looking at the nature of the issues involved, the 
principal contribution is made by applying the principles of 
international law to three different areas of law. These are, 
the law of international institutions, economic integration, 
inspired and influenced by the literature on the EEC, and the 
law of the use of force.
Chapters 1-6, which deal with the institutional aspect, 
examine the treaty-making power within the constitutions of 
the six member states and how treaties enter into force 
according to these constitutional arrangements. This occurs 
despite the fact that sometimes signature is sufficient, 
according to the agreement concerned, to bring it into force.
They further deal with the aims of establishing the 
organisation. Like other traditional organisations, the 
objectives stipulated in the instruments do not match the 
political realities in the state practice of the member 
states. The gap is widened by the realisation of the weak 
power entrusted to the G.C.C. organs. That the mechanism of
iv
decision-making, which requires unanimity in itself, is not 
binding per se. emphasises this view.
They also deal with the question of membership and the 
political and legal implications of excluding some states in 
the region from the organisation.
The constituent instrument is silent on the issues of 
expulsion, suspension and withdrawal. The probable 
implications of this omission are examined.
However, the case may be with the structure and the 
powers of the organisation, the G.C.C. is not deprived of its 
international personality on the international and national 
plane. The capacity of incurring obligations and obtaining 
rights, which is the indicating factor of such personality, 
has been shown in both the G.C.C. instruments and its actual 
practice.
Chapter Seven mainly deals with the implementation of the 
Unified Economic Agreement (UEA). It examines the concept of 
economic integration which is generally contemplated in the 
agreement, but loosely adjusted to meet the political and 
economic realities in the member states, rather than to meet 
the standards of functional integration which concede a higher 
degree of sovereignty.
A hypothetical problem is raised in the case of a 
conflict between the UEA and earlier treaties concluded in 
substantially similar terms under the Arab League auspices. 
Yet the invocation of de jure or de facto termination is 
possible by those parties to the later treaty (i.e. the UEA).
VThe implementation of the UEA provisions may also give 
rise to some difficulties for those GCC member states which 
are bound by the GATT (i.e. Kuwait), a matter which receives 
some consideration in this thesis.
This chapter also deals in great length with the problem 
of supervision within the G.C.C., which poses a real challenge 
for effective implementation of the UEA. This is a matter 
evidenced in the number of complaints of the governments and 
private parties to the G.C.C. Secretariat. It is also 
realised in the unilateral interpretation of the UEA by the 
member states.
Despite the fact that the UEA has an immense impact on 
individual citizens, this has not been regulated, a matter 
which has cast doubt on the extent of the rights of 
individuals under the agreement.
The implementation of the agreement also raises some 
important issues concerning the application of GCC decisions 
in a federal member state, such as the United Arab Emirates, 
which constitutionally reserves large powers for the 
individual Emirates.
Chapter Eight deals with security in the G.C.C. member 
states. It examines delicately the dividing line between 
illegal intervention and mere political propaganda. In this 
regard the acts of intervention and indirect aggression by 
Iran, which largely caused the involvement of the G.C.C. 
member states in the Gulf war are highlighted. Thus, a 
relationship between supporting Iraq financially, which is a
forbidden act under the strict rules of neutrality, and the 
exercise of collective self-defence in the form of such 
funding has been argued and examined in the light of the 
Nicaragua Case (1986). Also of great concern is the legal 
position of G.C.C. member states who are not required to 
remain strictly neutral when they are subjected to indirect 
aggression. This in fact raises the issue of collective self- 
defence under both the Arab League and the GCC arrangements.
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INTRODUCTION
On the 25th of May 1981 the Head of States of the six 
Gulf countries (United Arab Emirates, State of Bahrain, 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Sultanate of Oman, State of Qatar and 
State of Kuwait), signed two important documents. The first 
was the Fundamental Statute of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
for Arab States (G.C.C.),1 establishing the function, form and 
purpose of the Council. The second document, no less 
essential, is the Unified Economic Agreement.2
1 The General Secretary, acting on behalf of the parties 
registered the Fundamental Statute with the U.N. Secretariat 
on 20th September 1982, in accordance with Article 102 of the 
Charter of the U.N. The Certificate of Registration No. 29203 
done at New York on 20th August 1986, for the Secretary- 
General . The same document was registered with the Arab 
League Secretariat on 29.12.1982. A letter of notification 
from the G.C.C. Secretariat to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Qatar No. 49402/134712 dated 4.11.1983. For the text of the 
G.C.C. Fundamental Statute see the G.C.C. Legal Gazette No.3 
year (Arabic) - 11.6.1983, pp.7-13. For the English text see 
26 I.L.M. (1987), pp.1138-1143.
2 The Unified Economic Agreement unfortunately has not 
been registered either with the U.N. Secretariat or the Arab 
League Secretariat. For the text of the Agreement see the 
G.c.C. Legal Gazette, ibid.. pp.23-28. For the English text 
see 26 I.L.M.. pp.1160-1163. In spite of non-registration 
there can be no question here regarding the binding force of 
the U.E.A. The problem may arise in the case of a G.C.C. 
member state who wishes to invoke it before an organ of the 
U.N. For according to Article 102 of the U.N. Charter, 
agreements relied upon by a member state must be registered 
with the Secretary General of the U.N. This does not, 
however, affect the right of a state not a member of the 
G.C.C. to invoke the unregistered treaty. The fact that the 
G.C.C. published the U.E.A. in its Legal Gazette would be 
significant evidence as to the purpose of Article 102, mainly 
to eliminate secret diplomacy. Although Article 102 uses the
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It is obvious from the Fundamental Statute of the G.C.C. 
that integration is not a goal in itself, but merely a means 
for the achievement of the final objective. The final 
objective is to promote the unity of the Gulf.3 Yet economic 
integration is the determining factor to bring about the final 
objective.
Although the formation of the G.C.C. marked the first 
step towards institutionalizing the concept of Gulf unity, the 
six countries have shared close cooperation on multilateral 
and bilateral levels. Since the early 1970s cooperation has 
taken different forms: economic, cultural, educational,
informational, technical, commercial and military. Thus a 
very important factor which has helped the Gulf states to 
create the G.C.C. is that pattern of similarities in their 
history, culture, economy and forms of rule. By stressing 
these similarities of governmental institutions and political 
regimes among the six states, the council's members have 
impliedly and perceptively limited the G.C.C. membership to 
themselves4 at least for the time being. The other Arab Gulf
*N
words 'as soon as possible' but the G.C.C. even after few 
years still has the right to register the treaty since the 
statement appears to have a wide interpretation. See in this 
regard, Higgins, R., The Development of International Law 
through the Political Organs of the United Nations. Oxford 
University Press (1963), pp.328-36? Brandon, M . , "The 
Validity of Non-Registered Treaties", 29 B.Y.I.L. (1952), 
pp.186-204; Broches and Boskey, "Theory and Practice of 
Treaty Registration" 4 Neths.Int.L.R. (1957), pp.152-86.
3 Article 4.1 of the Fundamental Statute of the G.C.C.
4 Article 5 of the Fundamental Statute.
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State, Iraq, has not been included, partly because of the war 
with Iran but also because the social, economic and political 
systems of Iraq's Baathist regime were not shared with the
G.C.C. conservative countries.5 Furthermore in an attempt to 
avoid unnecessary offence to Iran, the organisation has the 
formal title of 'The Cooperation Council for Arab States of 
the Gulf'.
A number of factors have pushed the G.C.C. States to 
establish the organisation, not least of which was the 
realisation that cooperation would lead to the protection of 
the stability, security and progress of the region. The 
recent oil crisis has demonstrated how strategically important 
the Gulf region is to the West. This coupled with the fact 
that most of the Gulf States are small entities has 
contributed to making cooperation among them paramount 
concern.6 Another significant factor is the recognition by 
member states that if the region is to survive, political 
independence can prevail only through real unity. 
Nevertheless the impact of three major events between 1978 and
5 For these differences see Robins, P., The Future of the 
Gulf. Politics and Oil in the 1990s. Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, Gower Publishing Co., England (1989), 
p.30; Kechichian, J. , "The Gulf Cooperation Council in Search 
for Security", 7 Third World Quarterly No.4 (1985), pp.868-70.
6 Price, R . , The Gulf Cooperation Council. Congressional 
Research Services, The Library of Congress No.85-516, 
Washington D.C. 1054 0, November 30, 1984 at p. CRS-9. See 
also Nakhleh, Emile, A., The Persian Gulf and American Policy. 
Praeger Publishers, United States (1982), pp.44-46; Rizvi, 
N., "Gulf Cooperation Council", Pakistan Horizon. Vol.XXXV 
No.21, 1982, the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 
pp.29-38.
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1981 have compelled the six Gulf States to begin the pace of 
cooperation. These events were:
(i) The collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran and emergence 
of the Islamic Republic after a long mass upheaval.
(ii) The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 
December 1979.
(iii) The Iran-Iraq war which was started in September 1980.7 
However, the council so far is experiencing numerous
problems in particular the old and continuing question of 
territorial boundaries, several disputes remain unresolved. 
For example the unresolved Qatari-Bahraini dispute over the 
Huwar Islands, the lack of agreement between Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait over the location of their common maritime frontiers 
and the Oman-United Arab Emirates dispute (a longstanding one 
by which Oman claims substantial parts of Ras-Al-Khaimah).
In spite of the fact that the impetus behind the 
formation of the G.C.C. was the desire to evolve a common 
strategy for the defence of the Gulf, there are nevertheless 
differences in the foreign policy orientations of the six 
states. For example, perched strategically on the Strait of 
Hormuz, Oman tends to feel vulnerable and openly favours 
cooperation between the Gulf security system and that of the 
West. The other states, however, perceived western military 
presence as dangerously provocative as far as the Soviet Union
Rikye, J. , "Gulf Security, Quest for Regional 
Cooperation", A Report of the International Peace Academy. 
Report No.22, New York (1985), pp.14-16.
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was concerned.8 As such they favoured the development of an 
indigenous security system. Kuwait is more forthright in its 
dealings with the super powers. It was the first member of 
the G.C.C. which had diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union. In fact Kuwait has suggested that other members of the 
G.C.C. should have their own diplomatic ties with the Soviet 
Union to demonstrate their determination to avoid complete 
identification with the West and to provide the balanced image 
of non-alignment. This recommendation has been recently taken 
up by Oman and the U.A.E.9
Problems arose when Kuwait particularly gave notice to 
the G.C.C. member states stating its reluctance to sign a 
multilateral security agreement. Kuwait is the only G.C.C. 
member not to have signed a bilateral agreement with Saudi 
Arabia since for example the abortive coup attempt in Bahrain 
in December 1981. The security agreement set down provisions 
over cross-border pursuit, coordinating punishments for the 
same crimes which would have meant increasing penalties in
8 El Azhary, M.S., "The Gulf Cooperation Council and 
regional defence in the 1980s", Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, 
University of Exeter, Paper No.1 (1982), pp.14-16.
9 Oman established diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union in September 1985, see Keesing's Contemporary Archives 
(1985), p.34014 A. The United Arab Emirates Foreign Ministry 
announced on November 15, 1985 that diplomatic relations had 
been established with the Soviet Union with effect from 
November 13, 1985. The decision to establish relations which 
reportedly followed contact between U.A.E. officials and the 
Soviet Ambassador in Kuwait was described by a government 
spokesman as being in line with the U.A.E's neutral and non- 
aligned foreign policy. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives 
(January 1986) at 34134.
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some states and the extradition of criminals has aroused fears 
in Kuwait that it would threaten her democratic traditions.10
It has also been observed that some states found 
difficulties in applying the provisions of the Unified 
Economic Agreement, partly because of local resistance to 
price rises in commodities imported from outside the G.C.C., 
since these now attracted tariff.11 The provisions of the 
Unified Economic Agreement are the most ambitious ever 
undertaken in the Gulf region. However, it has not been found 
easy to implement most of the terms of the agreement. The 
realities of international politics as usual manifest 
themselves in compromise. This is not to dismiss the fact 
that the formation of the G.C.C. is the most important 
political, social, economic event in the history of the Gulf 
States since their independence. Also the G.C.C. free trade 
area established on 1st March 1983, so far fails to affect a 
large portion of total trade involving member states. Added 
to this, the planned 4-20 percent tariff structure - a much 
more complex and demanding measure - was to have taken effect 
on 1st September 1983, but some parties to the U.E.A. continue 
to levy customs duties at pre-agreement rates, which is
10 A report by Middle East Economic Digest (M.E.E.D.) 
November 1984 at p.20.
11 Under Article 4 of the Unified Agreement member states 
are authorised to impose a uniform minimum tariff on goods 
from non-member states. This inevitably could cause price 
rises in countries which had hitherto imposed taxes on such 
goods. A report by M.E.E.D. . ibid.. "Economic integration 
means toeing the lines", 28 October 1983, at p. 23.
contrary to the aims and objectives of the Unified Economic 
Agreement. For the G.C.C. officials the foregoing limitations 
in the U.E.A. are attributed to administrative elements. Yet 
numerous observers have stated the blockage in U.A.E. is due 
partly to the respective Emirates' slow progress in imposing 
higher customs duties on some powerful business personnel 
fearing an intensified recession in local markets. In this 
connection U.A.E. business personnel had expected strict and 
immediate application of the higher duties and in August 1983 
imported goods in bulk to take advantage of the previous 1 
percent rate.12 However it has to be mentioned that the 
Federal Ministries of the U.A.E. are in the process of looking 
at methods of introducing the G.C.C. rates.13
On the whole, however, it may be judged that the above 
problems have not undermined the G.C.C.'s main achievements 
and demands. Yet problems still exist, which as noted earlier 
arise mainly from the inevitable national interests of 
individual states. This occurs of course in contravention of 
the Unified Economic Agreement which stipulated that its 
provisions would supersede all laws and legislation (Article 
27). The question now to be asked is whether each state is 
willing to give up part of its sovereignty for the benefits 
of the council.
12Ibid.
13Ibid.
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Accordingly, the main purpose of this study is to 
investigate these issues in the light of international law. 
In particular the study will explore the legal status of the 
council as an international organisation. It is hoped that 
through the investigation, the writer will be able to identify 
most of the problems and offer further suggestions for 
improvements.
Further, in exploring these problems, the writer hopes 
to examine the functional aspects of the G.C.C., by comparing 
these to other similar regional international organisations, 
particularly the E.E.C., hence there are some common 
objectives between the G.C.C. and the E.E.C.
The methodology to be employed in the study consists 
mainly of investigating official documents and delegations 
reports. But also interviews were conducted with high ranking 
officials in both the Council and State members.
It should be admitted here that the travaux preoaratoires 
of the Fundamental Statute and other important instruments 
are apparently not written and are still kept on tapes, so the 
writer did not have access to these important documents. 
However efforts will be made to get some insight into these 
issues during the investigation. Accordingly, the thesis is 
divided into nine chapters.
The first chapter deals with the geographical and 
historical aspects of the member states of the G.C.C., reviews 
the political and legal background and discusses the first
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move in the Gulf towards federation, which had been 
unsuccessful previously.
The second chapter considers the various steps which 
contributed to the establishment of G.C.C. and the legal 
character of the G.C.C. establishing instrument. It also 
deals with the treaty-making power within the constitutional 
arrangements of the Member States.
The third chapter embraces a study of how the objectives 
of the organisation are realised.
The fourth chapter deals with membership. In this 
context, an attempt was made to explain why the membership is 
restricted to the six states and the significance of this 
restriction. In addition, the rules of expulsion, suspension 
and withdrawal under international law are examined since the 
constituent instrument of the G.C.C. is silent on these 
issues.
Chapter five examines the organs of the G.C.C. and the 
supplementary apparatus annexed to it. It also deals with 
decision-making powers of these organs and the extent to which 
these decisions are binding.
Chapter six looks at the international personality of the 
G.C.C. with a comparative view on the international and 
domestic plane.
Chapter seven deals with the G.C.C.'s Unified Economic 
Agreement (U.E.A) concluded in summer 1981. The 28 articles 
of this agreement - which set very ambitious targets that go 
much further than any previous effort to coordinate Gulf
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development - are examined. The chapter examines critically 
the advantages and the disadvantages of Gulf experience, 
comparing it specifically with the E.E.C. experience, mainly 
through the process of supervision. It furthermore deals with 
the problem of possible conflict between the agreement and 
other similar agreements concluded under the auspices of the 
Arab League. Moreover, careful attention is given to the 
implementation of the U.E.A in a federal state (i.e. United 
Arab Emirates (U.A.E)).
Chapter eight deals with some legal issues of the 
security in the Gulf. It particularly examines the question 
of neutrality of the G.C.C. in the Iraqi-Iran war and the 
relevance of the concept of self-defence to the attitude of 
the G.C.C in funding Iraq.
The concluding chapter (Chapter 9) gives a brief summary 
of the thesis pointing out the main findings of the study and 
offers recommendations and suggestions for further research.
Finally, one should note that the dearth of authoritative 
legal literature on the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the 
excessive confidentiality imposed on its documents, 
contributed significantly to the difficulties involved in 
writing this thesis.
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CHAPTER ONE
1. GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL ASPECTS
(a) Geography
The Arabian side of the Gulf refers to the United Arab 
Emirates, the State of Bahrain, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
Sultanate of Oman, State of Qatar and State of Kuwait. "The 
Gulf", however, is a term frequently used to include also 
Iran, which occupies the entire northern shore and the head 
east of the Shatt-al-Arab.
The Gulf is a shallow marginal sea of the Indian ocean 
that lies between the Arabian peninsula and south-east Iran. 
It has an area of 92,500 square miles (24,000 square 
kilometres) and is rarely deeper than 300 feet (50 fathoms or 
100 metres) although depths exceeding 360 feet are found at 
its entrance and isolated localities in its southern part. 
The length of the Gulf is 500 miles and its width varies from 
180 miles to a mere 26 miles at the Strait of Hormuz. The 
strait links the Arabian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the 
Arabian sea. At the northern point of the Gulf Shatt-Al-Arab 
enters it and for a very short distance to the west of its
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mouth the sea-board belongs to Iraq.1
The shallowness of the waters had led to the widespread 
belief that the whole of the Gulf is in the legal term a 
continental shelf, but it does not form a continental shelf 
in the technical meaning of the term.2 This explains why the 
rulers of the Arabian Gulf Shaikdoms did not refer to the 
continental shelf in their proclamations of the extent of that 
shelf.3
(b) History
At times the Gulf region has been noted as an area of 
important trade routes, for the ships of foreigners from 1507, 
the ships of Kuwait, Oman and the Hadhramout on their routes 
to the Far East and East Africa, the ships of Europe and 
America and now air traffic.4 All the Mid and Upper Gulf 
areas experienced the severe depression of the 1930's, which 
stemmed partly from the decline in the pearl trade resulting 
from world depression and the advent of the cultured pearl.
1 For general geographical and other information on the 
Arabian Gulf see Encyclopedia Britannica. 13th ed. (1973) at 
p.649; Wilson, Sir A.T., The Persian Gulf (1928 reprinted 
1954) Oxford? British Admiralty, A Handbook of Arabia. Vol.l 
(1916); Hay, Sir Rupert, The Persian Gulf States. The Middle 
East Institute (1959).
2 Amin, S., International and Legal Problems of the Gulf. 
Middle East and North African Studies Press Ltd., London 
(1981), p.97.
3 Lauterpacht, Sir H., "Sovereignty over Submarine Area", 
27 B.Y.I.L. (1950), p.384.
4 For the general history of the Arabian Gulf see 
Lorimer, J.G., Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf. Oman and Central 
Arabia. Historical Part 9A, Calcutta Superintendent Government 
Printing, India (1915), pp.2-4.
33
The whole population was on the move from many Shaikdoms for
lack of a livelihood.
Politically the Arabian Gulf was a divided area:
individual tribes, villages, townships, ports were very much
left to their own devices under the rule of their own Shaikhly
families, A1 Saud in Saudi Arabia, A1 Sabah in Kuwait, A1
Thani in Qatar, A1 Khalifa in Bahrain, A1 Nahyan in Abu Dhabi
5and A1 Bu Said m  Oman.
1. United Arab Emirates
The creation of United Arab Emirates in December 1971
came after a century and a half of the existence of the
6Trucial States in special treaty relations with Britain.
The trucial coast comprised seven Shaikdoms (Abu Dhabi, 
Dubai, Sharja, Ras-Al-Khaimah, Fujairah, Umm-Al Qaiwain and 
Ajman) .
Early in the eighteenth century, Britain represented by 
the English East India Company, began its monopoly of the 
trade and politics of the Gulf area. Subsequently the rulers
7
of these Shaikhdoms concluded in 1820 a general treaty with
5 Yapp, M. , The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries in 
the Persian Gulf States. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore and London (1980), pp.41-68.
6 See Exchange of Notes concerning the termination of 
special treaty relations between the United Kingdom and the 
Trucial States, 1st December 1971, U.K. Treaty Series No. 34 
(1972) Cmnd.4941.
7 . . . .For an English translation of the original Arabic copy 
of the treaty of peace of 1820 signed by Major-General W. 
Grant Keir with the Arab tribes of Ras El Khaimah see F.O. 
60117, January 1920. For the text of the treaty see also 
Aitchison, C.U., A Collection of Treaties. Engagements and 
Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries. Vol.XI,
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the British Government in which they agreed to help the 
British to maintain peace and order, prevent plundering and 
piracy on land and sea. The 1820 treaty was imposed on the 
Chiefs by the British in order to keep the Gulf route to India 
safe and open. This treaty was followed by a perpetual 
Maritime Treaty of 1853 and the 1892 Exclusive Treaty by which
the British Government became responsible for the external
. 8affairs of the Shaikhdoms. In 1951 a Council of Trucial
States rulers was formed with the object of inducing the 
Shaikhdoms to adopt a common policy in administrative matters, 
such as regulation for motor traffic, the issue of nationality
g
and passport laws and so on.
2. State of Bahrain
Since 1782 the Al-Khalifah branch of the Utub families 
has ruled Bahrain. Early in the eighteenth century they 
settled in Kuwait with their cousins Al-Sabah (rulers of 
Kuwait). In 1766 they moved to Qatar where they established 
themselves at Zubarah on the north-western coast. On 28th 
July 1782 Al-Khalifah with the help of their cousins Al-Sabah
Calcutta (1933), pp.245-8.
Q
See India, Foreign and Political Department. Part I - 
Treaties and Engagements in force between the British 
Government and the Trucial Chiefs of the Arab Coast 182 0-1912 
at p.19.
9 .For the history of trucial Shaikhdoms and their treaty
relations see Hay, Sir Rupert, The Persian Gulf States.
Washington (1959). The Middle-East Institute, pp.113-129;
Wilson, ibid.. pp.192-200, Arabian Gulf Intelligence
Selections from Record. Oleander Press (1985); Heard-Bey, F. ,
From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates. A Society in
Transition. Longman, London and New York (1982) .
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launched an attack on the Bahrain islands and occupied it in 
November 1782. However from time to time, as in the years 
1870-1905, Bahrain was involved in many attempts by, among 
others, the Sultan of Muscat, the Ottoman Turks, and the 
Wahhabis to exercise their sovereignty over her.
In 1861 Britain and Bahrain concluded a perpetual treaty 
of peace and friendship concerning such matters as slavery, 
piracy, maritime aggression and British trading.10
Nevertheless Bahrain did not come under British protection
11 . . . .  until 1820. In 1880 and 1892 Shaikh Isa-Bm-Ali signed two
further agreements which associated the British government
12more closely with the affairs of Bahrain. However, these
agreements were terminated on 14th August 1971 by Exchange of
13Notes between the Bahrain and British Governments.
3. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Owing to its Islamic background, size, material 
prosperity and vast resources, as also the stability of its 
government., Saudi Arabia enjoys a unique status among the
10 Great Britain, British Foreign and State Papers. 
Vol.56 (1864-5), pp.402-3. On the general history of Bahrain 
and her treaties see Aitchison, C.U., o p.cit.. p.196.
11 On the history of Bahrain see Arabian Gulf 
Intelligence, op.cit.. p.362? Lorimer, J.G., Gazetteer 
Persian Gulf. Vol.l, Historical Part IB, op.cit. at p.205; 
Belgrave, H.D. (ed.), Welcome to Bahrain. (1965), p.61.
12For the text of these agreements, see India, Foreign 
and Political Department, Treaties between the British 
Government and the Rulers of Bahrain (1820-1914), Part 4, 
pp.1-17.
13 Exchanges of Notes concerning termination of special 
treaty relations, U.K.T.S.. No.78 (1971) Cmnd. 4827.
36
Gulf states. Wahhabism, as the name of a modern Islamic 
reform movement in Arabia, hold that their movement is a 
return to the original principles of Islam and a repudiation 
of all innovations contrary to the practices of the Prophet 
Muhammed. In 1744 the reformer Muhammed-Ibn-Abdal-Wahab, the 
founder of Wahhabism, and the ruler Muhammed-Ibn-Saud entered 
into a compact by which the ruler promised the reformer to 
sponsor his movement in order to dominate the whole Arabian 
peninsula.
As a result of this alliance the movement extended 
through the subsequent reigns of the Saud House to many parts 
of Saudi Arabia. However in 1818 Muhammed Ali, the Governor 
of Egypt, accepting the charge put to him by the Ottoman 
Sultan who feared the spread of the movement, brought an end 
to the first Wahhabite State. Yet under the pressure of 
circumstances the Egyptians withdrew their forces. In 1838 
Mohammed Ali, not satisfied with the nominal suzerainty to 
which the progress of events had reduced his power, succeeded 
in re-establishing his control in many parts of Saudi Arabia. 
However, due to difficulties the Egyptians experienced in 
occupying a distant territory, they soon evacuated their 
troops in 1840. This was not the end of the series of 
troubles inflicted upon the Saud House. Since the first half 
of the eighteenth century the Saud House had repelled 
challenges for supremacy by other dynasties (i.e. Al-Rashid 
in Najd and Riyadh, Sharif-Hussein in Mecca and Hijaz). 
Eventually in 1902 Abal-Aziz-Ibn-Saudi, who is the founder of
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the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, emerged. It took him
thirty years to unify the greater part of the peninsula and
14announce the establishment of the Kingdom in 1932.
4. Sultanate of Oman
The ruling family and a large proportion of the Arab
tribesmen of Oman proper belong to the Ibadi Sect of Muslims
(originally the Kharijites). They prefer to entrust the
administration of their country to an elected Imam, though
15they have in fact submitted to dynastic rule. The founder 
of the present Al-Bu-Said dynasty, Saiyid-Ahmed, was elected 
Imam after driving the Persians out of Oman in 1744.
The most eminent ruler of the dynasty was Sayyid-Said- 
Ibn-Sulan. During his reign (1807-56) he devoted much of his 
power to consolidating his hold over Africa's east coast 
(Zanzibar). This led to a boom in Zanzibar which attracted 
Arab, Indian, European and American traders.
As a result commercial treaties were concluded between 
Oman and the United States (1833),16 Great Britain (1831),17
14 For the history of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, see 
Philby, H.St. J.B., Saudi Arabia. London (1955), p.337; 
Lorimer, o p .cit.. Vol.l, pp.1109-1164)? Hogarth, D.G., 
Arabia. Oxford (1922) at p.103.
15 .The Ibadhiya Sect were originally called Khawari}
(i.e. Outsiders) who fought against Ali the fourth Khalif. 
They believed that a man might become Imam of the Moslems, 
though he did not belong to the tribe of Kuraish. Against the 
Khawarij are the Shiahs, those who followed the Khalif Ali. 
See Wilson, o p .cit.. pp.80-1.
1 6 See the text of the Treaty in Arabian Gulf 
Intelligence. op.cit.. pp.262-64.
17 Ibid.. pp.250-56.
38
in addition to a series of political treaties with France 
(1844).18
Oman had for centuries been an independent state and the
Sultan conducted his own foreign relations. Great Britain
had, however, no exclusive provision in Oman such as she
enjoyed in the Gulf Shaikhdoms and relations between the two
19countries were governed by commercial treaties.
On 6th October 1971 Oman became a member of the League
of Arab States and on 7th October 1971 she was admitted to
20membership of the United Nations.
5. State of Qatar
The modern history of Qatar starts with the settlement 
of the Utub of Zubarah in 1766. It has been stated earlier 
that in that year Al-Khalifah (the rulers of Bahrain) remained 
at Zubarah until they occupied Bahrain in 1782.
Though Al-Khalifah showed their intention in the 
nineteenth century to keep Qatar under their control, it 
slowly came out of their power and other tribes started to 
take over.
18 Ibid.. p.266-271.
19 For the general history of Muscat and Oman, see 
Arabian Gulf Intelligence, op.cit.. p.170; Hay, op.cit.., 
p.130; Lorimer 1, o p .cit.. pp.420-35; Wilson, o p .cit.. at 
p.77.
20 See Keesing, o p .cit. (1971-72) pp.24670 B - 2490C A. 
See also U.N. Report of the Secretarv-Genera on the Work of 
the Organisation. 16 June 1971-15 June 1972, pp.68-9, 91.
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As a result of the Turkish influence in eastern Arabia
in 1820 Qatar was joined to the Turkish province there and
21Shaikh Muhammed-Ibn-Thani became the ruler of the peninsula. 
However after the withdrawal of Turks an agreement with the
Shaikh of Qatar was concluded by the British government on
22November 3rd, 1916. In it Shaikh Abdallah-Ibn-Jasim-Al- 
Thani undertook to abide by the spirit and obligations of the 
agreements with the other trucial Shaikhs. This agreement 
was followed by the 1934 agreement which extended British 
protection until September 1971 when Qatar obtained its 
independence.23
6. State of Kuwait
The first settlers of Kuwait belonged to the Utub tribe 
who are said to be derived from Anizah of northern central 
Arabia.
The modern history of Kuwait dates back to 1716, when it 
was founded by ancestors of the present ruling family (A1
21 . .On the general history of Qatar, see Lonmer, o p .cit.
at p.787? see also Arabian Gulf Intelligence, o p .cit.
22 . . . .For the text of this agreement see Aitchison, o p .cit. .
pp.258-60.
2 3 On 3rd September 1971 the agreement of 3 November 1916 
between Qatar and the British Government and the supplementary 
agreement of 1934 which placed Qatar under British protection 
in the past, was terminated by means of an Exchange of Notes 
between the Amir of Qatar and the British political Resident 
in the Gulf representing the British Government. On the same 
date, the state of Qatar and the United Kingdom signed a 10 
Years Treaty of Friendship. See U.K.T.S. No.4 (1972)
Cmnd.4850.
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Sabah). The first acknowledged shaikh of the community Al-
Sabah, assured rulership in 1750, and his successors
progressively strengthened Kuwait nationhood. Yet it was at
the time of Shaikh Mubarak Al-Sabah (1896-1905) that Kuwait
24signed the Exclusive Agreement of 1899 with Great Britain.
This agreement did not affect the Turkish suzerainty, and its
claims to the north west coast of the Gulf were contested.
However, such authority was over when the Turkish troops
25entered the First World War on the side of Germany in 1914.
Great Britain thus became responsible for conducting the
foreign relations of Kuwait and subsequently for its
protection against foreign aggression until Kuwait became
2 6independent on 19th June 1961.
2. The Legal and Political Background Position of 
Protectorates
Apart from Saudi Arabia and Oman, who were sovereign 
states, the rest of the G.C.C. members were under the
See Foreign and Political Department. Part 5, 
"Treaties and undertakings in force between the British 
Government and Rulers of Kuwait 1884-1913", pp.1-14.
25 . . . .For the history of Kuwait, see Lonmer, op. cit.
no.1002; Wilson, op.cit.. pp.247-53; Hay, o p.cit.. p. 98; 
Dickson, H.R.P., Kuwait and her Neighbours (1956), pp.26-8 and 
Chapter VI.
2 6 On 19 June 1961 the United Kingdom concluded with the 
Ruler of Kuwait, the late Shaikh Abd Allah A1 Salim A1 Sabah, 
a new treaty by virtue of which the former recognised Kuwait 
as a sovereign independent state. For the text see U.K.T.S. 
N o .1 (1961) Cmnd. 1409.
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protection of the British Crown.27
During the nineteenth century, as has been mentioned 
earlier, Britain concluded agreements with the various rulers 
of the Arabian Gulf by which the latter agreed not to cede, 
sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of 
their territories, except to the British Government. In 
return Britain obtained great control over the foreign 
relations of the Gulf States and undertook to defend them in 
case of any aggression.
Yet the position of the Gulf States under these 
agreements has been a matter of controversy. Although the 
British Government repeatedly qualified them as independent 
states under its protection28 some writers deny that they had 
any degree of separate personality at all.29 Others regard 
them (Oman excepted) as having some international status but 
not as independent states.30
Herbert J. Liebesny has considered them as having a 
similar status as Tunis and Morocco, whose protectorate
27 Saudi Arabia's sovereignty was fully practised and 
recognised since its independence. See supra. pp.36-37.
28 •Sir B. Eyres, House of Commons debate on April 18, 
1934, Hansard, Vol.88, cols.973-74. Article 6 of the Jidda 
Agreements, Foreign Office (Great Britain) Treaty Series, 4 
U.K.T.S. (1927) 35.
29 Amin, S.H., Political and Strategic Issues in the 
Persian Arabian Gulf. Royston Ltd. (1984), p.15.
30 A1 Bahama, H.M. , The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf 
States, Manchester University Press (1968), pp.79-80.
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treaties with France were internationally binding.31 Crawford
determines that since it is uncertain that they retained a
sufficient degree of independence under the protection
treaties a resort to ancillary criteria such as recognition
is necessary. He adds that:
"The principality of Morocco is recognised as an 
independent state in special treaty relations with 
France. It is a member of international
organisations and party to a substantial number of 
bilateral treaties."32
It may be argued that if this criterion was sufficient 
the legal status of the Gulf states as independent states 
would be obtained.33 Nevertheless the protection treaties 
have been considered as unequal treaties establishing gross 
inequality between the obligations of the parties.34 This 
argument, however, can be met by the fact that the protected
31 Liebesny, H. , "International Relations of Arabia", 
Middle East Journal (1947), at p.167.
32 Crawford, J., Creation of States in International Law. 
Clarendon, Oxford, (1979), at p.193.
33 It is to be noted that being protectorates has not 
prevented Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait from acceding to some 
international organisations long before they attained their 
independence (i.e. Bahrain to UNESCO and WHO, Qatar to OPEC, 
WHO, UNESCO, and Kuwait to International Telecommunications 
Union, WHO, International Civil Aviation, OPEC etc.) as well 
as all of them have participated in international conferences 
and concluded many agreements. See in detail Al-Baharna, 
op.cit.. pp.76, 102, 112.
34 The African-Asian Lawyers Conference, 1957. The Asian- 
African legal consultative committee which adopted a wide 
definition of duress in order to invalidate these treaties. 
Essam Sadik, Unequal Treaties in International Law (1978) 
Ph.D. thesis submitted to Cairo University (Arabic), pp.236- 
243. Sadik does not regard these treaties as international 
ones. The reason he gives is that the Shaikhs had no legal 
capacity at that time to conclude these treaties.
43
states in the Gulf specially requested the protection 
arrangements and these arrangements were not imposed on them 
in any way.
In the Nationality Decrees issued in Tunis and Morocco
Case (1923) the Permanent Court of International Justice
stated that the extent of power conferred on the protecting
power depends on two things; firstly upon the treaty or
"treaties between the protecting state and the protected state
establishing the protectorate and secondly upon the conditions
under which the protectorate has been recognised by third
powers as against whom there is an intention to rely on the
provisions of these treaties.1,35 Further, the court held that
"in spite of common features possessed by 
protectorates under international law, they have 
individual legal characteristics resulting from the 
special conditions under which they were created, 
and the stage of their development."36
In the Right of the United States Nationals in Morocco 
Case (1952) the International Court of Justice accepted the 
principle that "Morocco even under the protectorate, has 
retained its personality as a state in international law".37
At any rate one may conclude that while the four Gulf 
States (Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the Trucial States) have 
surrendered their external sovereignty, they reserved their 
internal sovereignty.
35 P.C.I.J. Series B No.4 (1923) at p.27.
36 Ibid.
37 I.C.J. Reports (1952), pp.185-8.
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Although it has not been agreed that for an entity to be
considered as a subject of international law it must be fully 
38sovereign, it is hard to conclude that Qatar, Kuwait, 
Bahrain and the Trucial States retained their personality as 
full states in international law since they were obliged 
according to the protection treaties to consult and take the 
consent of Great Britain as protector in most of their 
external affairs (ex. the establishment of diplomatic or 
consular relations with foreign powers, cession or disposal 
of their territory, the conclusion of treaties).
3. The Legal System During British Rule and After 
Independence
The highest British official in the Gulf was the 
political Resident, subordinated to him were the political 
Agents in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the Trucial States. The 
constitutional power of the political Resident derived from 
a succession of British orders in council issued on the basis 
of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890 as amended, and from 
the agreements concluded with the rulers.
The orders in council enacted separately for each of the 
States explained exclusively the exercise of the British
3 8 See Westlake, J., International Law. 2 vol., 2nd ed., 
Cambridge (1910-1913) at p.21; Willoughby, W.W., Fundamental 
Concepts of Public Law. New York (1924), p.21; Baty, T . , The 
Canons of International Law. London (1930), pp.6-7.
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39extraterritorial jurisdiction.
At the time of the Trucial States there was a court of 
law in Dubai administered by a qualified Qadi (Judge). Legal 
cases were as a rule referred to the ruler or a member of his 
family. Cases were decided primarily according to customs and 
tradition, otherwise in personal status matters they were 
subject to Islamic law.40 However with the establishment of 
the federal state (U.A.E.) there are two branches of Emirates 
laws and federal laws. The 1972 constitution provides three 
federal bodies, a supreme council of the rulers in which Abu 
Dhabi and Dubai have the right of veto, a federal government 
and a federal national assembly with advising powers and 
supreme federal court. Subsequently two main sources of law 
are applied. The Sharia law and the non-Islamic laws applied 
in the civil courts.
In Bahrain prior to the cession of British jurisdiction 
the only courts apart from the agency court which existed in 
Bahrain were Sharia's court and the customary law court. The 
latter dealt with disputes concerning the pearl diving 
industry.
3 9 See Hay, op.cit. . pp. 19-22. See also Persian Gulf 
Gazette (containing orders in council, laws and regulations) 
published by Her Majesty's Political Resident in the Arabian 
Gulf by his Authority, supplement, Nos.1-32 (1952-61). See
also, Ballantyne, W . , Commercial Law in the Arab Middle East: 
The Gulf States. Lloyds of London Press Ltd., London (1986), 
pp.13-24.
40 Hay, o p .cit.. pp.114-16.
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The Sharia court's jurisdiction included matters of 
marriage, divorce and inheritance.41
Nowadays the judicature in Bahrain is clearly separated 
into civil judicature and Islamic judicature and the Bahraini 
constitution makes mention of Sharia law as one of the 
principle sources of law in the state. The Sharia judicature 
is divided into Sunni and Jafari (Sect of Shiat) . It is worth 
noting that Bahrain among few Gulf states issued the penal 
code which is normally governed by Islamic laws and the 
criminal jurisdiction in these states is restricted to Islamic 
courts.
In 1973 a National Assembly was set up, composed of 22 
elected members plus 8 members nominated by the ruler. 
However, some ideologically opposed polarities united against 
government policy in an attempt to impose their own religious 
and political commitments. The ruler instead dissolved the 
Parliament altogether in 1975 and has continued to rule by 
decree. Amiri Order postponed the election of a new National 
Assembly until the promulgation of new election laws and 
suspended the effectiveness of Article 65 of the constitution 
and any other provisions relating to elections. The Amir and 
Council of Ministers took over all legislative powers.42
41 . . . .Liebesny, "Administration and Legal Development in
Arabia", Middle East Journal (1956) No.X, p.41.
42 Ballantyne, op.cit. . p.44. See also, A m m ,  S.H., 
Middle East Legal System. Royston Ltd. (1985), pp.18-37.
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The legal system in Saudi Arabia is entirely different. 
The main source of law in Saudi Arabia is the Hanbali school 
of Islamic jurisprudence.43 The government adopted no formal 
constitution other than the Quran and the other sources of 
classical Islamic law.
It is to be noted that Saudi Arabia is the only state 
among the G.C.C. members which applies strictly the Islamic 
penal law.
As for Oman the legal system is based on the Islamic law. 
The traditional doctrine which is administered is Ibadi.44 
Since 1970, Oman has adopted certain codes of law (i.e. the 
Income Tax Decree 1971, the Foreign Business and Investment 
Law 1977, the Commercial Companies Law 1974 and Commercial 
Agencies Law 1977. Legislation in Oman appears in the form 
of Royal decrees. In 1981 Sultan Qabus Ibn Said A1 Bu Said 
set up a 45-member advisory council to help the cabinet by 
putting forward recommendations for further policy 
developments.
Before the independence of Qatar in 1971 the Sharia
courts had jurisdiction in personnel status matters. In other
matters a court composed of two Shaikhs from the ruling family
with the British Advisor participating in an advisory capacity
45had jurisdiction. However, the laws have been changed
43 . . . .Ballantyne, ibid., p.49; Amin, ibid.. pp.312-319.
Also Liebesny, o p .cit.. at p.41.
44 Hay, o p .cit.. at p.101.
45 Amm, op.cit. . at pp.299-300.
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greatly after the cession of British jurisdiction.
The provisional constitution (1971) provides that Sharia 
shall be the principal source of law in the state. Along with 
the Sharia rules which are applied by religious Qadis there 
are the Qatari and Commercial Codes which are applied in the 
civil courts.46 Furthermore, in accordance with the 
provisions of the amended provisional constitution an advisory 
council was set up. The functions of the council inter alia 
are to discuss draft laws proposed by the cabinet before their 
submission to the Amir for ratification. It also makes 
recommendations to the government. Yet these recommendations 
are left entirely to the discretion of the government to be 
taken.
Finally Kuwait has experienced two different legal 
systems. During the years preceding her independence in 1961 
the Ruler's courts administered justice and Sharia laws were 
applied in both civil and criminal cases. Since its 
independence the legal system in all fields changed rapidly. 
The Kuwait government commissioned the well-known Egyptian 
jurist Al-Sanhouri to draft the constitution and major codes 
for use in the state. Sanhouri wrote the constitution and a 
commercial code (which has recently been replaced) in 1981. 
He also wrote a Courts' Law and a Conflict of Laws Code, which 
is the only one in the area apart from some fragmentary
4 6 Ballantyne, op.cit.. p.55.
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provisions in Bahrain and Qatar, and in Oman banking law.47
It is not surprising of course to note these codes were taken
mainly from the Egyptian counterpart and therefore based
originally upon the French system. In 1963 a national
assembly of 50 members was elected. The assembly has the
power, inter alia, of voting of no confidence against the
ministers, approve the budget and pass the laws. The
parliamentary life in Kuwait proved to be a unique experience
in the G.C.C. member states.
However in 1976 the Amir of Kuwait, due to internal
political turbulence, dissolved the National Assembly,
providing that the authorities delegated to the Assembly by
48the constitution become vested in the Council of Ministers. 
The cessation of the assembly remained in force until 1981 
when a new assembly was elected.
4. The Failure of Federation
Qatar, Bahrain and the seven Trucial shaikhdoms are
commonly known as the British protected states (they are in
49special treaty relations with the United Kingdom).
Following Britain's announcement to withdraw from the 
Gulf area by the end of 1971, the rulers of the nine Gulf
47 .Ballantyne, ibid., p.20.
48 .Ballantyne, ibid.. p.45.
4 9 Al-Baharna, H . , The Arabian Gulf States - Their Legal 
and Political Status and their International Problems, 
reprinted (1978) Singapore, pp.1-22.
50
Emirates (Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Dubai, Qatar, Sharjah, Ajman, 
Umm-Al-Qaiwain, Ras-Al-Khaimah and Fujairah) prepared to 
consider how political stability could be maintained and 
sustained thereafter. Anticipating a political vacuum after 
the British military presence in the Gulf, the rulers 
immediately responded and began to meet to discuss possible 
approaches to overcome potential threats.
Under its treaty obligations, Britain had conducted 
foreign and defence affairs on behalf of the Gulf states for 
many years. As a result of Britain's absence individually or 
collectively the Gulf states would have to take over these 
responsibilities themselves. Some of these countries, the 
smaller ones specifically, realised that their chances of 
becoming a viable political unit were very slim, especially 
as the bigger states tended to play a more key role in the 
area in the absence of Britain. The effect of Britain's 
withdrawal was not restricted to the nine Gulf city states 
however, for other Arab and non-Arab countries also saw that 
they also had involvement in the area obviously, taking into 
consideration the possible crises which might have occurred.
Therefore, the rulers had to unite and seek to achieve 
a concrete objective for the prosperity and security of the 
area. In this respect Abu Dhabi and Dubai were the first to 
spark off the movement towards federation. The rulers of the 
two Emirates met on 18th February 1968 on the border between 
their two states and formally agreed to form the two 
Shaikhdoms in a union, conducting jointly foreign affairs,
51
defence, security, social services and adopting a common 
immigration policy.
Article 4 of the Abu Dhabi-Dubai bilateral agreement 
urged the other Gulf Emirates to discuss the proposal for the 
establishment of the union. Rulers of the nine Emirates 
responded to the invitation of Abu Dhabi and Dubai and met in 
Dubai on February 25th, 1968, to consider the future of their 
countries. After three days deliberation they reached the 
federation agreement which was to come into effect at the end 
of March 1968.50
The Federation agreement invested ultimate political 
power in a supreme council composed of the rulers of the nine 
Emirates and this body was made responsible for formulating 
the overall policies of the federation on political, economic 
and social affairs. Chairmanship of the council was rotated 
annually among its members.
The chairman represented the federation body internally 
and externally. The legislative power was reserved to the 
supreme council, consisting of the nine rulers. The executive 
body of the federation was to be the "federal council" and 
three councils concerned with defence, economy and culture 
were to report to it. However, the role of the federal 
council was considerably reduced, and it was to operate under
50 The Documents of the Union of Arab Emirates. Part 1, 
Palace of Amir Doha, Qatar. Unpublished (Arabic). See also 
Heard-Bey, F., From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates - 
A Society in Transition. Longman, London and New York (1982), 
pp.343-47.
the close supervision of the supreme council. The composition 
of the federal council was left to the discretion of the 
law.51
Chapter 3 of the agreement, entitled "General Rules", 
addressed itself first to the need to cooperate in defending 
individual Emirates and the state as a whole against external 
aggression? secondly to the supreme federal court, whose 
functions were specified only in the draft? thirdly to the 
need for the supreme council to decide on its permanent 
headquarters? fourthly to the reservation to each Emirate of 
the right to manage its own internal non-federal affairs? and 
finally to a provision that the supreme council could amend 
the agreement, particularly if the amendment tended to make 
this among the member Emirates stronger.
It was decided that the agreement should come into force
on 30 April 1968, and remain in force until superseded by a
52permanent charter.
The first legal problem which the countries faced was how 
to implement the federation agreement. Qatar particularly 
strongly advocated the immediate establishing of the various 
organs necessary for the new state to function. On the other 
hand, the majority of the Emirates preferred to leave many
51 In the original draft which was prepared by Dr. Hasan 
Kamil Adviser to the Government of Qatar and submitted to 
Ruler and the Deputy Ruler of Qatar a maximum of four 
representations from each Emirate was proposed. See Heard- 
Bey, ibid.. at p.344.
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subjects until the adoption of a constitution for federation 
was considered by all the participating countries. It was 
impossible to promote progress. In an attempt to solve this 
problem and other related issues, the Government of Qatar 
suggested that the whole matter should be given to legal 
experts for advice. In this regard Qatar raised the question 
"Should the countries implement the Dubai Agreement of 1968 
or should they freeze it until the constitution of the
federation was adopted". Qatar also wanted to know if it was 
possible for the new union to obtain membership of the United 
Nations. The latter question was raised due to some
speculation that it might not be acceptable for the Union to 
be admitted to the United Nations.
The legal experts fully supported Qatar's view that the
Dubai Agreement of 1968 did not need ratification and the
agreement should come into force on 3 0th March 1968 without 
any need of further constitutional procedures. Thus failing
to implement the Dubai agreement would result in a breach of
53 .the agreement. In respect of the latter question raised by
Qatar, Professor Rousseau asserted that so long as the
"federal union enjoys sovereignty and can be considered as a
separate entity there is no reason why it cannot obtain the
53 Professor Charles Rousseau from P a n s  University and 
Dr. Wahid Rafat, the Egyptian legal adviser to the then Ruler 
of Kuwait; ibid. at p.472.
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54necessary UN membership".
(a) Manor Obstacles to the Federation
Despite all efforts made to overcome the differences 
between the nine Emirates, they could not achieve a consensus 
on three basic matters.
First, the question of where to locate the federal 
capital, and whether a permanent seat of the union should be 
designated for once and all as proposed by Qatar or whether 
this location should be left until a permanent constitution 
was drafted as suggested by Bahrain. It was suggested that 
after a short period of transition the city of Abu Dhabi 
should be chosen as the provisional federal capital.
Secondly, the voting system in the supreme council was 
debated. The proposals were whether unanimity should be the 
rule, as demanded by Qatar despite the difficulties of 
achieving a unanimous vote at all times, or whether a specific 
majority would be satisfactory. The various proposals 
included a two-thirds majority, including the vote of the four 
large Emirates (Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Dubai), providing 
that the council could not achieve unanimity, or a plain two- 
thirds majority without giving effect to any Emirate's vote, 
or a seven out of nine majority as was proposed by some legal
54 Quoted from Professor Charles Rousseau memo dated 22nd 
June 1968, Paris at p.7. Professor Rousseau considered that 
the Dubai Agreement 1968 formed a confederation among the nine 
Arab Emirates. The Documents of the Union. The Palace of the 
Amir of Qatar, o p.cit.
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experts.
Thirdly, according to the draft of the permanent 
constitution, there should be a federal assembly represented 
by the nine Emirates. Bahrain insisted that members of the 
proposed parliament (Federal Assembly) should be selected on 
the basis of proportional representation. This was opposed 
by all other Emirates because this system would have given
Bahrain with its large and well-educated population an
55overwhelming advantage. In addition to the above three
issues there were other minor differences in matters like the 
division of powers between the federal state and the member 
Emirates; the budget and whether it should be a percentage 
not exceeding 10 percent of the revenues of the oil-rich 
Emirates, or whether such contributions should be in 
accordance with the total income of every Emirate.
(b) Kuwait and Saudi Arabia Mediation
A joint Kuwait-Saudi delegation headed by Shaikh Sabah 
al Ahmed al Gaber A1 Sabah, Foreign Minister of Kuwait, and 
Prince Nawaf Ibn Abdelaziz, the then Special Advisor to King 
Faisal of Saudi Arabia, visited the nine Emirates, carrying 
with them some suggestions for a way to achieve a compromise. 
Following the recognition by both the Saudi and Kuwait
55 •For the different views over the provisions of the
provisional constitution, see Dr. Wahid Rafaat, "The United
Arab Emirates - A Study of the Development of the Provisional
Constitution of 1971", Egyptian Review of International Law,
Vol.26 (1970), pp.1-3; see also Al-Baharna, op.cit.. pp.XXI-
XXXIX.
t
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Government that there was little hope of convincing the nine 
Gulf Emirates to ratify the draft provisional constitution 
either as it stood or with any possible amendments, they 
finally agreed not to oppose the proclamation of the 
sovereignty of any member Emirate.
By June 1971 it became clear that both Qatar and Bahrain 
were proceeding with plans for independence. The other 
Emirates followed, namely, the United Arab Emirates state (the
C  rr
new federation in the Gulf).
56 Keesinq's Contemporary Archives (1971-72), pp.24731 
A, 25010 A.
CHAPTER TWO
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE G.C.C.
(1) The Kuwaiti Initiative:
It should be noted that Kuwait has played an important 
role in promoting the idea of cooperation since early in May 
1976 when the Amir of Kuwait, Shaikh Jaber Al Ahmed Al Sabah, 
who was then Prime Minister and Crown Prince, called for the 
establishment of Gulf unity.
The object was to realise cooperation in all economic, 
political, educational and informational fields and the
creation of "a form of unity with solid foundations to serve
, 2
the interests and stability of the people in the region".
In December 1978 Shaikh Saad Al Abdulla Al Sabah, Crown 
Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait made a Gulf tour, during 
which joint communiques were issued in the capitals of the 
five Gulf States (Riyadh, Manama, Doha, Abu Dhabi and Muscat). 
These communiques contained assurances of support for the 
realisation of Gulf unity. Furthermore intensive efforts 
were made by Kuwait during the Arab summit conference in Amman
1 For the reasons underlying the establishment of the 
G.C.C., see supra. pp.23-24.
2 The Gulf Cooperation Council, Kuwait News Agency (KUNA) 
Digest. Documentation Department, Kuwait, 9th edition, May 
1981, p.14.
3 Ibid.. p.16.
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in November 1980 when Kuwait's Foreign Office circulated a 
memorandum containing Kuwaiti views on joint cooperation among 
Gulf States in all fields. This memo was distributed to all 
Arab Gulf States.4
In January 1981 at the Islamic summit conference held in 
Mecca and Taif the leaders of the Gulf States discussed the 
Kuwaiti proposal and two other proposals submitted by Saudi
5
Arabia and Oman.
Following on from the Kuwaiti initiative the Saudi 
proposal identified possible external and internal threats 
(associated with the policies of Israel and Iran towards the 
Gulf States). The Saudi proposal emphasised that in terms of 
security the Gulf States are interdependent and a threat to 
one of them could jeopardise the security of every other 
state. It also promised Saudi assistance in the event of any
g
need to counter an external threat or internal subversion.
The Omani proposal was more particular. It called upon
the Gulf States to set up a joint naval force to protect the
Strait of Hormuz because of its strategic importance as an
7international waterway.
4 Ibid.. p.13.
^ Idem.
g
For the text of the Saudi plan, see Middle East, 
January (1981), pp.16-17.
7Al-Ashal, A., The Legal and Political Framework of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council. Riyadh (1983) (Arabic), p.24.
59
Nevertheless the Kuwaiti plan was welcomed and a warm 
response was given to it since it proved to be more inclusive. 
In final form it ranged over economic, political, social,
p
cultural and petroleum policies.
(2) Meetings and Discussions of Ministers and Experts
On February 4th, 1981 the Foreign Ministers of the six 
Arab Gulf States met in Riyadh to draw up an organisational 
structure for the consolidation and development of cooperation 
between them. The Ministers represented each of United Arab 
Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait. As 
a result of consultations and discussion held between these 
Foreign Ministers a declaration was released and the text was 
as follows:
"In recognition of the special ties which bind each 
of the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia,
Oman, Qatar and Kuwait to one another, arising from 
their common ideology and heritage and the 
similarity between their social, political and 
demographic structure and out of desire to promote 
their people's prosperity, growth and stability 
through closer cooperation, the Foreign Ministers 
of these states met in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on 
February 4th 1981, corresponding to Rabi Al Awal 
29, 402 A.H.
"The talks at this meeting were aimed at drawing up 
a practical framework for the consolidation and 
development of cooperation between the states 
concerned. As a result it was agreed to establish 
a cooperation council between these Arab Gulf states 
which would have a general secretariat and hold 
regular meetings both on the summit and foreign
p
The writer has been able to see the summary of the first 
and second memorandum of the Amir of Kuwait which has been 
sent to the Amir of Qatar. Both of them covered different 
ranges of cooperation. The first memo is undated, while the 
second is dated 21.12.80.
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minister level in order to achieve the goals of the 
states and their people in all fields.
The steps conform with the national aims of the Arab 
nation as expressed in the Charter of the Arab 
League, which encourages regional cooperation as a 
means of strengthening the nation. In this way the 
formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council can be 
seen as confirming the support of these states for 
the Arab League, its charter and objectives, and 
for Arab and Islamic causes as a whole.
Gulf States Foreign Ministers decided to hold a further 
meeting in Muscat on March 8th, 1981 which was to be preceded 
by two experts meetings composed of diplomatic and civil 
servants on February 24th and March 4th, 1981, in Riyadh and 
Muscat respectively. The purpose of the meeting was to draw 
up an integrated structure for the establishment of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council of Arab States.
Another statement, however, issued by the six states on 
February 14th 1981, outlined the objectives of the Council and
clarified the Council's legal status as an international
10organisation which was to have its headquarters in Riyadh.
As had been decided earlier at the fourth Ministers 
meeting, the first meeting for the experts took place in 
Riyadh from 24 to 26 February 1981. The participants, who 
were diplomats and civil servants, were entrusted with drawing 
up four basic statutes submitted by the Kuwaiti delegation. 
These statutes were concerned with (i) The Fundamental Statute
g
Documents of the Gulf Cooperation Council for Arab 
States (Arabic), Qatar News Agency. October 1983, Part 1, at 
p. 13.
1QIbid.. p.14.
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of the G.C.C., (ii) Rules of Procedure of the Supreme Council, 
(iii) Rules of Procedure of the ministerial council, (iv) 
Rules of procedure of the secretariat.
Between 6th and 10th March 1981 the second meeting of the 
experts committee took place in Muscat. The purpose of this 
meeting was to conclude the deliberations on the final 
revision of the four statutes, which had been discussed at the 
previous meeting of the experts. While the meeting was in 
progress the Foreign Ministers of the six states met on 8th 
March 1981 in Muscat to initial the four statutes.
The main issues the experts in their second meeting in 
Muscat dealt with in relation to the establishment of the 
G.C.C. were, inter alia, the status of the basic instrument 
of the organisation, and in particular whether it should be 
determined a 'treaty'. This was suggested by Qatar and 
supported by Kuwait because the 'term' is more common in the 
practice of international organisations. There was a proposal 
from the Omani delegation that it be termed a 'charter1. 
There was a further proposal from the delegation of Saudi 
Arabia that it should be called 'the fundamental statute'. 
The reasons put forward by this delegation were connected with 
an argument that there would be speculation that the G.C.C. 
had come to substitute the Arab League if the terms 'treaty' 
or 'charter' were used to describe the constituent
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11instrument. Other issues on the agenda were discussed, such 
as the preamble of the Fundamental Statute, the organs of the 
G.C.C., the frequency and order of the meeting of the supreme 
council, voting in the supreme council, the commission for the 
settlement of disputes, the meetings of the ministerial 
council and the nomination of the Secretary General.
However, having still some difficulties to overcome the 
experts committee submitted their recommendations and 
proposals to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs whose meeting 
was due to be held on March 8th, 1981. This meeting of 
Ministers took two days to deliberate by which time they 
unanimously agreed the draft of what came to be called the 
Fundamental Statute of the G.C.C. and internal regulations 
(the rules of procedure of the supreme council, the rules of
procedure of the ministerial council and the rules of
12procedure of the commission for settlement of disputes).
Report of the Head of Qatari delegation to the experts 
committee, dated 14.3.81, Doha, Qatar. The Palace of the Amir 
Archives. Unpublished (Arabic). it should be noted that the 
Saudi delegation's argument does not find support in the 
charter of the Arab League where it provides in Article 9 that 
"The states of the Arab League that are desirous of 
establishing among themselves closer collaboration and 
stronger bonds than those provided for in the present charter, 
may conclude among themselves whatever agreements they wish 
for this purpose. The treaties and agreement already 
concluded or that may be concluded in the future between a 
member state and any other state shall not be binding on other 
members". However, when the three proposals were put on vote 
the Saudi one won through.
12Qatar News Agency. Part One, op. cit. . pp. 25-26. For 
the text of the four instruments see 26 ILM (1987), pp.1138- 
1160.
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By initialling them they were proposed for signature by the
respective Heads of State.
It should be noted here that the International Law
Commission observed that state practice shows that initialling
of a treaty, especially by Head of State or Prime Minister,
or Minister of Foreign Affairs, "is not infrequently intended
as the equivalent of full signature". The Commission, while
recognising this, felt that "it was important that the use of
initials as a full signature should be understood and accepted
by other states".13
Article 12.2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties provides that initialling is the equivalent of a
signature when it is established that negotiating states so 
14agreed.
Article 12, however, is among several provisions in the 
Vienna Convention which "introduced fundamental changes in
practice or ran counter to generally accepted rules of
15international law", and since Kuwait is the only member of 
the Convention, it therefore cannot establish customary law
T 6for the other G.C.C. member states.
13 . . .Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1966-11) ,
p.196.
14 . •See Brownlie, Ian, Basic Documents m  International
Law, 3rd ed. (1983), p.355.
15 See Sinclair, I., The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. 2nd ed., Manchester University Press (1984), p.249.
1 6 According to Bowman, M. & Harris, D. , Kuwait is the 
only G.C.C. Member State party to the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. See Multilateral Treaties. Index and 
Current Status. Butterworths, London (1984) . See also the
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The Ministers in their meeting agreed to nominate Mr
Abdullah Yacoub Bishara of Kuwait to be the first Secretary
17General of the Council.
(3) The First Summit of the Heads of States
On 25th and 26th May, 1981, the Heads of State members
of the Gulf Cooperation Council met in the United Arab
Emirates federal capital Abu Dhabi where they signed the
Fundamental Statute, the Rules of Procedure of the Supreme
Council, the Rules of Procedure of the Ministerial Council,
the Rules of Procedure of the Commission for the Settlement
of Dispute. All these had previously been initialled by the
18Foreign Ministers. At the summit the Heads of State issued 
a final communique outlining the council's organisational 
structure, its institutions, objectives and the role of its 
member states in promoting regional, Arab and international 
causes and their relations with regional and global 
organisations.
The summit approved the Foreign Minister's nomination of 
Mr Bishara as the Secretary General.
In order to realise the objectives of the Council as 
stipulated in Article 4 of the Fundamental Statute the heads
Fifth Cumulative Supplement of the book, University of 
Nottingham Treaty Centre (1988), p.92.
17Mr. Bishara was the former Ambassador of Kuwait in the 
U.N. from 1971-1981.
18Qatar New Agency. Part 1, op.cit.. pp.25-26.
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of state in their communique established five committees for 
socio-economic planning, financial and economic cooperation, 
industrial cooperation, oil and socio-cultural services.
At the same time, the final communique clearly stressed 
that security and stability of the Gulf is the responsibility 
of its own people and states. It said the Council represented 
the will of these states and their right to defend and 
preserve their independence. The communique affirmed the 
leader's outright rejection of any foreign intervention 
whatsoever. It further called for the entire region to be 
kept out of international conflicts in particular as regards 
the presence of foreign fleets and military bases in the area. 
The communique also stated that the heads of the six states 
abide by the Charter of the Arab League and resolutions 
adopted at all Arab summit conference organisations and its 
resolutions. In addition, they expressed their commitment to 
the principles of the non-aligned movement and the U.N.
1 QCharter.
(4) The Legal Character of the G.C.C. Constituent Instrument 
and its Entry into Force
It is to be noted that most international organisations 
are established by a convention concluded between the member
19 . . .See the final communique in Qatar New Agency (Arabic),
op.cit.. pp.91-93.
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•y n
states. However there is some controversy as to whether a 
treaty is a necessary requirement to establish an
international organisation.
Seyersted considers that the requirement of a treaty is 
not a necessary requirement either to constitute an
international organisation or to establish it as a subject of
2 1 .  • international law. Quite a number of international
organisations have been established by resolutions. This is
the way the Asian-African Legal Consultative committee, the
Council for Technical Cooperation in South and South-East Asia
(Colombo Plan), Comecon, The Inter-American Defence Board, the
International Cotton Advisory Committee, the International
Hydrographic Bureau and the International Rubber Study Group
2 2were established. Schermers regards the treaty as a better 
criterion to distinguish public from private international 
organisations and this is widely accepted by the United 
Nations.23 Brierly provides a definition of international 
organisation in his report on the law of treaties to the 
International law Commission which includes the term treaty
2 0 . . .Schermers, Henry G., International Institutional Law.
Sijthoff and Noordhoff (1980), at p.11.
21 Seyersted, F., "International Personality of 
International Organisations. Do their Capacities Really 
Depend upon their Constitution?" I .J .I .L. (1964), pp.43-48.
2 2These examples are found in Peaslee, A.J., 
International Governmental Organisation Documents, revised 
third edition, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague (1974), pp.79, 273, 
326, 805, 243, 306 and 367 respectively.
23Schermers, o p .cit.. at p.11.
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as a basic element for defining an international
organisation.24 Fitzmaurice provides the following definition
with similar emphasis of the term "treaty” :
"The term - International Organisation - means a 
collective of states established by treaty with a 
constitution and common organs, having a personality 
distinct from that of its member states, and being 
a subject of international law with treaty making 
capacity."
As concerns the G.C.C. it has been found necessary to
establish the organisation by entry into force of the treaty
of 25th May 1981. This is embodied in Article 1 of the
Fundamental Statute.
"A council shall be established hereby to be named 
the cooperation council for the Arab states of the 
Gulf, herein after referred to as cooperation 
council."
Furthermore, Article 19 of the Fundamental Statute provides:
"This statute shall come into effect as of the date 
it is signed by the heads of state of the six member 
states named in the preamble."
The words of the above provision clearly indicate that the
Fundamental Statute was intended to come into force as from
the date of the signature of the heads of state.
It is firmly established as international practice that
heads of state are considered as representing their state for
the purpose of all acts relating to the conclusion of a
24See Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 
First report on relations between states and inter­
governmental organisations by Abdullah El Erian (C/CN 4/161), 
11 June 1963 at p.166.
25Ibid. at p.167.
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2 6treaty. However, it is not always easy to determine that
there is a general rule that international law attributes the
right to represent the state in its international relations
to heads of state and that a treaty concluded by him is
internationally valid. Some jurists hold the view that the
criterion of the competence of the treaty-making organ is the
authority which is conferred upon it under domestic law
27without any reference to international law. The
constitutional limitation upon the competence of the head of
state is emphasised by Oppenheim where he states:
"Treaties concluded by the heads of state in person 
do not require ratification provided that they do 
not concern matters in regard to which 
constitutional restrictions are imposed upon the 
heads of state."
However, the development of the constitutional system of 
government under which various organs are given a say in the 
treaty-making power, has increased the importance of 
ratification. It is a problem relating to the fact that some 
states insist on parliamentary approval of the treaty although 
the treaty expressly provides that it operates as from
2 6Sinclair, I, The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, 2nd ed., Manchester University Press (1984), at 
p. 31.
27Holloway, K. , Modern Trends in Treaty Law. Stevens & 
Sons, London (1967), pp.123-128. See also, Wildhaber, L. , 
Treaty Making Power and Constitution. Helbing and Lichtenhahm 
(1971), pp.149-152.
2 8L. Oppenheim, International Law. Vol.l, 7th ed., 
Longman (1948), pp.511-12.
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29signature.
Philip Jessup in this regard affirms that despite the 
fact that there is no residuary rule for ratification and 
international law has no problem to bring a treaty into force 
on signature, it is a matter of the constitutional law of the
state to provide for any particular procedure to be
30 .performed. Similarly Fitzmaunce agrees that a treaty needs
no ratification if it is expressed to take effect as from
signature. However, if the constitutional law of the
contracting party requires the consent of the legislature,
31then it must be obtained. In a modern approach to this
subject Article 4 6 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties provides:
"1. A state may not invoke the fact that its consent 
to be bound by treaty has been expressed in 
violation of a provision of its internal law 
regarding competence to conclude treaties as in 
validating its consent unless that violation was 
manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law 
of fundamental importance.
2. A violation is manifest if it would be 
objectively evident to any state conducting itself 
in the matter in accordance with normal practice and 
in good faith."
29Starke, S.G., Introduction to International Law. 9th 
ed., Butterworths (1984).
30Jessup, P.C., A Modern Law of Nations. Archon Books 
(1968), at p.126.
31 . .Fitzmaunce, G.G., "Do Treaties Need Ratification?"
B.Y.I.L. XV (1934) at p.127.
32See Brownlie, Basic Documents, op.cit.. pp.368-69.
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This Article establishes that a state may not invoke the 
fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been 
expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law 
unless this violation is objectively manifest to the other 
contracting parties. The constitutions of the G.C.C. member 
states save for Kuwait and Bahrain confirm the exclusive 
treaty-making power of the heads of state or the executive 
power.
Article 54 of the United Arab Emirates constitution 
describes the powers and functions of the head of state. 
These include chairmanship of the supreme council, signing 
union decrees, law and decisions, appointing the Prime 
Minister and some other ceremonial functions.33 Nevertheless 
according to Article 91 of the constitution the government 
must inform the federal council about the treaties and 
international agreements which it concludes with foreign 
countries or with various international organisations with 
appropriate explanations. Yet the union national council has 
no role whatsoever in ratifying the international treaties.
Article 47 of the constitution provides that the supreme 
council of the union (consisting of the rulers of seven
33Constitution of the United Arab Emirates in the 
Constitutions of the Countries of the World, editors Albert 
P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, Oceana Publications Inc., 
Dobbs Ferry, New York (1982). The union authorities of the 
U.A.E. is composed of the following organs: (i) the Supreme
Council of the Union, comprising the seven rulers of the 
Emirates; (ii) the President and the Deputy President of the 
Union; (iii) the Council of Ministers of the Union; (iv) the 
Union National Council; and (iv) the union judiciary.
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Emirates making up the union) is responsible for the
ratification of the international treaties. Such ratification
is accomplished by decree by the head of state.
It is to be noted that the decisions of the supreme
council in procedural matters are binding by an affirmative
vote of the majority of its members. But its decisions in all
other matters become binding by an affirmative vote of five
members, including the concurring votes of both the Emirates
of Abu Dhabi and Dubai (Article 49 of the constitution) .
However, the constitution does not lay down any criterion to
distinguish the procedural from substantive matters.
Article 37 of Bahrain's constitution provides that:
"The Amir shall conclude treaties by decree and 
shall transmit them immediately to the National 
Assembly with the appropriate statement. A treaty 
shall have the force of a law after it has been 
signed, ratified and published in the official 
gazette. However treaties of peace and alliance, 
treaties concerning the territory of the state, its 
national resources or sovereign rights or public or 
private rights of citizens, treaties of commerce., 
navigation and residence and treaties which entail 
additional expenditures not provided for in the 
budget of the state, or which involve amendment to 
the laws of Bahrain shall come into effect only when 
made by a law. In no case may treaties inc i t e  
secret provisions contradicting those declared.
According to the above provision it is obvious that the
National Assembly has a considerable role in ratifying some
treaties which are mentioned above. Nevertheless at the time
of establishing the G.C.C. the National Assembly played no
Constitution of Bahrain is modelled closely on the 
Kuwait constitution of 1962. See the constitution of Bahrain 
in Constitutions of the Countries of the World, op.cit. by 
Patricia E. Darkin, issued June 1985.
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role in approving the G.C.C. Fundamental Statute. In point
of fact the National Assembly was dissolved in 1975, and the
35Amir has continued to rule by decree. The power of
concluding treaties therefore vests solely in the Amir.
As for Saudi Arabia, it has no formal constitution other
3 6than the Quran and other sources of classical Islamic law.
However the king issued a regulation called "a regulation of
Council of Ministers" which organises, inter alia, the treaty-
37making power in Saudi Arabia. Articles 18, 19 of the
regulation give the king an exclusive power to approve 
international treaties and its amendments by Royal decrees. 
The Sultanate of Oman may be described as an Arab Islamic
state which regards the Islamic Sharia as the main source of
3 8 •legislation. The system of government m  Oman is not
governed by any written constitution. However the Sultan (the
head of state) issued a decree in 1975 which regulates the
35Amin, S.H., Middle East Legal Systems. Royston Ltd. 
(1985), p.18.
3 6Saudi Arabia is one of ten countries of the world which 
does not have a modern constitution. It has often been stated 
that its constitution is the Quran. See Constitutions of the 
Countries of the World, op.cit.. issued March 1976 at p.l.
37For the text see the G.C.C. Legal Gazette No.2 (1982), 
pp.73-83.
3 8By the Royal Decree of 19 October 1981 the Sultan set 
up a 45 member state consultative council. The council 
consists of 17 members representing various sections of the 
government, 11 members representing the private sector, and 
17 members representing the regions. However, all the members 
are appointed by the Sultan and they have no power whatsoever 
in passing any international treaty. See Amin, S.H., Middle 
East Legal Systems, op.cit.. at p.284.
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39administrative organs of the state. Article 3 of the decree 
gives the Sultan first the power to conclude international 
treaties and thus does not need any further procedure to bind 
Oman on the international plane. There is another type of 
treaty which are signed by persons authorised by the Sultan. 
In the second type the treaty does not bind the Sultanate 
unless it is ratified by the Sultan himself.
Article 24 of Qatar's amended provisional constitution 
provides that the Amir as head of state concludes treaties by 
decree and informs the Advisory Council with an appropriate 
statement.40 In accordance with the constitutional provisions 
the Advisory Council is not a legislative body and does not 
have the authority to pass legislation. The Council may be 
consulted as a convenient advisory body and its opinion sought 
on matters connected with legislation. If the government 
chooses to consult the council, the members of the council 
give their opinions in the form of recommendations which are 
entirely left to the discretion of the government to be taken 
(Article 51 of the amended provisional constitution).
Articles 23 and 24 of the constitution provide clearly 
that the treaty-making power vests in the Amir and in his
3 9For the text of the regulation and its amendment see 
G.C.C. Legal Gazette No.l (1983), pp.7-37.
40See the amended provisional constitution of 17 April 
1972, which repeated the provisional constitution of 2 April 
1970, published in Qatar Official Gazette (Al-Jaridah al 
Rasmiyah) No.55, 22 April 1972.
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capacity he concludes treaties and ratifies them by decree.41
Kuwait is the only country among the G.C.C. member states 
where its national assembly played a remarkable role in 
approving the Fundamental Statute. Following extensive 
deliberation upon the matter in the assembly, the body finally 
recommended that Kuwait become a member of the G.C.C. Members 
of the Assembly discussed what reservations and anxieties they 
had.42
In 1976 an order of the Amir suspended the operation of 
the provision of Articles 56(3), 107, 174 and 181 of the
constitution relating to elections, and dissolved the National 
Assembly, providing that the authorities delegated to the 
Assembly by the constitution vested in the Council of 
Ministers. The Order also provided that laws should issue by
1In accordance with the provisions of the amended 
provisional constitution of 1972, members of the consultative 
council, the first semi-legislative body in the history of 
Qatar, were appointed by a decree issued by the ruler on 23rd 
April 1972 under Articles 41-42 of the provisional 
constitution. Membership of the consultative council is 
restricted to original Qatari nationals over the age of 24 
years; see Amin, o p.cit.. at p.300.
/ p
Assembly members expressed fear that popular freedom 
in Kuwait might be diminished as a consequence of the decision 
to establish the new regional organisation. Abdul Aziz 
Hussein, the Minister of State, assured the Assembly that the 
council was compatible with the charter of the Arab League, 
which permits member countries to work in diverse ways for 
inter-Arab cooperation and coordination. The Assembly Vice- 
President underlined that the people in most of the Gulf 
states had no voice in the establishment of the council. He 
stressed that the single exception was Kuwait where the merits 
of the council had been discussed in the National Assembly and 
the mass media. See Assembly Proceedings. No.10, 7 July 1981, 
pp.70-80 and the Proceedings. No.11, 14 July 1981, pp.153-57.
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Amiri Decree or in case of emergency, by Amiri Order. Article 
4 of the Order provided for the setting up of the committee 
to recommend the necessary amendments to the constitution in 
the light of practical experience, "provided that such 
amendments shall be in accordance with the spirit of our 
Islamic Sharia, drawing upon our original Arab Kuwaiti 
traditions".43
Shaikh Jaber A1 Ahmed A1 Sabah, who survived a car bomb 
assassination attempt in May 1985, dissolved his country's 
parliament on 3 July 1986, saying that Kuwait was the target 
of a destructive foreign conspiracy. The decree states 
reasons for dissolution that the country faces many ordeals 
and hardships, its security has been exposed to a fierce 
foreign conspiracy which threatened lives and almost destroyed 
the wealth of the homeland. The decree also imposed press 
censorship and suspended four articles of the Kuwait 1962 
constitution. These articles are 56.3 which deals with the 
competence of the Amir to appoint ministers among the members 
of the National Assembly, Article 107 which gives the Amir the 
right to propose the constitution by amending or deleting or 
adding new provisions; and Article 181 which allows the 
National Assembly to hold its meetings even when martial law 
is in force.44
43 . . .  . .Kuwait Official Gazette. Supplement 1097, A m i n  Order,
29 August 1976. The Kuwaiti National Assembly was reconvened 
in 1980: Amiri Order, 24 August 1980, Official Gazette.
No.1316, August 1980.
44 See The Guardian. 4.7.86.
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Article 70 of the Kuwait constitution, which is identical
to Article 37 of the Bahrain constitution, provides:
"The Amir shall conclude treaties by decree and 
shall transmit them immediately to the National 
Assembly with appropriate statement. A treaty shall 
have the force of law after it is signed, ratified 
and published in the official Gazette.
However, treaties of peace and alliance, treaties 
concerning the territory of the state, its natural 
resources or sovereign rights, navigation and 
additional expenditures not provided for in the 
budget, or which involve amendment of the laws of 
Kuwait, shall come into force only when made by a 
law. In no case may treaties include secret 
provisions contradicting those declared."
From the above provision it appears that there are two
kinds of treaties, each of which requires a different
procedure in order to come into force.
The Amir himself has the constitutional power to conclude
treaties. The signature of the Amir on the Royal decree is
A  fi
considered equivalent to ratification. However, the
constitution requires that the Amir must inform the National 
Assembly immediately with an appropriate statement. This is 
only to keep the National Assembly informed as regards the 
external relations of the country. Nevertheless, the 
constitution does not limit the time in which the Amir should 
inform the Assembly. It also does not specify the content of 
the statement. All these matters are left to the discretion
45 . . .Constitution of countries by Blaustein, op.cit.. pp. 5-
35.
4 6This is the interpretation of Hassan, H. , The 
Principles of the Constitutional Law in Kuwait. Dar A1 Nahdah, 
Beirut (1968) (Arabic), pp.331-33.
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of the Amir. The National Assembly therefore has no power to
discuss the treaty or approve it or decide on it. But this
restriction does not extend to inquiring into the political
consequences of the treaty and even censuring the minister
47responsible through a vote of no confidence.
The second type of treaty mentioned in Article 70 
requires the consent of the Assembly. The treaties in this 
group are those which directly affect the rights of people, 
their personal freedom or concern, the sovereignty and the 
interest of the state. This type of treaty comes into force 
only by enabling Acts. The ratification of this type of 
treaty does not take place until the parliamentary procedure 
has been fully exhausted. The executive power first has to 
sign the treaty and send it to the National Assembly for its 
consent. If it is approved the National Assembly submits the 
treaty to the Amir for ratification and then to have it 
published in the official Gazette. The National Assembly, 
while it discusses the treaty, may approve it in its entirety 
or reject it, but it has the power to postpone giving its 
consent.48
However the question to be asked is whether the G.C.C. 
Fundamental Statute belongs to the first or the second type 
of treaty, as explained above.
47Ibid.
48 . . .Al-Tabtabai, A., The Constitutional Law in Kuwait - A
Comparative Study. Dar Al-Ulum, Kuwait (1985) (Arabic),
pp.553-57.
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It is apparent that the treaty belongs to the second
type. There are two reasons which the Kuwait National
Assembly put forward. One is that Article 17 of the G.C.C.
Fundamental Statute obliges the member states to contribute
equal amounts to the budget of the Secretariat General.
Article 73 of the Kuwait constitution does not allow budgetary
increase unless it is approved by the National Assembly. The
second reason is that Article 18 of the Fundamental Statute
provides that representatives of the G.C.C. member states and
the council's employees enjoy privileges and immunities as are
specified in agreements to be concluded for this purpose
49between the member states.
However, the position in international law is that
treaties of cooperation may imply a voluntary restriction of 
50sovereignty. Schwarzenberger points out that the
acquisition of any jurisdiction by international institutions
51must rely on the acts of transfer from the member states.
He further confirms that:
"By consenting to the establishment of an 
international institution each member must be taken 
to have transferred these rights to the institution 
in question. Thus the functional jurisdiction 
exercised by international institutions is merely 
the sum total of the pooled and delegated rights of
49See the decree No.44, 1981 and the explanatory
memorandum in Kuwait Official Gazette (Kuwait Today) No.1367, 
year 27, 22 July 1981, pp.12-15.
50See the Report of the International Law Association, 
45th conference, Lucerne (1952), pp.30, 35.
51 . Schwarzenberger, G. , "The Forms of Sovereignty", m
Defence of Sovereignty, edited by W.J. Stankiewkz, Oxford
University Press (1969), pp.178-79.
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positive sovereignty which result from the transfer
of rights from the member to these organisations."
The G.C.C. Fundamental Statute calls for political,
economic, social and cultural cooperation by the member
states, and organs have been established to strengthen this
cooperation (Article 4, 6). There exists an international
organisation by which G.C.C. member states seek reciprocal
interest in all fields. The G.C.C. has power to take binding
decisions as well as to make recommendations to member states
on a broad range of subjects. Although these recommendations
are not legally binding they may have political repercussions
53if not followed. They may, for example, affect foreign 
relations between member states. Since the organisation 
functions by means of its organs the Fundamental Statute 
provides some obligations on the member states to grant 
privileges and immunities to both the staff of the 
organisations and the representatives of the member states 
(Article 17). These provisions may have implications for the 
concept of sovereignty of states.
In making such provisions the sovereignty of each state 
must suffer to the extent stipulated in the constituent 
instrument.
Having satisfied ourselves with the conclusion that the 
Fundamental Statute of the G.C.C. could be included in the
52Ibid.
53 .Thomas and Thomas, Non-intervention. The Law and Its
Import in America. Southern Methodist University Press, Dallas 
(1956), pp.108-9.
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second type of treaty which needs the consent of the
parliament, it is necessary now to answer whether the Kuwaiti
Government could put forward such an argument and thereby
declare its signature invalid. In other words, is Kuwait
likely to plead its own failure to satisfy its constitutional
requirement as sufficient reason for not being bound by the
Fundamental Statute?
It is suggested by Fitzmaurice that except in those cases
where a treaty provides that entry into force is dependent on
the municipal legislature, a state cannot invoke its failure
54to escape its international obligations. However, Hyde
disagrees with this view where he states that an
55unconstitutional treaty must be regarded as void. Similarly
Wheaton says:
"Where, indeed, such auxiliary legislation becomes 
necessary in consequence of some limitation upon 
the treaty-making power, expressed in the 
fundamental laws of the state, or necessarily 
implied from the distribution of its constitutional 
power, such for example a problem prohibition of 
alienating the national domain, then the treaty may 
be considered as imperfect in its obligation until 
the national assent has been given in (-the forms 
required by the municipal constitution."
McNair, however, points out that a distinction should be
made between a state where its constitutional limitation as
54 . . ~Fitzmaunce, "Do Treaties Need Ratification?" , o p. cit. ,
at p.13 0.
55Hyde, C., International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and 
applied bv the United States. Vol.2, Little Brown and Co. 
(1947), pp.1383-86.
56Wheaton, Elements of International Law. Stevens & Sons 
Ltd., London, 6th English edition, Vol.l (1929), at p.499.
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regards the consent of the legislative power is notorious and 
a state where its constitutional provision in this regard is 
obscure to the other contracting parties. Only in the former 
case McNair suggests that a state may plead constitutional 
incapacity.57
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties has
restricted the power of states to invoke internal law as
invalidating their consent to be bound by a treaty. Such a
plea is possible now only where the violation would be
objectively manifest and would concern a rule of its internal
58law of fundamental importance.
In the light of the foregoing it is likely that Kuwait
would succeed in its claim that the constitutional provisions
have not been followed. Not only must the constitutional
59provision be manifest, "notorious" but must also be a 
fundamental rule. Therefore invoking Article 4 6 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties is possible due to the fact
57 . . . .McNair, A.D., in his introduction to Mr. Ralph Arnold's
Treatv-Makinq Procedure. Oxford/London (1933), p.118.
58The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 
46. See Brownlie, I., Basic Documents, op.cit.. pp.368-69.
59The attitude of the Kuwait National Assembly as regards 
the approval of the inclusive security agreement gives us 
clear evidence that the other G.C.C. member states are well 
aware of the constitutional limitation. On October 17-18 
1982, the G.C.C. Interior Ministers held their second meeting 
in Riyadh to discuss draft proposals for the security 
agreement. At the end of the meeting it was announced that 
the ministers had failed to reach an agreement. According to 
the Interior Ministers of Saudi Arabia and Oman the failure 
was attributed to the influence of the Kuwait constitution and 
the Kuwait National Assembly.
82
that the constitutional provision is manifest, "notorious” , 
whereas Article 70 of the Kuwaiti Constitution requires the 
consent of the National Assembly if the treaty concerns 
sovereign rights (e.g. granting privileges and immunities) and 
also involves additional expenditures.
Not only that, but also the absence of the consent of the 
Kuwait National Assembly may be regarded as a manifest 
violation to the constitution which is fundamental in 
nature.60
60 See in this regard, Meron, T. , "Article 4 6 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Ultra Vires 
Treaties): Some Recent Cases", XLIX B.Y.I.L. (1978), pp.180-
SI.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE REALISATION OF THE G.C.C. OBJECTIVES IN THE 
FUNDAMENTAL STATUTE AND THE U.E.A.
INTRODUCTION
The G.C.C., like any international organisation, aims at 
certain objectives contained in its constitution. However, 
one objective which is conspicuously avoided is any suggestion 
of a military character.1 Unlike other international 
organisations,2 the Fundamental Statute of the G.C.C. does not 
lay down any principles as a basis for achieving those 
objectives (i.e. the Arab league, the Organisation of African 
Unity, and the Organisation of American States). However, 
there are some principles which could be inferred from the 
constitutions of the G.C.C. member states, the final 
communique of the first meeting of the G.C.C. supreme council 
and the pronouncements of officials in the member states,3
1Bouachba, T. , "Le Conseil de Cooperation des Etats 
Arabes du Golf", Revue generale de droit international public. 
Tom.LXXXIX (1985), pp.60-62.
2A1-Ashal, A., The Legal and Political Framework of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council, o p.cit.. p.134.
3See Article 12 of the UAE constitution, Art. 5 (3) of 
Qatar constitution in The Constitutions of the Countries of 
the World, op.cit.. The UAE constitution issued August 1981, 
p.5. As for Qatar, see The Legal Gazette No.2 dated 15 March 
1983 at p.43 (Arabic). For the pronouncements of the G.C.C. 
officials, see Qatar News Agency Documentation (1983),
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principles such as sovereign equality of all G.C.C. member 
states, settling of disputes by peaceful means, non­
interference in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state, the adherence to the 
principles of non-alignment and the U.N. Charter. In addition 
to the objectives laid down in Article 4 there is also the 
intention to cooperate in various fields aimed at 
strengthening cooperation. It is envisaged that there would 
be cooperation in the establishment of scientific research 
centres, implementation of common projects and encouragement 
of cooperation by the private sector for the good of the 
people. These by themselves are not objectives but merely 
serve as a basis for cooperation. Nevertheless it is not 
difficult to identify four basic objectives from the 
Fundamental Statute. These will be examined in turn.
(i) Political Coordination
It is thought that within the provisions of Article 4 of 
the Fundamental Statute, it would not be possible to take 
meaningful and durable common actions among member states 
unless they adopted a unified political position.
Political unity is one of the G.C.C. objectives. Article 
4.1 of the Fundamental Statute provides:
"To effect coordination, integration and 
interconnection between member states in all fields 
in order to achieve unity between them."
op.cit.. pp.103-28.
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Yet the term "unity" is extremely vague and widely 
interpreted. It is important to examine the meaning of the 
word as used in this Article.
In the view of the G.C.C. Secretariat neither federal nor 
confederal unity is meant in the context of Article 4. The 
term "unity" is an elastic frame which responds to the changes 
of development and the degree of accomplishment. The Gulf 
joint work does not draw any end or border for the work. It 
is flexible, wide and spacious for any future activity.4 This 
suggests that the G.C.C. member states do not exclude any form 
of structural relations possible in the future whether federal 
or confederal.
The distinction between a federation and a confederation 
depends essentially upon the degree of centralisation of 
power. While in a federal structure the competence of the 
total state is distributed between a central government and 
the local government, in a confederation, states do not have 
such centralisation.5
In spite of the fact that the Fundamental Statute refers 
to political unity as an objective of the organisation, the 
Fundamental Statute does not indicate a clear intention on the 
part of the member states to relinquish some measures of 
sovereignty as would be necessary in a federal structure.
4The Secretary General Abdullah Bishara, The Role of the 
G.C.C. in the Realisation of Arab Unitv. G.C.C. Secretariat 
Publications (1985), p.2 et seq.
5Kelsen, H. , Principles of International Law. Holt, 
Rinehart (1966), pp.262-66.
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This view is supported by some delegates' reports while they 
were discussing the adoption of the fundamental statute.6
These reports suggest that member states prefer to retain 
their own executive, legislative and judicial power. 
Nevertheless, political coordination prevails and is achieved 
in reality. Political coordination is achieved by means of 
various contacts at ministerial level and among the heads of 
state. It becomes concrete both at ministerial level and the 
Supreme Council.
The member governments held their regular and 
extraordinary meetings to settle their disagreements in 
respect of differences regarding difficult international 
problems affecting, directly and indirectly, the Gulf states. 
The most important issues dealt with so far have been the 
Palestinian issue, the Lebanese issue, the Iraq-Iran conflict 
and generally the security of the Gulf region. On May 7, 13, 
14 and 16, 1984 Saudi and Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Gulf were 
hit by air strikes. The Foreign Ministers of the six G.C.C. 
member states immediately held an extraordinary session in 
Riyadh on May 17 to deal with the offensive and decided to 
present the issue to the U.N. Security Council as "a threat 
to the safety and stability of the area" which has serious
Since the travaux prenaratoires have not been printed, 
one may only refer to reports of the head of Qatar delegation 
to the legal experts committee. Muscat, March 1981, op.cit.. 
p. 3.
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implications for international peace and security.7
Meanwhile, the G.C.C. Ministerial Council decided to take 
the matter up at an extraordinary meeting of the Council of 
the Arab League for the adoption of a unified Arab stand on 
the issue.8 On May 21st, the G.C.C. member countries called 
for a U.N. Security Council meeting to discuss the offensive9 
with a majority of 13 votes to none and with two abstentions 
(Nicaragua and Zimbabwe). The Security Council on June 1st 
1984 adopted a decision which "calls upon all states to 
respect, in accordance with international law, the right of 
free navigation" in international waters and "the territorial 
integrity" of the G.C.C. member states which are not parties 
to the hostilities.10
This is further evidence of cooperation in practice of 
G.C.C. foreign ministers meeting privately to agree on a 
common position to present before major international 
organisations (i.e. the Arab League, the Organisation of the
70n the security issue, see infra, chapter 8. For the 
letter of the G.C.C. member states, see the Official Records 
of the Security Council. 39th year, supplement for April, May 
and June 1984, Document S/16574. See also Kuwait News Agency 
(KUNA). Special dossier on the occasion of the fifth G.C.C. 
summit conference in Kuwait, November 1984, pp.32-3 3.
8Ibid.
9A letter dated 21 May 1984 from the representatives of 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab 
Emirates addressed to the President of the Security Council 
(S/16574). See Official Records of the Security Council. 39th 
year, supplement for April, May and June 1984.
10 # •S/INF/40, Security Council Official Records. 39th year,
1984, p.15.
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Islamic Conference, U.N.). The G.C.C. states hope in this way 
to present a united and coherent group expressing a united 
voice in respect of the problems discussed. This could be 
achieved by many ways such as exchanging information, 
developing common positions, agreeing on candidates to be put 
forward and agreeing on a common spokesman.11
However it is not clear whether G.C.C. governments are 
obliged under the charter to consult and coordinate their 
foreign policy. In 1985 Oman and United Arab Emirates 
successively established diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union without consulting the G.C.C. in advance.12 This 
attitude of the two G.C.C. members was construed by some 
member states as incompatible with the objectives of the 
G.C.C. They added that all decisions which have been taken 
through G.C.C. organs required coordination at least in 
important political matters.13 Furthermore Article 8(5) of 
the Fundamental Statute provides that one of the Supreme
11See Kaufman, J., United Nations Decision-Making. 
Sijthoff and Noordhoff (1980), pp.90-2. It should be 
mentioned there that the G.C.C. member states acted both 
during and after the emergency session of the Security Council 
on the Iranian attacks against the Kuwaiti and Saudi 
commercial ships. The G.C.C. Foreign Ministers addressed the 
Security Council in the name of the G.C.C. as well as for 
their own respective governments. Kuwait's Deputy Premier, 
in his address, 25 May 1984, said: "the policy of Kuwait and
the G.C.C. member states is to preserve the Gulf as a zone of 
peace and stability". The same attitude was repeated by 
Qatar's State Minister of Foreign Affairs, see Kuna, op.cit.. 
p . 3 3 - A .
12 •Private information of the writer.
13 Ibid.
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Council*s functions in achieving the objectives of the G.c.c. 
is to "approve the bases for dealing with other states and 
international organisations”. However, if there is any 
obligation to consult it can only be moral* The enforcement 
of decisions of the G.C.C. appears to depend entirely on the 
good faith of its members. As such it may be argued that the 
relationship between the G.C.c. member states is akin to that 
between member states of loose confederation.14 A
confederation is defined as an association of independent 
states bound together by international treaty having its own 
organs. The constituent treaty gives the organisation certain 
power which acts upon the states and not the individuals 
though the organisation power does not affect the full 
sovereignty of the member state.15 Although the members of a
u See Rivlin, P., "The League of Nations as Confederacy” , 
International Relations. 5 (1975-77), Vol.V, No.4, November 
1976, pp.1121-38. Rivlin in this article compares the theory 
and practice of the League of Nations with the model of 
confederacy as presented by Professor Christopher Hughes in 
his inaugural lecture, Confederacies. Leicester University 
Press (1963) . See also, Schwarzenberger, International Law 
(1949), p.520 who describes both the League of Nations and the 
United Nations as "typical confederations as distinct from 
federations” . Makarim, E., "The Positive Impact of the 
Establishment of Gulf Cooperation Council on the Issues of 
Private International Law in member States”, seminar of 
Unification of Private International Law Legislations of the 
Gulf, Centre of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies. Kuwait, 
21-23 November 1987, pp.23-25. Makarim regards the G.C.C. as 
a confederation of states.
15 See Oppenheim, L. International Law. Vol.l, (1905), 
p.128. See also Reuter, P., International Institutions, 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd. (1955), p.184. Corbett, P., cites 
Jellinek's definition of confederation as "permanent union of 
independent states, based on agreement and having for its 
object the protection of the territory of those states and the 
preservation of peace between them. Other objects may by 
agreement be pursued. This union requires a permanent
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confederation of states may have some obligations regarding 
their international relations, their competence in foreign 
affairs is not restricted.16
Nevertheless there are essential differences between 
confederations which have all ceased to exist and 
international organisations.17
The object of confederations is declared to be the 
preservation of the external and internal security of the 
confederate states.18
The common features of the confederation differ greatly 
from those of international organisations. The main purpose 
of confederation is to maintain a common defence and foreign 
policy through binding decisions of the supreme organ.19
organisation for the realization of its end". Corbett 
concludes that Jellinek's definition is sufficient to consider 
the League of Nations as a confederation of states: "What is
the League of Nations?", 5 B.Y.I.L. (1924), pp.147-48.
16 Kelsen, H., Principles of International Law op.cit.. 
at p.263. Kelsen concludes that there is no essential 
difference between these confederations and international 
organisations. See also Kunze, J., The Changing Law of 
Nations. Ohio State University (1968), pp.28-33 and also p.107 
where he states that the O.A.S., Arab League and European 
organisations are no more than loose associations of sovereign 
states which have their highest form in the type of 
confederations.
17 The defunct Germanic confederation (1815-1866)? the 
American Confederation (1776-1787), later converted into 
federation? and the Swiss Confederation (1291-1798), also 
converted into federation.
18 Wheaton, H. , Elements of International Law with a 
Sketch of the History of the Science. London, vol.I (1836), 
p. 69.
Verzijl, J., International Law in Historical 
Perspective. A.W. Sijthoff, Leiden, Vol.II (1969), pp.160-61.
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Furthermore the constitutions of confederations contain 
provisions quite alien in nature to those of international 
organisations.
In the Germanic confederation, for example, the Diet had 
power to establish fundamental laws for the confederation, and
organic regulations as to its foreign, military and internal
• 20 • relations. When war was declared by the confederation, no
state could negotiate separately with the enemy, nor conclude
peace or an armistice without the consent of the rest.21
In case of denial or unreasonable delay of justice by any
member state to its subject, the aggrieved party might invoke
the mediation of the Diet.22
Furthermore, confederations envisage wars as a sanction
within the community against a member guilty of violating the
constitution and against a state outside the confederation and
in such a case the obligation arose to enact laws by which
individuals were obliged to do military service and to pay
taxes.23
Another marked contrast between a confederation and an 
international organisation is that, whereas an international 
organisation has international personality, the union of
20 •Acte final, Art.58, Wiener Schlass Acte Art.12-15 in 
Wheaton, op.cit.. p.73.
21 Ibid. . p.74.
22 Article 29 of the Wiener Schlass Acte in Ibid.. p.75.
23 Kelsen, H., Principles of International Law, o p.cit.. 
p.263.
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confederated states is not an international person.24
One cardinal distinction between the confederal structure 
and an international organisation is that in the former case 
the rules governing the establishment and relationship between 
the member state in peace and war were contained solely in 
their constitutions, while in the case of the latter the 
constitution has to observe certain universal rules as 
contained in the U.N. Charter.
(ii) Economic Integration
Article 4 of the Fundamental Statute deals briefly and 
in general terms with the economic objectives of the G.C.C. 
It states the following:
The basic objectives of the cooperation council are:
1. To effect coordination, integration and 
interconnection between member states in all 
fields in order to achieve unity between them.
2. To deepen and strengthen, links and scopes of 
cooperation now prevailing between their people in 
various fields.
3. To formulate similar regulation in various fields 
including the following
a. Economic and financial affairs
b. Commerce, customs and communications.
4. To stimulate scientific and technological progress 
in the fields of industry, mineralogy, water and 
animal resources, the establishment of scientific 
research centre, implementation of common projects, 
and encourage cooperation by private sector for the 
good of their people."
From the previous provisions it is apparent that the 
Gulf Cooperation Council is not only to be seen as providing 
the opportunity for achieving political coordination of the
Oppenheim, op.cit.. Vol.I, p.171: "A union of so-called
confederation states is not an international person".
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member states, but also it has an economic dimension which 
adds to its political character. Since their economic 
systems are similar, the G.C.C. states are easily able to 
turn towards this economic integration. This economic and 
political harmony makes regional integration much easier for 
the Gulf states. Thus while the groups such as the Arab 
League or the Organisation of Islamic Countries are of an 
ideal size for economic integration, the G.C.C. is able to 
realise this aim much more easily and in an atmosphere of 
homogeneity.25
Nevertheless, though the Fundamental Statute, in
particular the parts dealing with economic issues, embodies
integration in its articles, the economic objectives are
expressed in wide terms and no stages have been drawn for
their implementation. By contrast the European Economic
Community treaty provides for a transitional period of twelve
years for the common market to be established. Article 8 of
the E.E.C. treaty states:
"The common market shall be progressively 
established during a transitional period of twelve 
years. This transitional period shall be divided 
into three stages of four years each, the length of 
each stage may be altered . . .1,26
To remedy this situation the G.C.C. Supreme Council
Novati, G., "The E.E.C. and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council", in The Arab Gulf and the West. Centre for Arab Gulf 
Studies, University of Exeter (1985), p.114.
26 For the E.E.C. treaty, see Peaslee, International 
Governmental Organisations, o p .cit.. pp.459-60. For an 
economic study which explores the experience of the E.E.C. and 
G.C.C., see Novati, ibid.. pp.110-22.
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decided on 26 May 1981 to set up five specialised committees 
made up of the competent ministers, charged with the tasks of 
drawing up recommendations for achieving the economic 
objectives.27 The Supreme Council is empowered by Article 10 
of the rules of procedure of the Supreme Council to create any 
ad hoc committees it deems necessary.
Four of these committees deal mainly with economic 
affairs. These are:
1. The committee for economic and social planning.
2. The committee for financial, education and trade
cooperation.
3. The committee for industrial cooperation.
4. The oil committee.
The Fundamental Statute, having failed to specify the 
economic objectives, has been inadequate as a basis for 
economic integration. The G.C.C. member states therefore,
27 The final communique of the first Supreme Council, Abu 
Dhabi, 25.5.81, see Qatar News Agency documents, oo.cit.. 
pp.91-3. See also the G.C.C. working paper published in Abu 
Dhabi on 26 May 1981, Middle East Contemporary Survey. Vol.V. 
(1980-81) Shiloah Centre, Tel Aviv University, p.518. It 
should be noted here that though the provisions of the 
economic agreement do not include gradualist application of 
the objectives, in practice the gradualist approach has been 
adopted by the specialised committees in two stages. The 
first began on 1st March 1983 by a free trade area and the 
achievement of the economic citizenship through the objectives 
stipulated in Article 8 of the agreement. In the second 
stage, the G.C.C. intends by 1990 to establish a common market 
referring directly to the E.E.C. model. During the third 
summit (Bahrain, November 9-11, 1982), the G.C.C. heads of
state approved the gradual implementation of the agreement. 
See Qatar News Agency documents, o p.cit.. p.385. See also in 
this regard, Gulf Cooperation Council. The International 
Dimension. Arab-British Chamber of Commerce Publications, 
London (1 December 1983).
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signed a supplementary agreement on 8 June 1981, the United 
Economic Agreement, probably inspired by the E.E.C. The 
agreement sets out the practical steps necessary to achieve 
the objectives mentioned in the statute. It should be noted 
here that the legal linkage between the Unified Economic 
Agreement and the Fundamental Statute is found in the preamble 
to the economic agreement. It emphasises that the member 
states in conformity with the G.C.C. Fundamental Statute 
express their desire to achieve a solid understanding and to 
create strong bonds between the states they represent by 
developing and widening the commercial ties already existing 
among them.
The Unified Economic Agreement does not provide for 
disputes settlement as concerns the application and the 
interpretation of the agreement. Nevertheless the agreement 
provides in its preamble that observance of its terms is to
be in accordance with the Fundamental Statute which provides
• 28 for settlement of disputes under Article 10.
28 On the question of the legal value of the preamble it 
is well established under international law that the preamble 
is an integral part of the treaty. Schwarzenberger comments 
on this matter as follows: "As every word and part of a
treaty is presented to have been a meaning and produce some 
legal effects, no inherent reason exists for discrimination 
against the preamble as compared with the operative articles 
of a treaty". International Law. Vol.l, 3rd ed. , London, 
Stevens (1957), at p.526. The International Court of Justice 
in the Asylum Case (1950) referred to the preambles of both 
the Havana Convention of Asylum of 1928 and the Montevideo 
Convention on Political Asylum of 1933 as to determine the 
objectives of the treaty. I.C.J. Asvlum Case. November 20, 
1950, I.C.J. Reports (1950), pp.276-77, p.282. Kelsen, H. 
gives the same view, The Law of the United Nations. London, 
Stevens (1951), p.5.
The 28 articles of the Unified Economic Agreement set
ambitious targets which go much further than any previous
attempts to coordinate Arab development. The main features
of the agreement are:
1. Elimination of customs duties between G.C.C. states, 
provided goods satisfy a minimum local value added 
content criterion (Articles 2-3).
2. The establishment of a common minimum external tariff 
(Article 4). This has been set at between 4 percent and 
20 percent.
3. The coordination of import and export policies and 
regulations. The agreement also calls for the creation 
of a collective negotiating force to strengthen the 
G.C.C.fs position in dealing with foreign suppliers.
4. Free movement of labour and capital (Article 8).
5. Coordination of oil policies (Article 11).
6. Coordination of industrial activities and standardisation 
of industrial laws. Efforts are to be made to allocate 
industries to member states according to relative 
advantage (Article 12).
7. Cooperation of technology, training and labour policies 
(Articles 14-17).
8. A cooperative approach to land, sea and air transport 
policies (Articles 18-20).
9. Move to set up a united investment strategy and 
coordinate financial, monetary and banking policies. 
This will include the possibility of introducing a common
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currency (Articles 21-23) .29
The intention of the author is to deal in detail with the 
Unified Economic Agreement in Chapter Seven of the 
dissertation. Here one may just draw some general remarks.
1. Supremacy of the UEA Over Bilateral Treaties
Before the establishment of the G.C.C. and the signature
of the Unified Economic Agreement there were many bilateral
agreements among the G.C.C. member states in the economic
field.30 To resolve the problems coming out of these
concomitant agreements Article 28 stipulates that the Unified
Agreement has priority in application over all the bilateral
agreements. It states:
"Provisions herein shall supersede any similar 
provisions contained in bilateral agreements."
This provision confirms the principle of autonomous
operation which applies mainly to international organisations,
which presumes that "each international organisation must
regard itself as being bound in the first instance by its own
29 See the text of the agreement in the G.C.C. Legal 
Gazette (1982).
30 The writer has been unable to trace these treaties in 
the UNTS. As a result of investigation he carried out in the 
G.C.C. member states these bilateral treaties are found in the 
Official Gazette of the member states. For example, see 
U.A.E. Official Gazette No.70 (1977), pp.41-45, No.58 (1978), 
pp.32-34, No.85 (1980), pp.43-45. See also Qatar Official
Gazette No.50 (1979), p.101, No.11 (1981), p.107, No.8 (1982), 
p.128, No.3 (1983), p.128, No.4 (1984), p.185, No.8 (1984), 
p.212, No.8 (1984), p.214, No.11 (1984), p.216. For Kuwait 
Official Gazette (Kuwait Today) see No. 1039 (1975), p.16,
No.1238 (1979), p.5.
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constitution and will naturally apply instruments which it is 
itself responsible for administering rather than other 
instruments with which they may be in conflict11.31 However, 
one excludes the possibility of conflict between the U.E.A and 
those bilateral economic agreements among the G.C.C. member 
states. Furthermore the provisions of the bilateral 
agreements are similar to the U.E.A provisions and deal with 
the same subject except that the latter are made specific, 
effective and subject to close observation by the G.C.C. 
Secretariat.32
31 Jenks, W., "The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties" 30 
B. Y.I.L. (1953) at p. 448. In this regard it is worth 
mentioning that Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties does not include this principle, though the 
principle of hierarchy may be applicable according to the 
Article. This principle is to establish the superiority of 
the constitution of the organisation over the provisions of 
bilateral treaties. See Sinclair, I., The Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties. 2nd ed., Biddles Ltd., Guildford and 
King's Lynn, at p.96.
32 On the whole the bilateral economic agreements 
concentrate on the following: (i) to remove everything likely
to obstruct the freedom of economic and commercial activities 
of citizens of one country in the other as regards ownership 
of estate, shares and companies? (ii) to unify the policy 
relating to customs and excise regulations and tariff to 
commercial companies and to the provisions of goods and 
foodstuffs? (iii) to unify legislation relating to the 
protection of local industries and to encourage the 
establishment of joint projects by the citizens in each 
country? (iv) to ensure that each party grant the citizens 
of others the same treatment regarding right of residence and 
work,
(b) freedom of exercising economic activity,
(c) right to ownership, inheritance and bequest in 
accordance to the laws applied in each country,
(d) facilitate the procedure for free movement of 
capital?
(v) to permit the importation and exportation of agricultural, 
animal, industrial and natural resources products that are of 
national origin.
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2. Conflict between the UEA and other Treaties Concluded
with Third Parties
The conflict of treaty obligations may arise as regards 
those bilateral agreements concluded between each of the 
G.C.C. member states and third parties before and after the 
establishment of the organisation. Some of those agreements 
deal in part with the same subject matter as those of the 
first category but in the main they differ substantially from 
the bilateral agreements mentioned earlier.33
According to Article 30.4(b) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, 1961, the obligations of the G.C.C. 
member states within the UEA cannot override their obligations 
within the bilateral agreements concluded with third 
parties.34 However, the above provision does not reflect 
customary law, since the state practice in this area of law 
is continually developing and fixed guidelines have not been
33 There are a number of bilateral economic agreements 
concluded between each G.C.C. member state and other parties. 
For example between UAE and Iraq, 3 October 1977, UAE Official 
Gazette. No.58, 8 June 1987, pp.32-4? UAE and Greece (1976), 
ibid.. pp.44-6; Qatar Official Gazette No.9.4 (1984), pp.186- 
187; Qatar and the Republic of Korea, 21 April 1984, ibid.n 
(1984), p.212; Qatar and Jordan (1980), ibid.. pp.105-6; 
Qatar and Pakistan, 16 April 1984, ibid. at p.217? Qatar and 
India, 19 April 1984, ibid.n at pp.214-5. The writer will 
examine the legal implications of a possible clash between the 
UEA and treaties concluded substantially in similar terms 
under the Arab League auspices in Chapter Seven, which deals 
with the implementation of the UEA. See infra, pp.271-85.
34 See the text in Brownlie, Basic Documents, op.cit.. 
p.362.
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established yet.35
3. Supremacy of UEA Over Internal Law 
Article 27 provides that:
"In case of conflict with local laws and regulations 
of Member states, execution of provisions of this 
agreement shall prevail."
This sort of supremacy of inter-state law over domestic
law is clearly enshrined within the G.C.C., especially with
respect to its economic agreement.
The hypothesis of conflict with municipal law could be
posed in different terms. In accordance with the principle
of pacta sunt servanda, the state is legally obliged to fulfil
in good faith the international obligations it has undertaken
and to refrain from subsequent practice or concluding
contradictory provisions.
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties provides:
"Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it 
and must be performed by them in good faith."
This rule in fact demonstrates one of the most fundamental
principles of customary international law of treaties.36
The above Article is strengthened by Article 27 of the
Convention that a party to a treaty may not invoke the
provisions of its constitution or its internal laws as an
35 Sinclair, I., The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, op.cit.. pp.97-98.
36 Sinclair, I., op.cit.. pp.84-119; Elias, T. , The 
Modern Law of Treaties. Oceana Publications Inc., Dobbs Ferry, 
N.Y., A.W. Sijthoff, Leiden (1974), p.40. For the text see 
Brownlie, op.cit.. p.3 61.
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excuse for failure to perform any international obligation it
has undertaken under the treaty. It provides:
”A party may not invoke the provisions of the internal 
law as justification for its failure to perform a 
treaty..."
Furthermore, a state can only derogate from its 
obligations through procedures prescribed in the treaty and 
not merely by unilateral act.37 It is arguable that Article 
27 attempts to introduce into the G.C.C. an E.E.C. type of 
legal practice which provides for the supremacy of Community 
legislation irrespective of whether the municipal legislation 
concerned has been enacted before or after the commencement 
of membership.38
However, one has to state clearly that this sort of 
supremacy does not lead to the conclusion that a proof of 
supremacy of international law over national law could be 
maintained.39
37McNair, The Law of Treaties. Oxford Clarendon Press 
(1961), pp.493-4.
38 Although this rule is not found in any of the EC 
treaties, it has been firmly established by the court of the 
European Community. See the Simmenthal Case. Case 106/77, 
[1978] E.C.R. 629, pp.651-2. See also, Ratti Case. Case 
148/78, [1979] E.C.R. 1629? French Merchant Seaman Case (The 
Commission v. France), Case 167/73, [1974] E.C.R. 359? Lasok, 
D. and Bridge, J . , Introduction to the Law and Institutions 
of the European Communities. 3rd ed. , Butterworth (1982), 
pp.261-67. See also, Wyatt, D. and Dashwood, A., The 
Substantive Law of the EEC. Sweet & Maxwell (1980), pp.53-4? 
Hartley, T.C., The Foundations of the European Community. 
Clarendon, Oxford (1981), pp.219-23.
39 In spite of the fact that Al-Awadi, B. accepts the 
view that the constitution of Kuwait 1962 and its explanatory 
note annexed to it do not refer to the question of primacy of 
international law over national law, she maintains that this 
could be inferred from treaties concluded by Kuwaiti
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The constitutions of the G.C.C. member states do not 
contain provisions of this sort.40
At any rate, the admission of external law to the 
territory of a state cannot be achieved merely by providing 
supremacy over municipal law, but there is a further problem 
which is the constitutional transmission of internal law.
4. Entry into Force of the UEA
According to the law of treaties, treaty provisions 
determine the manner in which and the date on which the treaty 
enters into force.41 Article 26(1) of the UEA states that the 
agreement "shall enter into force, four months after its 
approval by the Supreme Council". Nevertheless the G.C.C.
government which provide so. She gives two examples of 
treaties providing this sort of supremacy:
(1) The treaty establishing the Arabian maritime company of 
oil transportation, 1972;
(2) The treaty establishing the Arabian company for petroleum 
services, 1975.
See her book, Public International Law in Time of Peace and 
War and its Application in the State of Kuwait. Dar-Alfiker, 
Damascus (1979) (Arabic), pp.43-5.
40 The constitutions of the G.C.C. member states instead 
adopt the dualist theory which requires transformation 
measures for the rules of international law. See Article 47 
of the UAE constitution, Article 37 of the Bahrain 
constitution, Article 70 of the Kuwait constitution, Article 
18 of the Saudi Arabia Cabinet Order, Article 3 of the Oman 
Decree of the Administrative Organ, and Article 24 of the 
Qatar constitution. For the text, see G.C.C. Legal Gazette 
1 (1982), pp. 16, 54, 61, 79 and 2 (1983), pp.8, 47 and 69
respectively.
41 Article 24 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (1969).
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member states, save for Oman, ratified the UEA.42
It is worth mentioning that according to the G.C.C. 
Legal Gazette issued 11.6.83, the various constitutional 
measures taken by the member states are described by the 
secretariat as ratification documents. By examining these 
documents, however, it becomes apparent that some of them are 
in fact ratification instruments. UAE ratified the agreement 
on 4.10.82 and in that instrument there is reference to the 
incorporation act No.47 1982. This may explain the process 
in Article 47(4) of the constitution which requires the 
consent of the union council to ratify the treaty and enable 
the head of state to issue the ratification instrument. 
Therefore the consent to ratify the treaty by the union
council paves the way to both ratification and incorporation. 
And yet the signature of the head of state, according to 
Article 54(4), is necessary to execute the act of 
incorporation which is followed by the ratification document.
Bahrain has deposited an instrument which is difficult 
to be called a ratification instrument. It is in fact an 
incorporation act which brings the treaty into force under 
municipal law. As such it appears that Bahrain complied with
Article 26(1) of UEA that there is no need for further
procedures to be taken to bind her internationally.
Saudi Arabia has deposited a ratification instrument by 
which is referred to the approval of the Council of Ministers 
No.4 dated 6.1.1402 A.H. and the Royal Act No. M113. 
According to Article 18 of the decree of the Council of 
Ministers of 1958 combination of the final approval of the 
cabinet and the Royal decree constitute incorporation first 
and ratification.
Oman has not deposited any instrument since the signature 
of the Sultan does not need any further procedures. Qatar 
deposited an instrument of ratification. Its attitude 
reflects the practice in Qatar and in compliance with Article 
26 of the constitution that a treaty is signed, ratified by 
the Amir then the incorporation process takes place in the 
form of a decree signed by the Amir and published in the 
Official Gazette.
Kuwait deposited a ratification instrument issued on 
1.11.1982. However this was preceded by a legislative act by 
the National Assembly on 31.10.1982 and enabled the Amir to 
ratify the treaty. One may notice the different
constitutional procedures taken by Kuwait and Bahrain although 
their constitutions require identical measures. The reason 
appears to lie in the fact that the Bahrain National Assembly 
was dissolved at the time Bahrain joined the G.C.C. and 
therefore played no role in approving the ratification 
process.
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This kind of practice among the G.C.C. member states may 
have the advantage of order and certainty and would confirm 
compliance with the domestic constitutional requirement, yet 
there is no residuary rule to the effect that ratification is 
essential.43 However, for the purpose of examining the effect 
of internal law on the question of entry into force it seems 
necessary, in view of the diversity of the legal systems in 
G.C.C. member states, to investigate the position in each 
member state.
According to the constitution of the six member states, 
save for Kuwait and Bahrain, treaties are made and ratified 
by the head of state or the Supreme Council.44
Article 47 of the UAE constitution provides that the 
Supreme Council ratifies the international agreements, thus 
committing the country internationally. Both the
constitutions of Bahrain and Kuwait provide for an identical 
approach as for signature and ratification for two types of
See Sinclair, I, The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, 2nd ed. (1984), pp.39-42. For the practice of 
states in this regard see Blix, H., "The Requirement of 
Ratification", 30 B.Y.I.L. (1953), p.380.
44 • . • •See the Articles m  the constitution of the member 
states. The English text is found in The Constitutions of the 
Countries of the World, op.cit.
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treaties.45
(a) Treaties concluded by the Amir notified to the National 
Assembly with appropriate explanations and published in 
the Official Gazette.
(b) Treaties requiring the consent of the National Assembly. 
The treaties in this group are those which directly 
affect the rights of the people, their personal freedom 
or concern, the sovereignty and interest of the state. 
It seems that the first type of agreement is signed and
ratified by the Amir while the second type needs a legislative 
act which enables the Amir to ratify and therefore for the 
country to be bound internationally.46
Article 18 of the Saudi regulation states that 
international treaties do not come into force unless they are 
approved by the Council of Ministers. The approval of the 
cabinet is final unless it requires a royal decree. Article 
19 determines that all the international treaties after the
45 For the English text of the constitutions, see The 
Constitutions of the World. Bahrain constitution, June 1958, 
at p.26. As for the Kuwait constitution, see ibid., the 
provision at p.16. The Kuwait National Assembly approved the 
agreement and it was promulgated by a decree No. 5811982. 
This process was succeeded by a ratification of the UEA. For 
the decree see Kuwait Official Gazette. Kuwait Today. No.1443, 
2 November 1982, pp.2-6.
46 According to the article the distinction between 
ratification as a procedure which binds the state 
internationally and the procedure of incorporation which 
brings the treaty into force under municipal law is unclear. 
In practice however the government tends to incorporate 
treaties of both groups, although the wording of Article 20 
of the Constitution provides for incorporation only of the 
second group.
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approval of the cabinet need to be brought into force by a 
Royal decree.47 According to this provision one may infer 
that both signature and ratification which vest with the 
cabinet and the King are necessary procedures to bind Saudi 
Arabia.
Oman may be considered an exception in this regard as the 
signature of the Sultan may suffice to bind her 
internationally.48
As it is provided in the Omani decree there are two types 
of treaties.49 First, treaties signed by the Sultan himself, 
and this type does not need further procedures to be complied 
with. The second type of international treaty, which are 
signed by those who are authorised by the Sultan, clearly need 
ratification by the Sultan.
Finally, in Qatar Article 24 of the constitution provides 
that "The Amir concludes treaties by a decree and informs the 
advisory council with an appropriate statement” . The treaty 
has "the force of the law” when it is signed, ratified and
47 See the text of the decree in G.C.C. Legal Gazette 
(1982), op.cit.. pp.75-82.
48 See the text of the decree, the regulation and its 
amendments in G.C.C. Legal Gazette 3 (1983), ibid. . pp.7, 37.
49 In a letter sent by Oman Minister of Foreign Affairs 
to the secretary general of the G.C.C. dated 18.4.82 regarding 
the application of Article 26(1) of the UEA the Minister 
indicated that in accordance with Article 3 of the regulation 
the administrative organ of the state and its amendments there 
is no need to ratify treaties that have been signed by the 
Sultan. See G.C.C. Legal Gazette, ibid.. No.3 (1983) at p.36.
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published in the Official Gazette.50
5. Incorporation of the UEA into Municipal Law
The question here concerns how the provisions of the UEA 
penetrate the legal systems and reach the municipal organs and 
individuals to become binding upon them.
There are some requirements, such as promulgation, 
publication and legislative or executive approval to transfer 
the treaty provisions into municipal law.
The requirements of course do not alter or affect the 
obligation of a state. Therefore a state cannot plead its 
municipal law to evade international obligations.51
The constitution of the G.C.C. member states includes 
certain acts to transform international treaties into 
municipal law.
The UAE constitution requires the issue of a decree 
signed by the head of state to incorporate the ratified
50 See the text of the constitution and its amendments 
in the Legal Gazette, ibid.. pp.41-58.
51 This principle is widely acknowledged, see Article 27 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. See 
also Fitzmaurice, G. , "The General Principles of International 
law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law" 92 RC 
(1957) 11, pp.85-90. See also, McDougal, M . , Studies in World 
Public Order. New Haven Press, New Haven (1987), pp.196-200; 
McNair, The Law of Treaties, op.cit.. 100-4; Morgenstern, F., 
"Judicial Practice and the Supremacy of International Law", 
27 B.Y.I.L. (1950), pp.43-48; Waldock, H . , "General Course 
on Public International Law" 106 RC (1962) 11, pp.123-38; 
Brownlie, I, Principles of Public International Law. Clarendon 
Press, Oxford (1982), pp.36-37.
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agreement into the municipal law.52 The Unified National 
Assembly has no rule whatsoever to discuss or approve the 
international treaties.53
Although Article 89 of the constitution gives the 
Assembly the right to approve, amend or reject the laws 
proposed by the governments, this rule is without prejudice 
to Article 110, which gives the final word to issue any "union 
acts" to the head of state or the Supreme Council.
The constitutions of Bahrain and Kuwait require some 
method of incorporation.54 For treaties not requiring the 
consent of the National Assembly the Amir need only issue a 
decree and publish the treaties in the Official Gazette. The 
second type of treaties are incorporated into the municipal 
law by act of the National Assembly after which the Amir 
issues a decree and gets them published in the Official 
Gazette.
According to the Saudi order for the Council of 
Ministers, Article 19 requires a Royal decree to incorporate
52 Articles 47 and 54 of the constitution. Some writers 
hold the view that publication and issuing an act are not real 
legislative acts and therefore it cannot be considered as such 
process of incorporation. See Morgenstern, F. "Judicial 
Practice and the Supremacy of International Law", B.Y.I.L. 
Vol.XXVII (1959), pp.50-2. See also Wildhaber, L., op.cit.. 
pp.225-27.
53 Article 91 provides that agreements concluded by the 
governments are notified to the National Assembly with 
appropriate explanation.
54 See Article 37 of the Bahrain constitution and Article 
70 of the Kuwait constitution, G.C.C. Legal Gazette (1982), 
pp.54 and 61.
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international treaties into municipal law. Furthermore, 
Article 24 requires publication for all Royal decrees to come 
into force. Therefore both procedures, the issue of a decree 
by the King and publication, are necessary steps for 
incorporation.55
Article 3 of Oman's decree provides that the signature 
of the Sultan of an international treaty makes it part of the 
law of the land. However, publication in the Official Gazette 
is a necessary requirement for incorporation for both treaties 
signed by the Sultan or ratified by him after the signature 
of whom he authorises.56
The above article was amended by the Royal decree with 
the addition "unless the Sultan determines otherwise".57
This amendment of Article 3 of the decree in fact gives 
the Sultan enormous power of incorporation. As such it is not 
clear whether the signature of the Sultan and the publication 
of the treaty suffices to incorporate a treaty into Oman's 
legal system and therefore becomes binding internally.
According to the constitution of Qatar, incorporation 
takes place through a decree and publication, which both
co
succeed signature and ratification.
55 Ibid. . p.79.
56 Ibid. (1983) , p.8.
57 Ibid.
CD
Article 24 of the constitution. The practice shows 
in Qatar that the incorporation act is issued by the Amir 
through the Ministry of Justice and called "the instrument of 
approval".
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6. Non-Self Executing Treaty
A treaty becomes incorporated into municipal law to the 
extent that it is necessary for application. However the UEA 
encounters the problem of a non-self executing treaty.59 It 
requires further decisions from the Supreme Council to 
implement it.
In international law, treaties sometimes stipulate in
terms that they shall be put into effect by legislative
enactment. The agreements may be drafted in general terms
leaving the details of their application to be filled out by
internal legislation.60
The UEA cannot be applied without further acts. As such
the G.C.C. Secretariat puts it in this way:
"It is necessary when applying the provisions of the 
UEA to draw distinction between the provisions 
according to its nature. Some of these do not take 
long measures to be implemented but it is enough 
to take a decision and then the application comes 
in a normal and regular way (i.e. Article 18 of the 
UEA which deals with national treatment for 
transportation and communication in the G.C.C. 
states."
59 The notion of self-executing has two meanings. In the 
U.S.A., where the notion first evolved, it means the automatic 
incorporation of treaties into internal law. The other 
meaning, which may correspond to the UEA, is that a treaty 
cannot immediately be applied without further implementing 
acts to individuals. See Wildhaber, L., op.cit.. pp.226-28. 
See also Preuss, L. , "The Execution of Treaty Obligations 
Through Internal Law System of the United States and of Some 
Other Countries", A.S.I.L. Proc. (1951), pp.82-100.
60 Dickinson, E., "Are the Liquor Treaties Self- 
Executing?", A.J.I.L. Vol.20 (1926), p.448. See also 
Morgenstern, F., B.Y.I.L.. op.cit.. pp.66-8. See also 
McDougal, M. and associates, Studies in Public Order. Yale 
University Press (1960), pp.217-19.
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Some other provisions require gradual implementation in order
to comprehend the experience and reduce what might be the
cause of negative effects as the right of ownership and
freedom of exercising economic activity (Articles 18, 2 3).
In this regard the agreement uses proper phrases for these
Articles which begin with words such as:
The member states shall agree on the executive rules 
which would insure that each member state shall grant the 
citizens of all other member states the same treatment 
granted to its own citizens..." Article 8.61
The secretariat emphasises further that the executive
implementation of the UEA is subjected to subsequent accords
among the G.C.C. member states.
"There are provisions which require a long time to 
be implemented as the achievement of similarity in 
development plans, unification of their attitudes 
towards the world and coordination of their 
financial monetary and exchange policies (i.e. 
Articles 10, 11, 12, 21, 22 and 23). These Articles 
dealing with those above subjects which usually 
begin with words such as 'The member states shall 
seek to. . . or endeavour to' . .. "62
Furthermore the UEA includes some provisions which are 
merely "a guiding rule for cooperation as the obligation of 
the member states to support private enterprise".63
Thus from the intention of the contracting parties and 
the words of the agreement one may say that neither the G.C.C. 
governments nor the individuals can derive direct rights from
61 Unpublished memorandum of the G.C.C. Secretariat 
regarding the implementation of the UEA. The G.C.C. archives, 
September 1984 at p.l.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
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the UEA without further municipal executive implementation.
According to well established principles of international 
law the international agreements cannot, as such, create 
direct rights and obligations for individuals unless it is the 
intention of the parties.64
Furthermore, it is not the intention of the G.C.C. member 
states to create direct rights and obligations for individuals 
to the extent that they can see their rights and obligations 
directly enforceable by the national courts.65
By contrast, the E.E.C. treaty provides that Community 
law can prevail over municipal law and that a directly 
effective provision of Community law may benefit 
individuals.66 However the constitutional requirements in
64 The Advisory Opinion regulating jurisdiction of the 
courts of Danzig, P.C.I.J.. Ser.B. No.15 (1920), pp.17-18.
65 In an interview by the writer with the Director General 
of Legal Affairs in the G.C.C. Secretariat, the writer raised 
the question whether it is possible for private individuals 
and companies to claim any right derived from the UEA before 
the national court. The answer was that in the present 
practice the only channels to bring these issues would be 
through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in each member state. 
They would go in their turn to the G.C.C. Secretariat in the 
form of complaints. It is worthy of mention in this regard 
that the G.C.C. is working on a draft of an agreement for 
commercial arbitration. This is to deal with the economic 
disputes arising out of the implementation of the U.E.A. 
However, due to the issue of compulsory jurisdiction of the 
committee concerned, which the member states do not prefer, 
and the high cost of establishing such body, the draft is 
still under discussion. The interview was conducted in 
Riyadh, the G.C.C. headquarters on 21 November 1986. For the 
rights of individuals under the UEA see infra. Chapter 7, 
pp.325 et seq.
66 See Van Gend en Loos Case. Case 26/62, [1963] at p.12. 
See also, Hartley, T., The Foundation of European Community 
Law, op.cit.. pp.219-21.
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each member state determine the forms of implementation that 
may be taken and which organs of the state may be considered 
competent in the application of Community law.67
7. Techniques of Incorporation
Due to the requirement in the UEA that provisions of the 
agreement shall come into force in stages, the G.C.C. Supreme
Council in its third session held in Bahrain took the decision
68to start implementation of the agreement from March 1983.
These executive measures recommended by the financial and 
economic committee at its second meeting in Riyadh cover a
• • 69very limited area of the agreement.
Nevertheless, these measures to implement gradually the 
UEA reveal a diversity of approach from one country to 
another.
The UAE gives effect to the Unified Economic Agreement 
by a decree by the head of state or by a cabinet decision.70 
In Qatar and Bahrain the technique of incorporation comprises
67 See Brinkhorst, L., "Implementation of (Non-Self- 
Executing) Legislation of the European Economic Community, 
including Directives", in Legal Problems of an Enlarged 
European Community. London, Stevens & Sons (1972), pp.77-81. 
In the same meaning see Opsahl, T . , "Implementation of Non- 
Self-Executing Community Legislation, including Directives in 
Scandinavia", ibid, pp.104-9. For a different view see Lasok 
and Bridge, op.cit.. pp.263-4 who think that the E.E.C. treaty 
is a self-executing treaty whose rules bind both the member 
states and individuals directly and immediately.
68 See the decision in the G.C.C. Secretariat publication, 
The Decisions and Measures which have been Taken to Implement 
the UEA. (October 1984), pp.8-10 (Arabic).
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid. . pp. 15, 42 and 67.
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a decree signed by the Amir (the head of state) ,71 while Oman 
applies the agreement through ministerial decisions provided 
that the G.C.C. organ which takes the decision is the Supreme 
Council. Here the legal provision is clear because it 
presumes that the Sultan of Oman participates in issuing the 
G.C.C. decisions. Otherwise, if the decision to implement the 
UEA comes from another G.C.C. organ such as the Ministerial 
Council, the approach would be different and ordinance by the 
Sultan himself is necessary to bring the rule into force 
municipally.72
Saudi Arabia uses a slightly different approach which is 
the Royal order to implement the G.C.C. Supreme Council 
decisions.
In Kuwait the technique is similar to that of Oman. The 
compliance to the UEA rules through the G.C.C. decisions is 
accomplished by ministerial decisions and not by a decree.73 
The reason may lie in the fact that the National Assembly 
approved the UEA by a statute and therefore there was no need 
for further constitutional measures.74
However, some writers hold the view that such decrees and
71 Ibid. . pp.15, 26, 42, 51 and 67.
72 Ibid. . pp. 22, 49 and 67.
73 Ibid. . pp. 18, 44 and 67.
74 Ibid., pp.31 and 56. It is worthy of mention that the
Amir of Kuwait dissolved the National Assembly and suspended
some provisions of the constitution for the second time in the 
history of Kuwait parliamentary life. See the declaration in 
the G.C.C. Legal Gazette. No.17, 13.11.86, pp.161-2. For more 
details, see supra. Chapter 2, pp.74-75.
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decisions do not amount to an act of incorporation but only 
means of publicity and notification on the national plane. 
The decisions of the organisation are capable of creating 
direct rights and obligations.75
It is clear from this brief survey of the methods of 
implementing the UEA through the G.C.C. organ decisions that 
the member states have a tendency to put the matter in the 
hands of the executive. The methods are various, ranging from 
a decree to merely ministerial decision, but this depends on 
the constitution of each member state.76 The diversity of 
approach therefore does not reduce the effectiveness of the 
incorporation process or allow the G.C.C. Secretariat to 
interfere for a common approach and uniform procedure. 
Nevertheless, the G.C.C. Secretariat drew the attention of the 
member states to the slow process of incorporation and the 
necessity of issuing their acts at the fixed time they agree
75 Vicunna, F. , "Contemporary International Law in the 
Economic Integration of Latin America. Problems and 
Perspectives", Hague Academy of International Law. Colloquium 
(1971) at p.14.
76 By contrast the EEC countries according to their 
constitutions adopt various measures to comply with the EEC 
treaty. In Belgium the King takes measures by decree subject 
to parliamentary approval. In Netherlands the Queen is 
delegated by the authority of law to carry out the Community 
agricultural policy by decree. In Denmark there is a system 
of general delegation, according to constitutional provision. 
In the UK and Eire there exists a general delegation system 
by virtue of the European Communities Acts 1972. In Italy and 
the German Federal Republic a system of special delegation of 
legislative power operates. In Greece the constitution 
provides for delegated legislation to carry out economic 
measures. For the details of the EEC countries' techniques 
of incorporation, see Lasok and Bridge, op.cit.. pp.281-6.
upon.77
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(iii) Security
Neither external defence nor internal security were 
referred to explicitly in the Fundamental Statute, perhaps out 
of apprehension of being misunderstood as a formation of a 
regional military bloc. The other reason is that the Joint 
Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty established, though 
in theory and not in practice, a system of collective 
security,78 thus making further agreement along these lines 
unnecessary. Kuwait in particular was reluctant to commit 
itself to another multilateral defence scheme. Kuwait had 
previously rejected a bilateral security agreement with Saudi 
Arabia while the rest of the G.C.C. member states entered into 
such agreements.79
77 Unpublished memorandum prepared by the G.C.C. 
Secretariat on the implementation of the UEA. The G.C.C. 
Secretariat Archives, September 1984, pp.1-2.
78 See Pogany, I., The Arab League and Peacekeeping in 
the Lebanon. St. Martin's Press, New York (1987), p.13.
79 In an explanation for the Kuwait position the Kuwaiti 
Defence Minister stated in an interview that as a member state 
of the Arab League Kuwait was bound by the provisions of the 
joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty between the 
states of the Arab League, which envisages military 
cooperation: Al-Anba newspaper Kuwait, 2 October 1982. It 
is to be mentioned that Article 2 in particular of the Joint 
Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty between the States of 
the Arab League provides:
"The contracting states consider any act of armed 
aggression made against any one or more of them or their 
armed forces to be directed against them all. Therefore, 
in accordance with the right of self-defence individually 
and collectively, they undertake to go without delay to 
the aid of the state or states against which such an act 
of aggression is made, and immediately to take
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However, thorough examination of the Fundamental Statute
of the G.C.C. reveals that security matters are impliedly
included in the area of cooperation. Article 4.1 of the
statute provides:
"The basic objectives of the Cooperation Council 
are: To effect coordination, integration and
interconnection between member states in all 
fields."
Furthermore Article 8.2 of the Statute entrusts the 
Supreme Council with certain functions inter alia to lay down 
the higher policy for the Cooperation Council and the basic 
line it should follow.
Therefore the Supreme Council fulfilling its functions 
called upon the ministers of defence to examine the military 
situation in the region, the military data of individual 
member states and the establishment of the means of 
coordination between them. Of relevant interest is the 
signing in August 1981 of a treaty of friendship and 
cooperation between the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, 
Libya and Ethiopia. The G.C.C. Supreme Council responded by 
inviting the Defence Ministry to examine the question of 
mutual defence. Ministries of Defence met for the first time 
in January 1982 and in conjunction with the G.C.C. chiefs of
individually and collectively all steps available, 
including the use of armed force, to repel the aggression 
and restore security and peace in conformity with Article 
6 of the Arab League pact and Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter, the Arab League Council and United 
Security Council shall be notified of such act of 
aggression and the means of procedure taken to check it."
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staff have met several times since. A joint military exercise 
called ’Peninsula shield1 held in October 1983 and October 
1984, as well as bilateral air and naval exercises, paved the 
way for the announcement by the Supreme Council in December 
1984 of a joint military command consisting of units drawn 
from the armed forces of all member countries.80
On another occasion, acting on the G.C.C. Supreme 
Council’s recommendation, the defence ministers met on 25 and 
2 6 January 1982 in Riyadh to discuss defence priorities in 
the light of the discovery of an Iranian backed plot to 
overthrow the government of Bahrain. They also discussed the 
security agreement between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, a G.C.C. 
military delegation's visit to Oman and an Iranian warning not 
to conclude security treaties.81
These activities led to the belief that the G.C.C. has 
upgraded its security arrangements into a military alliance 
much like NATO.82
The experience of alliance in some outstanding cases such
80 • • •Major-General Rikhye, J . , Gulf Security Question for
Regional Cooperation. A Report of the International Peace
Academy, Report No.22, New York, (1985), pp.34-35.
81 Middle East Contemporary Survey (M.E.C.S.) (1982-3), 
op.cit. 483.
82 Martin, L.G., The Unstable Gulf. Lexington Books, D.C. 
Heath and Co., Lexington, Massachusetts, Toronto (1984), at 
p. 155. GCC officials insisted, however, that the units 
participating in the manoeuvres were not designed as a 
permanent force, but rather as a group of units which would 
coordinate and deploy rapidly in response to any perceived 
threat. See M.E.C.S. (1982-83), o p.cit.. p.453. For the 
question whether the GCC is a "regional arrangement" for the 
purposes of Chapter VIII, UN Charter, see infra, pp.13 3-38.
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as NATO and ANZUS brought about fierce controversy as to 
whether the term "regional arrangement", within the meaning 
of the expression used in Chapter VIII (Articles 52-4 of the 
UN Charter) applied to them.
Eric Becket points out that the North Atlantic Treaty is 
not a regional arrangement and contains no provisions about 
enforcement action, but much about self-defence.
This enforcement action, according to Chapter VIII of the 
U.N. Charter, is essentially different from the use of force 
in the exercise of collective self-defence. The first is 
"decided or approved" by the Security Council, the latter 
regulated by Article 51 of the Charter.83
Furthermore, he argues that the "hallmark" of a regional 
arrangement constituting a regional organisation is the 
provision "that the enforcement measures are to be taken in 
case of a conflict between any two or more of the members of 
this union".84
Since the North Atlantic Treaty "does not contemplate 
that if a party to the treaty violates the peace, the other 
parties should be the medium of taking enforcement action 
against it" then the treaty is not a regional arrangement.85
Professor Starke similarly points out that:
"The great weight of opinion and practice is to the
07
Becket, E . , The North Atlantic Treaty. The Brussels 
Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations. London, Stevens 
& Sons (1950), p.16.
84 Ibid. . p. 21.
85 Ibid. , p . 34 .
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effect that NATO, ANZUS and the South-East Asia 
Collective Defence Treaty are not regional
arrangements under Chapter VIII of the UN 
Charter."86
Furthermore Starke argues that the parties in those 
alliances did not intend to enter into a regional arrangement 
within the meaning of Article 52 and if so they would have 
kept the Security Council "at all times fully informed of
• 87their activities".
On the other hand, Hans Kelsen argues that there is no
doubt that NATO is a regional arrangement within the meaning
of Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter and fulfils all the
requirements of that chapter, hence:
"Chapter VIII does not contain an exhaustive
enumeration of the matters which may be regulated 
by regional arrangements."88
The G.C.C., however, like the Arab League, the
Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) and the Organisation 
of American States (O.A.S.) is distinguished from the
aforementioned alliances.
86 Stark, J., The ANZUS Treaty Alliance. Melbourne 
University Press (1964), pp.79-80.
87 Ibid. . pp.78-79.
oo (
Kelsen, H . , "Is the North Atlantic Treaty a Regional 
Arrangement?" A.J.I .L. 45 (1951), pp.162-6. See also his
book, Recent Trends in the Law of the U N . London, Institute 
of World Affairs (1951), pp.918 et seq. Kleffans, N. supports 
the view that the North Atlantic Treaty is wholly consistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations - "Regionalism and 
Political Pacts with Special Reference to the North Atlantic 
Treaty", A.J.I.L. 43 (1949), pp.666-78.
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Alliance treaties are mainly concerned with the security
• • • 89of the parties and may be offensive in nature. In contrast, 
the G.C.C. is a peaceful regional organisation and deals with 
coordination and integration between member states in all 
fields (Article 4 of the Fundamental Statute).
The G.C.C. Fundamental Statute does not contain any 
security provisions, such as an obligation on member states 
to establish a particular form of military structure for 
mutual defence. The NATO and ANZUS treaties impose on the 
parties the obligation of mutual aid and collective defence 
in case of armed attacks.90
However, Bowett refers to the fact that although NATO is 
not a "regional arrangement" within the meaning of Chapter 
VIII of the U.N. Charter, it is an organisation expressed to 
be one for "collective self-defence" under Article 51 of the 
Charter.91
Some regional organisations, however, have provisions 
which, while not providing a military alliance, make 
provisions for collective repulsion of aggression. Such 
provision is contained in Article 6 of the Arab League Pact92
89 Kleffens, ibid. . p.670.
90 Articles 3 and 5, NATO; Articles 2 and 4, ANZUS. For
the text see Peaslee, International Governmental
Organisations. op.cit.. pp.1148 and 74 respectively.
91 . . .Bowett, W..The Law of International Institutions. 4th
ed., Stevens & Sons, London (1982), pp.164-5.
92 For the text of the treaty, see UNTS 69-71 (1950),
pp.248-63.
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and in Article 7 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance.93 However, the G.C.C. lacks any of these 
provisions. The Fundamental Statute reveals a general 
obligation of the G.C.C. members to "complement efforts 
already begun in all vital scopes that concern their people 
and their hopes for a better future on the path of unity of 
their states".
Also of some significance is the fact that the G.C.C. 
Fundamental Statute establishes a machinery for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes among member states. Article 10 of the 
Statute provides for a commission for settlement of disputes. 
These provisions have been included so as to project the 
G.C.C. as a regional organisation rather than a military 
alliance.
Finally, if we are satisfied that the G.C.C. is a 
regional organisation under Article 52 of the U.N. Charter, 
there is little doubt that the G.C.C. has the capacity under 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter to take collective self-defence 
or under Article 53 of the Charter to take enforcement action 
authorised by the Security Council. In doing so, the 
establishment of joint command forces as a subsidiary organ 
does not contradict the very purpose of the U.N. Charter 
provisions.94
93 For the text of the treaty see UNTS 21-23 (1948-49), 
163, pp.77-91.
94 • •In practice the joint command forces have played a 
remarkable role in maintaining peace and security among the 
G.C.C. member states themselves. In March 1986 Bahrain began 
to construct a coast guard station on a reef of Fashet-al
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(iv) Cooperation in Various Fields
The Fundamental Statute provides some general obligations 
which envisage the realisation of cooperation in all fields. 
Article 4.3 stresses the necessity of elaborating and adopting 
similar systems in fields of education and culture, social, 
health, information and tourism, legislation and 
administrative affairs. It states that the basic objectives 
of the Cooperation Council are:
"3. Formulate similar regulations in various fields
including the following:
a. economic and financial affairs
b. commerce, customs and communications
c. education and culture
d. social and health affairs
e. information and tourism
f. legislation and administrative affairs.
The objective of the G.C.C. here is to bring about
coordination, approximation in various fields and not 
integration.95 Thus certain developments in the form of new 
policies require the harmonisation and most likely a reform 
of internal laws.96 Yet apart from the economic objectives
Deribel. Qatar, disputing Bahrain's claim, seized the reef 
on April 26, installing artillery and anti-aircraft guns. The 
confrontation was eased by the G.C.C. and especially Saudi 
mediation, and military observers from the G.C.C. joint 
command forces supervised the Qatar withdrawal. See the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, Moderation and Stabilities in an 
Interdependent World, edited by Sandwick, West View Press, 
American Arab Affairs Council (1987), at p.194.
95 The Secretary-General Abdullah Bishara, The Role of 
the G.C.C. in the Realisation of Arab Unity. A research paper 
submitted to a seminar held in Riyadh on 29-30 April 1985, 
G.C.C. Secretariat General, p.26.
96 According to the recommendations of ministerial and 
technical committees the G.C.C. secretariat has conducted 
legal studies in order to unify the legislation in the member 
states. These legal studies concentrate on a unified law of
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which are stipulated in the UEA, the Fundamental Statute has 
unclear references to cooperation in the above fields. One 
may notice only that these goals are generalities. There is 
no firm commitment except for a determination to adopt similar 
systems in all fields.
The terms "cooperation", "coordination" and formulating 
similar regulations in various fields are methods to be 
employed in pursuing the aim of achieving "unity between 
them". These methods of cooperation are not absolutely 
binding in view of the nature of the cooperation and the 
method has to be flexible rather than obligatory. In other 
words the achievement of similar regulations comes as a result 
of negotiation between the member states and within their own
printing and publication in the member states, a draft system 
for pesticides and fertilizers, a draft system of registration 
and selling of drugs, a draft of unified patent system and a 
draft for establishing a Gulf company for road transport. 
Furthermore, there are recommendations concerning the unified 
tariffs for electricity and water, standardisation of 
electricity and water equipment, standardisation of 
construction equipment, unification of telecommunications 
rates etc. See the G.C.C. Annual Report (1985), pp.59-62, 73 
and 119-26. See also some studies conducted on the 
unification of G.C.C. internal laws. Al-Alfi, M. , "The 
Unification of Private Law Legislations in the G.C.C. Member 
Sates", a seminar organised by the Centre of Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula Studies, o p .cit.. pp.1-32; Al-Ahwani, H. , 
"Perceptions on the Unification of the Civil Law between the 
G.C.C. Member States", ibid.. pp.1-2 6; Attyia, A., "Aspects 
of Cooperation in the Procedural Fields between G.C.C. Member 
States", ibid.. pp.1-42; Al-Baharna, H. , "A Study of the 
Unified Economic Agreement and its Impact on the Unification 
of Rules of Ownership. Commercial and Economic Codes of the 
G.C.C. Member States", ibid.. pp.1-19.
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institutions.97
The G.C.C. Statute does not provide that the organisation 
shall follow any other than traditional methods of 
international cooperation. It seems therefore that the basic
In the annual report of the G.C.C. (1985) the 
secretariat affirms that the fourth objective concerns the 
approximation and not integration of their systems in the 
various fields. Therefore it is not surprising that most of 
the activities in this area take the form of recommendations. 
For example, the first meeting ever of the G.C.C. ministers 
of education was not held until September 1985. Bahrain's 
Education Minister attributed the apparent slow pace of 
educational cooperation under the G.C.C. to two factors. 
First, significant educational cooperation existed even before 
the creation of the G.C.C. (i.e. educational cooperation has 
taken place under the auspices of the Arab Education Office 
of the Gulf States, which has been in existence for several 
years and which also includes Iraq). Second, G.C.C. policy­
makers have directed their attention to more immediate issues 
such as economic and industrial planning. On the information 
level, cooperation has involved news agencies, radio 
programmes, and even the creation of a regional G.C.C. radio 
programme called the "Voice of the Gulf Cooperation Council". 
This programme, initiated in July 1985, would broadcast from 
Abu Dhabi for three months and then would rotate among the 
members. The voice would be heard two hours daily 
(recommendations of the Deputy Ministers of Information at 
their meeting on 12 March 1985).
Another example is the recommendations taken by the 
Ministers of Labour and Social Affairs in their meeting in 
Doha on 6 May 1985. The recommendations concern the 
following:
To study the recruitment of G.C.C. citizens in the 
social welfare institutions.
To prepare regulations concerning social welfare and 
assistance.
To study the possibility of establishing a regional 
centre for private education for the handicapped. 
To formulate social policy and legislation to 
recruit blind and handicapped people in various 
fields.
There are other recommendations taken by specialised 
committees on the levels of culture, youth and sport, civil 
service, health and the protection of the environment. For 
more details on these recommendations see the G.C.C. Annual 
Report (1985), ibid.. pp.97-115. See also Nakhleh, E. , The 
Gulf Cooperation Council. Policies. Problems and Prospects. 
Praeger (1986), pp.35-38.
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philosophy of the Fundamental Statute is the idea of 
cooperation among governments of the region but which does not 
go towards the achievement of functional integration.
The emphasis is put entirely on cooperation between
inter-governmental organs, such as the ministerial committees.
No rule has been created for independent supranational bodies, 
which by their very composition and function could escape the 
control of the governments of member states. By contrast to
• • 98 •the European Economic Community and the defunct East African
• 99 • •Community, there is a more elaborate and more integrated
institutional framework to achieve their objectives. Both 
organisations have been endowed in addition to the strictly 
intergovernmental organs with:
(1) A kind of supranational body (The Commission 
in the EEC and the East African Ministers in 
the defunct EAC)
(2) A kind of parliamentary assembly.
(3) A court of justice.100
98 •For the provisions governing the institutions of the 
EEC see Sohn, L., International Organisation and Integration: 
Annotated Basic Documents and Descriptive Directory of 
International Organisations and Arrangements. Martinus 
Nijhoff, The Hague (1986), pp.833-853.
99 For the EAC treaty see Sohn, L. , Basic Documents of 
African Regional Organisations. Oceana Publications, pp.1145- 
1201.
100 For the legal status of the European Community see 
Lasok, D. and Bridge, J. , Introduction to the law and 
Institutions of the European Communities. 3rd ed. , London, 
Butterworth (1982), pp.26-46. See also Hartley, T.C., The 
Foundations of European Community Law. Clarendon Press, Oxford 
(1983), pp.8-24. As for the defunct EAC, see Akiwumi, A., 
"Juridical Aspects of Economic Integration Treaties in 
Africa", Hague Academy of International Law Colloquium (1971)
(23-25 VII) Sijthoff, Leiden, pp.33-46. In December 1977 the 
EAC collapsed and the constituent treaty of Kampala 1967 was 
terminated. This termination is probably due to changed
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However, as mentioned earlier the Fundamental Statute is 
only concerned with pointing out the larger objectives, the 
major principles and the fundamental machinery, but does not 
enter into detailed regulation of all objectives, a task 
which to a great extent is left to the institutions it 
establishes.
In accordance with Article 10 of the rules of procedure 
the Supreme Council set up five ministerial committees in 
order to achiever, inter alia, these goals.
As soon as these committees started their work they 
realised the need for other ministerial committees and 
subcommittees to be established. There are fourteen 
ministerial committees so far entrusted with the task of 
coordination and implementation of the various objectives in 
both the Fundamental Statute and the Unified Economic 
Agreement. The ministerial committees meet in accordance 
with the dates proposed by the Secretary General. The 
process of consultation and cooperation continues both within 
the Secretariat General, which has a coordinating role101 and 
within a number of subcommittees. Some of the subcommittees 
are permanent, others ad hoc (i.e. permanent subcommittees 
for basic industries operating under the aegis of the
circumstances, both political and economic. See Green, R. , 
"The East African Community, Death, Funeral, Inheritance" 
African Contemporary Record (197701978), pp.A125-A137. See 
also, Africa Contemporary Record (ACR) (1976-77), pp.A59-67.
101 •Article 15 of the Fundamental Statute.
128
• • . • . 102 ministerial committees for industry).
The main function of all these committees and 
subcommittees is to exchange information and coordinate 
activity. However, there is a move gradually to set 
standards and to make recommendations within the various 
areas of competence of each ministerial committee and 
subcommittee, aiming to meet their obligations set out in 
Article 4.3 of the Fundamental Statute.103
Nevertheless these committees are empowered to make 
recommendations for the consideration and the final approval 
of the Supreme Council.
The G.C.C. political organs (the Supreme Council and 
ministerial council) normally are under no obligation 
whatsoever to consult these committees. Therefore, from the 
institutional point of view, these committees do not have any 
participation in the process of decision-making.
102 There are other various committees with specific 
responsibilities, for example for pollution effects from oil- 
based industries and the massive oil slick from Gulf war- 
damaged oil fields, a joint committee on pharmaceuticals to 
develop regulation for joint purchase of pharmaceutical 
products, a committee concerned with issuing a single G.C.C. 
passport to nationals in member states. See Middle East 
Executive Reports (MEER), a monthly legal and business guide 
to the Middle East (June 1983), Vol.61, No.6, pp.7-15. See 
also A1 Quwaiz, A., The G.C.C. Secretary-General Assistant for 
economic affairs, "Gulf Cooperation Council from an Economic 
Integration View", a lecture being presented in the Institute 
of Diplomatic Studies, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Saudi 
Arabia, January 1986, p.3 (Arabic).
103 For more details of the ministerial committees' work, 
especially in areas such as education, agriculture, 
information, see Nakhleh, E., The Gulf Cooperation Council, 
Policies. Problems and Prospects. Praeger, New York, London 
(1986), pp.23-38.
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Furthermore, for the purpose of achieving the objectives laid 
down in the Fundamental Statute the Supreme Council (composed 
of the heads of state) is the only organ empowered to 
consider the cooperation plans and take decisions on them.104
In this regard one may conclude that the G.C.C. closely 
resembles the Arab League. Although the cooperation efforts 
have been relatively successful in the social and cultural 
fields, the League has no enforcement authority in the 
functional fields and limited staff of the secretariat can 
hardly support large-scale regional programmes. The best 
they can do is to remind the competent bodies of member 
governments about decisions taken and request them to submit 
progress reports.105
However, one has to keep in mind that organs and 
institutions usually reflect to a great extent the ideologies 
and realities of the member states they are representing. In 
the case of the G.C.C. neither the political realities nor 
the economic and social conditions allowed the authors of the 
Fundamental Statute to go further in stipulating their 
cooperation efforts.
104 Article 8 of the Fundamental Statute. See also 
Article 12, where one would notice that the rule of the 
ministerial council does not have decision making power of the 
scope and degree of the Supreme Council. All the resolutions 
aim at developing cooperation and coordination in the various 
fields adopted by the ministerial council must be referred to 
the Supreme Council to be decided on (Article 12.1 of the 
Statute).
105 Macdonald, R. , The League of Arab States - A Study in 
the Dynamics of Regional Organisation. Princeton University 
Press (1965), pp.172-83.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MEMBERSHIP
1. Closed Type of Membership
The provision of the Fundamental Statute governing
membership is contained in Article 5, which provides:
"The Cooperation Council shall be formed of the six 
states that participated in the foreign ministers 
meeting held at Riyadh on 4 February 1981."
The above provision indicated clearly that the G.C.C.
adopts a closed type of organisation. It is made up of only
six states which took part in the meeting of foreign ministers
held in Riyadh on 4 January 1981, which met together
specifically to declare the establishment of the organisation.
It should be noted that the reference to the foreign
ministers meeting is inappropriate, since the first Supreme
Council held in Abu Dhabi on 25 May 1981 led to the signature
of the G.C.C. Fundamental Statute by the heads of state, which
formally established the organisation. The Fundamental
Statute of the G.C.C. makes no provision for other Arab states
of the Gulf region to join the organisation in the future.
In general international organisations set some rules
regulating membership as regards the original parties to the
constituent treaty and states which may later be admitted.
1 See the final communique of the first meeting of the 
Supreme Council in Abu Dhabi on May 25, 1981 in the Documents 
of Qatar News Agency. Ministry of Information, (October 1983), 
pp.91-93.
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In contrast, Article 1 of the Arab League pact provides a
. . 2  . •criterion of admission. Membership is open to independent
Arab States which "shall have the right to adhere to the 
league". However, in practice subsequent membership of Libya, 
Sudan, Tunisia, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Mauritania and the 
United Arab Emirates was determined by application and
unanimous acceptance of the applications by the council of the
3League. Membership under Article 237 of the treaty
establishing the European Economic Community is open to every 
European state, yet application must be submitted to the 
council. The council determines unanimously the admission of 
any new member, acting on the proposal from the Commission.
Since the G.C.C. has adopted a closed type of membership, 
it is thought that the member states deliberately exclude 
states with republican constitutions or with revolutionary 
tendencies.4 The preamble of the Fundamental Statute 
impliedly excludes Iraq from G.C.C. membership. It speaks of 
the similarity between the regions of Arab Gulf states in
2
The pact of the League of Arab States concluded on 22 
March, 1945 in Cairo. It entered into force on 22 May 1945. 
The members of the League are 22 countries, including 
Palestine which became a full member on 9 September 1976. 
Egypt's membership was suspended in March 1977 and the 
League's headquarters moved from Cairo to Tunis. See Bowman 
and Harris, Multilateral Treaties Index and Current Status. 
Butterworths (1984), at p.112.
3 . . .Bowett, D. , The Law of International Institutions. 4th
ed. (1982) London, Stevens & Sons, p.230. For the question
of membership of the Arab League, see Pogany, o p .cit.. pp.6-7.
4 Bouachba, "Le Conseil de Cooperation Des Etats Arabes 
du Golfe", Revue generale de droit international public. Tome 
LXXXIX (1985), p.33.
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their political and economic orientations. It states: "Being
fully aware of their mutual bonds of special relations, common 
characteristics and similar systems...” etc.
Iran of course was excluded from the beginning since the 
G.C.C. is only for Arab states in the Gulf, and therefore the 
title of the organisation "The G.C.C. for Arab States" has 
been drawn very carefully. However, some held the view that 
because of the Iraqi-Irani war it would have been unwise for 
the Gulf states to admit Iraq to the G.C.C. since this might 
incite the hostility of Iran against the Gulf states. This 
view is accentuated in that Iran accused the Gulf states of 
supporting Iraq.5
The G.C.C. ministerial council has also excluded other 
states which are not in the region by rejecting applications 
for admission from the Arab Yemen Republic (North Yemen) and 
Somalia.6
This decision must be correct, for not only do these 
states lie outside the Gulf region, but also maintain 
political systems which are incompatible with those of the 
region. Furthermore, the economic conditions prevailing in
5 Alssivasa Newspaper. Kuwait, 28.1.1981. The President 
of Iraq, Sadam Hussein, was displeased with the exclusion of 
Iraq from the G.C.C. on the ground that Iraq was fighting for 
Iraq rights as well as the Gulf states. See Muhklis, A., The 
Gulf Cooperation Council. A Political Study. University of 
Basra (1986), p.115.
6 Al-Ashal, A., The Legal and Political Framework of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (1983), op.cit.. pp.135-36. See 
also, Kechichion, "The Gulf Cooperation: Search for
Security", 7 Third World Quarterly (1985), p.583; 26 ILM,
p.1132.
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these states are vastly different from those within the member
states. Consequently the G.C.C. has been accused of being a
7rigid political and military organisation, a charge which its 
founders vehemently deny. G.C.C. officials have expressed 
their standpoint and explained the implications of having a 
closed type of organisation. They stated that the political, 
economic and social similarities of the six member states are 
the real reasons behind the decision. They added that the 
success of the organisation would be guaranteed only if they 
preserved the degree of homogeneity and natural similarities
p . . .
between the founders. As the Saudi Minister of Foreign
Affairs put it:
"This does not exclude other states in the region 
from becoming members in the future if they possess 
institutions and legislation similar to that of the 
founding member states."
However, it is clear from this diplomatic announcement that
the G.C.C. member states do not wish to open their doors to
other states. At any rate, an attempt to admit new member
states requires the amendment of not only Article 5 but also
the preamble.
Yet the question to be asked is whether the term 
"regional organisation" applies to the G.C.C., though it does
7
Bouachba, o p .cit.. p.33.
p
Qatar News Agency documents, Part One, o p .cit. . pp.103-
5.
g
An interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Saudi Arabia, Prince Saud Al-Faisal, A1 Saudia Newspaper. 
4.4.1981.
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not include all the states in the region.
Professor Schermers excludes the strict geographical
meaning of the word "region" and "regional" to be attributed
to international organisations, though it derives its name
from it. As he puts it:
"The exact meaning of the word ‘region* depends on 
the interest involved and therefore on the purpose 
of the organisation concerned and the organs 
formed."10
A region therefore should not be defined as geographical 
characteristics only but also by other factors such as 
economic, social, cultural and political. The G.C.C. as such 
possesses certain characteristics which are undoubtedly 
difficult to find in other regional organisations. However, 
the factors to qualify an organisation as a regional 
arrangement under the U.N. Charter are quite different. The 
U.N. Charter, though it does not define the concept of 
regional arrangement, sets two criteria to qualify an 
association of sovereign states as a regional organisation.
Schermers, H.G., International Institutional Law. 
Vol.l, Structure, A.W. Sijthoff, Leiden (1980), p.108 In 
another place Schermers gives examples of a group of states 
forming a regional organisation although they are from 
different continents (i.e. British Commonwealth, the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)) . 
The former counts the U.K., Canada and India, and the latter 
Japan. Other examples: O.A.S. excludes Cuba for its
different system; OAU excludes South Africa for its racial 
discrimination policy? see p.18 for the meaning of the term 
"region". See also Kieffens, E.N., "Regionalism and Political 
Pacts with Special reference to the Northern Atlantic Treaty", 
A.J.I.L. Vol.43 (1949), at p.667; Smithers, P., "Toward
Greater Coherence among Intergovernmental Control", in 
Regionalism and the United Nations, edited by Andemicael B., 
Oceana Publications (1979), pp.26-7.
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(i) Whether its objectives and activities are compatible with 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations 
(Articles 1, 2 of the Charter)? and
(ii) Whether it contributes to the maintenance of 
international peace and security as is appropriate for 
regional action, including peaceful settlement of 
disputes and enforcement action as authorised by the 
Security Council (Article 52 of the Charter).11
From the travaux oreparatoires of the UN Charter relating 
to Article 52 a proposal by the Egyptian delegation to 
introduce a definition into the Charter that would emphasise 
as requirements of a regional arrangement such factors as 
permanent organisation, geographical proximity, community of 
interest, and cultural and historical affinities was rejected 
on the ground that while it "clearly defined obvious 
legitimate and eligible factors" it failed to cover possible 
cases.^
Furthermore, in the practice of the U.N. Israel raised 
the issue of whether the Arab League as regional arrangement 
and its activities are consistent with the purpose and 
principle of the United Nations when the League chief
11 Andemicael, B. , The O.A.U. and the U.N. Relations 
between the Organisation of African Unitv and the United 
Nations. African Publishing Co., New York and London (1976) 
at p.2.
12 Goodrich, L. , Hambro, E. & Simons, A., Charter of the 
United Nations. Commentary and Documents. 3rd and revised 
edition, Columbia University Press, New York and London 
(1969), p.356.
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administrative officer invited to meetings of the UN General
Assembly. Israel maintained that the League was based on
racial principles and its activities in Palestine had not been
consistent with the purpose and principles of the UN Charter.
The Assembly, however, did not make a decision on the 
13matter. It is widely accepted that the Arab League 
constitutes a "regional arrangement” within the meaning of
Article 52 of the UN Charter,14 and that can also be deduced
15from the practice of the UN itself.
The G.C.C. Fundamental Statute is silent on the question 
of whether the G.C.C. should be considered as a regional 
organisation within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the U.N. 
Charter. Neither does the Statute explicitly refer to the 
parties' commitment to achieve international peace and 
security in accordance with the U.N. Charter.16 However, the
-LJ Ibid. . p.359.
14 Hassouna, H. , League of Arab States and Regional
Disputes. A Study of Middle East Conflict. Oceana
Publications, New York (1975), pp.11-12? Kourala, E., 
"Peacekeeping and Regional Arrangements" in Cassese, A., 
United Nations Peacekeeping. Sijthoff & Noordhoff, The 
Netherlands (1978), pp.102-3? Eide, A., "Peacekeeping and 
Enforcement by Regional Organisations", Journal of Peace 
Research. Vol.3 (1966), note 53 at p.136? Moussa, A.,
"Rapports entre les Nations Unies et la Ligue des Etats 
Arabes", 29 Revue Egyptienne de Droit International (1973), 
pp.69-70.
15 Hassouna, o p.cit.. p.12? Pogany, I., The Arab League 
and Peacekeeping in the Lebanon, o p.cit.. p.103.
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While discussing the draft of the Fundamental Statute 
the Bahrain delegation proposed adding a paragraph in the 
preamble which would refer to the obligation of the G.C.C. 
member states to adhere to the principles and purposes of the 
U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
However, this proposal was rejected by the Saudi Arabia
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G.C.C. Heads of State affirmed in the final communique of the
first Supreme Council meeting their entire obligations towards
the U.N. Charter and their willingness to make every effort
17to maintain international peace and security. Furthermore, 
the G.C.C. Fundamental Statute provides for establishment of 
a commission for the settlement of disputes (Article 10) . 
While at the same time it provides for the resolution of local 
regional disputes, these provisions conform to the U.N. 
concept of peaceful resolution of disputes, the development 
of friendly relations and international cooperation as 
provided under Article 1 of the Charter.
It may not be necessary to mention in the constitution 
of the organisation that its aims are compatible with those
delegation, claiming that such addition might contradict some 
provisions of Islamic law. This view could truly be envisaged 
reading Articles 2, 4, 7, 16(1), 18, 25(2) and 30 of the
Declaration.
It appears though that the most contradictory provision 
of the declaration is in Article 16(1) which provides "Men and 
women of full age without any limitation due to race, 
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found 
a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, 
during marriage and at its dissolution". According to Islamic 
law women get married only with Moslems. They also cannot 
divorce their husband without court proceedings, while 
husbands can. Furthermore, the Saudi Arabian delegation 
claimed that there is no need to refer to the U.N. Charter so 
long as there is reference to the Arab League pact in the 
preamble of the Fundamental Statute of the G.C.C. They added 
that it is sufficient that the Arab League pact refer to the 
U.N. Charter. The latter argument cannot be supported since 
the Arab League pact could not possibly have referred to the 
Charter which came into force on 26 June 1945, while the pact 
became operational on 22 March 1945. (The second report of 
the head of Qatar delegation to the legal experts meeting 
which was held in Muscat on 14.3.1981).
17 Documents of Qatar News Agency, op.cit.. pp.91-93.
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of the U.N. provided that those aims are in fact compatible 
and do not conflict with the U.N. Charter.
2. Expulsion and Suspension
The expulsion of a member state from an organisation is 
a very strong measure by way of sanction against the wrong­
doing state. While expulsion terminates membership, 
suspension is a temporary action which suspends membership
until a particular situation has been remedied or particular
18conditions have been fulfilled.
Some constitutions of international organisations contain
19provisions on both suspension and expulsion, some others
. . 2 0  make provision for only suspension and some are silent on
21 . the matter. The G.C.C. Fundamental Statute falls within the
18 Schermers, o p.cit.. at p.54. Professor Sohn, however, 
raises the doubt as to the effectiveness of expulsion as a 
sanction to achieve any useful long-range purpose. He thinks 
that suspension or selective exclusion might be a much better 
sanctions. See his article "Expulsion or Forced Withdrawal 
from an International Organisation", Harvard Law Review. 
Vol.77 (June 1964), pp.1420-25.
19 . .This is the situation for instance m  the United
Nations (Article 5 and 6 of the Charter), the International 
Civil Aviation Organisation (Article 93) and the International 
Monetary Fund (Article XXVI) and the WHO constitution (Article 
7). See Peaslee, A.J., International Governmental
Organisation Documents. 3rd ed., o p.cit.. pp.1303, Part 1, 370 
Part 5, 1014 Part 1 and 453 Part 3 and 4 respectively.
20 .WMO Constitution (Article 31, Statute of I.A.E.A.
(Article XIX(B)). See Peaslee, ibid.. pp.545 and 231 Parts 
3 and 4 respectively.
21 UPU, F.A.O., UNESCO, IMCO and ITO. See Peaslee, 
ibid. . pp. 634 Part 4, 98 Part 2, 439 Parts 3 and 4, 370 and 
497 Part 5.
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last category.
Due to similarities in history, culture, economy and
political system, there is no such provision for expulsion in
the Fundamental Statute of the G.C.C. This fact has been
deliberately emphasised so as to appeal to the good faith of
the member states to observe and implement their obligation
as provided in the Statute. However, since the G.C.C.
Fundamental Statute is silent on this matter and there is no
practice giving rise to guidance on the point, one needs to
consult the opinion of the legal commentators and the practice
of other international organisations. This may help to reach
a solution if a problem occurs in the future.
Opinion is divided among legal commentators on whether
it is permissible to suspend or expel a state member of an
international organisation in the absence of constitutional
provision to that effect.
Nagendra Singh states the general position in the absence
of constitutional provision.
"It is a well-established principle of international 
law that where a constituent instrument is silent.. . 
there is no right vested in the organisation to 
expel or suspend a member state."
Professor Schermers is also of the view that expulsion 
in the absence of constitutional provision may not be
22 . .Singh, N . , Termination of Membership of International
Organisations. Stevens and Sons Ltd., London (1958), p.79. 
Singh makes an exception to this principle when a member state 
persists in refusing to ratify an amendment to the 
constitution of the organisation even though the same is 
passed in accordance with the procedure for amendment laid 
down in the constituent instrument.
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compatible with the general objectives of an international
organisation, especially an organisation of universal 
23 . . .character. However for closed regional organisations (such
as the G.C.C.) he thinks that the situation is different.
Schermers argues that although the legal argument against
expulsion without constitutional provision would be the same
as in the universal organisation, a state may lose its
membership without express provisions for expulsion. This
could happen when a state places itself outside the political
24or economic sphere of the organisation.
The attitude of some European states is against the
expulsion of a member from an international organisation in
the absence of express constitutional provisions. This was
declared at the signing of the Final Act of the 1979 congress
of the Universal Postal Union in Rio de Janeiro on 26 October
1979 by the nine member states of the European Community.
"... the decision taken on 13 September 1979 
purporting to expel a member country from the U.P.U. 
constitution which contains no provision for the 
expulsion of members. The decision, therefore, has 
no legal validity and accordingly the nine do not 
accept it. They consider that South africa is 
still a member of the Universal Postal Union and 
will therefore continue to treat with the South 
African postal administration.11
However, Professors Schwarzenberger and Brown agree that 
international institutions may suspend a member in the absence
23 Schermers, o p.cit.. p.81.
24 Ibid.. pp.81-2.
25 Quoted by Marston, G. , "United Kingdom Materials on 
International Law", 50 B.Y.I.L. (1979), pp.310-11.
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of express provision, if such power is indispensable to the
2 6fulfilment of the organisation's function. As for
expulsion, they express the doubt as to whether an 
international institution should be granted the power of 
expulsion, but if there are persistent breaches of membership 
obligations amounting to a serious breach of a treaty, then 
it is the right of every member to exclude the wrong-doing 
state.27
The Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties accepts the
latter view if the persistent violations of the obligation of
membership amount to a material breach of the constituent
instrument of an international organisation. Article 60 of
the Convention provides, inter alia, that:
"A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one 
of the parties entitles (a) the other parties by 
unanimous agreement to suspend the operation of the 
treaty in whole or in part or to terminate it either
(i) in the relation between themselves and the defaulting 
state; or
(ii) as between all the parties."
According to the Article:
"A material breach of a treaty, for its purposes, 
consists of (a) a repudiation of the treaty not 
sanctioned by the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, or (b) the violation of a provision 
essential to the accomplishment of the object or 
purpose of the treaty."
2 6 Schwarzenberger, G. and Brown, E.D., A Manual of 
International Law. 6th ed. , Professional Books Ltd. (1976) at 
p. 265.
27 Ibid.
2 8 See the Convention in Brownlie, Basic Documents m
International Law, op.cit.. pp.372-3.
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The International Court of Justice in its Advisory
Opinion in the Namibia Case (1971) appears to have accepted
this approach while dealing with the question of the failure
of South Africa to fulfil its obligation in respect of the
administration of the mandated territory. The Court stated:
"In examining the action of the General Assembly it 
is appropriate to have regard to the general
principles of international law regarding the 
termination of a treaty relationship on account of 
breach... The rules laid down by the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted without
a dissenting vote) may in many respects be 
considered as a codification of existing customary 
law on the subject... General Assembly resolution 
2145 (XXI) determines that both forms of material 
breach had occurred in this case. By stressing that 
South Africa has in fact disavowed the mandate, the 
General Assembly declared in fact that it had 
repudiated it. The resolution in question is
therefore to be viewed as the exercise of the right 
to terminate a relationship in case of a deliberate 
and persistent violation of obligation which 
destroys the very object and purpose of that 
relationship.
The Court emphasised that:
"The silence of a treaty as to the existence of such 
right cannot be interpreted as implying the exclusion of 
a right which has its source outside of the treaty in 
general international law, and is dependent on the 
occurrence of circumstances which axe not normally 
envisaged when a treaty is concluded."
In practice, members have been expelled from an 
international organisation in the absence of constitutional 
provisions. An outstanding example is the expulsion of Cuba 
from the Organisation of American States (O.A.S.) in January 
1962 because of Cuba's adoption of the communist system and
29 I.C.J. Reports (1971), pp.46-7.
30 Ibid.. p.47.
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its political, economic and military ties with the communist 
nations.31
There have been many reasons given for the Cuban 
expulsion. Some justify the expulsion on the basis of the 
rule of international law that violation of a treaty by one
party justifies the release from treaty obligations by another
32 . . . .party. Others maintain that it is an inherent right of any
regional organisation to determine which countries should
participate and it was for the O.A.S. to interpret its own
3 3charter for its purposes.
3. Withdrawal
Withdrawal is one of the methods by which a state can 
bring its membership in an international organisation to an 
end.
The G.C.C. Fundamental Statute does not provide for 
withdrawal from membership of the organisation. Apparently 
the authors of the Fundamental Statute did not want to 
jeopardise the permanent nature they wanted for the
31 U.N. Doc. S15075 SC. Official Records. 17th year, 
p.74. On the exclusion of Cuba from the O.A.S. generally see 
Thomas & Thomas, The Organisation of American States. Southern 
Methodist University Press, Dallas (1963), pp.58-60; Sohn, 
L. , "Expulsion or Forced Withdrawal", o p.cit.. pp.1417-20; 
Fenwick, "Non-intervention v. Collective Security", 56
A.J.I.L. (1962), pp.469 and 474; Schermers, International 
Institutional Law, o p.cit.. at p.62.
32 Fenwick, o p.cit.. p.474.
3 3 Sohn, o p.cit.. p.1419. See Schermers, who concludes 
"OAS has taken the view that a state which no longer satisfies 
the criteria on which the regional cooperation is based may 
be suspended without express provision", ibid.. p.122.
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organisation. Therefore the statute was designed with the 
belief that the organisation would be permanent no matter what 
obstacles may appear in its path.
However, the silence over the question of withdrawal in 
the constitution of some international organisations has given 
rise to serious controversy. Some argue that withdrawal is 
an inherent right arising out of principle of state
sovereignty, equality, expediency and fundamental changes in 
circumstances, and this right exists unless expressly
^  A
barred. Others attach the right of withdrawal to the
confederate states. They point out that the right of
withdrawal in a confederal structure is well established in
political practice and in constitutional law. It is based
upon the principle that confederal states are sovereign,
35retaining their full international personality. However, 
this argument is not supported by many commentators who deny 
the existence of a right to withdraw, even from a 
confederation.
Jellinek considers withdrawal from a confederation a
3 6breach of treaty. Professor Kunz points out that
confederations have been established for ever and the right
of withdrawal is nowhere expressly granted except the
34 . . . .See Schermers, o p .cit.. who explains in detail the
states' claims in supporting this argument, pp.51-53.
35 Singh, o p .cit.. p.9.
3 6 This view is cited by Feinberg, N. , "Unilateral 
Withdrawal from an International Organisation", 39 B.Y.I.L. 
(1963), p.214.
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37confederated states (1861-65).
This also was the problem of the League of Nations. 
Although it was founded on the basis of confederation, it
. 3 8allowed states to withdraw.
McNair also denies the right of withdrawal in the absence
of an express or implied provision, if a treaty is intended
to be of perpetual duration. He states:
"A treaty is intended to be of perpetual duration 
and incapable of unilateral termination, unless, 
expressly or by implication, it contains a right of 
unilateral termination, or some provision for its 
coming to an end."
This view is supported by Article 56.1 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. It stipulates:
"1. A treaty which contains no provision regarding 
its termination and which does not provide for 
denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to 
denunciation or withdrawal unless
(a) it is established that the parties intend to admit 
the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal, or
(b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied 
by the nature of the treaty.”
The practice of some international organisations shows
that withdrawals have taken place even in the absence of such
37 . . .Cited by Feinberg, ibid.
3 8 See Rivlin, D., "The League of Nations as 
Confederacy", International Relations (November 1976), 
op.cit.. pp.1125-30. Rivlin refers to the fact that the right 
to withdraw was explicitly refuted in the United States 
Articles of Confederation. Article 13 stated: "The articles
of this confederation shall be inviolately observed by every 
state and the union shall be perpetual".
39 McNair, The Law of Treaties. Oxford, Clarendon Press 
(1961), pp.493-94.
40 . .See the convention in Brownlie, Basic Documents in
International Law, op.cit.. p.371.
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express provisions.41 However, opinion is divided on the 
matter among international lawyers after the Indonesian 
withdrawal from the U.N. This came as a result of the 
absence of withdrawal provisions in the Charter of the U.N.
and ambiguity in the declaration of withdrawal passed by the
. 42San Francisco conference on the U.N.
Writers such as Unni maintain that Indonesia had the
right to withdraw from the U.N. He concludes that, since it
was not the purpose of the U.N. to compel a member to continue
its cooperation in the organisation. The conference
declaration envisaged certain illustrative and not exhaustive
circumstances to justify the withdrawal of a member from the
A ^
United Nations. Livingstone points out that although
41 . . .Although the WHO constitution did not contain any
provision which permitted members to withdraw, in 1949 and 
1950 the East European countries (USSR, Ukrainian SSR, 
Byelorussia SSR, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland) informed the secretariat of the WHO that 
they were withdrawing from the organisation. On 6 May 1950 
China also withdrew from WHO. In 1952 and 1953
Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary announced that they 
considered their membership of UNESCO terminated, although 
withdrawal was not authorised under the UNESCO constitution. 
See respectively, The records of the 3rd session of the 
Council of WHO (WHO Official Records No.17) Annex 22, and the 
Report of the 3rd session of the WHO Conference (WHO Official 
Records No.28) Annex 13, UNESCO resolution 9.3.1964, pp.189- 
192. See also Schermers, o p.cit.. pp.47-51.
42 . . .Unni, A.C., "Indonesia's Withdrawal from the United
Nations", 4-5 Indian J.I.L. (1964-65), pp.128-46.
43 The declaration of committee 1/2 approved unanimously 
at plenary session of the San Francisco conference, read as 
follows:
"The committee adopts the view that the charter should 
not make express provision either to permit or to 
prohibit withdrawal from the organisation. The committee 
deems that the highest duty of the nations which will 
become members is to continue their cooperation within
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Indonesia had no right to declare withdrawal from the U.N., 
it had the legal power to do so. A state cannot be deprived 
of its legal power in the constitutional structure of the 
U.K.44
On the other hand, Schwelb considers that withdrawal from 
the United Nations is permissible only in the exceptional 
circumstances set forth in the interpretative declaration. 
The Indonesian withdrawal cannot be considered as such and it 
constitutes a breach of international obligation according to 
article 4 of the Charter. Indonesia's return to the U.N. 
without the requirement of readmission confirms this
the organisation for the preservation of international 
peace and security. If, however, a member, because of 
exceptional circumstances, feels constrained to withdraw 
and leave the burden of maintaining international peace 
and security on the members, it is not the purpose of the 
organisation to compel that member to continue its 
cooperation in the organisation.
It is obvious, however, that withdrawals or some other 
forms of dissolution of the organisation would become 
inevitable if, deceiving the hopes of humanity, the 
organisation was revealed to be unable to maintain peace 
or could do so only at the expense of law and justice.
Nor would it be the purpose of the organisation to compel 
a member to remain in the organisation if its rights and 
obligations as such were changed by Charter amendment in 
which it has not concurred, and which it finds unable to 
accept, or if an amendment duly accepted by the necessary 
majority in the assembly or in a general conference fails 
to secure the ratification necessary to bring such 
amendment into effect." Documents of the United Nations 
Conference on International Organisations. San Francisco 
1945, London, New York (1945), Vol.7, p.37, doc.314, 
1.2.17.
44 . . .Livingstone, F. , "Withdrawal from the United Nations -
Indonesia”, 14 I.C.L.O. (1965), pp.637-646.
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45 .conclusion. Similarly Feinberg considers that withdrawal 
is not legally permissible when the constituent instrument is 
silent on the matter unless a right to withdraw can be 
inferred from the relevant circumstances.46
One may conclude tentatively that the right to withdraw 
from the G.C.C. is not permissible. This view could be held 
for a number of reasons. There is no clause in the 
Fundamental Statute which entitles any member to withdraw nor 
is the right of withdrawal capable of being implied. 
Furthermore the practice of the United Nations shows great 
reluctance to support such an act in the absence of express 
provision. Moreover, the vast majority of the commentators 
support the view that unless the right of withdrawal 
explicitly or impliedly exists, a state may not unilaterally 
withdraw. As such there exists no presumption in favour of 
the right of unilateral withdrawal from the G.C.C.
45 Schwelb, E., "Withdrawal from the United Nations. The 
Indonesian Intermezzo", 61 A.J.I.L. (1967), pp.661-72. See 
also Schwarzenberger who considers the Indonesian withdrawal 
ineffective in law: "Letter to the Editor", the Times.
London, 8 January 1965 at p.9. Another writer, William R. 
Harris, states that Indonesia has withdrawn de facto and there 
has been no test of her withdrawal de jure. Inaction of the 
Security Council of the U.N. coupled with the silence of 
member states acknowledged the de facto withdrawal, "Legal 
Aspects of Indonesia's Withdrawal from the United Nations", 
Harvard International Law Club Journal. 6-7 (Winter 1984 - 
66), pp.180-83.
4 6 .
Feinberg, N . , o p .cit.. p.215.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE G.C.C.
I. INTRODUCTION
On examining the internal structure of the G.C.C., 
compared with other regional organisations, the G.C.C.*s 
structure is relatively simple and hardly original. It 
presents the characteristics of a traditional, classical type 
of international organisation with three main organs, the 
Supreme Council, the Ministerial Council and the Secretariat. 
However, the G.C.C. Fundamental Statute does not exclude the 
possibility of the principal organs creating subsidiary organs 
whenever they deem it necessary Article 6 states:
"The Cooperation Council shall have the following
main organs:
1. Supreme Council to which shall be attached the 
commission for settlement of disputes.
2. Ministerial Council
3. Secretariat-General.
Each of these organs may establish subsidiary organs as
necessary.11
The constituent instruments of some international 
organisations expressly provide for delegation of functions 
to competent organs, as is the case with the U.N. Charter 
(Articles 22, 29 and 68). In other cases the constituent 
instruments are silent on the subject of delegation. However, 
the main organs may utilise their implied power to create
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subsidiary organs to perform their functions.1
Furthermore, it must be pointed out that the authors of 
the Fundamental Statute did not take much care in defining the 
nature of the powers of the G.C.C. organs.2 However, one has 
now to look more closely at the functions and powers of the 
organs of the G.C.C. to define its efficiency.
II. FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE ORGANS
(1) Functions and Powers of the Supreme Council 
From the wording of Article 8 of the Fundamental Statute 
it seems that the statute confers vast powers upon the G.C.C. 
Supreme Council. Therefore the Supreme Council could be 
considered as the highest authority of the G.C.C. The Supreme 
Council is entrusted with examining matters which concern all 
the member states. The provision does not specify which 
matters in particular are to be reviewed by the Supreme 
Council, but it is clear since the Supreme Council comprises 
the head of states that these matters are of immense 
importance, especially those of a political nature.
1 Seyersted, F., "Objective International Personality of 
International Organisations", 34 Nor. T.I.R. (1964), p.111. 
See also ICJ Advisory Opinion, Effect of awards of 
compensation made bv the U.N. Administrative Tribunal. 
Advisory Opinion of July, ICJ Reports (1954-55), pp.58-62.
2 • • Schermers thinks that the vagueness of competence is
a result of the absence of real power. International
organisations do not tend to specify their competence if they
only issue recommendations to the members, while this is not
true with the treaties of the European Communities, which
provide for binding decisions. Therefore they define the
powers of the organs for each subject. International
Institutional Law, o p.cit.. p.202.
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However the Supreme Council is not competent to determine 
any question which is essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any member state.
The restriction, though it is not stipulated, may be
implicit in the understanding of the G.C.C. member states that 
the organisation can only perform those powers for which the 
provisions of the Fundamental Statute were made.
The inclusion of the principle of non-interference in
matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states
under Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter has provided members
of the U.N. with a strong argument opposing taking measures
in fields such as human rights, colonial questions,
peacekeeping forces and disarmament. This has great impact
3on the effectiveness of international cooperation.
One of the intricate functions of the Supreme Council is 
the responsibility for "approving the bases for dealing with
other states and international organisations".4 This in fact 
means that the Supreme Council determines the main policy 
which the member state is requested to follow in conducting 
its relationships with other states as well as with 
international organisations such as the United Nations and its 
specialised agencies, the Arab League, the Islamic Conference
3 . . . .For a detailed view on this question, see Goronwy, J.,
The United Nations and the Domestic Jurisdiction of States. 
Cardiff, Welsh Centre for International Affairs (1977), 
Chapters III, IV, V and VI.
4
Art.8 of the Fundamental Statute.
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5Organisation and the E.E.C.
5 . . .
For instance (a) the G.C.C. summit held in Riyadh, 10
November 1981 reviewed the Saudi initiative for realising 
peace in the Middle East and solving the Palestinian problem, 
and decided to ask Saudi Arabia to table the proposal at the 
21st Arab summit conference. The Saudi initiative called for:
(1) An Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied 
in 1967, including Jerusalem.
(2) Removal of settlements established by Israel in the 
occupied Arab territories after 1967.
(3) Securing the right of worship for all religions.
(4) Affirmation of the right of the Palestinians to return 
home and compensation payments to those who do not wish 
to do so.
(5) The West Bank and Gaza to be placed under supervision of 
the United Nations for a transitional period not 
exceeding a few months.
(6) The establishment of an independent state of Palestine 
with Jerusalem as its capital.
(7) The plan called for the United Nations, or some of its 
member states, to be assigned responsibility for 
implementing these principles.
In September 1982, the 12th Arab summit conference in its 
second stage, endorsed the Saudi initiative after certain 
amendments to clauses 4, 7 and 8, which read as follows:
(4) Affirm the right of the Palestinian people to self
determination in practising their inalienable national 
rights under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation, their sole legitimate representative.
(7) The Security Council to set guarantees of peace among all 
countries of the region, including the independent 
Palestinian state.
(8) The Security Council to be responsible for implementing 
these principles. See Kuwait News Agency. Special 
Dossier (1984), pp.28-29.
(b) As a result of Supreme Council approval in 1983 the 
G.C.C. sponsored a mission which aimed at trying to overcome 
Iran-Iraq differences and follow up efforts to cap the leaking 
of crude oil from the Iranian Nowruze oil fields into the Gulf 
waters.
(c) The G.C.C. adopted a unified stand by supporting the 
Afghanistan cause against the Soviet intervention through the 
Islamic Conference Organisation (I.C.O.), see ibid.. pp.32.
(d) Following air strikes against Saudi and Kuwaiti oil 
tankers in the Gulf area, the G.C.C. Supreme Council decided 
in 1984 to take the matter up at an extraordinary meeting of 
the Arab League and on May 21 to the U.N. Security Council, 
ibid.. pp.32-3.
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This may imply the Supreme Council has legal authority
to conclude agreements on behalf of member states - a view
which conforms to the general position in international
institutions that the more effective organ may conclude
agreements on behalf of the organisation.6 Another possible
interpretation is that major foreign policy transactions must
conform to the ground rules laid down by the Supreme Council.
It is probable that the objection to the establishment of
diplomatic relations between Oman, U.A.E. and the Soviet Union
7without prior consultation was based on Article 8(5).
Another function of the Supreme Council is to examine 
recommendations, reports and common projects which are passed 
to it by the Ministerial Council (Article 8(3) of the 
Fundamental Statute). This provision reveals that the
(e) The G.C.C. Supreme Council has taken some practical steps 
to unify the stand and relations of its member states on the 
case of African resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel 
by suspending aid and breaking diplomatic relations with some 
countries, ibid., p .34.
(f) The Supreme Council in its third summit approved a 
detailed plan to subsidise some vital enterprises to both the 
Arab Republic of Yemen and the Popular Democratic Republic of 
Yemen. See the G.C.C. Annual Report (1985), o p.cit.. pp.29- 
44.
(g) The G.C.C. Supreme Council approved the policy of good 
offices to solve the political and boundary disputes between 
Oman and South Yemen. See ibid.
6 Detter, I., "The Organs of International Organisations 
Exercising their Treaty-Making Power", 38 B.Y.I.L. (1962), 
422. See also, Jenks, W . , "Some Constitutional Problems of 
International Organisations", 22 B.Y.I.L. (1945), 23. Brierly 
in his report on the law of treaties. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4123,
p. 26.
7
See supra. Chapter 3, pp.88-89.
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approval of the Supreme Council is necessary for any act taken 
by the Ministerial Council (Article 8(3) of the Fundamental 
Statute) . The Supreme Council is also in charge of the 
appointment of the Secretary General. This gives the 
Secretary General more prestige and power to deal not only 
with administrative but also with political issues. Most 
specifically, the Supreme Council is endowed with power to 
establish a commission for settlement of disputes whenever a 
dispute arises and to nominate its members.8 The jurisdiction 
of this commission is consultative and its findings are only 
recommendations. (Article 9(1) of the Rules of Procedure of 
the Commission for Settlement of Disputes.)
The Commission cannot be considered as an effective 
judicial body, nor does it have compulsory jurisdiction. On 
a different level, the Supreme Council has competence on 
certain matters which affect the Fundamental Statute as well 
as the overall working of the organisation. It has the right 
to approve the budget of the Secretariat (Article 8(10) of the 
Statute) as well as reserving the right of amending the 
Fundamental Statute (Article 8(8) of the Statute).9 The 
latter right could be exercised only with the unanimous
8 See Article 8(6) of the Fundamental Statute.
9 The Supreme Council has approved the amendment of the 
Fundamental Statute on a single occasion to include Art.11(1) 
of the Fundamental Statute and Art.15(1) of the rules of 
procedure of the Ministerial Council. Both of these 
amendments deal with the rotation of presidency which is to 
take place once a year at the same time as the Supreme Council 
meets. See the Annual Report (1985), op.cit.. p.122.
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approval by the Supreme Council.10
According to the modern law of treaties, amendment would 
also be possible by majority, but it could not oblige the 
dissenting members.11 However, the unanimous vote of the 
member states is not always sufficient to establish an 
amendment, especially when ratification is required.12
In spite of the wide function and competence of the 
Supreme Council in Article 8, the powers to take decisions or 
recommendations are not clearly set out. Nevertheless, the 
absence of these does not create any serious restriction upon 
the power of the Council to take decisions or recommendations, 
since performing functions and exercising powers are normally 
carried out by them.
(2) The Legal Nature of the Supreme Council Decisions
The concept "decision” is often used to mean both binding 
and non-binding pronouncements of a body, although some 
international organisations use the word only for the legally 
binding decisions.13 The vast majority of decisions of
10 Article 2 0 of the Fundamental Statute.
11 Articles 39, 40 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, 1969. See also Sinclair, o p.cit.. pp.106-8.
12 Schermers, o p.cit.. para.1024.
13 These organisations are EEC, Art.187, ECSC, Art.14, 
Benelux, Art.19a, OECD, Art.5. See Schermers, ibid.. p.363. 
The UN and the Organisation of American States (OAS) may also 
issue binding decisions in the field of peace-keeping: see
Higgins, R . , "The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: which UN
Resolutions are Binding under Article 25 of the Charter?", 21 
I.C.L.O. (1972), pp.270-86. In case of a meeting of 
consultation, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (OAS, Art.59)
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international organisations are not binding per se. However, 
where a decision is binding under the constituent treaty a 
member state still needs to incorporate it into its municipal 
legislation in order to give it binding effect.
The decisions of the Security Council are binding on all 
members under the terms of Article 25 of the U.N. Charter, 
regardless of the agreement of the member states. 
Recommendations of the Security Council are not covered by the 
term of Article 25 and cannot be mandatory.14
As regards the power of the U.N. General Assembly, it is 
generally recognised that the Charter of the U.N. does not 
possess mandatory power, except in internal organisational 
matters.15
As such, the binding nature of General Assembly 
resolutions or declarations has been a matter of controversy 
among a number of writers. Some have claimed, except in some 
cases, that these decisions are not binding, and they are 
merely recommendations which may not be the source of legal
act as an organ of consultation under the treaty of Rio de 
Janeiro of 2 September, 1747121, UNTS. p.93, Treaty of Rio de 
Janeiro, Art.17.
14 Higgins, R . , "Compliance with United Nations Decisions 
on Peace and Security and Human Rights Questions in the 
Effectiveness of International Decisions", Papers of a 
Conference of the American Society of International Law and 
the Proceedings of the Conference. Leiden (1971) at p.3. See 
also her Article "The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN
Resolutions are Binding Under Article 25 of the Charter?", 21
I.C.L.O. (1972), p.270.
15 Ibid. . p.272.
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rights and duties.16 On the other hand, there is the view
which admits the legal significance of these resolutions and
refutes the traditional assumptions. This view regards the
resolutions of the Assembly as collective acts of states which
17are capable of creating customary international law. In
Detter's view a great many of the administrative decisions of
the U.N. and other specialised agencies are binding on member
18states regardless of whether or not they have approved them. 
Castaneda points out that the legal value of the General
Binding decisions of the Assembly relate to the 
admission of members into the United Nations (Article 4(2))? 
the election of some members of the Security Council, the 
Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship (Articles 32, 
61, 86) ? the adoption of rules of procedure (Article 21) ; the 
suspension and expulsion of members from the organisation 
(Articles 5 and 6) ? the appointment of the Secretary General 
(Article 97); the determination of conditions under which a 
non-member state becomes a party to the statute of the 
International Court of Justice (Article 13) ; the
establishment of subsidiary organs (Article 22)? the 
selection of the judges of the International Court of Justice 
(Article 8 of the statute)? the approval of a budget and the 
appointment of expenses (Article 17) . For this view, see 
Sloan, F., "The Binding Force of a 'Recommendation' of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations", 25 B.Y.I.L. 4 (1948)? 
Fitzmaurice, G., "Law and Procedures of the International 
Court of Justice, 1951-4", 34 B.Y.I.L. 4 (1958); Vallat, "The 
Competence of the United Nations General Assembly", 97 Recueil 
des Cours 225-230 (1959); Johnson, D. , "The Effect of
Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations", 
32 B.Y.I.L. (1955-56), p.97.
17 Higgins, R. , The Development of International Law 
Through the Political Organs of the United Nations. Oxford 
University Press (1963) at p.2. See also her article, "The 
United Nations and Law Making. The Political Organs", 
Proc.A.J.I.L. (1970); Falk, R. , "On the Quasi-Legislative 
Competence of the General Assembly" 60 A.J.I.L. (1966), pp.782 
et seq.
18 Detter, I., Law-Making bv International Organisations 
(1965), pp.319-29.
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Assembly resolutions
” ... depends not only on the organ that approves 
them and their form, but also, and especially, on 
their content. Even if there is no real creation 
of norms, there is often recognition and 
confirmation that certain practices or principles 
are, in the judgment of an organ largely 
representative of the international community, 
either customary rules or general principles of 
international law.”
In a recent judgment of the International Court of
Justice the Court asserted that except for those resolutions
regarding organisations and financial matters, General
Assembly resolutions have no legal effect because such powers
20have not been conferred upon it by the Charter.
The legal nature of the G.C.C. Supreme Council's 
decisions could not be easily analysed without thorough 
examination of the provisions of the Fundamental Statute and 
the practice of the member states.
However, some maintain that all the decisions of the 
Supreme Council of the G.C.C. are binding. They claim that 
decisions of the Supreme Council do not need further 
legislation in the member states by referring to an
Castaneda, J. , Legal Effects of United Nations 
Resolutions. Columbia University Press, New York and London 
(1969) at p.5? Virally, M. , in his introduction to Yemen, E. , 
Legislative Powers in the United Nations and Specialised 
Agencies, Sijthoff (1969)? Asamoah, 0. , The Legal
Significance of the General Assembly of the United Nations. 
Sijthoff, The Hague (1966). Asamoah ascribes some legal 
effect to the U.N. declarations and considers them in 
themselves as state practice.
2 0 Legal Conseguences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia. I.C.J. Reports (1971), 
pp.45-50.
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unpublished advisory opinion issued by the Department of 
Advisory Opinion and Legislation in Kuwait, No.2/428/1985.21 
The opinion states that the UEA has binding effect on national 
authorities and individuals. Yet, it may need further
ministerial decisions or decrees to implement the UEA 
provisions in the light of the merits of each individual case, 
and with the observance of the internal laws, noting that in 
case of conflict with the local laws and regulations of member 
states execution of the provisions of the UEA shall prevail 
in accordance with Article 27 of the UEA without a need for 
amendment of the internal laws.22
This view, however, cannot find support either in the 
Fundamental Statute of the G.C.C. or the practice of the 
member states. On the contrary, the practice reveals that 
only by virtue of municipal law and not the UEA provisions the 
Supreme Council decisions are implemented internally. 
Furthermore, Article 8 of the UEA explicitly provides that 
prior agreement of the member states is a necessary 
requirement in implementing the UEA provisions, especially in 
the field of economic activities. In the experience of the 
G.C.C., like many other similar organisations, it is essential 
to draw a line between obligations of the states on the 
international plane and those obligations on the municipal
21 Makarim, E., "The Positive Impact of the Establishment
of the G.C.C. on the Issues of Private International Law of 
member States", op.cit.. pp.28-29.
22 Ibid.
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plane which need further legislation to bind the internal
23institutions and private individuals.
According to the Fundamental Statute, the Supreme Council 
is allowed in general terms to take various decisions which 
carry out the objectives of the organisation. The statute 
itself does not indicate which decisions are binding, but a 
useful guide may be obtained by classifying them into 
categories.
(a) Decisions Pertaining to the Structure and Operation of 
the G.C.C.
The G.C.C. Fundamental Statute entrusts the Supreme
Council with certain functions concerning the internal law of
the organisation. These functions are described by Article
8 as follows:
"6. Approve the rule of procedures of the 
commission for settlement of disputes and 
nominate its members.
7. Appoint the Secretary General.
8. Amend the Charter of the Cooperation 
Council
9. Approve the council's internal rules
10. Approve the budget of the Secretariat."
In fact, international organisations tend to create 
their own rules in regard to their internal structure, a 
matter which is well established and recognised by the League 
of Nations since 1929.24 The technical instrument normally 
used by the organisation for such purpose is obligatory
23 See supra, Chapter 3, pp.107-13.
24 Castaneda, op.cit.. at p.22.
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2 Rdecision, either adopted by unanimous or majority voting. 
This category of resolutions does not raise much dispute 
among the writers as to their binding effect. They derive
their juridical effect from the authorisation of the
• 2 6 constituent instrument and give rise to direct obligations.
(b) Decisions Concerning the Interpretation of the
Fundamental Statute and the UEA
Article 10 of the Fundamental Statute provides:
"l-L • • • •
2 . ...
3. If a dispute arises over interpretation 
or implementation of the Fundamental 
Statute and such dispute is not resolved 
within the Ministerial Council or the 
Supreme Council, the Supreme Council may 
refer such dispute to the commission for 
the settlement of disputes.
4. The commission shall submit its 
recommendations or opinions, as 
applicable, to the Supreme Council for 
appropriate action."
25 For example, according to the League of Nations pact 
unanimous voting had to be followed to determine its internal 
system, while the Charter of the United Nations does not 
distinguish between internal and external activities of the 
organisation. The enumeration of "important questions" 
contained in Article 18, which requires two-thirds majority, 
includes internal as well as external matters. See Castaneda, 
ibid.. at p.26. The O.A.U. presupposes the acceptance of all 
member states on internal structure and function. See 
Cervenka, Z., The Unfinished Quest for Unity. Africa and the
O.A.U.. Friedman (1977), at p.24. In the Arab League some of 
the internal functions require two-thirds majority (i.e. 
confirmation of the Secretary General and approval of 
amendments). Others require only simple majority (i.e. 
adoption of annual budget, establishment of the regulations 
of the League). See McDonald, R . , The League of Arab States. 
Princeton (1965), at p.57.
2 6 See supra, note 16.
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In this Article the distinction between interpretation
and application is not easy to make. It is for the
commission of settlement of disputes, which works as an ad
hoc committee, to give its recommendation or its opinion to
the Supreme Council, but it is the Supreme Council which
decides on it. The relationship here is between a superior
organ and a subordinate one. The Supreme Council may direct
or entrust the commission through the resolution which
27establishes it with certain tasks.
However, Article 10 of the Fundamental Statute provides 
that the commission for the settlement of disputes "submits 
its recommendations or opinion, as applicable, to the Supreme 
Council for appropriate action". That is to say, the 
appropriate act which will be taken by the Supreme Council if 
it accepts the recommendation of the commission is an 
authoritative interpretation, and at the same time 
application of the Fundamental Statute. The authoritative 
interpretation of the Supreme Council here derives its 
existence from the explicit competence of the Council in the 
Statute. Any decision in this regard would be legally 
binding.28
27 For the decisions being the work of more than one 
organ see Tammes, A, "Decisions of International Organs as a 
Source of International Law", Recueil des Cours. Vol.94 (1958) 
- 11, pp.324-26.
2 8 This position represents the "textual" or "ordinary" 
meaning of words school. See Fitzmaurice, "Law and the 
Procedure of the International Court of Justice", 28 B.Y.I.L. 
(1951), at p.7.
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As Professor Tammes suggests, a state may not insist on
the correctness of its views if the organ’s power of
• • • • 29effective interpretation is recognised m  advance.
Furthermore, the application of the law necessarily, as
30Kelsen says, implies interpretation.
As such, the G.C.C. Supreme Council interpreted the 
Fundamental Statute in order to apply the provisions of the 
Fundamental Statute. This has been done by the application 
of some provisions to a new fact situation which indicates 
the meaning attached by the Supreme Council to the provision 
applied. For instance, in order to institutionalize economic 
cooperation in the light of the provisions of the Fundamental 
Statute, the G.C.C. Supreme Council approved, in 1983, the 
establishment of two regional agencies - the Organisation for
Standards and Measurement and the Gulf Investment
31Corporation.
The G.C.C. does not encounter the problem of the U.N. 
General Assembly as to whether the Assembly is competent to 
interpret the Charter.
Writers such as Vallat and Kelsen hold the view that the 
General Assembly is a "law-applying" and not a "law-making"
29 Tammes, o p.cit.. at p.350.
30 Kelsen, H., Recent Trends m  the Law of the United 
Nations, London, Stevens and Sons Ltd. (1951), at p.960.
31 See, m  particular, Articles 4 and 6 of the 
Fundamental Statute. For the establishment of the two 
agencies, see Gulf Cooperation Council, Initial Measures Taken 
bv the Member States for the Implementation of the Unified 
Economic Agreement, pp.32, 37.
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body and has no power of interpretation. Therefore, the
32interpretation could be made only by amendment.
Professor Higgins points out that the General Assembly
is
”... engaged in a constant process of Charter 
interpretation. This process cannot be simply 
defined as classical treaty interpretation.”
The I.C.J. has shown a tendency to adopt the above
principle.34
Some consider that the interpretative resolution of the
Inter-American Conference, which is the supreme organ of the
O.A.S., is legally binding due to the establishing role it
35plays in revealing the intent of the parties.
Vallat, F., "Competence of the United Nations General 
Assembly”, 97 Recueil des Cours. 11 (1959), at p.211. Kelsen 
states that "the General Assembly as any organ of the United 
Nations is certainly competent to interpret the Charter, but 
only in connection with an act by which the organ applies the 
Charter": Recent Trends in the Law of the United Nations.
London, Institute of World Affairs (1951), p.960.
33 Higgins, R . , "The United Nations and Law-Making - The 
Political Organs", 64 Proceedings of the A.S.I.L. (1970), 64th 
annual meeting, 1970 No.4 at p.44. See also Schachter, 0., 
where he makes a distinction between the power of 
interpretation which the General Assembly possesses and the 
recommendatory functions of the assembly: "The Relation of
Law, Politics and Action in the United Nations" Recueil des 
Cours, 109 (1963) at p.185. Asamoah, 0., The Legal
Significance of the Declarations of the General Assembly of 
the United Nations, op.cit.. pp.30-45.
34 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of 
the United Nations Case (1949) I.C.J.Rep.. p.71.
35 Thomas and Thomas, The Organisation of American 
States, o p.cit. . pp.72-3. They go further than that by
stating that "resolutions of an interpretative nature may be 
said to be legally binding, even to the extent of what may be 
in effect an amendment to the treaty".
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However, if the interpretative power of the Fundamental 
Statute is a matter which is settled clearly in Article 10 of 
the Fundamental Statute, the power of interpreting the UEA is 
not clear. Article 10 of the Fundamental Statute, which sets 
out the competence of the commission for the settlement of 
disputes, refers only to disputes which arise over
interpretation and application of the Fundamental Statute, but 
not to disputes between member states. One may, however, 
refer to another instrument concluded between the member
states to find a solution. Article 3 of the rules of
3 6procedure of the commission for settlement of disputes 
provides:
"The commission shall once installed have
jurisdiction to consider the following matters
referred to it by the Supreme Council:
1. Disputes between member states.
2. Differences of opinion as to the interpretation or 
execution of the Cooperation Council Fundamental
Statute.11
The wording of the above Article enlarges the competence 
of the commission to include all the disputes among the member 
states.
There is little doubt that the rules of procedure of the 
commission for the settlement of disputes, as an international 
treaty, have a legal character akin to the Fundamental Statute 
and the UEA, and therefore are legally binding upon the G.C.C.
3 6 The text of the rules can be found in the G.C.C. legal 
Gazette, ed. 3 (1983), pp.17-19.
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member states.37
However, while in principle the authoritative 
interpretation of the Fundamental Statute and the UEA is 
determined by both the Supreme Council and the commission for 
the settlement of disputes, in practice what occurs is that 
the member states or the Secretariat tend to interpret the 
basic instruments.38
According to the prevailing view in international law, 
every party may interpret the extent of its own obligations. 
However, this practice is considered as a political act and 
has no binding force on other parties to the treaty.39
37 See Jessup, P., "Parliamentary Diplomacy", 89 Recueil 
des Cours (1956) at p.204. See also Rosenne, S. who refers 
to the rules of procedure of the International Court of 
Justice as an "international example of delegated or 
subordinate law-making": The Law and Practice of the 
International Court. Nijhoff at p.53; Skubiszewski, K. , 
"Enactment of Law by International Organisations, 41 B.Y.I.L. 
(1965-66) at p.242.
38 The G.C.C. Supreme Council decided in its second 
session to grant the facilities for steamers, ships and boats 
of the member states and give them the same treatment and 
privileges granted to their own in docking or calling at their 
ports. This is in accordance with Article 20 of the UEA. 
Kuwait wrote to the G.C.C. secretariat in May 1983 that the 
wording (steamers, ships and boats of the member states) 
should not be restricted to the governmental ships as the 
literal interpretation may lead to, but it should include also 
those belonging to citizens. This interpretation, the 
memorandum said, would be continued for the purpose of the 
agreement. The ministerial committee for finance and economy 
accepted Kuwait's view. See G.C.C. Secretariat, Cooperation 
in the Field of Customs between the G.C.C. Member States in 
accordance with the U.E.A.. Riyadh (1985), pp.33-34.
39 Wright, Q., International Law and the United Nations. 
London (1960), pp.35-39,
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The Secretariat similarly may occasionally be confronted 
with issues of interpretation by giving legal advice to other 
organs which cannot be regarded as authoritative.40 The 
practice of the Secretariat and the member states in this 
regard seems to emphasise the principle of effective 
interpretation which gives weight to the purpose of the 
organisation unless it is explicitly forbidden, rather than 
the restrictive principle which sticks to the provisions of 
the treaty.41
(c) Decisions Pertaining to the Application of the U.E.A. and
the Concept of Subsequent Practice
The UEA was approved on 8 June 1981 by the signature of 
the heads of state and ratified by the six member states.42 
During the third summit (Bahrain, November 9-11, 1982), the 
G.C.C. heads of state decided to begin gradual implementation 
of the agreement starting 7 March 1983.43
The initial decision was to implement the following 
provisions of the UEA:44
40 Schachter, 0., "The Development of International law 
through the Legal Opinion of the United Nations Secretariat",
B.Y.I.L. 25 (1948), pp.93-96.
41 Ibid. For the restrictive and effective
interpretation, see Lauterpacht, H. , "Restrictive 
Interpretation and the Principle of Effective Interpretation 
of Treaties", B.Y.I.L. 26 (1949), p.48 et seq.
42 Initial Measures Taken bv the G.C.C. Member States
to Implement the UEA. G.C.C. Secretariat, op.cit.. p p .3-31.
43 Idem.
44 Ibid. , pp.3-31.
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1. Article 18 which provides that the mfember shall accord
means for passenger and cargo transportation belonging 
to citizens of the other member states, when transiting 
or entering its territory, the same treatment they accord 
to the means of passenger and cargo transportation
belonging to their own citizens, including exemption from 
all duties and taxes.
2. Article 5, which concerns the facilities for the transit
that each member state must grant to any other member 
state.
3. Article 2, which exempts all the agricultural, animal,
industrial and natural resources products that are of 
national origin from duties and other charges having 
equivalent effect.
4. Article 8(3), which encourages G.C.C. citizens to expand
their economic and professional activities.
5. Article 8(1) which gives individuals the freedom of
movement, work and residence.
6. Article 20, which provides that member states' ships are
allowed to use freely the various ports facilities. 
These types of decisions clearly have binding force, as
they express the consent of the member states to the UEA.
Member states which fail to comply with these decisions may
be in breach of the agreement.
In spite of the above, neither the Fundamental Statute
nor the Unified Economic Agreement contains provisions to the
effect that the decisions of the Supreme Council are binding
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on the member states.
By contrast, the E.E.C. treaties specify the binding 
force of its measures as regards their objectives, means and
45their addressees.
Thus, this category of resolutions, as Judge Castaneda 
suggests
"... juridically significant, have as their content 
an informal agreement, explicit or tacit, among the 
members of an organ or international organisation.
To the extent that a resolution is the result of an 
agreement, giving it form and registering and 
externalising it, the resolution can have binding 
force."46
Another legal interpretation which may be applied to 
these decisions is the examination of the state practice of 
G.C.C. members in relation to the provisions of the UEA, which 
indicate the binding nature of the Supreme Council decisions.
45 . . .  . . . .The EEC institutions may issue a variety of specific
measures of the types defined in Article 189 of the EEC
treaty. It provides: "In order to carry out their task the
council and the commission shall, in accordance with the
provisions of this treaty, make regulations, issue directives, 
take decisions, make recommendations or deliver opinions. A 
regulation shall have general application. It shall be 
binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all member 
states. A directive shall be binding as to the result to be 
achieved upon each member state to which it is addressed, but 
shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and 
methods. A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon
those to whom it is addressed. Recommendations and opinions 
shall have no binding force." See the text in Peaslee, A., 
International Governmental Organisations. Part 1, op.cit.. 
p. 506.
4 6 See Castaneda, op.cit.. p.150 where he refers to the 
fact that these resolutions have precedent both in the League 
of Nations and in the Inter-American system.
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All the G.C.C. member states tend consistently to apply 
the measures the Supreme Council takes to implement the UEA.47 
Any member state which does not want to comply with the 
Supreme Council decisions because of certain domestic 
difficulties will seek the application of Article 24 of the 
UEA which is a derogation clause, allowing temporary exemption 
from applying the UEA by the unanimous approval of the Supreme 
Council .48
Consequently, the practice of the G.C.C. member states 
is consistent enough to constitute a subsequent practice in 
relation to the measures taken by the Supreme Council to 
implement the UEA.49
See these decisions mainly in the G.C.C. Secretariat 
publications. Initial measures taken to implement the U.E.A.. 
op.cit.. See also, Cooperation between the G.C.C. Member 
States in the Field of Customs to Implement the Unified 
Economic Agreement Provisions (Arabic), G.C.C. Secretariat
(1985), pp.23-44.
/  Q
So far Oman and Qatar have been exempted from the 
application of some of the UEA provisions. See Measures Taken 
to Implement the U.E.A. (1986). For the discussion of the 
exemption see infra. Chapter 7, pp.362-71 (the question of 
safeguard clauses within the UEA).
49 The concept of subsequent practice is a reliable 
principle, regarded as a guide to infer the intention of the 
parties as to the meaning of a treaty, by observing the manner 
in which the parties to a treaty have acted in carrying out 
its provisions. The principle may apply to throw light on a 
previous state of fact or the evidence of the existence at an 
earlier date of certain rights or possession of certain 
territory. See Fitzmaurice, G. , The Law and Procedure of the 
International Court of Justice. Grotius Publications, Vol.l
(1986), pp.61, 184-86. See also South West Africa Case.
I.C.J. Reports (1950), pp.135-6? Corfu Channel Case, I .C.J. 
Reports (1949), p.25; Mincruiers and Ecrehos Case. I.C.J. 
Reports (1953), p.82. In the Asvlum Case. Judge Read in his 
dissenting opinion referred to the principle of subsequent 
practice which the ICJ recognised in the Corfu Channel Case.
I.C.J. Reports (1950), p.324. In the U.S. Nationals in
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Further, Article 31.3(b) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties supports this principle in certain 
circumstances. However, the value of subsequent practice 
depends on whether it is concordant, common and consistent,
50and not merely an isolated fact or a few individual events.
(d) Regional Customary International Law
The subsequent practice of the G.C.C. member states, as 
demonstrated in their continuous compliance with the decisions
of the Supreme Council, has not nevertheless developed into
51international customary Law. The very limited length of 
time since the establishment of the G.C.C., and the 
insufficient frequency, coupled with the small size of 
membership, is not capable of creating customary international 
law. Yet it is difficult to determine with certainty that a 
rule of regional customary international law cannot emerge as 
a result of Supreme Council decisions, if it is for a long 
time and of sufficient frequency. It depends on the 
experience of the G.C.C. and its competence consistent with 
Supreme Council decisions, followed by a conviction that such
Morocccrcase. the court, in interpreting Article 95 of the Act 
of Algeciras had extensive recourse to the subsequent 
practice, though it happened in a confused and inconsistent 
manner, I.C.J. Reports (1952), p.211.
50 .Sinclair, I., The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, op.cit.. pp.135-8.
51 .For the binding effect of the U.N. General Assembly 
resolutions as customary law, see Higgins, R . , The Development 
of International law through the Political Organs of the 
United Nations, op.cit.. p.2. See also Asamoah, o p.cit.. p.2.
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52conduct is obligatory.
By contrast, the O.A.S. resolutions and declarations, as
a result of continuous habits of compliance with them together
with the conviction that the action of compliance is
obligatory, are considered by some writers as likely to become
53binding by custom.
(e) Recommendations
The obligatory force of certain of the Supreme Council
resolutions, which cannot be considered as a direct
application of the UEA provisions and which seek to determine
general principles for cooperation without identifying precise
obligations of the member states, may be subject to doubt.
As such there are some occasions on which the Supreme Council
has to take decisions to fulfil in general terms the purposes
54and the aims of the Fundamental Statute and the UEA.
52 The consistent state practice of the Gulf states as 
regards the delimitation of the offshore boundaries using the 
median line in their bilateral agreements led to the belief 
that a regional customary international law has come into 
existence. See Al-Baharna, H.M., The Legal Status of the 
Arabian Gulf States (1968), o p.cit.. p.289. See also, El- 
Hakim, A . , The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea. 
Manchester University Press (1978), p.130? Amin, S., 
International and Legal Problems of the Gulf. London, Middle 
East and Northern African Studies Press Ltd. (1981), p.143.
53 Thomas and Thomas, The Organisation of American 
States. op.cit.. p.71.
54 . . . .e.g. (1) The decision of the Supreme Council m  its
fourth session which provides for unifying the prices and the
fees of services, inter alia electricity and water rates.
(2) The decision to unify oil prices (except for diesel) 
in the G.C.C. member states market. See the Annual Report 
(1985), op.cit.. pp.59, 83.
(3) The Supreme Council decision in its sixth session to 
approve the general policies and principles to protect the 
environment in the G.C.C. member states, according to Art.4
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These decisions by their very nature do not appear to
constitute legal obligations to behave in conformity with
them. They are rather recommendations or invitations to
direct the G.C.C. member states to act in a certain way and
legally are not binding.
The distinction between the above decisions is
illustrated in Castaneda's observations:
”... the treaty gives the member states a margin for 
judgment concerning the best way to realise its 
institutional ends, at least when an organisation 
makes a recommendation. When the treaty does not 
allow this margin for judgment, it provides other 
technical means to achieve its goals which, unlike 
recommendations, have a mandatory character."
(Ill) FREQUENCY OF MEETINGS AND VOTING OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL
(a) Meetings
Article 7 of the Fundamental Statute authorises the
56Supreme Council to meet once a year m  an ordinary session
of the Fundamental Statute, the recommendation of the 
specialised ministers of the environment and the 
recommendation of the ministerial council.
(4) According to Art.4 of the Fundamental Statute and 
Art.16 of the UEA, the Supreme Council decided in its sixth 
session in Oman to approve the aims and areas which are 
recommended by the ministerial council in planning the role 
of education and implementing integration. In G.C.C. 
Decisions of the Supreme Council in its Sixth Session. Oman 
(1985), The G.C.C. Secretariat Archives.
55 Castaneda, op.cit.. at p.13.
56 The draft of the experts committee for Article 7 
provides that the Supreme Council hold its regular session
twice a year. This proposal was rejected by Oman which 
preferred one session a year to give the heads of state enough 
time to meet their commitments in the Arab League, the Islamic
Conference and the non-aligned movement. At the same time the 
council may hold extraordinary sessions whenever the need
arises. The Report of Qatar Delegation to the Legal Experts
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with the possibility of an extraordinary meeting at the
request of a member state, and this request must be upheld by
at least one other member state. An extraordinary meeting can
also be held by a decision taken by the Council in a previous 
57meeting. The extraordinary meeting must discuss only
matters for which it was convened and should take place within
CQ
five days of the official date of the request.
Usually organs of international organisations meet at the 
headquarters of the organisation.59 However, the Supreme 
Council, like other organisations (i.e. O.A.S., O.A.U.,
COMECON) is allowed to hold its sessions in the member states' 
territories.60
The official invitations to the meetings are the
61responsibility of the Secretary General.
cgmnrttrge". "6-io .3.1981.
57 Article 4 of the rules of procedure of the Supreme 
Council provides the same provisions. It should be noted that 
there is repetition of the provision which regulates the 
meetings of both the Supreme Council and the Ministerial 
Council in the Fundamental Statute and the rules of procedure 
of both councils.
58 Articles 5, 6 of the rules of procedure of the Supreme
Council.
59 Schermers, International Institutional Law, o p.cit..
p.130.
60 • Idem. It should be mentioned here that Saudi Arabia
suggested having the Supreme Council sessions regularly at the
headquarters of the organisation in Riyadh. This proposal was
supported by Qatar and Kuwait later. Qatar Delegation
Reports. op.cit.
61 Article 4.2(a) of the rules of procedure of the 
Supreme Council.
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At the beginning of each session the Supreme Council 
decides whether the meeting should be public or private. 
Presidency is taken in turn by each head of state of each 
member state in alphabetical order. Each President retains 
his presidency for the start of one session to the beginning 
of a new session. However, if a head of state was involved 
in legal dispute with another member state, he would not be 
allowed to preside over the session of the Supreme Council to
discuss the subject of the dispute. If such a case arose, a
63temporary president would be appointed.
The Supreme Council*s meeting (ordinary and 
extraordinary) is only valid if the quorum is made up of two- 
thirds of the heads of state.64
(b) VOTING
Article 9 of the Fundamental Statute provides:
"1. Each member of the Supreme Council shall have 
one vote.
2. Resolutions of the Supreme Council in substantive 
matters shall be carried by unanimous approval of the 
member states participating in the voting, while 
resolutions or procedural matters be carried by majority 
vote.”
The above Article reflects the principle of the sovereign 
equality of independent states, that of one state, one vote. 
Since the League of Nations and subsequently the United
62 Article 5(1) ibid.
63 Article 7(3) ibid.
64 Article 7(4) of the Fundamental Statute.
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Nations, the principle has become accepted in theory and 
practice.65
However, the equality of voting power of all members 
seems to be unreal. The unreality is reflected in decision­
making in different ways. It could be in the form of a block 
of states acquiring a degree of political influence within an 
organ which is disproportionate to their real political 
influence in the world at large. Yet the resolutions they 
pass have little chance of implementation because of the 
opposition by states which alone have the power to implement 
it.66
Inequality also exists in some international 
organisations because of the disparity of the interests 
involved. Therefore different systems of weighted voting have 
been considered in order to compensate for the inequality of 
voting in some international organisations (e.g. the
International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for
67Reconstruction and Development).
6 R
Jenks, W . , "Unanimity, the Veto, Weighted Voting, 
Special and Simple Majorities and Consensus as Modes of 
Decisions in International Organisations" in Cambridge Essays 
in International Law. Essays in Honour of Lord McNair. 
London, Stevens and Sons, Dobbs Ferry, New York, Oceana 
Publications (1965) at p.52. See also Williams, J. , "The 
League of Nations and Unanimity" 19 A.J.I.L. (1925), pp.475-6
6 6 Bowett, D., The Law of International Institutions. 
op.cit.. p.44.
67 See Schermers, H . , International Institutional Law. 
op.cit.. pp.395-400.
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The method of unanimity has advantages and disadvantages. 
It may paralyse the process of decision-making in a very 
prolonged discussion. However, states prefer it as their 
interest is surely protected and the decision once reached is 
easier implemented.68
As such, some writers have expressed the view that law­
making by unanimity in international organisations is similar
69to a treaty and therefore is binding. Nevertheless, neither
the law of international organisations nor state practice has
70considered them as treaties.
(c) Absence
Article 5(2) of the rules of procedure of the Supreme
Council provides:
"A meeting shall be considered valid if attended by 
heads of states of two-thirds of the member states."
This provision led some delegations to suggest that,
since the absence of any G.C.C.member state does not harm its
68 Schermers, o p.cit.. pp.391-2. Unanimity is the rule 
in the East African Community, Benelux, the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, the European Free Trade 
Association, the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) 
and the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries. In the 
Council of Europe and in the European Communities unanimity 
is required in many cases. In the UN the unanimity rule was 
not followed, with only a partial exception for the Security 
Council where the concurring vote of the permanent members is 
required in certain cases. Ibid.. pp.393-94.
69 Kelsen, Principles of International Law. New York 
(1952), p.66.
70 See Parry, C., The Sources and Evidence of 
International Law. Manchester University Press, Oceana 
Publications (1965), p.22. See also Detter, I., Law-Making 
by International Organisations, op.cit.. p.321; Skubiszewski, 
op.cit.. p.222.
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position as regards to substantive matters because of the
unanimity rule in voting, the quorum for meetings should
71conform to the unanimity rule as well.
However, the correctness of this view is doubtful, as
Article 7(2) of the Fundamental Statute provides that
unanimity is the "unanimous approval of the member states
participating in the voting".
As such, the absence of a member state cannot operate to
block the voting process in taking unanimous decisions,
provided that the quorum of two-thirds is met.
In the experience of the U.N. Security Council absence
is regarded as abstention, so that decisions could be taken
without all permanent members being present according to
Article 27(3) of the Charter. This happened in 1950 when the
U.S.S.R. refused to participate in meetings of the Security
Council, in which China was (allegedly) illegally represented
72by the wrong delegation.
(d) Abstention
Article 9 of the Fundamental Statute does not deal with
the effect of abstention in voting, yet Article 5 of the rules
of procedure of the Supreme Council provides:
"Any member abstaining shall document his voting not 
bound by the resolution."
71 The delegations of Oman and Saudi Arabia, Qatar 
Delegation's Report, o p.cit... p.2.
72 Schermers, o p .cit.. p.414.
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But it is unknown whether the above provision applies to 
substantive or to procedural matters. The provision is 
usually found in organisations where rules require unanimity, 
while on the other hand providing for the validity of 
decisions taken in spite of abstentions.73
It has been well established in the United Nations that 
abstention does not prevent unanimity, even in cases where the 
Charter expressly provides that the concurring votes of the 
permanent members of the Security Council are needed.74
However, as some have noted, if this effect of abstention 
of the Supreme Council's decisions is applied to the majority 
rule on procedural matters, this would mean that decisions on 
what are substantive and procedural matters are binding on 
those who reject them.75
Any G.C.C. member may participate in the voting if it is 
involved in a dispute, a matter which increases the difficulty 
of obtaining unanimity on a decision concerning that dispute.
According to Article 7 of the rules of procedure of the
73 Jenks, W . , "Unanimity, the Veto, Weighted Voting, 
Special and Simple Majorities and Consensus as Modes of 
Decision in International Organisations", op.cit.. p.50. See 
also Skubiszewski, op.cit.. p.261? Schermers, o p.cit. pp.460- 
7 where he gives examples of these provisions: Article 6, 
para.l of the OECD, Article 4 of CMEA and under the General 
Arrangement to Borrow, para.7 of IMF.
74 Schermers, ibid. at p.412.
75 See Al-Ashal, A., The Legal and Political Framework 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council, op.cit.. p.140. This view 
may explain why consensus in procedural matters may not be 
required because of majority vote, but in actual fact the 
G.C.C. experience shows that member stats demand it, even on 
procedural matters, as will be explained later.
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Supreme Council, the head of a state which is a party to an
outstanding dispute may not preside over a session or a
meeting called to discuss the subject of dispute, but he is
entitled to vote.
By contrast, in the Security Council of the U.N., where
unanimity of the permanent members is required "in decisions
under Chapter VI, and under para.3 of Article 52", the parties
to a dispute must abstain from voting on decisions concerning
7 6the peaceful settlement of the dispute.
(e) The Distinction between Substantive and Procedural 
Matters
Another issue that Articles 9 of the Fundamental Statute, 
and 5 of the Rules of Procedure raise is that neither of them 
lays down a criterion to distinguish the substantive issue 
from the procedural.77 This is due to the fact that there is 
no clear-cut criterion which might help in the distinction of 
the nature of each category and enumeration of what matters
7 6 U.N. Charter, Art.27, para.3. See in this regard, 
Bailey, S., Voting in the Security Council. Indiana University 
Press, Bloomington and London (1969), pp.63-74.
77 From Qatar Delegationfs Report. Muscat, 6-10.3.1981, 
op.cit.. p.7. It seems that Qatar suggested an addition to 
Article 9 of the Supreme Council that in case of dispute on 
the nature at issue, whether it is substantive or procedural, 
the Supreme Council should decide that by absolute majority. 
However, this addition was apparently later omitted for 
unknown reasons, though it is interesting to note that the 
Qatar proposal was upheld by the meeting of the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs.
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. . 7 8fall into each category cannot be exhaustive. However, it
is viewed by some that Article 33(2) of the rules of procedure
of the ministerial council lends help to this problem, since
the ministerial council is the organ which deals with all the
issues to be submitted to the Supreme Council. Therefore it
is said to be within the ministerial council's competence to
79determine the nature of these decisions.
The Article provides:
"If a member of the council should disagree on the 
definition of the matter being put to the vote, the 
matter shall be settled by majority vote of the 
member states present."
This view, though it appears to be sensible, is however 
not persuasive. The main objection to it lies in the fact 
that this provision simply does not apply to the Supreme 
Council voting system. It only deals with the session of the 
ministerial council. One way of avoiding this problem is to 
amend either Article 9 of the Fundamental Statute or Article 
5 of the rules of procedure of the Supreme Council by giving 
the Supreme Council the power to decide by simple majority on 
the nature of the decision whether it is substantive or 
procedural. Another way is to apply the practice of the U.N. 
Security Council. The question whether a matter is procedural 
or substantive is regarded by the Security Council as
78 See Kerley, E, "Voting on Important Questions in the 
United Nations General Assembly", 53 A.J.I.L. (1959), pp.324- 
40. See also Kelsen, H. , The Law of the United Nations. 
London, Stevens (1950), pp.180-81.
79 Rajab, Y., The Gulf Cooperation Council of Arab 
States, op.cit.. p.107.
182
substantive and therefore subject to the approval of each of 
the five permanent members.80
As regards the General Assembly the practice is unclear. 
For example whether a request for an advisory opinion is a
procedural or substantive matter seems to have no clear
ar,cwor 81 answer•
Furthermore, neither Article 9 of the Statute nor Article
5.2 of the rules of procedure require certain majority (i.e.
82simple, absolute) for the Supreme Council meetings. 
However, simple majority (the smallest possible majority which 
is more than half of the votes counted) apparently is 
required.
8 0 See Rosenne, S., Law and Practice of the International 
Court. Leiden (1985), pp.666-7. Rosenne states that "... the 
double veto entails a decision, itself subject to the veto, 
as to whether the decision is procedural or not". See also 
Bailey, S., Voting in the Security Council, o p.cit.. pp.18- 
25. Bailey points out that the decisions of the Security 
Council in different cases do not reveal a consistent pattern. 
Goodrich and Hambro, The Charter of the United Nations. New 
York (1943), pp.222-3 maintain a similar view to Rosenne.
81 Rosenne, ibid.. pp.661-66.
8 2 Schermers states at para.706, o p.cit. that some 
international organisations and several authors do not 
distinguish between simple majority and absolute majority. 
They even consider the terms identical as regards multiple 
voting. However, the U.N. makes a distinction between simple 
majority and absolute majority. Both the General Assembly and 
the Security Council define simple majority as the majority 
of the votes cast, and absolute majority as the (simple) 
majority of the total number of possible voters or, in other 
words, the majority of the total membership of the U.N. See 
also Rudsinzki, A., "Election Procedure in the United 
Nations", 53 A.J.I.L. (1959), pp.82-111, who opposes the 
practices of the U.N.
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Because the quorum for holding a meeting is two thirds
of the member states, simple majority would be the least that
must be expected to carry out a decision on procedural mattes.
This would means either 4 votes out of 6 if all the members
. 8 3attend or 3 out of 6 if 5 member states attend the meeting.
However, in practice, and since the establishment of the
G.C.C., the habitual working method of the Supreme Council is 
84consensus.
(f) Consensus
The concept of consensus is not legal but political. It 
differs from unanimity in that unanimity requires voting in 
order to reach full agreement while consensus is collective
8 3 It should be mentioned here that according to Qatar 
Delegation's Reports the G.C.C. Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
agreed on using the terminology "absolute majority" for 
decisions on procedural mattes. This could mean in the light 
of other provisions (i.e. Article 7(4) of the Fundamental 
statute which deals with the quorum for holding meetings) a 
simple majority.
84 The author interviewed the director of the legal 
department in the G.C.C. Secretariat, Dr. Al-Sayari, who 
confirmed that the G.C.C. never applied voting as a method of 
decision-making. It has always been consensus as a result of 
the negotiation process. Riyadh on 22 November 1986. See 
also, Bouachba, The Council of Cooperation of Gulf States. 
op.cit.. p.41.
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opinion achieved as a result of the negotiation process.85 
However, consensus is greatly influenced by unanimity in the 
sense that all the members have the right of veto.86 Yet, 
both consensus and unanimity being only a formality does not 
change the legal effect of the G.C.C. Supreme Council 
decisions. The decisions concerning direct application of the 
U.E.A. provisions, are rules which were agreed upon 
registering and which the content of the treaty expressed 
would be binding. Other decisions which reflect the aims and 
purposes of both the Fundamental Statute and the UEA, and 
which are consistently followed by the practice of the member 
states, would provide only some evidence of their mandatory 
nature.
By contrast, a decision taken by the Security Council 
under Article 25 of the U.N. Charter is legally binding 
regardless of the formalities of its passing.87
85 M'Bow, A., "Consensus in International Organisations", 
in Consensus and Peace, ed. by Selassie, B. , UNESCO (1980), 
pp.13-30. See also Jenks, W. , "Unanimity, the Veto, Weighted 
Voting, Special and Simple Majority and Consensus as Modes of 
Decision in International Organisation", o p.cit.. pp.55-57; 
Bailey, S., op.cit.. pp.75-83; Merillot, H. (ed.), Legal 
Advisers and International Organisations. Oceana Publications 
Inc., New York (1966), pp.25-34; Buzan, B., "Negotiating by 
Consensus. Developments in Technique at the United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea" 75 A. J. I . L. (1981) ; 
Schermers, op.cit.. p p.391-93.
86 Schermers, idem.
87 From the examination of the use of consensus method 
in the Security Council. Bailey concludes that consensus is 
a decision in the sense that it has the effect of "settling 
an important aspect of the question at issue and of providing 
authority for future action", op.cit.. p. 83.
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However, consensus may have some legal relevance to the 
decision reached by the U.N. General Assembly. It may be 
considered as evidence of customary process of international
law being a decision reflecting a consistent pattern of
. 88 conduct which develops into a legal rule.
IV. Committees and Agencies Established bv the Supreme 
Council
Article 10 of the rules of procedure of the Supreme
Council provides for temporary committees that the Supreme
Council may form at the beginning of every session, to study
some issues listed on the agenda. These committees take
recommendations by majority vote. In addition to these
committees there are technical committees which may be
established by the Supreme Council to be charged with giving
advice on the design and execution of Supreme Council
89programmes m  specific fields.
However, the Supreme Council, referring to Article 4(3)
of the Fundamental Statute which provides a foundation for
further G.C.C. cooperation in all fields, decided in its first
session in 1981 to set up five ministerial committees which
90include competent ministers from G.C.C. member states. Yet
88 See Cassese, A . , International Law in a Divided World. 
Clarendon Press, Oxford (1986), pp.197-198.
89 Article 17(1) of the rules of procedure of the Supreme
Council.
90 These committees are: (1) Social and economic
planning committee; (2) Economic and financial cooperation;
(3) Industrial cooperation committee; (4) Oil committee; (5) 
Social and cultural committee. See, for the functions of 
these committees, Qatar News Agency, Documents of the Gulf
186
questions concerning the relations between the ministerial 
specialised committees and other institutions of the 
organisations, mainly the Supreme Council and the ministerial 
council (ministers of foreign affairs), are not satisfactorily 
clarified in the Fundamental Statute or the rules of 
procedure. It is not clear whether these committees are those 
which are provided for in Article 10 of the rules of procedure 
which envisage a direct relationship with the Supreme Council. 
In practice, though, there appears to be little relationship 
between the Supreme Council and the ministerial committees. 
In practice the relationship between the ministerial 
committees and the Supreme Council is not direct. The 
ministerial committees tend to submit all its decisions to the 
ministerial council in forms of recommendations, and if it is 
approved the ministerial council submits them to the Supreme 
Council for the final approval. Yet, because of the 
subordinate position of the ministerial committees to the 
ministerial council, the relationship is not decided by any 
form of regulation.
Various projects anticipated by the specialised 
committees mostly have not achieved the required progress. 
Perhaps the most significant committee is the Economic and 
Financial Cooperation Committee which paved the way greatly 
for the implementation of the UEA through its frequent
cooperation council— of Arab States, op.cit.. pp.97-99.
, , on
recommendations to the ministerial council. Yet one must 
say that the activities of these committees still remain in 
the nature of an experiment, the success of such will be 
determined in the light of experience during reasonable time.
Furthermore, according to Article 4 of the Fundamental
Statute, the Supreme Council on its third session in Bahrain,
1983 decided to convert the Saudi Organisation for
Specifications and Standards into a Gulf Board of
. 92Specifications and Standards for the G.C.C. The concerned
ministers in the G.C.C. member states are authorised to
approve the regulations of the Board and to determine its
powers and relationship to the member states. The Board has
. 9 3legal personality of its own and has an independent budget.
It enjoys legal capacity on the national level as well as the
94same privileges and immunities enjoyed by the G.C.C. staff.
Accordingly, all agreements between foreign 
manufacturers, suppliers and dealers or distributers in the 
G.C.C. member states shall stipulate that the foreign seller's 
goods conform to all relevant specifications and standards
91 The economic and financial committee has played a 
remarkable role in advising the ministerial council on how to 
implement the UEA provisions in the form of recommendations. 
Examples of these recommendations relating to Articles 2, 4, 
5, 8 and 20 can be found in Initial Measures Taken bv the 
G.C.C. Member States to Implement the Unified Economic 
Agreement (1985), op.cit.. pp.4-5, 28-30.
92 See the decision in ibid.. pp.32-34.
93 Article 8 of the Board statute, ibid.
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which are required by the Board.
This must be applicable as well to the national products
to benefit from the available experience in the member states
in order to establish national industry on unified grounds.
In the same session of the Supreme Council which was held
in Bahrain, the Council decided to establish the Gulf
Investment Corporation with an initial capital of two thousand
and one hundred million U.S. dollars. The G.C.C.
ministerial committee for financial and economic cooperation
signed an agreement which established the corporation in
Bahrain in November 1982.96 The mandate of the corporation
is to seek opportunities for investment as a joint venture
partner within and outside the Gulf states in the private as
97well as public sector. The corporation will seek self- 
sustaining projects and should not be regarded as an aid 
institution.
V. The Commission for the Settlement of Disputes
In accordance with the provision of Article 6 of the 
G.C.C. Fundamental Statute, the Supreme Council is entitled 
to set up subsidiary organs.
95 Gulf Cooperation Council, Secretariat General, Gulf 
Investment Corporation. (1986) Riyadh, p.3.
96 Ibid. The agreement contains 11 articles which, inter 
alia, provide the legal capacity of the agency on the national 
level, its privileges and immunities under the internal law 
of member states, the settlement of disputes should be through 
negotiation, arbitration clauses and statute attached to the 
agreement of 48 articles which declare how the agency works.
97 Article 10 of the agreement.
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Furthermore, Article 10 of the Fundamental Statute
provides that a commission for settlement of disputes shall
be attached to the Supreme Council. However, the commission
has not yet been established, though the Supreme Council
approved its rules of procedure with a main basic instrument
at the time of establishing the organisation. The commission
is not of a permanent nature and shall be formed whenever the
occasion arises for every case separately, based on the nature 
. 98of the dispute. It should be noted here that the
establishment of the commission is the last resort of the 
Supreme Council after all other means have been exhausted. 
A dispute should be resolved first within the ministerial 
council or the Supreme Council, then is to be referred to the
, , , go . . . .
commission for settlement of disputes. The jurisdiction of 
the commission covers disputes between member states and 
differences of opinion on the interpretation and application 
of the Fundamental Statute.100
go
Article 10(2) of the Fundamental Statute.
99 Article 10(3) ibid.
100 Article 3 of the rules of procedure of the commission 
for the settlement of disputes, G.C.C. Legal Gazette. 1981. 
Through the travaux preparatoires some delegations proposed 
another type of jurisdiction to cover cases related to the 
staff of the G.C.C. Secretariat and an advisory opinion could 
be given at the request of any of the G.C.C. principal organs, 
but these were omitted later. In practice, though, and 
according to the G.C.C. staff regulation, the disputes of the 
staff are solved within the Secretariat itself. The above 
proposal came in Qatar delegations. Both Riyadh and Muscat 
meetings, op.cit.. pp.7-8, 8-9.
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Although it is not clear whether the commission's 
jurisdiction extends to boundary disputes among G.C.C. states 
which already existed before the establishment of the 
G.C.C,101 the literal interpretation of the provision of the 
rules would entitle the Supreme Council to refer any dispute 
either before or after the establishment of the G.C.C.
One should stress that the decision of the commission is
not binding and it is merely a recommendation or opinion to
. . 1 0 2  be submitted to the Supreme Council for further action.
Furthermore, the commission apparently is a judicial body,
judging by the provisions of Article 9(1) of the rules of
procedure which requires it to apply the norms of
103 .international law and the Sharia. The Supreme Council is
entitled to elect at least three citizens of the member states
101 There are some unsettled boundary disputes between 
G.C.C. member states, i.e. Kuwait-Saudi Arabia, Qatar-Bahrain, 
Qatar-Saudi Arabia and Oman U.A.E. See Amin, H. , op.cit.. 
pp.11136 and El-Hakim, A., o p.cit.. pp.107-131.
102 Article 4 of the rules of procedure. It should be 
mentioned here that during the discussion of this article 
Qatar, supported by Saudi Arabia, proposed that the
jurisdiction of the commission should be compulsory if the 
parties to the dispute agree in advance, while the decision 
of the commission is not final and executable until the
Supreme Council endorsement. This proposal in fact does not 
add any element of compulsory jurisdiction of the commission. 
However, it met with rejection by the Kuwait delegation, 
stating that international courts in their traditional form 
have not gained the trust of the states and they sometimes 
instead tend to seek for mediation and conciliation. The 
report of Qatar delegation, Muscat, op.cit.. p.8.
103 Article 9(1) of the rules of procedure of the
commission. Al-Ashal, commenting on the commission
composition, its jurisdiction, power and operation, considers 
it as a judicial body with advisory jurisdiction, o p.cit.. 
pp.155-6.
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not involved in the dispute.*04 Professional competence is 
not required.*0^ Yet the Rules of Procedure of the commission 
refer to "international law and custom, and the principles of 
Islamic Sharia" as sources for the commissions 
recommendations,*0^ a matter which needs to be determined by 
legally qualified personnel.
From the composition, jurisdiction and operation of the 
commission one may conclude that the G.C.C. would rather adopt 
a political solution than a judicial one to settle its 
disputes through ad hoc committees. Therefore, it is perhaps 
worthwhile to note that the settlement of legal disputes has 
not yet had the occasion to function. However, this does not 
mean that there have not been disputes between the G.C.C. 
member states, particularly after the G.C.C. establishment. 
One example of these is the lingering dispute between Qatar
*04 Article 4(1) of the rules of procedure of the 
commission.
105 Kuwait has rejected a Qatar proposal that the 
commission must have legal task and maintained that the door 
should be left open as regards the composition of the 
commission. Therefore the ministers of foreign affairs could 
be members of the commission if the dispute has only a 
political aspect, or lawyers if the dispute has a legal 
aspect, a distinction which is difficult to maintain. Qatar 
Delegations Report, Legal Experts Meeting, Muscat, o p.cit. . 
p. 9.
*06 It should be noted here that customary international 
law is part of international law and one of its main sources. 
However the authors might mean as international law only 
multilateral and bilateral treaties.
192
107and Bahrain concerning the Huwar Islands. Instead, the
G.C.C. urged both parties to settle their dispute through the
107 . . . .Since 1930 a territorial dispute has existed between
Qatar and Bahrain. The dispute is about the Huwar Islands 
situated less than one mile off the western coast of Qatar and 
18 miles off the Bahrain coast. In 1938, Belgrave, the 
political adviser to Bahrain, claimed that Huwar had been 
occupied by the subjects of Bahrain and Shaikh Isa, the ruler 
of Bahrain, used to pay an annual visit to Huwar. In July 
1939 the British government, according to the advice of her 
political agent in Bahrain, decided that the Huwar Islands 
belonged to Bahrain. Qatar protested against the British 
government's decision and claimed that the Huwar Islands lay 
in its territorial waters and Bahrain's physical acts were 
temporary, discontinuous and accomplished by unauthorised 
individuals, which did not signify sovereignty claims and 
therefore lack animus occuoandi. The second issue which 
further arose was a dispute regarding the demarcation of the 
offshore boundaries between the two countries using the median 
line. In 1947 the British government took a decision 
concerning the delimitation of the two countries' boundaries, 
based on the median line. This decision was accepted by Qatar 
while it was rejected by Bahrain. Bahrain claims that the 
median line cannot be strictly applied and should deviate to 
include the pearl fisheries in Bahrain. Such deviation is 
justified by the principle of special circumstances. In 1964 
Qatar suggested to the British government to refer the whole 
dispute to arbitration. Both Bahrain and Britain agreed to 
the process of arbitration in settling the dispute, but in 
1966 Bahrain withdrew its agreement. In 1971 Saudi Arabia 
accepted to play the role of the mediator. On 3 March 1983 
the dispute between the two countries erupted when Bahrain 
named one of its military ships "Huwar" in a ceremony attended 
by her Prime Minister. Qatar considered it as a provocative 
act and protested strongly. The G.C.C. decided to resolve the 
dispute peacefully and requested Saudi Arabia to resume its 
mediation role. On 26 April 1986 Qatar landed troops on the 
disputed reef between the two countries and seized it. This 
occurred, Qatar claimed, as a result of Bahrain's "insistent" 
violation of Qatar sovereignty represented in dredging and 
construction work on the reef which is against all the 
principles of mediation. Bahrain described Qatar's act as a 
violation of good neighbourliness within the G.C.C. Mediation 
by Saudi Arabia and the G.C.C. subsequently defused the 
confrontation. See Huwar Islands, R/15/2/547 (unpublished 
official document), India Office Library and Records, London. 
See also the author's LL.M. dissertation, The Oatari-Bahraini 
Boundary Dispute over the Huwar Islands. Hull University 
(1984) (unpublished).
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. . 108 mediation of Saudi Arabia.
108 On 4 April 1978 the government of Saudi Arabia 
submitted a draft consisting of five principles as framework 
for a peaceful solution, which includes the following terms 
(translated from Arabic by the writer):
(1) The sovereignty over the Huwar Islands and the offshore 
boundaries are inalienable issues, so they should receive 
exclusive settlement.
(2) Every party pledges from the date of this plan not to 
take any action which might strengthen his legal 
position, or weaken the legal position of the other party 
or to change the present situation as regards the 
disputed matters. Any act of this kind would have no 
legal effect at all.
(3) (a) The parties pledge not to exercise any act through 
the media against each other, either in regard to the 
dispute or any other issues until they reach a final 
settlement.
(b) The two parties pledge not to take any action which 
would obstruct the process of negotiation.
(4) A committee of the two parties will be set up, attended 
by a representative of Saudi Arabia in order to achieve 
acceptable solutions based on justice, good 
neighbourliness, balanced interests and the security 
requirements of both parties.
(5) The two parties pledge to solve all the disputed issues 
and this would be achieved through negotiations. In case 
of disagreement on any of these issues, the parties 
should delegate Saudi Arabia to suggest a compromise for 
the disputed issues. That compromise should be accepted 
as a solution between them.
On 2 July 1981 the government of Qatar made its comments on 
the above draft, by which it gave its primary acceptance 
accompanied by the following clarifications:
(1) All the disputed issues should be considered as legal 
ones.
(2) In referring to Article 5 of the draft Qatar stated that 
the question of sovereignty cannot accept compromise; 
it is either complete and for one of the parties, 
otherwise not.
(3) If the two parties did not reach a settlement through the 
mediation of Saudi Arabia the latter government may share 
the view of the government of Qatar that the dispute 
should be settled according to the principles of 
international law. Accordingly Qatar suggests that 
Article 5 of the Saudi draft should be read as follows: 
"If the negotiations stipulated in Article 4 have not led 
to an agreement on one or more of the disputed issues 
which have already been mentioned (i.e. the sovereignty 
over the Huwar Islands and the demarcation of offshore 
boundaries), the governments of the two parties pledge 
with the consultation of the government of Saudi Arabia
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The reluctance of the G.C.C. member states to resort to 
compulsory jurisdiction is understandable as they are newly 
independent states, unwilling to submit their disputes on 
vital matters to final judicial settlement unless they are 
entirely sure of their legal position. Similarly other 
international organisations have set up ad hoc commissions for 
the settlement of disputes, though with different composition 
and jurisdiction. In the case of the O.A.S., for example, 
there is no compulsory jurisdiction, while with the O.A.U.
there is no enforcement procedure of the decisions of the ad
. 109hoc committees.
V I . The Ministerial Council
(a) Functions and Powers
The ministerial council is composed of the ministers of 
foreign affairs of the member states. However, it is 
understood that in the case of a minister for one reason or 
another being unable to represent his state, another minister
to determine the best means for solving those issues 
according to the rules of international law. The 
decision of the agreed body for this purpose will be 
final and obligatory for both parties.” From the above 
comment, it seems apparently that Qatar is willing to go 
to arbitration rather than accept a political compromise. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives. Doha, Qatar, 
17.4.1978.
109 Thomas and Thomas, o p.cit.. p.288. See also Fenwick, 
International law. 4th ed., New York (1965), p.233. For the 
O.A.U. see Cervenka, Z., The Organisation of African Unitv and 
its Charter. C. Hurst & Co., London (1968), pp.85-92. See 
also Elias, T. , Africa and the Development of International 
Law. Sijthoff, Leiden (1977), pp.164-70; Andemicael, The 
O.A.U. and the U.N., o p.cit., pp .35.36.
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could be delegated to take his place.110 The ministerial 
council deals with a large scope of affairs which makes it an 
essential factor in the running of the G.C.C.111 One of the 
most important functions of the ministerial council is to 
prepare the future political moves and to propose 
recommendations, studies and projects which allow for the 
cooperation and coordination of the member states to develop 
in all spheres. The ministerial council finds itself in the 
unenviable position of promoting cooperation and coordination 
between the private and the public sectors as well as 
regulating the movement of capital, citizens and generally 
supervising economic activity as provided in the UEA. The 
ministerial council has the power to entrust the study of any 
question concerning the diverse interests of cooperation 
between member states to one or several technical or 
specialised committees. Equally, the council lays down its 
rules of procedure as well as the rules of procedure of the 
Secretariat. The ministerial council also approves
nominations of the assistant Secretaries-General put forward 
to them by the Secretary-General. However the nomination of
the assistants is carried out through close consultation
112between the ministers of foreign affairs. Finally, the
n o Article 11(1) of the Fundamental Statute.
111 . . . .The functions of the ministerial council are
described by Article 12 of the Fundamental Statute.
112 This experience in fact happened when Oman decided 
to replace the Secretary General assistant for political 
affairs who is an Oman citizen with another citizen for the 
same post, after six years of holding this position. Private
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ministerial council, inter alia, examines all the matters 
referred to it by the Supreme Council. However, in actual 
fact the ministerial council enjoyed more power than merely 
examining these referred matters. On more than one occasion 
the Supreme Council delegated powers to the ministerial 
council to adopt policies and to take decisions which are
addressed directly to the G.C.C. member states without
113subsequent consent of the Supreme Council.
By contrast, the O.A.U. Council of Ministers has far less 
power than the G.C.C. ministerial council. It is charged 
mainly with the implementation of the Assembly of Heads of 
State decisions and also has no power to nominate the 
assistant of the Secretary general.114
(b) Meetings and Voting of the Ministerial Council 
Article 11(2) of the Fundamental Statute provides that 
the ministerial council meets once every six months in an 
ordinary session with the possibility of holding an
information of the author.
113 . . .  . .During the fifth session of the Supreme Council it
delegated power to the ministerial council to adopt the 
document of 'aims and policies of development plans in the 
G.C.C.'. On another occasion the Supreme Council in its sixth 
session in Muscat 1986 delegated power to the ministerial 
council to adopt a timetable for the implementation of the UEA 
which is based on the Secretary General's proposals. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Council in its seventh session 
delegated power to the ministerial council to approve the aims 
and policies of cooperation with other states and 
international economic groups. See The Annual Report. 1985, 
p.53. For the sixth and seventh sessions, see Measures to 
Implement the U.E.A.. G.C.C. Secretariat, Riyadh (1986).
114
Article XIII of the O.A.U. Charter. See Peaslee, 
Part 1, o p.cit.
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extraordinary session at any given moment if ever any state 
wishes to have one, as long as at least one other member state 
supports it. However, the council*s presidency rotates among
l i e
member states annually in alphabetical order of the state.
On the whole, provisions of the rules of procedure of the 
ministerial council are more or less identical to those of the 
Supreme Council. Furthermore, for both organs many rules of 
procedure are simply repeated as already embodied in the 
Fundamental Statute.
The usual outcome of the council's deliberations consists 
of resolution and recommendations. However, the legal 
substance of each is not specified.116
Article 33(1) of the rules of procedure of the 
ministerial council provides that decisions are taken 
unanimously except those relating to procedural matters which 
shall have a majority vote. It is also stressed in Article 
33(2) that in case of disagreement on the definition of 
whether the mater is substantive or procedural, the matter 
will be decided by a majority vote of the state members
115 This is the first amendment to the Fundamental 
Statute (Art.11(2)) and consequently Article 15(4) of the 
rules of procedure of the ministerial council. The previous 
formula provided that the council's presidency shall rotate 
among member states every six months, a rule which is not 
compatible with Article 7(2) of the Fundamental Statute which 
organises the presidency of the Supreme Council. The G.C.C. 
Secretary General's Memo No. 4383/49402 dated 6.5.1985. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Qatar.
Article 12(1) (2) (3) of the Fundamental Statute.
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117 . .present and voting. Here one could notice, unlike the case 
of the Supreme council, the rules of procedure provide a 
solution for the distinction between substantive and 
procedural matters. However, the ministerial council*s rules 
of procedure contain provisions for appearing on the occasion 
of examining certain questions by the council. If such a case 
were to arise it would be up to the President of the 
ministerial council (chosen in the same way as the President 
of the Supreme Council) and to the Secretary General to 
reconcile the divergent viewpoints and to forge an
understanding between the members before putting the issue to
118 . the vote. Probably this is meant to avoid differences in
opinion which would result in the failure of the meeting of
the ministerial council, although the G.C.C. organs pay more
importance to the consensus than to vote.
Furthermore, the President of the ministerial council,
the Secretary General and member states are even allowed to
ask for a vote to be delayed for a certain period of time in
119order to negotiate a consensus.
117 . . .During the discussion of the legal experts committee
on the rules of procedure for the ministerial committee, the
Oman delegation was the only one which insisted that both
decisions on substantive and procedural matters should be
taken by unanimous vote. Qatar Delegation Report. Muscat,
6.10.1981, o d .cit.. p.6.
1 1 Q
Article 36(1) of the rules of procedure of the 
ministerial council.
119 Article 36(2) of the rules of procedure.
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Yet the experience of the ministerial council in the 
decision-making process shows that voting is a desirable 
procedure when consensus among the member states cannot be 
obtained. In 1984 the Secretary General prepared a draft for 
the unified patent system which was agreed upon by the 
committee of science and technology. The draft was further 
submitted to the ministerial council for approval. It was 
approved by all member states except Oman, and yet in spite
of Oman's objection the draft was submitted to the Supreme
. 12 0 Council for final approval. In a letter from the Omani
Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary General, Oman
objected to taking the recommendation to the Supreme Council
on the ground that the question under discussion was a
substantive issue and needed unanimity according to Article
13(2) of the Fundamental Statute. The G.C.C. Secretariat
studied the Oman objection and replied in the following way:
(1) Article 13(2) of the Fundamental Statute which Oman
referred to deals only with "legislative decisions" taken
by the ministerial council. This type of decision is
final and can be addressed to the member states for
implementation without further consent by the Supreme
Council. These binding decisions, the Secretariat
explained, fall into two categories. Firstly, decisions
stipulated in the Fundamental Statute concerning the
approval of the rules of procedure of the ministerial
120 The Secretary General's memo No.201, No.122 dated 
June 1986.
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council as well as the rules of procedure of the
. . 121 Secretariat and other internal organisational matters. x
Secondly, decisions which are delegated by the Supreme
Council. The Omani complaint does not fall into any of
these, therefore it cannot be regarded as a matter to be
dealt with under Article 13(2).
(2) The decision whether a matter is procedural or 
substantial cannot be determined by an individual member 
state along, but collectively at a session of the 
ministerial council as provided by Article 33.
(3) The unanimity rule which is required in the ministerial 
council decisions does not mean necessarily all the six 
member states, but it is for all the casting and present 
member states. If a member state is absent or abstained 
this does not affect the quorum.
On the legal opinion of the Secretariat General one may
draw few remarks. The word "decision” is often used to mean
legally binding and non-binding actions. In the U.N. Charter
122it refers to all types of actions as decisions. Article
198 of the E.E.C. treaty restricts the use of the word 
"decision" to legally binding decisions. Article 7 of the 
Arab League pact on the other hand, provides that the word 
"decision" covers both decisions arrived at unanimously, which 
are binding on all members, and decisions arrived at by a
121 Article 12(7) of the Fundamental Statute.
12 2 See m  particular Article 18(2) for the concept of 
recommendations. See Castaneda, op.cit.. pp.6-16.
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majority vote, which are binding only on those who vote in 
favour.
However, a number of international organisations apply 
decisions to recommendations or preparatory work even though
. 123these are not decisions.
Article 13(2) of the G.C.C. Fundamental Statute provides:
"Resolutions of the Ministerial Council in 
substantive matters shall be carried by unanimous 
vote of the member states present and participating 
in the vote, and in procedural matters by majority 
vote."
According to the above article there is no distinction 
between legally binding decisions and recommendations. It is 
apparent that it covers all types of actions taken by the 
ministerial council. Article 12(2) of the Statute describes 
that resolutions adopted in developing and coordinating 
activities existing between member states in all fields shall 
be referred by the ministerial council as recommendations to 
the Supreme Council for appropriate action. However, in 
Article 12(1) of the Fundamental Statute both the words 
"resolution" and "recommendation" are used to demonstrate the 
required actions in the same fields. Moreover, if one accepts 
the Secretariate argument that Article 13(2) deals only with 
"legislative decisions" then the question arises as to how the 
council arrives at its recommendations.
As such it is arguable that the Fundamental Statute does 
not draw a distinction between binding decisions and
123 Schermers, o p .cit.. pp.203-4.
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recommendations. Nevertheless it is accepted in the law and 
practice of international institutions as mentioned earlier 
that decisions relating to the internal structure or
1 O A
functioning of the organisation are binding.
Where the ministerial council implements a binding
decision by way of delegation from the Supreme Council, it may
not exceed its own powers. As such there are limits to the
power of delegation. Thus the delegating organs may not
delegate power they do not possess and responsibility for the
delegated power resides with the delegating organ.
It is arguable that the Supreme Council has absolute
power of delegation to the ministerial council which empowers
it to take binding decisions addressed to member states, since
125the Supreme Council decisions are not binding per se.
(VII) The Secretariat
The usual structure of an international organisation
consists of a Secretary General assisted by deputies. The
G.C.C. is not an exception to this basic rule. The
organisation has a Secretary General and two assistants, each
126responsible for political and economic affairs.
The Secretariat is staffed by officials from member 
states nominated by their governments and approved by the 
Secretary General, permanent staff and others who are
124 See supra, note 16.
125 See supra, pp.160-73.
126 Article 14(3) of the Fundamental Statute.
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recruited locally. However, it is provided that the Secretary 
General can recruit if need be candidates from states that are
not members, if permission is first obtained from the
127ministerial council. In performing its duties the
128Secretariat consists of seven m a m  departments.
For the purpose of presentation the Secretary General and 
his staff will be dealt with separately.
(a) The Secretary General
The Secretary General of the G.C.C., who must be a
citizen of one of the member states, is appointed by the
Supreme Council for three years, which can only be renewed 
129once. The Fundamental Statute does not altogether make
clear the precise functions of the Secretary General. 
Nevertheless, the mere fact of leaving the decision to the 
Supreme Council to appoint him indicates the political 
character of such a choice and emphasises his importance. 
However, one has to examine the power of the Secretary General 
in the Fundamental Statute, in the rules of procedure of the 
Supreme Council and the staff regulations to obtain an
127 Article 14(4) of the Fundamental Statute.
128 These departments are: (1) The office of the
Secretary General? (2) The Department of Political Affairs?
(3) The Department of Economic Affairs? (4) The Department 
of environment and human resources? (5) The Department of 
financial and administrative affairs? (6) The Department of
legal affairs? (7) Information centre. See the G.C.C. Annual 
Report, The secretariat (1984), pp.22-24.
129 Article 14(2) of the Fundamental Statute. It is 
interesting to note that the Secretary General has remained 
in his post for more than two terms without giving reasons or 
amending Article 14 of the Statute.
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accurate view.
The G.C.C. Secretary General is ultimately answerable to
any action to do with the Secretariat and has to ensure its
smooth running. It is also the duty of the Secretary General
to supervise and to make sure that the functions of the
Secretariat devolved by the Fundamental Statute are dealt with
130by the Secretariat. The Secretary General is also
described as having the power to act as representative of the
131organisation within the powers vested to him.
The function is often not only to speak publicly about 
the organisation but also to buy, rent, borrow, pay on behalf
of the organisation and, more important, conclude agreements
. . 132on behalf of the organisation.
The Secretary general is empowered to pay a significant
role in the meeting of both the Supreme and ministerial
council and perform functions entrusted to him by other
133organs.
130 Article 14(5) of the Fundamental Statute.
1 3 1 .In this regard one may mention that Oman suggested 
adding "within the power vested in him” to Article 5(5) to 
restrict the Secretary General1s power in representing the 
organisation and to avoid ultra vires acts. Qatar Delegation 
Reports, Muscat meeting, o p .cit.
132 Schermers, o p .cit.. p.250.
133 The Secretary General is responsible for setting the 
opening date of the Supreme Council's session and suggesting 
a closing date (Article 4.2(a) of the Supreme Council's rules 
of procedure). He attends every session of the Supreme 
Council's rules of procedure. For his powers in the rules of 
procedure of the ministerial council, see Articles 
3(2)(3),4(2)(3), 8(1)(4), 11, 36(1)(2) and 38(1).
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There are other tasks the Fundamental Statute empowers 
the Secretariat to exercise which apparently cannot be 
achieved properly without the efforts of the Secretary General 
himself. For instance, the Secretariat is empowered to follow 
up the implementation of the member states of the decisions 
and recommendations of the Supreme Council and ministerial
<i ^  <
council. Furthermore, to recommend to the chairman of the
ministerial council the convocation of an extraordinary
13 5session of the council whenever necessary. The latter
power may impliedly include what is stipulated in Article 99 
of the U.N. Charter, where the U.N. Secretary General is 
empowered to bring to the attention of the competent organ 
"any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance 
of international peace and security". Article 8(4) of the 
rules of procedure of the ministerial council emphasises this 
power by giving the Secretary General the right to include in 
the Council*s agenda matters he believes should be reviewed.
Moreover, he enjoys the capacity of proposing an amendment to
13 6the rules of procedure of the ministerial council.
However, it is too early to say at this time whether the 
G.C.C. Secretary General could play a political role such as 
the Secretary General of the Arab League, who has developed
134 Article 15(3) of the Fundamental Statute.
135 Article 15(8) of the Fundamental Statute.
13 6 Article 38(1) of the rules of procedure of the 
ministerial council.
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. . 1 T 7a political role similar to the U.N. Secretary General.
Yet the role of the G.C.C. Secretary General is stronger than
the Secretary General of the O.A.U. who is merely
administrative head by the very name, and may be removed from
office before the end of his four year term by a two-thirds
. 138majority of the O.A.U. Assembly.
(b) The Secretariat General
The Secretariat General has to deal with some matters
13 9which are exclusively of an administrative nature. The
G.C.C. Secretariat is responsible for a number of tasks which 
consist of the commissioning of studies related to cooperation 
and coordination, concerned with common action in the member 
states, as well as for preparing periodic reports and studies
137 See Bowett, The Law of International Institutions. 
op.cit.. at p.232. On the recent dispute between Qatar and 
Bahrain over the construction of a coastguard post in Fasht 
Al-Diabal, a reef midway between the two countries, the G.c.C. 
Secretary General Abdullah Bishara and the head of the 
military committee conducted talks in Qatar and Bahrain on how 
to carry out the Saudi plan. However, the G.C.C. Secretary 
General has not played a significant role in settling the 
dispute as representative of the organisation. This may be 
partly due to the Saudi mediation role. Reuter Reports. 
London archive, 25 May 1986. While in the Iraq-Iran war the 
role of the Secretary General was confined to political 
announcements which are not accompanied by actual acts, a 
matter which carried by some of the G.C.C. ministers of 
foreign affairs. See G.C.C. Annua1 Report. 1986, o p .cit..
pp.29-34. See also Nonneman, G., Iraq, the Gulf States and 
the War. A Changing Relationship. 1980-1986 and Beyond. 
Ithaca Press, London (1986).
138Article XVI of the O.A.U. Charter and Article 36 of 
the O.A.U. Assembly rules of procedure. In Peaslee, o p .cit.. 
pp.1165-1181.
139 . . .The functions of the Secretariat are described m
Article 15 of the Fundamental Statute.
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ordered by the two other principal organs of the organisation.
In this way, the G.C.C. Secretariat is regarded as a sort of
information bureau. The Secretariat has to ensure that the
member states carry out the decisions reached by the Supreme
Council and the ministerial council. It also prepares the
drafts of administrative and financial regulations as well as
the budget and the closing accounts of the organisation. The
budget is prepared according to the actual needs of the
Secretariat which are determined by the competent bodies of
the Secretariat within the Secretary General's 
14 0instructions
The Secretariat has certain tasks regarding the
preparation for the two councils and carrying out any missions
delegated to it by the two main organs.141
The distinctively international character of the
Secretariat is spelled out in Article 16 of the Fundamental
statute which borrows the language of Article 100 of the
United Nations Charter:
"In the performance of their duties the 
administrative Secretary General and the staff shall 
not seek or receive instructions from any government 
or from any other authority external to the 
organisation."
140 Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the G.C.C. Financial
Regulation. The Secretariat prepared the G.C.C. Staff 
Regulation and the Financial and Audit Regulation. The two 
Regulations were issued by a decision of the ministerial 
council on 12.7.1982.
141 . . . .The ministerial council has delegated the Secretariat
represented by the Secretary General on 14 August 1984 to 
negotiate on behalf of the organisation with the E.E.C. to 
reach an agreement on the policy of levying tax on G.C.C. 
petrochemical products. G.C.C. Annua1 Report (1985), p.65.
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Article 16 in the same language reminds the Secretary
General and all the Secretariat General staff that they
"shall carry out their duties in complete
independence and for the common interest of the 
member states. They shall refrain from any action 
or behaviour that is incompatible with their duties 
and from divulging the secrets of their jobs either 
during or after their tenure of office."
One can notice here the functional protection which is
expressly confirmed in a number of international
organisations142 and confirmed in the advisory opinion of the
• 143International Court of Justice.
The G.C.C. staff regulation at the same time enriches the
international character of the staff by providing an
obligation upon the Secretary General to consider the
principle of merit in recruitment to the Secretariat posts.144
The subjection of recruitment of the staff member to the
political consent of governments would allow for pressure from
member states to employ those who enjoy their confidence
regardless of their standard of efficiency and competence.
This if it occurs would contradict the letter and spirit of
Article 16 of the Fundamental Statute, which provides:
"The Secretary-General and the Assistant Secretaries- 
General and all the Secretariat General's staff shall 
carry out their duties in complete independence and for 
the common interest of the member states. They shall
142 Seyersted, F. , "Jurisdiction over Organs and Officials 
of States, the Holy See and Intergovernmental Organisations 
(2)" 14 I.C.L.O. (1965), pp.493-96.
143 See the advisory opinion on Reparation for Injuries 
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations. I.C.J. Reports 
(1947), pp.181-82.
144 Article 6 of the Staff Regulation.
209
refrain from any action or behaviour that is incompatible 
with their duties and from divulging the secrets of their 
jobs either during or after their tenure of office."
However, the staff regulation does not provide this
perception of independence, whereas Article 7(7) provides that
a citizen who is dismissed from government service in the
member state for disciplinary reasons or has not done military
service, would not be entitled to hold Secretariat posts.
This sort of emphasis on governmental loyalty greatly
contradicts Article 6 of the staff regulation and Article 16
of the Fundamental Statute. By contrast the practice of the
U.N. Secretariat towards states who exert pressure of this
character and the Secretary General who yields to such
pressure is considered in violation of Articles 100 and 101
of the U.N. Charter.145
The G.C.C. staff regulation probably reflects the
tendency of law and practice of international organisations
in establishing statutory instead of contractual relationships
of employment with their officials, and the law to be applied
in case of dispute is the regulation of the organisation.146
145 Meron, T., "Staff of the United Nations Secretariat: 
Problems and Directions" 70 A.J.I.L. (1976), pp.678-83. In 
practice though the G.C.C. at the present time recruited more 
than three-quarters of its staff from Saudi Arabian citizens. 
This initial imbalance will probably slowly modify over years 
by recruiting on a wider basis.
146 For the legal nature of staff recruitment with 
international organisations, see Seyersted, o p .cit.. pp.496- 
505. See also Akehurst, M . , The Law Governing Employment in 
International organisations. Cambridge University Press 
(1967), pp.4-5, while Kelsen maintains that the relationship 
of employment has the character of contract of private law and 
the organisation has no right to establish the rights and 
duties of the individuals on a unilateral basis. It should
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The G.C.C. staff regulation provides that the Secretary
147general recruits the staff by a decision.
However, those who are recruited locally (G.C.C. citizens
and others) are bound by a renewable contract on an annual
basis, signed between them and the assistant general director
for finance and administrative affairs.148
There is no clause in the regulation which allows the
organisation to amend unilaterally the conditions of service,
but the organisation has a legislative power derived from the
149G.C.C. Fundamental Statute to make rules for the staff.
This would mean that acquired rights for the permanent 
staff become incapable of protection, since there is no 
contract by which they can be protected. A similar view has
duties of the individuals on a unilateral basis. It should 
be governed by the law of the host country. The Law of the 
United Nations (1950), pp.313-14 and 318.
147 Articles 15 and 16 of the staff regulations.
148 The rights and duties of the employee are clearly set 
out in a model contract sent to the author by the Director of 
Finance in the G.C.C. Secretariat. In case of dispute, the 
staff regulations will apply. Furthermore, the employee is 
subject to any duty imposed on the staff by the staff 
regulations. In case of administrative malpractice committed 
by the employee, the competent body of the organisation may 
apply either the staff regulation or the provisions of the 
labour law of the host country (Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the 
model contract). It appears therefore that non-permanent 
staff have no acquired rights that they can pursue in the 
courts of the host country.
149 See Article 12(9) of the Fundamental Statute which 
describes the ministerial council competence. In this meaning 
see Akehurst, M . , The Law Governing Employment in 
International Organisations, o p .cit.. p.201. See also 
Seyersted, "Jurisdiction over Organs, Officials of States, the 
Holy See and Intergovernmental Organisations", o p .cit.. p.469.
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been adopted by the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities.150
Furthermore, the staff regulation provides that the 
Secretary General, or whom he authorises, has the right to
terminate the employment unilaterally for non-disciplinary
151reasons. One of those is the cancellation of the service.
This is a matter which gives the authorised body a great
deal of discretion. Moreover, any appeal against the
administrative decision should be taken to the next senior
152head of service and the latter*s decision is final. This
decision would be detrimental to the official concerned and
for the efficacy of the organisation if the next senior
officer himself is involved in the dispute. The protection
necessary to ensure the independence of the services cannot
be guaranteed by merely having a regulation but by securing
the right of officials to challenge the administrative
decision before an administrative tribunal or any other form
153of judicial observance.
As a result one may conclude that the G.C.C. staff
regulation does not provide the officials with great security 
since there is no guarantee against abuse of administrative
decision through a judicial body, and at the same time
150 Akehurst, ibid.. pp.228-36.
1 5 1 .
Article 134 of the staff regulations.
152 Article 118 of the staff regulations.
153 Jenks, W. , The Proper Law of International
Organisations. London, Stevens & Sons Ltd. (1962), p.68.
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deprives the staff of acquired rights because of the statutory
character of the regulation.
(c) The Budget
Article 18 of the Fundamental Statute provides that the
budget is contributed only to the Secretariat and therefore
154does not cover other expenditure of the organisation.
The budget is divided into four chapters. Salaries of 
the staff, administrative expenditure, capital expenditure, 
and enterprise expenditure which requires a large amount of
155 . . . .money. Due to the difficulty of anticipating all needs and 
priorities of the expenditure, the Secretariat is given some 
administrative flexibility to transfer funds from one chapter 
to another.156
154 The budget estimated at:
1. 98,304,857 Saudi Ryials in 1404 AH
2. 95,700,000 Saudi Ryials in 1405 AH
3. 95,100,000 Saudi Ryials in 1406 AH
4. 85,156,000 Saudi Ryials in 1407 AH.
The last figure is equivalent to £13,002,290.08. These 
figures came in a letter to the author from the secretariat 
dated 15.6.87. According to the interview the writers 
conducted with the Director of the Finance Department in 
December 1986, the latter revealed that the budget is confined 
strictly to the Secretariat expenses. Therefore it does not 
cover the expenditure of the peninsula shield troops or any 
obligations coming out of contracts concluded for military 
purposes for these troops. These troops represent a unified 
military command based in the north-eastern Saudi Arabian 
desert town of Hafr A1 Baten formed at the G.C.C. summit 1984 
as a unified military command. For the meetings of the chiefs 
of staff in preparation for these troops, see Qatar News 
Agency Documents. Part 4 (1984), pp.27-42.
155 . . . .Article 7 of the G.C.C. Financial and Audit
Regulation. The G.C.C. Secretariat published by the Institute
of Public Administration Riyadh (1982).
156 Article 8(2).
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However to prevent abuse of appropriating funds the
Secretariat power does not extend to transferring funds from
chapter one, which is designated to salaries, to chapter four,
which is allocated to enterprises expenditures, a matter which
157needs the approval of the ministerial council.
The budget is prepared by the Secretariat, recommended 
by the ministerial council and approved by the Supreme 
Council.158
This gives the Secretariat some power of initiative to 
investigate new fields of activity and gives an accurate 
estimate of the need for expenditures. However, this estimate 
is revised by the ministerial council and the final decision 
on budget must be taken by the Supreme Council.
Undoubtedly the question of financing international
institutions involves some elements of restricting sovereignty
. 159and contains economic, social as well as political matters.
This is obvious in the equal contribution to the budget
and the unanimous decision which must be taken by the Supreme
Council to approve it. This indicates the important power the
Supreme Council enjoys in reviewing the work of the
organisation and controlling its activities. Yet the power
to approve does not mean that it has the right to refuse to
157 Article 8(3) .
158 Article 9(1) of the Financial Regulation and Article 
8(10) of the Fundamental Statute.
159 Jenks, W . , "Some Legal Aspects of the Financing of 
International Institutions", Transactions of the Grotius 
Society. Vol.28 (1962) at p.88.
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give effect to obligations entered into by the organisation 
in the proper discharge of its functions, especially those on 
a contractual basis. This view is asserted in the advisory 
opinion of the I.C.J. on the Effects of Awards of Compensation 
made bv the United Nations Administrative Tribunal (1954).160
While governmental contribution remains the primary 
source of income of the G.C.C., neither the G.C.C. Fundamental 
Statute nor the Financial Regulation formulate clearly the 
legal obligation to contribute the sums decided by the Supreme 
Council. Article 18 of the Fundamental Statute provides:
"The Secretariat General shall have a budget to
which the member states have equal amounts.”
Article 9.3 of the Financial Regulation provides only 
that the budget will be informed to the member states with 
schedules and an explanatory memorandum as soon as it is 
approved.
The contribution lacks a fixed date for the payment. 
Furthermore, the above obligation is weakened by the absence 
of any sort of sanction in case of failure to pay their 
contribution.
By contrast the U.N. Charter includes a clear provision 
for failure of a member to pay its contribution and calls for 
the loss of its vote in the General Assembly if it falls into
I.C.J. Reports (1954), para.47 at p.59. See also 
Meron, T. "Budget Approval by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations. Duty or Discretion?" XLII B.Y.I.L. (1967),
pp.91-122.
161 Jenks, op.cit.. p.104.
215
arrears of more than two years.162
Funding of the UN is not always straightforward and
unproblematic. The Soviet Union submitted that in the General
Assembly of the UN an express decision would be required
before a member could lose its voting rights. Such a decision
163would only be possible by a two-thirds majority. This
164view, however, was not accepted by the UN Secretariat.
The great crisis in the General Assembly, particularly
during the 19th session, demonstrated the danger of applying
sanctions automatically. The General Assembly was not strong
enough to apply sanctions to strong members. The Assembly did
not vote throughout its entire 19th session. Decisions were
either postponed or taken by acclamation. The expenses of
peace-keeping operations would be paid out of a special fund
open to voluntary contributions of all the members. After
separating these expenses from the normal budget of the
organisation, Article 19 was no longer applicable since the
states concerned were not significantly in arrears in the
165payment of their normal contributions.
Article 11 of the regulation provides investment policy 
for the short and medium term designated from the budgetary
162 Article 19 of the United Nations Charter.
163 UN Document A/5431.
164 Schermers, o p .cit.. p.722, para.1298.
165 Higgins, R., "United Nations Peacekeeping. Political 
and Financial Problems", The World Today. August 1965, pp.325- 
33.
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surplus of the Secretariat in a way that does not affect its 
activity and is consistent with Islamic law.
The concept of investment under Islamic law, with its 
different categories, is based mainly on the idea that the 
organisation should be a partner with the bank, sharing profit 
or loss by way of trade. Fixed interest on the assets is 
considered as forbidden usury.166
The provision is compatible with Article 32 of the 
regulation where it provides that assets of the Secretariat 
should be deposited in the current account in one of the
national banks in the G.C.C. member states and the city of the
167headquarters.
166 Hamoud, S., Islamic Banking. Ph.D. thesis submitted 
to the University of Cairo (1984). Arabian information, 
London (1986), pp.236-55.
167 In actual fact the Secretary General, according to 
the ministerial council decision, is allowed to obtain 
interests on the assets of the organisation. He maintains 
internal financial control in addition to external audit under 
the observance of the committee, which includes the Directors 
of Finance of the G.C.C. member states. An interview with the 
Director of the Finance Department in the G.C.C. Secretariat, 
December 1986. See also Articles 19, 20 of the regulation.
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE LEGAL PERSONALITY OF THE GCC
I . The Legal Personality on the International Plane
The legal personality as a concept does not exist as an 
objective reality. It is law which creates it and attaches 
to it certain rights and duties for the social benefit of the 
community.1
The situation is similar as regards international 
organisations whose constitutional instruments expressly or 
impliedly provide for their legal capacities.2
However some international organisations explicitly tend 
to mention the term "legal personality" in their constituent 
instruments to spell out the full capacity of the organisation 
to be the subject of legal rights and duties from the member 
states on the international plane.
As such Article 6 of the Sixth International Tin Council
1Nekam A . , The Personality Concept of the Legal Entity. 
Harvard University Press, 1938, pp.21-27.
2In this meaning see Weissberg G . , International Status 
of the United Nations. New York, 1960, pp.203-4; Bowett, The 
Law of International Institutions, o p .cit.. p.337; Seidl- 
Hohenveldern, "The Legal Personality of International and 
Supranational Organisations", Revue Egyptienne de droit 
international. Vol.21-22, 1965-66, p.71; Hahn H., "The
Conception of an International Personality", Harvard Law 
Review. 71 (1957-58), pp.1045-6; Lauterpacht, E. , "The
Development of the law of international organisations by the 
decisions of international tribunals" 152 RdC (1976), Part IV, 
pp.422-27; Bindschedler, R. , "International organisations, 
general aspects", in Encyclopedia of Public International Law. 
North-Holland: 5 (1983), p.130.
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Agreement (ITA6)3 provides:
"The Council shall have a legal personality. It shall 
in particular have the legal capacity to contract, to 
acquire and to dispose of movable and immovable property 
and to institute legal proceedings."
Other international organisations such as the UN do not use
the term "legal personality". Article 104 of the UN Charter
provides:
"The organisation shall enjoy in the territory of each 
of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary 
for the exercise of its functions and fulfilment of its 
purpose."
This, however, does not amount to a denial of a legal entity 
separate from its member states. The actual terms of Article 
104 of the UN Charter may give rise to controversy as to 
whether "legal capacity" equates to international personality 
since it does not use the term "international personality" 
expressly.
The ICJ in the Advisory Opinion in Reparations Case 
(1949)4 thought that it was necessary to consider first the 
preconditions for establishing the existence of international 
personality. The Court found that the Charter
(i) had gone further than creating a mere centre for 
harmonizing the action of nations in the attainment of common 
ends (Article 1, para.4) but also
(ii) had equipped that centre with organs,
3See the text of the ITA6 in Misc 13 (1982), UKTS, 
Cmnd.854 6.
4See the Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries 
suffered in the services of the United Nations in ICJ Reports 
(1949), pp.178-9.
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(iii) had given it special tasks,
(iv) had defined the position of the members in relation 
to the organisation, which should be detached from its members 
and given the organisation legal capacity and privileges and 
immunities in the territory of each member state.
The possession of these legal capacities would
necessarily entitle the UN to bring an international claim,
which is an element of international personality.
The Court view was enshrined as follows:
"... In the international sphere, has the organisation 
such a nature as involves the capacity to bring an 
international claim? In order to answer this question, 
the Court must first enquire whether the Charter has 
given the organisation such a position that it possesses, 
in regard to its members, rights which it is entitled to 
ask them to respect. In other words, does the 
organisation possess international personality."5
To answer this question the Court thought it must
consider what characteristics the term "legal capacity" was
intended thereby to give the UN.
The Court stated:6
"... the organisation was intended to exercise and 
enjoy, and is in fact exercising and enjoying, 
functions and rights which can only be explained on 
the basis of the possession of a large measure of 
international personality and the capacity to 
operate upon an international plane."
The international personality of an organisation is 
therefore established as being the necessary consequence of 
the possession of certain functions, duties, and rights, for
5 Ibid.. p.178.
6Ibid.. p.179.
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the due performance and exercise of which the attribution of 
such personality is indispensable.7
The functional approach of legal personality was upheld 
in the Certain Expenses of the United Nations Case (1962)8 in 
which it was held that the organisation in relation to third 
parties was bound by the acts of its organ, even if these acts 
were ultra vires provided that the acts in question were 
within the scope of the functions of the organisation.
However, the Court in the Reparation Case expressly 
stated that its conclusion that saying the UN is an 
international person is not the same as saying that its legal 
personality, rights and duties are of the same nature as those 
of a state. What it meant is only that the UN is a subject 
of international law and capable of possessing international 
rights and duties.9
The Court added:
"...The rights and duties of any entity such as the 
organisation must depend upon its purposes and 
functions as specified or implied in its constituent
7Ibid. For contrary view see Ronyer-Hameray, B. , Les 
competences implictes des organisations internationales. 
Librairie generale de droit et de jurisprudence. Paris, 1962, 
p. 69. He points out that capacity is not conclusive evidence 
that international organisation has international personality. 
Capacity is merely one of the factors to be taken into 
consideration when determining international personality.
8See the Advisory Opinion in the ICJ Reports (1962),
p .168.
9The Advisory Opinion in ICJ Reports, op.cit.. p.179. 
See also in this meaning, The American Law Institute, 
Restatement of the Law. The Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States No.l (1987), pp.140-44.
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documents and developed in practice.1,10
Article 17 of the GCC Fundamental Statute, which bears
great resemblance to Article 104 of the UN Charter, provides:
"The Cooperation Council and its organs shall enjoy 
on the territory of Member States such legal 
capacity, privileges and immunities as required to 
realise their objectives and carry out their 
functions."
It is clear that the above provision uses the term "legal 
capacity" but as demonstrated in the Reparation Case, the 
Court had to apply the functional approach to interpretation 
of legal capacities which was intended to mean international 
personality.
It is a mistake as Professor O'Connell states to:
"... jump to the conclusion that an organisation has 
personality and then deduce specific capacities of the 
concomitants of personality. The correct approach is to 
equate personality with capacity, and to inquire what 
capacities are functionally implied in the entity 
concerned. "11
One therefore ought to deduce the legal capacities from
the constitution, which expressly or impliedly states the will
of its members.
Bowett emphasises the point further by stating:
"The danger is, therefore, that one might be tempted 
to deduce say, a general treaty-making power from 
the very fact of personality even though personality 
is itself deduced from a specific treaty-making 
gower. In other words one becomes involved in a 
circular argument unless great care is taken to 
restrict implied power to those which may reasonably 
be deduced from the purpose and functions of the 
organisations in question. Therefore the test is
10Ibid. . p.180.
110'Connell, D., International Law. London, Vol.I (1970),
p. 98.
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a functional one.12
However, the practice seems to confirm the view that 
express provisions in the constituent instruments of the 
organisation are not necessary for carrying out its 
functions.13
The GCC Fundamental Statute has equipped the organisation 
with organs and has given it special tasks to achieve certain 
ends. (Articles 6, 8, 10 and 15). The GCC as political and 
economic organisation is involved in various areas of 
cooperation. The agreement on privileges and immunities 
creates rights and duties between each member state and the
12Bowett, The Law of International Institutions, op.cit.. 
p.337. Kelsen takes a much more restrictive view by granting 
organisations only those special capacities as are conferred 
upon them by particular provisions, but he admits the right 
of the UN to receive and send diplomatic missions without 
recourse to express provisions in the Charter. See his book, 
The Law of the United Nations. New York, 1951, p.335. 
According to another school, the international personality of 
international organisations is enjoyed as a consequence of the 
actual existence of an organisation. Personality is an 
objective fact which can be enjoyed by every organisation 
constituting an international person regardless of the 
particular provisions of the constitutions. For this school 
of thought see Seyersted, I, "Objective international 
personality of international organisations: Do their
capacities depend upon the convention establishing them?", 
31-34, N.O.R.T.I.R. (1961-64), pp.28-9; Serreni, A., Diritto 
internationale. Vol.2 (1960), p.847, cited by Rama-Montaldo, 
M. , "International legal personality and implied powers of 
international organisations", 44 B.Y.I.L. (1970) at p.120; 
Balladore, P., Diritto internazionale pubblico (1962), cited 
by Rama-Montaldo, ibid.. p.118. See also, for the same 
approach, Carroz and Probst, Personalite iuridiaue 
internationale et caoacite de conclure des traites de l'ONU 
et des institutions soecialisee (1953), p.86.
13Seyersted, "International personality of 
intergovernmental organisations. Do their capacities depend 
upon the convention establishing them?", o p .cit.. pp.45-50.
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organisation. The Unified Economic Agreement (UEA) lays down 
specific plans for economic integration. It sets to 
coordinate and unify economic, fiscal, monetary, industrial 
and trade policies of the GCC member states. The GCC in its 
dealings with third parties sometimes resorts to treaties to 
implement its aims. It is doubtful that the GCC can perform 
all these functions without international personality being 
conferred upon it.
The ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on the Reparation Case14 
did not only affirm the international personality of the UN 
vis-a-vis the member states, but also held that it possesses 
such status in its relations with non-member states.
This view may not necessarily apply to a closed type of 
organisation such as the GCC which includes very few members 
and is only competent to deal with certain areas of the 
members' interest. It is true that organisations with a 
universal character enjoy objective international personality 
vis-a-vis non-member states while closed international
u The Advisory Opinion of the Court, o p .cit. . p. 185. This 
judgment is criticised by Schwarzenberger who maintains that 
recognition or acquiescence is necessary on the part of non­
member states since they are not parties to the constitution 
of the organisation. International Law. I, 3rd edition, 
London (1957), pp.128-30. Other writers take similar views, 
like Seidl-Hohenveldern who states that the non-member state 
would suffer a disadvantage if the organisation can require 
the non-member state to accept that it has rights under duties 
vis-a-vis her, while they are not in an equal position to sue 
each other. "The legal personality of international and 
supranational organisations", op.cit.. p.54.
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organisations need recognition by non-member states.15
Thus, if the Secretary-General of the GCC or his 
assistants violate the laws or damage property in a non-member 
state, they cannot rely on their immunities against suit in 
that state*s domestic jurisdiction by claiming that they are 
fulfilling their duty as GCC officials at that time.16
This position, however, could be avoided if there are 
certain arrangements between the GCC and the non-member state 
conferring on its officials the necessary privileges and 
immunities.17
A. Tests for Personality
The possession of legal personality under international 
law normally requires evidence of certain capacities of the 
organisation,18 such as the right to conclude agreements, to
15Schermers, o p .cit.. p.778. In the same meaning, see 
also Bowett, The Law of International Institutions, op.cit.. 
p.339. Hahn, H. also states that the ICJ judgment does not 
appear to be applicable to all international organisations. 
Third parties to other international organisations should show 
their willingness through their recognition of the legal 
personality. See his article, o p .cit.. p.1049. There is, 
however, an unsupported view which maintains that the GCC has 
objective personality, like states. Makarim, E., "The 
positive impact on the establishment of the GCC on the issues 
of private international law of those states", o p .cit.. pp.27- 
28.
16Seidl-Hohenveldern gives a similar example, o p .cit..
p.54.
17Ibid. . pp. 57-60.
18 See Seidl-Hohenveldern, I., "The legal personality of 
international and supranational organisations", o p .cit.. 
pp.42-3. He points out, by giving examples, that there are 
inherent capacities of international organisations resulting 
from their legal personality and they exercised them without
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enjoy privileges and immunities, to own property19 and the 
right of litigation. However, the proof of actual exercise 
of these capacities is unnecessary in order to let the 
organisation be the holder of such capacities.20
1. The GCC Capacity to Conclude Agreements
To Parry and Bowett the effect of the capacity to 
conclude treaties on the concept of personality is quite 
significant. They point out that treaty making power is 
evidence of international personality but the reverse may not 
be so.21
The GCC Fundamental Statute neither contains a general 
provision authorising the organisation to enter into 
international agreements, nor does it make specific provisions 
determining the organ competent to conclude on behalf of the 
GCC such agreements.
contest of their validity.
19As far as the GCC is concerned, it owns its headquarters 
in Riyadh, but it pays regular rent for its subsidiary 
organisation's buildings sited i<n Manama (Bahrain), and 
Kuwait, where it established the technical bureau for 
communication and the Gulf Investment Organisations.
20 • •Seyersted, Objective International Personality of
Intergovernmental Institutions. Do their Capacities Really 
depend upon their Constitutions? Copenhagen (1963), p.60. See 
also Seidl-Hohenveldern, op.cit., p.32.
21Parry, C., "The treaty-making power of the United 
Nations", 26 B.Y.I.L. (1949), p.147; Bowett, op.cit.. p.341. 
For opposite views see Kasme, B. , La capacite de 
1 1 organisation des Nations Unies de conclure des traites. 
Librairie generale de droit et de jurisprudence (1960), pp.30- 
31.
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However, Article 17(2) of the Fundamental Statute 
provides:
"Representatives of the member states of the Council 
and the Council employees, shall enjoy such 
privileges and immunities as are specified in 
agreements to be concluded for this purpose between 
the member states.”
It may be argued that according to the above provision 
the GCC is not a contracting party, since the agreement on 
privileges and immunities is concluded between the member 
states. Therefore, this as such does not indicate that the 
GCC has the capacity to conclude agreements.
The ICJ recognised expressly that the conclusion of the 
UN privileges and immunities agreement intended to exercise 
and enjoy "functions and rights which can only be explained 
on the basis of the possession of a large measure of 
international personality and the capacity to operate upon an 
international plane".22
However, the UN is in a rather unique position which 
enables it to enjoy objective personality and therefore it 
possesses an "inherent treaty-making power". The Charter of 
the UN also includes a group of provisions which can be relied
22The Advisory Opinion in the Reparation Case, op.cit.. 
p. 174. For the criticism of this view see Parry, C. , "The 
treaty-making power of the United Nations", 26 B.Y.I.L. 
(1949), pp.142-45. Detter, I considers the conventions on 
privileges and immunities as conventions between states and 
not treaties of organisations. They are international
agreements in favour of third parties. Law-making bv 
International Organisations. Stockholm 1965), at
p.124.
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upon as evidence of the treaty-making power.23
The GCC is a political body entrusted with a wide range 
of activities to foster and strengthen various aspects of 
cooperation. To achieve its aims it must be endorsed with the 
competence to conclude treaties.24
As such the Fundamental Statute contains provisions
regarding treaty-making power couched in general terms.
Article 8(5) provides that one of the Supreme Council's
functions is to "approve the bases for dealing with other 
states and international organisations".
The latter may be widely interpreted as capacity of the 
GCC to conclude agreements. There is yet another way of 
attributing such power to the GCC. That is to adopt the 
approach taken by some writers on the question of personality, 
to find the basis of the capacity not only in the
constitutional provisions, but also in the acts of the organs 
and the practice which developed through the organisation's 
functions.25
Despite the fact that the UEA operates within the express 
and spiritual context of the Fundamental Statute, it does not 
make clear reference to the capacity of the organisation to
See Parry, o p .cit.. p.148. See also, Seidl- 
Hohenveldern, I., "International Economic Law", III Recueil 
des Cours (1986), pp.108-109.
In this meaning, see the Advisory Opinion in Reparation 
Case, op.cit.. p.182.
25This is the functional approach. See Weissberg,
op.cit.. p.37. See also Bowett, o p .cit.. p.342.
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conclude agreements.26 Article 7 formulates such capacity in 
general terms as well as in specific terms, but it is 
attributed to the member states and not to the organisation 
as such.
"Member states shall coordinate their commercial 
policies and relations with other states and 
regional economic groupings and blocs with a view 
toward creating balanced trade relations and 
favourable circumstances and terms of trade 
therewith.
To achieve this goal, the member states shall make the 
following arrangements:
1 ........
2 ........
3. Conclude economic agreements collectively when and 
if the common benefit of the member states is realised."
Another provision in the UEA demonstrates similar
capacity to the member states, inasmuch as Art.15 provides
that:
"Member states shall set rules, make arrangements 
and lay down terms for the transfer of technology, 
selecting the most suitable or introducing such 
changes thereto as would serve their various needs. 
Member states shall also, whenever feasible, 
conclude uniform agreements with foreign governments 
and scientific or commercial firms to achieve these 
objectives."
On the whole one may draw the conclusion that the legal 
capacity of the G.C.C. to conclude agreements is not provided
26The UEA could be regarded as a supplementary agreement 
to the Fundamental Statute. The legal linkage between the two 
is clearly laid down in the UEA preamble. It confirms that 
the governments of the GCC member states agree to implement 
the UEA in accordance with the Fundamental Statute. It is 
needless to say that the organs which implement the provisions 
of the two instruments are the same. The only difference is 
while the Fundamental Statute deals with the cooperation in 
general and wide terms the UEA is confined to specific 
economic issues.
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expressis verbis either by reference to the Fundamental 
Statute of the G.C.C. or the rules embodied in the UEA.
In practice the GCC has moved collectively to build on 
the authorization of the Supreme Council to enter into 
international arrangements with the EEC and other economic 
groups.27 The Cooperation Agreement initialled in March 
between the E.E.C. and the G.C.C. was signed in Luxembourg on 
15 June, 1988. Mr. Genscher, President of the Council, and 
Mr. Cheysson, Member of the Commission with special 
responsibility for North-South relations, signed on behalf of 
the Community. Prince Saud al-Faisal bin Abdul Aziz, the
27The Ministerial Council in its eleventh session 12-13 
June 1984 discussed the Secretariat-General memorandum and the 
Saudi Government memo No. 96/40/15/2375813 dated 15.9.1404 . A.H. 
It decided to endorse the principle of entering into direct 
negotiation with the economic groups starting with the EEC, 
then Japan and finally USA. This decision was preceded by 
another decision by the Ministerial Council taken on 14 August 
1984 to delegate the Secretary-General to start his contact 
with the European group. The main issue on the agenda was the 
conclusion of agreements with the EEC in order to reduce the 
customs tariff which is imposed on the main GCC export 
products to the European market. The debate on this issue 
covered a series of GCC Ministerial Council sessions. These 
decision are not published yet, and collected by the author 
during his tour of the GCC member states (November-December 
1988). The first ministerial meeting between the GCC and the 
EEC took place in Luxembourg on 14 October 1985. Both sides 
agreed that discussion should cover the conclusion of a 
comprehensive, mutually beneficial agreement to foster the 
broadest possible commercial and economic cooperation between 
the two regions. The agreement should contain provisions 
covering future developments in such fields as energy, 
industrial cooperation, investment, transfer of technology and 
training. See Bull. E.C. 2 1985, point 2.2.24, Bull. E.C. 3 
1985, point 2.2.24, Bull. E.C. 7/8 1985, point 2.3.29, Bull. 
E.C. 9 1985, point 2.3.15. See also the resolution of the 
European Parliament adopted on economy and trade with GCC, 
Bull. E.C.2, Vol.20 1987, point 2.4.11, Bull. E.C.5, Vol.21, 
1988, p.68
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Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs and current 
President of the Ministerial Council of the G.C.C., and Mr. 
Abdulla Y. Bishara, Secretary-General of the G.C.C., signed 
on behalf of the G.C.C.28 The Agreement sets relations 
between the two organisations on a contractual footing. It 
provides for cooperation in the following fields: economic
affairs, agriculture and fisheries, industry, energy, science, 
technology, investment, the environment and trade.
As regards economic cooperation the two sides will seek 
to facilitate the transfer of technology through joint 
ventures and to encourage cooperation on standards. In the 
case of energy, both sides will promote cooperation between 
firms, training and joint studies on trade in oil, gas and 
petroleum products. They will also endeavour to promote 
appropriate investment protection and a reciprocal improvement 
of investment conditions. In the trade sector the aim of 
cooperation will be to encourage expansion and 
diversification. Both sides will also continue to accord each 
other most-favoured-nation treatment. In order to ensure that 
the cooperation measures are given practical application a 
Joint Council will be set up which will meet at least once a 
year, or at the request of one of the parties.29
On 15 June a joint political statement was issued on the 
occasion of the signing of the cooperation agreement between
28 See EC Bull. 6 (1988), p.97.
29See EC Bulletin No.3, Vol.21 (1988), p.93, EC Bull.. 
No.6, Vol.21 (1988), p.97? EC Bull. 7/8 (1988), p.90.
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the G.C.C. and the E.E.C.30 Nevertheless, the political
30 On 15 June the following joint political statement was 
issued to mark the signing of the Cooperation Agreement 
between the European Community and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC):
”1. On the occasion of the signing of the Cooperation 
Agreement between the European Community and the Member 
States of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of 
the Gulf (GCC), the European Community and its Member 
States and the GCC and its member States expressed their 
determination to continue strengthening and intensifying 
relations between the two regions in the political, 
economic and cultural fields. The signing of the 
Agreement will no doubt create the momentum for the 
strengthening of their already solid relations and will 
expedite the realization of their common objectives.
2. On this occasion the Ministers of the European 
Community and the GCC discussed regional and
international issues of common interest. They expressed 
their deep concern over the gravity of the situation in 
the Occupied Territories. They share the view that the 
repressive measures taken by Israel against the
Palestinian people are in clear contradiction to 
international law and human rights and must stop 
forthwith. This situation underlines the urgent need 
for a speedy negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. In this context, the Ministers of the European 
Community and the GCC, recalling respectively the Venice 
Declaration issued by the European Council and subsequent 
declarations and the Fez Plan and subsequent statements 
adopted by the Arab League summit, reaffirmed their
support for the early convening of an international peace
conference and will do their utmost with a view to 
reaching a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the 
Middle East.
Both sides expressed their profound concern about the 
continuation of the war between Iraq and Iran, which 
endangers international peace, security and stability. 
They reiterated their full support for the early 
implementation of Security Council resolution 598 and 
commended the efforts of the UN Secretary General in this 
regard. They urged the Security Council to take every 
effort for the realisation of a peaceful solution to the 
conflict and to take whatever additional measures are 
necessary in accordance with the UN Charter to secure 
compliance with Security Council resolution 598.
The two sides also reviewed problems related to 
navigation in the Gulf's international waterways. They
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statement did not reflect clearly that the two organisations 
and not the member states are the parties.31 In the 
introductory paragraph of the statement the reference was made 
to the E.E.C. and the countries of the G.C.C. as parties.32 
This was reiterated in paragraphs 1 and 4.33 Yet in paragraph 
2 the statement provides:
explicitly emphasized that freedom of navigation and 
unimpeded flow of trade is a cardinal principle in 
international relations and international law. In this 
context they call upon the international community to 
safeguard the right of free navigation in international 
waters and sea lanes for shipping en route to and from 
all ports and installations of the littoral States that 
are not party to the hostilities.
3. Reaffirming that cooperation between the European 
Community and the GCC countries is complementary to the 
Euro-Arab dialogue and not a substitute for it, they 
expressed their determination to support actively the 
objectives of the dialogue and contribute positively 
towards its success.
4. Recognising the positive role of the GCC for the 
preservation of peace, security and stability of the Gulf 
region, the European Community and its Member States are 
determined to develop further cooperation with the GCC 
and its member States, particularly in the framework of 
the Cooperation Agreement. In so doing both sides will 
be contributing to peace and stability in the region.
5. Both sides expressed their determination to take 
necessary steps to ensure the early entry into force of 
the Cooperation Agreement signed today, and to pursue 
with vigour its subsequent implementation. In accordance 
with the provisions of the Agreement, they decided to 
hold one annual meeting with the participation of the 
Member States of the Community and the Commission on the 
one hand, and the member States of GCC and the 
Secretariat-General of the GCC on the other hand."
See EC Bull. 6-1988, pp.118-119.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
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•'On this occasion the Ministers of the European Community 
and the G.C.C. discussed regional and international 
issues of common interest.”
This formula was also reinforced in paragraphs 4 and 5 to
demonstrate the will of the two organisations.34
However, this authorisation and the practice which
followed is not necessary to prove the capacity of an
organisation to conclude international agreements. There are
a great number of treaties concluded between the UN and both
states and specialised agencies which do not fall within the
categories authorized in the UN Charter. The same applies to
a number of other organisations.35
Neither the OAU nor the Arab League have any
constitutional authorisation for entering into agreements, but
in practice they have concluded agreements with some
specialised agencies.36
The wide practice of international organisations as such
led some writers to the belief that capacity to conclude
agreements and hence cooperation agreements, is based on
customary rule of international law recognising that
34 Ibid.
35Seyersted, "International personality of 
intergovernmental organisations", o p .cit.. pp.8-10.
36McRae, D. , "Cooperation Agreements and the law relating 
to Agreements concluded by international organisations", in 
Agreements of International Organisations and the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, edited by Zemanek, K . , New 
York (1971), p.13.
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capacity.37
However, the contributions of the International
Commission as to the question of agreements between states and
international organizations or between several international
organizations have defined the concept of capacity within the
functions of the organization.38
The basic rule as to the legal capacity of international
organizations is therefore stated in Article 6 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties between states and
international organizations or between international
organizations:
"The capacity of an international organization to 
conclude treaties is governed by the rules of that 
organization."39
It is rightly observed by the Rapporteur of the International
Law Commission, Paul Reuter on this question when he states:
"The most important question... is whether all 
international organizations, both universal and 
regional, serving a general or a specific purpose, 
have the same capacity to conclude treaties. On 
that point, a firm negative reply can be given at 
once. As far as its capacity to perform legal acts
37Chiu, H . , The Capacity of International Organizations 
to Conclude Treaties and the Special Legal Aspects of the 
Treaties So Concluded. The Hague, Nijhoff (1966), p.34. See 
also, Seyersted, "Objective International Personality of 
International Organisations", op.cit.. p.10? Schneider, 
Treaty-Making Power of International Organisations. Geneva, 
Droz (1959), pp.139-42.
38For the discussion and draft of Article 6 of the Vienna 
Convention on the law between states and international 
organizations, or between international organizations, see 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission (Y.B.I.L.C.) 
(1979) II/II, 139, (1974) II/I, p.145, (1973), I.P. 209,
(1972) II, pp.178-182.
39See the text in I.L.M. Vol.25 (1986), pp.543-592.
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of whatever kind is concerned, any international 
organization is a highly individualized entity which 
cannot a priori be assimilated to any other. An 
intergovernmental organization... is based on a 
treaty between states: each intergovernmental
organization is shaped individually by the will of 
its founders, and subsequently of its members... It 
necessarily results that, if we consider the 
specific content of the capacity of an international 
organization, this capacity depends essentially on 
the law peculiar to each organization.1,40
There is another category of agreements the GCC member
states concluded collectively, yet which cannot be subject to
international law and did remain governed by private law.41
These are contracts between the GCC as an international person
on the one hand and companies or natural persons under a
domestic legal system on the other hand, and therefore should
be governed as a rule by the system of municipal law chosen
by the parties.42
2. Essential Element - 'Volonte Distincte*
The concept of volonte distincte refers to that 
international authority which is unique to the legal 
personality of an international institution. It is only when
40Reuter, P. , Third Report on the question of treaties 
concluded between states and international organizations or 
between two or more international organizations, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/279, Y.B.I.L.C. (1974) II/I 135, at p.146.
41The GCC delegated Saudi Arabia to negotiate on behalf 
of the Council to buy rice from an association of rice export 
located in Pakistan where they reached an agreement to sell 
rice to all the GCC member states at $665 per ton. See the 
GCC Annual Report. 1985, op.cit.. pp.88-9.
42Mann, A., "The proper law of contracts concluded by 
international persons", 35 B.Y.I.L. (1959), p.41.
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an international organ is able to exercise "volonte distincte, 
superior to that of the member state, that it is possible to 
speak of genuine power (or will) and existence of 
international personality of the organization.43
Some writers maintain that in order to detect the 
existence of "volonte distincte" for an organisation the 
existence of a power of decision-making by majority is a 
necessary element to indicate its international personality.44
However, Article 13 of the GCC Fundamental Statute 
provides that the resolutions of the Supreme Council on 
substantive matters are taken by unanimous vote of the member 
states participating in the voting.
In spite of the provision for unanimity the GCC does not 
cease to have legal personality as the organisation continues 
to act on behalf of its members and its will (volonte) is
43See Adam, A, Les etablissements publics internationaux. 
Librairie generale de droit et de jurisprudence (1957), who 
states at p.57: "Le pouvoir international est la marque de
la personnalite internationale qui comporte egalement d'autres 
elements revelaturs de 1'apparetenance a l'ordre juridique 
international. C'est dans la measure ou un organe 
international peut manifester une volonte independante et 
superieur a celle d'un etat membre composant qu'on peut parler 
de la realite du pouvoir, de I 1existence de la personnalite 
internationale de cet organe."
44This view is expressed by Mouskheli, regarding the 
international personality of the Arab League. According to 
Art.7 of the League pact, only those decisions taken 
unanimously are binding on all the member states. He thinks 
that as a result of this provision there is no detached will 
for the organisation and therefore it lacks international 
personality. See his article "La ligue des Etats Arabes: 
Commentaires du pacte du 22 Mars", 3 R.G.D.I.P.. Tome L 
(1946), pp.149-151. A similar view is expressed by El- 
Gunaimy, M . , The League of Arab States. Alexandria (1973), 
p.153 (Arabic).
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detached from that of its member states.45
Reuter raises this issue stating that:
"...if the organization has jurisdiction then its 
decisions, even when taken unanimously by the member 
states, have the immediate force of law and bind 
that state as decisions and not as agreements 
subject to national conditions of constitutional 
validity.,|46
The GCC as such has independent organs established by 
sovereign states and entrusted with common interest towards 
cooperation and integration.47
One may argue that the distinct will of the GCC as an 
organisation could be realised in the light of its unanimous 
decisions if it is incorporated in the internal law of the 
member states, whereas it changed the individual 
characteristics of the legal system of each member and 
replaced it with characteristics of community law.
New laws have in fact been enacted on the domestic plane 
to reflect Supreme Council decisions (e.g. by providing for 
supremacy of the UEA provisions - which are implemented by 
those decisions - over local law, either by modifying or 
repealing conflicting laws).
45See in this meaning, Kelsen, The Law of United Nations. 
op.cit. . p. 329, who states that the rule of unanimity does not 
exclude the assumption that international organs exercise 
rights and competence of the community and act on behalf of 
the community, not the members.
46Reuter, P., International Institutions. George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd., London (1958), p.215.
47The preamble of the GCC spells out the notion of 
permanence clearly when it declares the aim of the 
organisation is to achieve coordination, cooperation and 
integration on the path of "unity".
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These new laws covered a great area of the UEA provisions 
which are new to the legal system of the member states. Laws 
which provide for free movement and equal treatment of goods, 
including elimination of customs duties on products of member 
states (Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the UEA).
New laws in Member States accord the GCC means of 
passenger and cargo and transportation, ships, boats and their 
cargoes belonging to citizens of other member states the same 
treatment accorded to those belonging to their own citizens 
(Articles 18 and 20 of the UEA).
New laws in member states give all GCC citizens the same 
treatment granted in the member states, without discrimination 
or differences in the fields of freedom of movement and 
residence, right of ownership, freedom of exercising economic 
activities and movement of capital (Article 8 of the UEA).48
However, it must be pointed out that incorporation of 
common policies into national law does not necessarily prove 
the existence of the legal personality of the G.C.C.
Furthermore, the organisation exercises organic 
jurisdiction over its organs which includes enacting 
regulations which govern procedures, rights and duties of the
/ o
See the decisions of the Supreme Council on implementing 
the UEA and the following constitutional procedures in each 
member state in Initial Measures taken bv the Member States 
to Implement the UEA. GCC Secretariat Publications (1984), 
op.cit.. pp.3-31. See also The Decisions and Measures taken 
to Implement the Unified Economic Agreement. GCC Secretariat, 
2nd ed. (1987), pp.17-178.
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staff vis-a-vis the organization itself.49 Some of these are 
fulfilled through the decisions of the GCC Secretary-General 
without even requiring voting.50
Moreover, one may argue that the unanimous approval of 
the GCC member states participating in the voting does not 
always assure that the positive unanimity of all the member 
states will be attained (Article 9.2 of the Fundamental 
Statute). The absence of some members does not preclude 
taking decisions by at least two-thirds of the member states 
(Article 7(4) of the Fundamental Statute).
There yet remains the question that one should admit that 
the unanimity rule for small and closed types of 
organizations, such as the GCC, is more appropriate than
majority rule.
The liberal approach of interpretation which takes into 
account new developments may be unsuited to the GCC. For, to 
achieve this unanimity the members may have to rely more
heavily on the text of the constitution. In organisations
adopting the majority principle the position is rather 
different. They are more likely to apply a liberal 
interpretation "... of the purposes and functions of an
49Seyersted, F. , "International personality of 
international organisations", I .J.I.L.. op.cit.. pp.6-8.
50For the powers of the Secretary-General in both the 
administrative staff regulation and the financial regulation, 
supra. pp.203-08.
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organisation ...1,51 conceiving it ” ... as a dynamic 
institution evolving to meet changing needs and circumstances 
and, as time goes by becoming further and further removed from 
its treaty base."52 This may lead to confrontation and 
eventually to withdrawal from the organization.53
3. The GCC Joint Command Forces
There is a certain special attribute of personality which 
attaches to the GCC and that is the power to maintain 
international forces.
This special attribute may derive from the very wide and 
general functions and powers stipulated in the GCC Fundamental 
Statute. The power to maintain an international force is not 
provided for in the Statute, but the Supreme Council decided 
in 1983 to establish a joint command force, in order to ensure 
the Gulf security and safeguarding the peace and stability of 
the GCC member states.54
51Bowett, The Law of International Institutions, o p .cit..
p.338
52Ibid. . p.338.
53Ibid. . p.338.
54The GCC participating forces consist of paratroops, 
artillery, tanks and mechanised infantry. Kuwait, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Oman were represented by contingents 
of approximately brigade strength. Bahrain, with the smallest 
defence establishment among the Gulf states, sent a detachment 
no larger than a company. In addition, the UAE contributed 
aircraft: both Mirage interceptors and Gazelle helicopters.
The total number of men involved in their first manoeuvre 
announced was estimated by unofficial sources at c.5,000. 
Middle East Contemporary Survey, o p .cit. (1983-4), p.389.
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It must be noted, however, that a common military 
arrangement is not a necessary requirement of international 
organisation. Several international organizations do not have 
such position (e.g. Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), OAU, FAO, etc.)
In 1933, the League of Nations established an 
international detachment in connection with the Leticia 
dispute and in 1934 the Council of the League sponsored an 
international force to police the Saar plebiscite.55
It is interesting to note that the UN Command in Korea, 
UNEF, UNOGIL, ONUC, UNYOM and UNFICYP provide useful examples 
of remarkable attributes of international personality.56
The constitutional basis of the GCC joint command forces 
however is not articulated in as much detail as is the case 
with the UN.57 However, one may assume that the GCC joint 
forces is a "subsidiary" organ of the Supreme Council and it 
is established in accordance with Article 6 of the Fundamental
5514 0.J.L.N. (1933) 977-979 and 15 0.J.L.N. (1934),
pp.1729-1730 respectively.
56See Bowett, op.cit.
57 Art.40 of the UN Charter. There are certain 
differences between the UN and the GCC forces. The GCC forces 
do not enjoy privileges and immunities. They have their 
independent budget from that of the Secretariat. The GCC 
Secretary-General does not have any supervisory power over 
the forces in spite of the fact that they take their orders 
from the Defence Committee (composed of the Ministers of 
Defence and Chiefs of Staff) which is one of the Secretariat 
Committees. In addition to this Committee there is the 
Military Committee which is an organ in the GCC Secretariat. 
The latter committee is responsible, inter alia. for 
organizing the administrative and other military affairs of 
the Defence Committee. Private information of the author.
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Statute58 which provides:
"The cooperation Council shall have the following 
main organs:
1. Supreme Council to which shall be attached the 
Commission for Settlement of Disputes.
2. Ministerial Council.
3. Secretariat-General.
Each of these organs may establish subsidiary organs as 
necessary."
The United Nations Emergency Forces as such were 
classified by the Secretary-General as the subsidiary organ 
of the General Assembly and this position has received general 
support.59
Furthermore, in the experience of the UN it is not always 
easy to identify the Charter article in which the Security 
Council has based its establishment of a UN force.60 A matter 
which has led some writers to the belief that it is the 
inherent power of international organizations to establish 
military forces and which cannot be challenged without express 
provisions to the contrary.61
II. The Legal Personality on the Domestic Plane
The legal personality of an organisation as in the case
58For the value of this view see Sohn, B., "The authority 
of the United Nations to establish and maintain a permanent 
United Nations force", 52 A.J.I.L. (1958), p.234.
59See Bowett, United Nations Forces. London, Stevenson & 
Sons (1964), p.287.
^See Seyersted, "Some legal problems of the UN forces",
37 B.Y.I.L. (1961) pp.436-37.
61Ibid. . p. 4 61.
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of states derives its existence from public international law 
and municipal law only warrants its effectiveness in the 
territory of the member states.62 
Jenks states:
"It is as inherently fantastic as it is destructive 
of any international legal order to regard the 
existence and extent of legal personality provided 
for in the constituent instrument of an 
international organisation as being derived from, 
dependent upon and limited by, the constitution and 
laws of its individual member states."63
For the constituent instrument of the international
organization to give effect to the legal personality on the
domestic plane there is a need of recourse to other
instruments incorporated into the legal system of the member
states, such as the Headquarters Agreements or the Privileges
and Immunities Agreement and sometimes there is need for a
municipal legislation to avoid domestic difficulties.
The Headquarters Agreement usually operates in the host
state and does not provide capacities in other member states.
Accordingly it is doubtful that the legal personality of the
organisation in those states is secured.
Nevertheless, a Headquarters Agreement may be taken as
evidence of legal personality of the organisation. Although
the G.C.C. has yet to sign a Headquarters Agreement, the
signing of such an agreement is usually evidence of the
recognition of legal personality of the organisation.
62See Jenks, "The legal personality of international
organisations", 22 B.Y.I.L. (1945), p.270.
63Ibid. . pp. 270-71.
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In the case of the G.C.C., the incorporation of certain 
legal instruments into municipal legislation (such as the 
Fundamental Statute and the Agreement on Privileges and 
Immunities) conferring immunities on the G.C.C., is sufficient 
to claim that the G.C.C. enjoys legal personality on the 
domestic plane. Such incorporation may also lead to the 
conclusion that the legal personality of the G.C.C. implies 
that member states are not severally liable under domestic 
law. In both instruments mentioned above, "legal capacities" 
should be interpreted in the light of international law which 
requires a separation of the entity of the organisation from 
that of the member states. Secondly, there appears to be no 
legislation in the G.C.C. member states which holds member 
states of an international organisation severally liable.
An example worth citing in some detail is the agreement 
between the British Government and the International Tin 
Council (ITC). The agreement was a directly relevant issue 
before the Court of Appeal.64
64 See J.H. Ravner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v. Department of 
Trade and Industry and Others; Related Appeals? Maclaine 
Watson and Co. Ltd. v. Department of Trade and Industry. The 
case is reported in 3 All England Law Reports [1988], pp.257 
et seq. The court rejected by a 2:1 majority the creditors' 
argument that ITC's members were legally liable for the 
organisation's debts and dismissed appeals against the High 
Court's striking out of a petition for the compulsory winding 
up of the ITC and refusal to appoint a receiver of the ITC. 
However, Lord Justice Nourse dissenting said that in ITA6 the 
members did not, as they easily could have done, expressly 
exclude or limit their liability for ITC obligations. The 
intention was that ITC members should be liable for its 
obligations. The ITC had separate personality in
international law, but its members were nevertheless jointly 
and severally, directly and without limitation liable for its 
undischarged debts.
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The legal problems involved in the proceedings of this 
case do not only concern English law. They concern all 
international organisations operating in the host countries 
and require analysis on the plane of public international law 
and of the relationship between international law and the 
domestic law of those countries. Such relationship between 
international law and municipal law raises also the issue of 
liability of international organisations in the municipal 
courts. Laws of the states differ as to whether the exclusive 
liability of an international organisation is a necessary 
corollary of its legal personality.
A. The Headquarters Agreement of the ITC
According to the legal system of some countries (e.g. 
U.K.), the Headquarters Agreement cannot operate on the 
domestic plane without the enactment of municipal legislation. 
This was, inter alia, the issue which was dealt with in J.H.
For the criticism of this judgment see "ITC - Bringing 
the Law into Disrepute" in Business Law Brief. (ecd.) A. 
Hermann, May, 1988, pp.297-9. Two judgments brought under 
appeal have common nature as to the possible liability of the 
ITC members on contracts made in the name of the organisation. 
These are J.H. Ravner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v. Dept, of Trade 
and Industry. Butterworths Company Law Cases (1987), pp.557- 
706, and Maclaine Watson & Co. Ltd. v. Department of Trade and 
Industry and Others (1987). ibid.. pp.707-16.
For short comments on the cases brought against the ITC 
see Ramond, H . , "Tin's losses, lawyers' gain. Collapse of the 
International Tin Council and succeeding litigation", Law Mag. 
1987, 1 May, pp.30-31. See also MacGlashan, M . , "Winding up 
corporate personality. The International Tin Council. Should 
a trading organisation enjoy immunity?" C.L.J. 1987, 46(2), 
pp.193-95? Cunningham, A., "Winding up corporate personality. 
Court lacks jurisdiction to wind up international 
organisation", Oil & Gas: Law & Taxation Review. 1986/87,
5(12), pp.146-7; Owles, D., "Whether the Tin Council can be 
wound up", N.L.J.. 1987, 137 (6294), 206.
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Ravner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v. The Department of Trade and
Industry and Others: Arbuthnot Latham Bank Ltd. and Others
v. Department of Trade and Industry and Others: Maclaine
Watson & Co. Ltd. v. Department of Trade and Industry.65
This case concerned the Sixth International Tin Council
Agreement (ITA6) which was concluded in April 1982 by 23
sovereign states and the EEC. Due to the fact that the seat
of the Council was located in London, a Headquarters Agreement
was concluded in February 1972 between the Government of the
United Kingdom and the ITC. Those two instruments, ITA6 and
the Headquarters Agreement, were international treaties and
did not form part of English law.
The process of enactment, "perfectly or imperfectly", of
some part of their provisions into English law is necessary
to give effect to the two agreements on the domestic plane.
This process begins with the International Organisation Act
196866 which provides:
"1(1) This section shall apply to any organisation 
declared by Order in Council to be an organisation 
of which
(a) the United Kingdom, or Her Majesty's Government
65 Ibid. . pp.323-324. On the breakdown of the ITC see 
McFadden, E., "The collapse of tin: restructuring a failed
commodity agreement" 80 A.J.I.L. (1986) p.811 et seq; The 
House of Commons Second Report from the Trade and Industry 
Committee, session 1983, The Tin Crisis. Vol.l, p.IV et seq. 
On the proceedings initiated by creditors in the United 
Kingdom, see P. Sands, "The Tin Council litigation in the 
English courts" 34 N.I.L.R. (1987) p.367 et seq.? Herdegen, 
M. , "The insolvency of international organisations and the 
legal position of creditors: some observations in the light
of the International Tin Council Crisis", N.I.L.R. (1988),
pp.135-144.
^ Ibid.. p.280
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in the United Kingdom, and
(b) one or more foreign sovereign powers, or the 
Government or Governments of one or more such powers, are 
members.”
The Act in Article 2(a) confers on the organisation the 
legal capacities of a body corporate.
In accordance with the above Act parliament has approved 
the 1972 Order which confers on the ITC the legal capacities 
of a body corporate.67
This sort of relationship between international treaties 
and English law supports the proposition that the legal 
capacity of an international organisation may depend on 
municipal legislation to determine its scope in municipal law.
It is well settled that an international treaty to which 
the United Kingdom is a party does not alter the law of
England. That is the function of Parliament, or of delegated
• • 68 legislation.
Lord Denning M.R. in Blackburn v. Attorney-General69 
states:
11... It is elementary that these courts take no 
notice of treaties as such. We take no notice of 
treaties until they are embodied in laws enacted by 
Parliament, and then only to the extent that 
Parliament tells us.”
However, the crucial question before the court was the 
determination of the meaning of para.5 of the 1972 Order in 
Council in order to ascertain the relationship between the
67Idem.
68 Ibid. . pp.291, 324-325.
692 W.L.R. [1971] at p.1039.
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Headquarters Agreement, ITA6 and English domestic law.70
The Order in Council used the words, "shall have the 
legal capacities of a body corporate”, while the ITA6 and the 
Headquarters Agreement used the term "legal personality".
In determining this relationship the court had to 
consider how far the concept "legal capacities of a body 
corporate" relates to legal personality in international law.
The only instrument having direct effect in English 
municipal law is the 1972 Order. Article 4 of the Order 
provides that the ITC is an organisation in international law, 
and Article 5 does no more than to confer "capacities on this 
organisation without purporting to define, or to alter its 
legal nature in any way. So the Court must consider the Sixth 
Agreement against the background of international law in order 
to inform itself about the nature of the ITC.71
It is accepted in English law that if domestic 
legislation deals with the topic as in an international 
treaty, it would be proper to examine the treaty to resolve 
any ambiguity in English legislation.
In Salomon v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise Diplock 
L.J. said:
"When the Crown has entered into a treaty the court 
will so far as possible construe a domestic Act in 
conformity with the treaty, so that the Crown in its 
judicial capacity does not sleep while in another
70The judgment of the Court of Appeal, op.cit.. pp.292,
338.
71 Ibid. . pp.292-3.
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capacity it watches.”72
The law of the creation of the ITC is public
international law and the constituent instrument is the Sixth 
International Tin Agreement. But no rule of English law 
prohibits the examination and interpretation of the Agreement, 
although it is an international treaty not directly 
incorporated into domestic law.73
However, the problem of interpretation of U.K. obligation 
by looking at treaty provision lies in the fact that the 1972 
Order expressly refers to the Headquarters Agreement in para.l 
and uses at the same time the words "shall have legal
capacities of a body corporate".74
It would be rather easy to refer to the Headquarters 
Agreement to infer the intention of English legislation to 
comply with the international obligation imposed by the 
Headquarters Agreement (i.e. the Council shall have legal
personality). But the 1972 Order used the words "shall have
legal capacities of a body corporate" because no other power 
was conferred by the enabling Act (the International 
Organisation Act 1968). The Act was directed at a whole host 
of international organisations and not only the ITC.75
722 Q.B. 116 [196*>] at p.132.
73 The judgment of the Court of Appeal, op.cit., p.343.
74 Ibid. . pp.280-81.
75 Ibid. . pp.338-40.
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In order to construe the true meaning of "legal 
capacities of a body corporate" the judge referred to previous 
legislation containing similar words, especially the United 
Nations Act (1946) . There is no doubt that what the 
legislator had in mind was to establish international legal 
personality with the necessary implication that the members 
of the organisation were not liable for its obligations.76
76Ibid.. pp.338-40. In another case the question of 
liability of international organisation against third parties 
has received different legal treatment. In the case Westland 
Helicopters Ltd. v. Arab Organisation for Industrialization 
(API). United Arab Emirates. Saudi Arabia. Qatar. Egypt and 
British Helicopter company [1984], the four sovereign 
aforementioned states concluded an agreement establishing an 
Arab Industrialization Organisation. On 14 May 1979 after the 
Camp David Agreement between ARE and Israel and as a result 
of it the three Gulf states decided to put an end to the 
organisation by their withdrawal. There the issue was whether 
the claimants were entitled to arbitrate against the member 
states which comprised the AOI. It was held that the answer 
depended on whether the states were liable for the obligations 
of the AOI and that they were so liable. The Tribunal appears 
not to apply the concept of legal personality, which 
necessarily excludes the liability of the individual member 
states. It held:
"The fact that the AOI 'has the juridical personality', 
'enjoys full administrative and financial independence' 
and has the right of ownership, disposition and 
litigation as mentioned in its statute (Treaty, Art.2: 
in the same vein, see Basic Statute, Art.5), that is to 
say the express attribution of legal personality, of 
administrative independence and of the right to sue in 
the courts, do not in any respect allow one, as has been 
shown, to deduce an exclusion of the liability of the 
four states."
See the Award of the ICC in International Legal Materials. 
Vol.33 (1984), pp.1073-89 at p.23 and 25 of the Award. For 
similar view, see Schermers, o p .cit.. p.780.
Under the EEC law, the European Court of Justice requires that 
member states are sued for their liability before any claim 
against the Community. See Schermers, H. , Judicial Protection 
in the European Communities. Kluwer Europa Instituut, Third 
edition (1983), pp.313-18. See also, Lasok, D. and Bridge,
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Gibson L.J• observed that from the statutory context of 
the 1968 Act, it appears that Parliament should have intended 
that ” ... a contract made by the ITC was made by the ITC as 
a separate entity and that sufficient legal personality for 
that to be the position in law was conferred on the ITC by the 
1972 Order”.77
He further emphasised the separate entity of the ITC by 
rejecting the principle relied upon by the plaintiffs in the 
Westland Helicopter Case, that because the liability of the 
members had not been excluded in the constituent instrument 
of the organisation, the member states should be held liable.78
B. The Headquarters Agreement of the GCC
The Headquarters Agreement ensures the functioning of the 
organisation in a particular area.79 There is little doubt
J . , Introduction to the Law and Institutions of the European 
Communities. op.cit.. p.40.
The International Law Commission's Draft on the Law of 
Treaties between States and International Organisations or 
between International Organisations envisaged obligations of 
the members of an international organisation flowing from 
agreements between the organisation and other states only on 
the basis of their clearly expressed consent. But this 
provision was not adopted as a part of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organisations or between Organisations, UN DOC.A/CONF.129/15. 
See G.E. da Nascimento e Silva, "The Vienna Convention and the 
treaty-making power of international organizations", 29 
G.Y.I.L. (1986), pp.79-82.
77 The judgment of the Court of Appeal, Ibid.. p.341.
78 Ibid.. pp.352-3. For Westland Helicopter Case, see 
supra. note 76.
^See Jenks, C., The Headquarters of International 
Institutions. A Study of Their Location and Status. The 
Royal Institute of International Affairs (1945), p.45.
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that this type of agreement ensures the legal capacity of an
• 80 international organisation to contract under local law.
In fact the Headquarters Agreements cover the same
grounds as the general agreement on privileges and immunities
among member states. In addition to that the Headquarters
Agreement includes special provisions regarding freedom of
access to the Headquarters, police protection and public
utility services and the law applicable to the organisation's
premises.81 The GCC has not concluded any Headquarters
Agreement with the Saudi Arabian Government.
In the absence of a Headquarters Agreement but with the
existence of the General Agreement on Privileges and
Immunities, certain writers contend in law that the host
country is under a duty to grant certain basic privileges and
82immunities to the organisation as is necessary to its task.
80See Detter, o p .cit.. p.124. See also, Parry, C., "The 
treaty making power of the United Nations", o p .cit.. p.146 who 
states that the same argument used against the UN general 
convention on privileges and immunities could be used here 
that both treaties came to existence as an application to the 
provisions of the Charter of the UN which is approved by the 
member states. For the same view, see the UN Secretariat 
opinion in Y.I.L.C.. 1967, p.246.
81See Jenks, International Immunities, o p .cit.. pp.7-9.
82See Jenks, "The legal personality of international 
organisations", o p .cit.. pp.270-73. For the opposite view, 
see the case of Standard Chartered Bank v. I.T.C. (Q.B.D.) 1 
W. L.R. . 22 May 1987, pp. 641-44. As far as the GCC is
concerned one has to emphasise that it is one of basic 
immunity which should be prima facie given to the organisation 
that its property and assets wherever located and by 
whomsoever held shall be immune from search. Article 2(2) of 
the GCC Agreement on privileges and immunities provides this 
principle. The Agreement itself is incorporated in the legal 
systems of the member states. In this regard very few 
incidents occurred in the host country concerning inspecting
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It is maintained that the general convention would govern the
position in this case more fully than the Headquarters
Agreement, which may have temporary character.83
However the GCC constituent instrument is not in fact
silent on the question whether the organisation may conclude
Headquarters Agreements. Article 17 provides that:
” (2)... A special agreement shall organise the 
relation between the Council and the state in which 
it has its headquarters.
(3) Until such time... its staff shall enjoy the 
diplomatic privileges and immunities established for 
similar organisations."
The shortcoming of this provision is that it defines the 
privileges and the immunities accorded by reference to 
undefined privileges and immunities to be accorded to other 
international organisations.84
newspapers and magazines owned by the GCC (e.g. Kuwaiti 
newspaper called Al-Waton and The Times of London). The 
problem was solved later through telephone conversation 
between the GCC Legal Department and the competent authorities 
in Riyadh. An interview conducted by the author with the 
General Director of the Legal Department of the GCC, Dr. Al- 
Sayari, 22.11.1986. One should assert that censorship of 
newspapers either those published in the GCC member states or 
outside the GCC is a common procedure in all GCC member 
states.
^See, for example, Agreement concluded between WHO and 
China, UNTS, Vol.210, pp.78, 80 and 82 cited by Detter, Law 
Making bv International Organisations, o p .cit.. p.126.
^Article 17(2) and (3) of the GCC Fundamental Statute 
bears resemblance to Article 60 of the ICAO Convention which 
provides:
"Each contracting state undertakes, so far as possible 
under its constitutional procedure, to accord to the 
President of the Council, the Secretary General, and the 
other personnel of the organisation, the immunities and 
privileges which are accorded to corresponding personnel 
of other public international organisations."
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The legal personality of the G.C.C. on the domestic 
plane, however, is secured in the G.C.C. member states since 
the G.C.C. Agreement on Privileges and Immunities confers 
legal capacities on the organisation and the treaty has been 
incorporated into the legal systems of each member state.
C. The GCC Agreement on Privileges and Immunities 1984
Another right which is associated with the international 
personality of organisations is the enjoyment of the rights 
of privileges and immunities from the local jurisdiction of 
member states.
The GCC member states concluded an agreement on 
privileges and immunities in March 1984.85
Similar also is the case of Article VIII (4) of the FAO
Convention which provides:
"Each member nation and associate member undertakes, 
insofar as it may be possible under its constitutional 
procedure, to accord to the Director General and senior 
staff diplomatic privileges and immunities and to accord 
to other members of the staff all facilities and
immunities accorded for non-diplomatic personnel attached 
to diplomatic missions, or alternatively, to accord to 
such other members of the staff the immunities and 
facilities which may hereafter be accorded to equivalent 
members of the staff of other public international 
organisations."
For the text of the conventions see Sohn, L., International 
Organisations and Integration. Martinus Nijhoff (1986), 
pp.514-33 and pp.482-90.
85For the text of the agreement and the ratification 
instruments of the member states, see The GCC Legal Gazette. 
13 ed. (1985), pp.167-74. It was signed by the six member 
states on 11.3.1984 and ratified on the following dates: 
Qatar on 2.4.84, Bahrain on 3.4.84, Saudi Arabia on 21.7.84,
Oman on 11.2.85, UAE on 13.3.85 and Kuwait on 20.3.80.
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The conclusion of such treaties evidences the capacity 
of an organisation to conclude agreements as has been referred 
to and may pave the way for the international personality of 
an organisation to operate on the national plane. This point 
may be illustrated by referring to the incorporation process 
which took place in the GCC member states by issuing decrees 
which express their approval of the Agreement on privileges 
and immunities. According to the constitutions of the member 
states the Agreement becomes part of the domestic law and 
there is no need for further legislation.86
The GCC agreement on privileges and immunities is 
identical to that of the UN from which the GCC heavily 
borrowed most of its provisions. However, certain differences 
exist between the two instruments.87
Article 15 of the GCC's agreement, which is similar to 
Art.IV(18) of the UN Convention on Privileges and Immunities, 
grants certain privileges and immunities to the GCC officials 
without any form of nationality distinction. The GCC's 
agreement, however, covers only: (a) immunity from arrest or 
detention in regard to acts performed by them in their 
official capacity; (b) immunity from legal process in respect 
of words and acts in their capacity as GCC officials even 
after such capacity terminates; (c) exemption from taxation
^For the incorporation process of international treaties 
under internal law of the member states, see supra, pp.113-16.
87For the UN General Convention on Privileges and 
Immunities, see Vol. 1-4 UNTS (1946-7), pp.16-33.
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on salaries and emoluments.
The exemptions from national service obligations are not 
included, but the GCC agreement draws distinction between 
senior officials who enjoy civil service immunity and junior 
officials who enjoy such immunity only when they are not
• AA
nationals of the host state.
By contrast, Art.IV(18) of the UN General Convention 
provides without qualification that officials of the UN shall 
be immune from national service obligations.
However, the GCC agreement provides exemption for the 
official of the organisation where public service obligations 
are concerned. As concerns military service, this may be 
delayed for a maximum of two years where the national
88Art.18 of the agreement.
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government so requests.
Furthermore, Article 18 of the Agreement confers on non-
• # • • • • 00 Saudi junior officials below the eighth rank the following
privileges:
(a) Immunity together with their spouses and their 
relatives dependent on them, from immigration restrictions and 
alien registration.
(b) Privileges in respect of exchange as are accorded to 
the officials of comparable ranks forming part of diplomatic 
mission to the host state.
89Art.20 which provides that the delay cannot be more 
than two years applies also to the experts according to 
Art.22. It is to be noted that according to Section 18(C) of 
the UN agreement both the civil service and military service 
obligation are national obligations, the UN officials are 
exempted without distinction between them. Some of the G.C.C. 
member states have enacted domestic laws providing for 
conscription and consequently insisted on the provision above.
Kuwait is mainly concerned with this provision. It 
therefore made reservation on the first draft which stated 
that a list of names of the exempted persons should be drawn
up and be submitted by the Secretary General to the state
concerned for its approval. The main reason for that is that 
it violates its internal law concerning conscription.
Oman in its memo No. 3/3/4928 dated 15.7.1982 made 
reservations without declaring reasons. UAE made reservations 
and suggested the following amendment:
(a) The provision should provide two years only for the 
exemption which cannot be extended; or
(b) to leave the matter for the state concerned; or
(c) to replace the word "exemption" with another.
The UAE delegation however has announced that UAE has 
drafted a conscription statute.
90 • • • •Those officials holding the eighth rank onwards 
classified according to the GCC Administrative Regulations: 
Specialised (B), Director (C) , Specialised (A), Director (B) , 
Director (A), General Director. All these ranks come below 
the rank of Secretary General Assistant. See the Regulation, 
GCC Secretariat, o p .cit.. at p.38. See also the study on The 
Regulation of the GCC Secretariat. Public Administration 
Institute, Saudi Arabia, 1403 A.H. at p.171.
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(c) Repatriation facilities in time of international 
crisis as diplomatic convoys. (The provision omits without 
justification the reference to the official's spouses and 
relatives.)
(d) The exemption from import fee of duty on their 
furniture during two years of taking up their post in the 
country in question.
This group of privileges is considerably justified to be
granted only to other nationals of the host state since such
immunity is granted ratione materiae and not ratione personae.
It is significant to note that unlike the UN General
Convention agreement the GCC's agreement makes an exception
for the general rule of immunity from legal process for
officials by providing that:
"The officials of the Secretariat-General who 
possess the nationality of the host country whatever 
their positions are, may not claim immunity before 
domestic courts concerning matters extraneous to 
their official duties."91
The above provision may raise fears to some writers as
regards the determination of what is an official act and
private act and who decides that, since the GCC does not have
its own tribunal.
Jenks points out on this fact that:
"If a national court can assume jurisdiction over 
private acts of an international official without 
a waiver of immunity by international institution 
concerned, the determination of the official or 
private character of a particular act pass from 
international to national control... In the case of 
international as in that of diplomatic immunities
91Art.l9 of the Agreement.
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the only principle which affords real protection is
that of complete immunity from jurisdiction.1,92
However, there is little doubt that the greater part of 
judicial interpretation of international agreements falls to 
the municipal rather than the international tribunals.93
Furthermore, there are some specialised agencies and 
regional organisation statutes which make an exception to the 
diplomatic immunity in case of nationals, even in respect of 
the Secretary-General as regards judicial proceedings 
concerning matters extraneous to their official duties.94 The 
idea behind this exception may be that according to generally 
recognised rules of international law, when an international 
official is a national of the host state, he does not enjoy 
the privileges and immunities to the same extent as other
92Jenks, W . , "Some problems of an international civil 
service", Public Administrative Review. Vol.Ill, No.l (1943), 
p.103.
93Schreuer, C., "The interpretation of treaties by 
domestic courts", XLV, B.Y.I.L. (1971) p.255. See also, Falk, 
R. , The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal 
Order. Syracuse University Press (1964), pp.19-20.
94 European Community officials of whatever rank do not 
have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of national 
courts, but only immunity from legal process for acts 
performed by them in their official capacity. Yet there is 
a jurisdiction in the court of the Communities to take 
proceedings against a community or an official for official 
or personal fault. See Bowett, The Law of International 
Institutions. op.cit.. p.356. Another example exists in 
Art.19 of the Agreement between UNESCO and France which 
excepts French nationals from diplomatic immunity in matters 
not relevant to their work. For the text of the agreement see 
U.N.T.S.. Vol.357, pp.3-26.
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officials who are of foreign nationality.95
\
Article 25 of the GCC agreement deals with disputes 
between states on the interpretation or application of the 
agreement when no settlement could be reached by negotiation 
or other means. Then the dispute should be taken to the 
Commission of Settlement of Dispute according to Article 10 
of the Fundamental Statute.
The above article does not provide for dispute settlement 
between the Secretariat and member states, although disputes 
are possible in view of the fact that the agreement deals at 
length with the status of the Secretariat officials, who are 
protected by the organisation and not by the member states.
Accordingly, and as the International Court of Justice 
states:
11 It must be noted that the effective working of the 
organisation, the accomplishment of its task and the 
independence and the effectiveness of the work of 
its agents require that these undertakings should 
be strictly observed. For that purpose, it is 
necessary that, when an infringement occurs, the 
organisation should be able to call upon the 
responsible state to remedy its default, and in 
particular to obtain from the state reparation for 
damages that the default may have caused to its 
agents.96
The Court states further that the agent
"should not have to rely on the protection of his
95See Ahluwalia, K., The Legal Status of the Specialised 
Agencies of the United Nations and Certain Other International 
Organisations. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague (1964), pp.177-78. 
The author gives many examples of organisations which deny the 
officials of the nationality of the host state the privilege 
of exemption, like IMCO, OAS, IAEA and FAO.
96Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the 
United Nations Case. ICJ Report (1949), p.183.
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own state. If he had to rely on that state, his 
independence might well be compromised."97
However, Article 25 of the GCC Agreement on the
Privileges and Immunities does not seem to be formulated
properly or even render an effective way for settlement of
dispute between the member states. It provides:
"If the subject of the dispute arises out of the 
interpretation or application of the present 
agreement and has not been resolved by negotiation 
or any other means of settlement agreed upon, then 
the dispute could be referred to the Commission of 
Settlement of Dispute in accordance with Article 10 
of the Fundamental Statute of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council for Arab States."
The Article refers the dispute to the Commission of
Settlement of Disputes according to Article 10 of the
Fundamental Statute. Article 10 of the Statute includes only
disputes arising over the interpretation or implementation of
the Fundamental Statute. It provides:
"If a dispute arises over interpretation or 
implementation of the Fundamental Statute and such 
dispute is not resolved within the Ministerial 
Council or the Supreme Council, the Supreme Council 
may refer such dispute to the Commission for 
Settlement of Dispute."
A recourse to Article 3(1) of the Commission Rules of 
Procedure would be more appropriate, where it includes general 
jurisdiction as regards disputes between member states. It 
provides:
"The Commission... has jurisdiction to consider the 
following matters referred to it by the Supreme 
Council.
1. Disputes between member states.
2. Differences of opinion as to the interpretation or 
implementation of the Fundamental Statute of the Gulf
97Idem.
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Cooperation Council."
The other problem with the GCC Settlement of Disputes 
clause is that unlike the UN General Convention which provides 
that the opinion which is given by the ICJ in interpreting and 
applying the Convention shall be binding (Article VIII(30) of 
the UN Convention), the opinion given by the GCC Commission 
for Settlement of Disputes (if the parties agreed to refer the 
case at all) is not binding and needs further unanimous
• • • • 98decision of the Supreme Council to comply with.
98 Art.4(3) of the Commission rules of procedure. It is 
interesting to note that in the short experience of the GCC 
an incident occurred and raised the question of immunity from 
taxation. The authorities at Bahrain airport imposed airport 
services fees on the GCC officials. The GCC Secretariat wrote 
to Bahrain Ministry of Foreign Affairs and obtained the 
exemption. The Secretariat claimed that since the Bahraini 
Government exempted accredited diplomats from paying these 
fees, therefore an international official working in the GCC 
is entitled prima facie to such treatment. They added that 
according to international law, international officials enjoy 
privileges and immunities over and above those diplomats who 
are only immune in foreign jurisdictions, but not in the 
sending state. (A memo of the GCC legal department dated 
27.9.1986 obtained by the author.) Although the memorandum 
of the Secretariat refers to some accepted rules of immunity 
it is arguable that these immunities cannot cover all the GCC 
officials as regards exemption from airport departure fees. 
Since there is no express provision covering exemption from 
airport fees in the GCC agreement, it is possible that the 
Secretary-General, his assistants and those high-ranking 
officials may enjoy such immunity under Art.16 and 17 which 
regard them as diplomats.
According to Art.34(e) of the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations 1969 the diplomatic agent is not exempt 
from charges levied for specific services rendered.
However, the question depends on the interpretation of 
the "departure service fees" which is levied by Bahrain. If 
they are charges for public utility services then the 
organisation normally does not claim exemption, but if they 
are direct taxation then there should be exemption. See in 
this regard Jenks, International Immunities. Stevens, London 
(1961), pp.59-60.
On the other hand, it should be mentioned here that it 
is a difficult task to draw analogy between the immunities and
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Despite the obligation of the Secretary General and the 
member states to waive immunity in order to prevent abuse of 
privileges included in the GCC agreement," the agreement 
includes other provisions which provide for the security and 
the preservation of public order in the member state.
Article 26 entitles the member states to take any action 
necessary to protect their security and public order. Any 
state taking such measures has to contact the Secretariat 
General to agree on the effective arrangements to protect the 
Councilfs interest.
Criticism can be levelled against the above provision on 
the ground that it is vague and liable to be abused by 
withholding immunities and privileges, especially as there is 
not an effective tribunal which can guarantee that the 
invocation of the Article is done in a manner compatible with 
the Agreement.100
privileges of the international organisation and that of a 
diplomatic one which had been regulated almost exclusively by 
virtue of a rule of customary international law. See Bowett, 
op.cit.. p.348.
"Art.13 and 21 of the Agreement.
100Some headquarters agreements refer explicitly to the 
right of the host state to expel the representatives of the 
member state when they indulge in the territory of the host 
state in undesirable activities which have nothing to do with 
their official functions. This right, however, is subject to 
strong safeguards. For example the representatives shall not 
be required to leave the country except in conformity with the 
diplomatic procedure applicable to diplomatic envoys 
accredited to the country (Art.25(2.1) of the Specialised 
Agencies Convention), or with the prior approval of the 
Secretary of State of the United States, which shall be given 
only after consultation with the member state in question. 
(Section 11 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement). 
Similar provisions in Section 22(e)(i) of the FAO, Art.9(4)
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The final difference existing between the two agreements 
is that the GCC agreement does not authorise the Secretary 
General to issue to the officials travel documents or what is 
analogous to the laissez-passer in section 24 of the UN 
Convention. The officials have instead identification cards 
which cannot be recognised and accepted as valid travel 
documents. The Saudi high ranking officials in the GCC hold 
diplomatic passports issued by the Saudi Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs,101 this depending in this regard on the national 
government.
This position is the result of strong objections raised 
by some member states who claimed the issuance of a travel 
document is best reserved to the prerogative of a sovereign
state. This led to the omission of such capacity from the
• • 102 , • original draft, a matter which may reflect the attitude of
these governments to curb the power of the Secretary General
and noticed throughout the debate.103
of the UNESCO and Section 27(e)(i) of the IAEA Headquarters 
Agreements. See Ahluwalia, o p .cit.. pp.184-87.
101Private information of the author.
102 • t t .Oman particularly had a strong objection against 
including this provision. This was raised during the meeting 
to draft the agreement in Bahrain on 29.10.1982. A later memo 
from Oman No. 3/3/4928 dated 15.2.1982 confirmed this attitude 
to the GCC Secretariat.
i03ibid.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNIFIED ECONOMIC AGREEMENT (UEA)
1. The Concept of Economic Integration in the UEA
GCC economic objectives are set out in five documents, 
all of which were adopted by the Supreme Council. These are 
the Fundamental Statute of the GCC, the Unified Economic 
Agreement, Objectives and Policies of GCC Development, GCC 
Industrial Strategy and GCC Agricultural Policy.1
Since most of these objectives are broad and 
comprehensive, the UEA, signed by the six GCC Heads of State 
in November 1981, came to catalogue their details and 
specifics. The ultimate aim of the agreement is to integrate 
the economies of the six member states.2
1E1 Kuwaiz, A., The Secretary-General Assistant for 
Economic Affairs, Economic Integration of the Cooperation 
Council of the Arab Statues of the Gulf. Challenges. 
Achievements and Future Outlook. G.C.C. Secretariat-General, 
p.3. See also, Gnichtel, "The Arab States' Gulf Cooperation 
Council: Rules for Trade and Industry", 20 The International
Lawyer 309 (1986); Rissi, "II Consiglio di Cooperazione del 
Golfo: La CEE del Mondo Arabo?", 24 Rivista di Diritto
Eurooeo (1984), p.172? Wittingham, "GCC allows more 
professionals, some service industries to operate regionally", 
6 Middle East Executive Reports. No.12 (1983), at p.23; also 
his article "Modernizing the Rules", in ibid.. No.10 (1984),
p. 18.
2 The word "integration" denotes the bringing together 
of parts into a whole. In the economic literature the term 
"economic integration" does not have such a clear-cut meaning. 
Some authors include social integration in the concept, others 
include various areas of cooperation, but the existence of 
trade relations between independent national economies is an 
indication of integration. See in this regard, Balassa, B.,
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The motive behind economic integration of the GCC is to 
achieve the following goals:
1. The advantage of reduced cost of production cannot be 
achieved without mass production of goods in large 
factories. This, however, cannot be accomplished except 
by the removal of barriers obstructing the movement of 
products to a larger market.
2. The construction of large production units will lead 
necessarily to the use of modern technology and the
diversification of sources of income.
3. The consumption capacity of the GCC member states will
be increased as a result of enlargement of the market.
4. The similarity in modes of production, and export and
import arrangements will enhance trade between member 
states.3
Theoretically, economic integration can take several
forms. First, a free trade area where the customs tariffs 
among member states are abolished, but each country retains 
its own tariff against non-members. Secondly, establishing 
a customs union which involves, besides the elimination of 
customs tariffs between the member states, unified customs 
tariffs which are imposed on goods imported from non-member 
states. The third form is a common market, where not only
The Theory of Economic Integration. Richard D. Irwin Inc. 
(1961), p.l.
3 El-Kuwaiz, A., "The Gulf Cooperation Council and the 
Concept of Economic Integration", American Arab Affairs No.17 
(Winter 1983-84), p.41.
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trade restrictions but also restrictions on all factors of 
production are abolished. And last, economic union as 
distinct from a common market, combines the elimination of 
restrictions on commodities and factors of production with 
some degree of harmonization of national economic policies in 
order to remove discrimination which might exist in these 
policies.4
In this connection, assessing the UEA provisions we find 
some elements of integration.
Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the UEA deal with the issue of 
free movement of trade, as they provide for the exemption of 
products of member states from customs tariffs.5
Article 4(1) provides for the establishment of a customs 
union, calling for a unified customs tariff arrangement vis- 
a-vis the outside world within a specific time limit (five 
years).
These two stages come before the establishment of a 
common market where not only trade restrictions are abolished 
but also restrictions on labour, capital and other factors of 
production.
Therefore, Articles 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the UEA deal with 
the establishment of a common market where they state the
4 Balassa, op.cit.. p.2.
5 One may suggest that the wording of Articles 1-3 
coupled with the practice of the member states and reflected 
in the list of complaints against the breach of UEA provisions 
appear to be exclusively concerned with tariffs. See also 
infra, pp.318-325.
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necessity of reaching an agreement on arrangements related to 
the freedom of movement of capital, labour and right of 
residence and possession, and freedom to participate in all 
economic activity.
Articles 10, 11, 12, 13, 21, 22 and 23 allow for the
unification of the various political and economic aspects of 
integration. This stage forms the last step of economic 
integration and amounts to economic union.
The stipulation of these forms of integration in the UEA 
does not mean that these forms can be easily achieved within 
the capacity of the G.C.C. institutions. It is doubtful that 
the institutions of the G.C.C. have the capacity or power to 
carry through the economic objectives anticipated in the UEA.
Furthermore, it is uncertain that the G.C.C. could 
implement these economic objectives while the economic order 
is left to be determined by free market conditions, and the 
member states stubbornly cling to their national sovereignty.6
These difficulties are compounded by the unanimity rule 
which governs all decisions, including those regarding 
economic integration.
See Townsend, J., "The Gulf Council for Cooperation: 
Is there an economic potential?", British Society for Middle 
East Studies. King's College, University of Cambridge (1983), 
pp.1-18. See also, El-Kuwaiz, "Economic Integration of the 
Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf", o p .cit.. 
p. 12, who suggests that the G.C.C. institutions develop 
themselves to assume increasingly the role of supranational 
power, which is a crucial step to see the implementation of 
the G.C.C. economic objectives.
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An examination of the economic objectives contained in 
the Fundamental Statute and the UEA reveals a remarkable 
absence of real powers bestowed on the institutions of the 
G.C.C., to carry out these objectives.
The G.C.C. is not unique in this regard. The traditional 
trend is for governments to restrict the powers conferred on 
institutions of a regional organisation to coordination. In 
this way governments avoid subordinating their sovereign 
powers and retain their privileges, including their veto 
power.7
Nevertheless, the lack of supranational organs within the 
G.C.C. and the existence of a unanimity rule do not mean that 
the sovereignty of each member state remains intact.
The forms of economic integration which have been 
included in the UEA have established a great degree of freedom 
of commerce among the member states and required joint action 
towards the world which demonstrates that there is a 
functional limitation on the economic sovereignty of each 
member state.8
However, the gradual implementation of the UEA without 
effective supervision9 and the tendency of the governments to
7 Vicuna, F., "Contemporary international law in the 
economic integration of Latin America. Problems and 
perspectives” , Hague Academy of International Law Colloquium 
(1971), p.140.
8 See in this regard, Schwarzenberger, G., "The 
Principles and Standards of International Economic Law", 117 
Recueil des Cours (1966) I, p.33.
9 For supervision of the UEA, see infra. pp.297 et seq.
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interpret the provisions unilaterally may reinforce the 
sovereignty of the members.
It must also be emphasised that the attempts of the 
G.C.C. to achieve integration through trade liberalization is 
inappropriate, as it does not conform to the economic 
realities of the member states.10
All the member states trade heavily in the exportation 
of oil and import their other requirements from the major 
industrial countries. Consequently, trade, inter se . is 
absent. Liberalisation of trade is unlikely by itself to 
create integration. The question of integration is a problem 
of development which makes integration more difficult for the 
G.C.C. than it would be for developed countries, which have 
diversified economies and many products to trade with each 
other.11
10 Morsi, M. , The Gulf Cooperation Council for Arab
States. The Proper Introductions to Achieve Economic
Integration. Doha, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1982), p.101. 
Morsi adds that the attempts of the Third World, including the 
G.C.C., to achieve integration through trade liberalisation 
have challenged the correctness of J. Viner*s traditional 
theory which calls for customs union as an introduction for 
the achievement of economic integration. For the works of the 
two writers Morsi refers to, see Viner, J . , The Customs Union 
Issue. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York 
(1950), pp.46-51? Lipsey, R . , "The Theory of Customs Union" 
in Bhagwati, J., International Trade. Harmondsworth, Middx., 
Penguin Books (1969), p.218. In this meaning see also Dager, 
M . , The Use of Coordinating Plans and Developing Programmes 
in Supporting Economic Cooperation among Arab Gulf States. 
University of Basra (1986), p.124.
11 The Secretary-General Assistant El-Kuwaiz, in his 
article "Economic Integration of the G.C.C."., op.cit.. p.8. 
See also Arikat, H., Regional Cooperation and Integration: 
The Case of Arab Gulf States. Ph.D. thesis, University of 
Sheffield (1984), pp.3-4. Khawajkiah, H. , "Remarks on the 
Gulf Economic Agreement", Economy and Business (Arabic) (March
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Hence, the EEC model of integration is not easily 
adaptable to the economic realities of G.C.C. countries, where 
production growth is limited by the small size of the national 
markets coupled with the lack of communication and organised 
markets.12
Articles 1-2 of the UEA for instance put strong emphasis 
on trade liberalization in terms of agricultural and 
industrial products as a positive integration method, yet the 
economic value of agriculture and industry in the case of the 
G.C.C. member states is so low as to be irrelevant.
Thus, the lack of sufficient interdependence and 
interrelationships of the economic structure of the G.C.C. 
countries has not yet allowed the positive integration to 
really get off the ground.13
Furthermore, the EEC is a supranational organisation, the 
distinctive mark of which is its independent institutions vis- 
a-vis the national governments and the power to take decisions 
not necessarily requiring unanimity, and which may apply to 
both the member states and individuals. Moreover, the 
jurisdiction of its dispute settlement organ does not depend
1982), pp.36-37.
12 Morsi, M. , The Gulf Cooperation Council for Arab 
States, op.cit.. pp.104-105. See also Novati, G., "The EEC 
and the Gulf Cooperation Council" in The Arab Gulf and the 
West. edited by Pridham, B. , Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, 
University of Exeter, pp.115-16.
13 See in this regard, Morsi, idem. See also Novati,
idem.
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on the ad hoc consent of the states or their organs.14
In addition to that, with the existence of the European 
Court of Justice, which has adopted a technique of 
interpretation in favour of integration, the treaty provisions 
are remarkably observed and implemented.15
The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing is that 
although the G.C.C. draws its inspiration from the EEC as far 
as trade liberalization is concerned, the absence of basic 
economic conditions necessary to apply the EEC model and the 
lack of independent organs with power to implement the treaty 
obligations confirms the view that the EEC model cannot be 
imitated.
2. The Problem of Coexistence between the UEA and the Arab 
League Economic Agreements concluded in substantially similar 
terms
There are a number of obligations included in the UEA and 
the Arab League economic agreements formulated in fairly 
similar terms, but there are some substantial differences in 
purpose and function of these agreements.
Since the establishment of the Arab League on 22 March 
194 5, the Arab countries have increasingly paid attention to
14 Seidl-Hohenveldern, "International Economic Law. 
General Course on Public International law", Recueil des 
Cours. (1986) III, p.110.
15 Rasmussen, H. , "The Court of Justice", in Thirty Years 
of Community Law. Commission of the European Communities, 
Belgium (1983), pp.190-91.
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economic cooperation and integration through bilateral and
multilateral agreements.16
Article 2 of the Arab League Pact17 provides:
"The League... has also as its purpose the close 
cooperation of its member states, with due regard 
to the system and conditions of each state, on the 
following matters (a) economic and financial affairs 
including trade, customs, labour, agricultural and 
industrial matters, and (b) communication affairs, 
including railways, roads, aviations, navigations, 
post and telegraph."
However, after the setback the Arabs experienced in 
Palestine in 1948, the Arab states badly felt the need to 
develop new strategies, both economic and military, to 
strengthen their position. Their efforts culminated in the 
conclusion of the Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation 
Treaty by the Council of the Arab League on April 13, 1950 
which has been subsequently ratified by the majority of Arab 
states.18 Article 7 of the Treaty provides:
See in general on Arab economic cooperation and 
integration, Ghantus, E., Economic Development and 
Integration, a paper presented at the Arab Countries Seminar 
OECD, Beirut, 13-15 February 1978; Zalzallah, A., "Arab 
Economic Integration and its Challenges", Arab Future Journal. 
No.21, (November 1980), pp.6-21 (Arabic); Sayigh,
"Incorporation of Arab Economies", The Arab Future Journal. 
No.6 (March 1979), pp.23-41 published by the Centre for Arab 
Unity Studies, Beirut (Arabic); Khawajkiah, H. , "Arab 
Economic Integration: presence, Problems and Means for
Development", Al-Feker A1 Arabi.Arab Development Institute, 
2nd year, Issue No.9, (January 1986), pp.44-60.
17 See the text in 70 UNTS. 338 and in 39 A. J. I . L. . 
Supp.266.
18 See Kaddori, F., "The Joint Arab Economic Action and 
the Role of the Council of Arab Economic Unity", a lecture 
given at the Royal Institute for International Relations, June 
7, 1982, published in Studia Diplomatica. Vol.XXXVI (1983), 
No.l, pp.32-33. See also, Bowman, M. & Harris, D., 
Multilateral Treaties.______ Index and Current Status.
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"In fulfilment of the objectives of this treaty 
which aim at generalizing assuredness in the Arab 
countries, providing for their prosperity and 
raising their standard of living, the signatories 
shall cooperate in developing their economies, in 
exploiting their national resources and facilitating 
the exchange of national products, both agricultural 
and industrial and generally cooperate in organising 
their economic activities and coordinating and 
signing whatever special agreements are needed for 
the achievement of these objectives."
Article 8 further provides:
"An Economic Council is to be formed of ministers 
of economic affairs of the signing states, or, if 
necessary, their representatives, to propose to the 
governments of those states whatever is conceived 
by them as necessary for the achievement of the 
objectives in Article 7."
However, the above provisions of the pact of the Arab 
League are confined solely to economic cooperation laid down 
in very broad terms and do not bear clear obligations upon the 
parties, whilst Articles 7 and 8 of the Joint Defence and 
Economic Cooperation Treaty do not seem to embody the tendency 
toward integration in the joint Arab economic action.
On 7 September 1953, another step was initiated by the 
League of Arab States towards economic cooperation by signing 
a trade agreement.19 This agreement was concluded between 
some of the Arab countries. The main objectives of the 
agreement were to facilitate trade and transit movements among 
the Arab countries. Furthermore, the agreement deals with the
Butterworths, London (1984), p.161.
19 This agreement was first ratified by Egypt and Jordan 
(1952), Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria (1954) and 
Kuwait (1961). For the text of the agreement see the text in 
the Collection of Treaties. The Arab League (July 1978) .
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extension of preferential treatment in customs duties. 
Agricultural and animal products were to be exempted from 
duties. Industrial and intermediate products became subject 
to a reduction of 25-50 percent respectively in the applicable 
duty.
Yet, the trade agreement did not succeed. It fell far 
short of establishing a free trade area or a customs union. 
Furthermore, it did not provide for the elimination of all 
customs duties, nor did it call for the establishment of a 
common external tariff. The agreement was not effectively
implemented by the parties, a matter which led to a very
• • • • • • 20limited multilateral trade rather than economic integration.
Thus, the three economic agreements concluded by some of 
the GCC member states under the auspices of the Arab League 
do not appear to conflict with the G.C.C. UEA provisions. The 
UEA operates in a different functional orbit where economic 
integration in its full form is the main objective of the 
G.C.C., and therefore the obligations are articulated in a 
more specific and effective manner, while the Arab League 
agreements deal with broad economic issues which fall short 
of economic integration.
20 • ■ •See Ankat, H., op.cit. . p.105. See also Makdisi, S.,
"Arab Economic Cooperation Implications for the Arab World and
World Economics", in Arab Industrialisation and Economic
Integration. edited by Aliboni, R. , Croom Helm, London (1979),
p.91. For more details on the factors which have limited the
effectiveness of this first trade agreement by the League of
Arab States, see Dajani, B. , "Arab Economic Cooperation,
Practical and Historical Aspects", Day of Arab Economic
Cooperation, 22 March 1972, a paper submitted in a seminar
organised by the Kuwait Economic Society, pp.50-53 (Arabic).
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This situation of successive treaties dealing with the
same subject responds to the application of the lex soecialis
principle which gives priority in implementing successive
treaties to the "most specific” one which "approaches most
heavily to the subject in hand: for special provisions are
ordinarily more effective than those which are general.”21
The principle of lex specialis though is not expressed
as such in Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, but it is widely supported.22
In order to provide a more effective legal framework for
the advancement of joint Arab action, the Economic Council of
the Arab League has paved the way for the Arab Economic Unity
Agreement, which came into force in 1964.23
The reasons for concluding such an agreement are clearly
stated in its introduction:
"The signatories, desiring to organise and
consolidate economic relations among the Arab League 
states on bases that are consistent with the natural 
and historical links among them, and to provide the 
best conditions for bolstering their economies, 
developing their resources and ensuring the
21Jenks, C., "The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties", 30 
B.Y.I.L. (1953), p.446.
22 Sinclair, I., The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, op.cit.. p.96.
23 So far, 13 Arab states have signed the Agreement and 
that is slightly more than half the number of member states 
of the Arab League. These 13 states are: Kuwait, the United 
Arab Emirates, Egypt (whose membership was suspended in 1979 
after the Camp David agreement) Irag, Syria, Jordan, the Arab 
Republic of Yemen, Sudan, the People's Democratic Republic of 
Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Mauritania and Palestine. See the text 
of the Agreement and the dates of ratification in the 
Collection of Treaties. The Arab League (July 1978), pp.277- 
86.
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prosperity of their countries,
Have agreed on the establishment of a complete economic 
unity among themselves and on the achievement of such 
unity in a gradual way and as fast as possible, such that 
the transfer of their countries from the status quo to 
the future status is accomplished without rendering any 
damage to their basic interest."
The main features of the Arab Economic Unity Agreement 
which bear resemblance to the obligation of the G.C.C. Unified 
Economic Agreement are:
1. The achievement of economic unity among Arab 
countries. The Agreement specifies that the achievement of 
this objective shall guarantee for the Arab states and their 
citizens certain freedoms and rights: namely, freedom of 
personal and capital mobility, freedom of exchange of foreign 
and national goods and products, freedom of residence, work, 
employment and practice of economic activities, freedom of 
transportation and transit and the rights of possession, 
bequest and inheritance (Article 1).
2. The Agreement specifies the way by which the 
signatories can accomplish economic unity, namely by merging 
their countries into a single customs area subject to a 
unified administration, customs legislation and regulation, 
transit regulations, by signing multilateral trade and payment 
agreements jointly with other countries, by coordinating 
trade, agricultural and industrial policies and by unification 
of economic legislation such that it would guarantee 
equivalent conditions for all citizens of the signing states 
working in agriculture, industry and other professions
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(Article 2).
The first two features of economic unity mentioned above 
show the purposes and the objectives of the agreement are 
similar to the provisions of the UEA, though with more details 
in the latter.
In fact, some of the G.C.C. provisions started to operate 
on regular implementation since March 1983 by the unanimous 
decision of the Supreme Council. To illustrate the similarity 
of obligations in the two instruments, reference to some 
examples of the UEA is necessary.
According to Article 2 of the UEA member states are 
required to exempt from customs duties agricultural, animal, 
industrial and natural resources products of national G.C.C. 
origin.
By resolution of the Supreme Council in November 1982, 
two requirements for exemption from customs duties were 
imposed:
a. The seller must be a citizen of a G.C.C. member 
state, or a company which is at least 51 percent owned by 
G.C.C. citizens. In the case of an industrial company, it 
will qualify for exemption even if not 51 percent owned by a 
G.C.C. citizen during a period of one year from the effective 
date of the resolution, namely March 1, 1983 through March 1, 
1984.
b. The product must be either of G.C.C. member state 
origin or at least 4 0 percent value must have been added by
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the seller to the product*s final value.
The Supreme Council decided at its third session held in 
Bahrain in 1982 that according to Article 20 of the Agreement 
member states are required to allow vessels "belonging to any 
member state” to use port facilities and otherwise be placed 
on a parity of treatment with nationals of the member state.25
Article 4 of the UEA requires member states to establish 
a uniform minimum tariff applicable to products of non-member 
states. By a resolution adopted in November 1987, the minimum 
tariff on such foreign merchandise, effective from September 
1, 1983, is 4 percent; the maximum is 20 percent. All member 
states are required to raise their minimum tariff to 4 
percent.
There is a further resolution, however, imposing customs 
duties of 30 percent on merchandise of a special nature, 
described as tobacco and the like. Member states are given 
an option to impose duties higher than 30 percent on products 
in this category.26
Yet, a few differences remain between the two 
instruments, the UEA and the Arab League Agreement of Economic
24 See the Decisions and Steps taken to Implement the 
Unified Economic Agreement. published by the G.C.C. 
Secretariat, 2nd ed. (1987) (Arabic), p.72.
25 Controversy subsequently arose as to whether this 
article was confined solely to government-owned vessels. A 
clarifying interpretation by Kuwait, approved later by the 
Committee of Financial and Economic Cooperation, states that 
a vessel will qualify for such favourable treatment whether
solely owned by governments or citizens. See ibid.. p.170.
26 Ibid. . pp. 175-78.
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Unity.
With the GCC agreement, the Supreme Council, which 
comprises the heads of state, is entrusted to endorse most of 
the economic policies and plans. Therefore the implementation 
of the economic decision is far more effective, especially 
when prevailing national ideologies are also similar and as 
such, the legal procedures to follow the adopted policies by 
the heads of state need, in fact, no further approval by any 
other superior body.
The Council of Arab Economic Unity, which has been 
established as the highest authority governing the Agreement, 
consists of representatives of the member states, who are 
usually the ministers of economy, finance or trade.27
According to Article 7 of the Arab Economic Unity 
Agreement, the Council is regarded as a financially and 
administratively independent entity, and has its own budget 
and its own rules and regulations.
One of the significant elements of the Arab Agreement 
which the UEA lacks is that linkage between governing the 
speed of progress towards economic unity and the mechanism of 
decision making. To guarantee efficiency in the decision­
making process, the Agreement provides that the Council of 
Arab Economic Unity may take its decision by a majority of two 
thirds of the votes of member states and not necessarily as
27 See Kaddori, F., op.cit.. p.36.
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the case in the GCC, unanimously.28
Yet, the achievement of some form of economic unity among 
the Arab countries has always been a declared objective of the 
Arab League, while has not yet been realised despite their 
various efforts at laying down the most binding terms to move 
the Arab economies towards integration.29
While the ultimate objective of the Arab Economic 
Agreement is a full economic union, beginning with the gradual 
implementation of a free trade area among the parties, only 
four countries, namely Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Syria, have so 
far agreed to implement a free trade area. Even, to that 
primary obligation, a truly free trade area among these four 
countries has not been fully established. Important obstacles 
still remain in the way of free movement of goods relating to 
trade regulations of an administrative character and the
28 Article 4(4) of the Arab Economic Agreement.
29 Makdisi, op.cit. . p.91.
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decisions of the public sector organisations.30
Accordingly, when one refers to the Arab economic 
agreements and their obligations it is necessary to draw a 
distinction between obligations agreed upon in the concerned 
instruments and the de facto non-compliance with these 
arrangements. This is a matter which may lead some to the 
belief that the Arab League decisions cannot be binding and 
always need endorsement from the member states,31 despite the 
fact that the agreements concerned include their binding 
effect.
Nevertheless, there appears little difficulty in 
harmonising and reducing the differences between the two 
instruments, particularly as each of them has a great degree 
of flexibility in giving non-member states the same rights and
30 Ibid.. p.92. On August 13, 1964 the Council of Arab 
Economic Unity took a decision to establish an Arab Common 
Market, the aims of the market are specified in the text of 
that resolution as the accomplishment of the following 
freedoms among member states of the market:
(1) Freedom of personal and capital mobility.
(2) Freedom of exchange of foreign and national goods 
and products.
(3) Freedom of residence, work, employment and practice 
of economic activities.
(4) Freedom of transport, transit, and use of transport 
vehicles, ports and civilian airports.
In actual practice there has been no significant achievement 
in any objective set in this resolution. See the text of the 
resolution in ILM, Vol.Ill, No.6 (November 1964). For the 
achievement of the Arab Common Market, see Kaddori, op.cit.. 
p.37; Arikat, op.cit.. pp.109-111.
31 Schermers, G. , International Institutional Law (1980), 
op.cit.. para.715 at p.412.
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the preferential privileges included in the agreement.32
Thus, Article 15 of the Arab Economic Unity agreement 
provides:
"Two parties or more may conclude economic 
agreements aiming at further economic unity.”
Article 25 of the UEA provides:
"No member state shall give to any non-member state 
any preferential privilege exceeding that given 
herein.11
However, the G.C.C. Committee of Financial and Economic 
Cooperation, in its seventh session, appeared to discourage 
the G.C.C.parties from giving effect to Article 25.33 The 
decision apparently focuses only on the bilateral agreements 
intended to be concluded between a member states and third 
parties.
It refers particularly to Article 4 of the UEA which 
requires the member states to set a minimum unified customs 
tariff to be applied to the goods originating from the non­
member countries. It also refers to Article 7 of the UEA 
which requires the member states to coordinate their trade 
policies and relations with other economic and regional blocs
32 By contrast, the EEC commercial relations have never 
been uniform. Each member state had its own commercial 
treaties with third states when the Community was established. 
It was therefore provided in Article 234 of the EEC treaty 
that, as soon as possible, the member states were to terminate 
treaties whose provisions were inconsistent with the transfer 
of powers to the Community, which meant they could be replaced 
by Community agreement. See Schermers, International 
Institutional Law, op.cit.. p.787.
33 See the decision in the G.C.C. publication, Decisions 
and Steps Taken to Implement the UEA. op.cit.. pp.179-80.
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and groups in order to provide equal circumstances and 
conditions for their trade dealings.
In order to implement these principles the decision 
emphasises the obligations of the member states to observe 
these provisions in case of concluding any treaty with non­
member states.
Accordingly, the G.C.C. Secretariat informed the 
competent bodies in the member states not to give non-member 
states any preferential treatment concerning foreign products 
entering G.C.C. member states. Elimination of the customs 
tariff within the G.C.C. member state creates rights to the 
local producers, a matter which is illusory if others outside 
the G.C.C. share such privileges.34
The G.C.C. Secretariat puts it as follows:
"This is in keeping with the text and the spirit of 
the Unified Economic Agreement, whereby the 
cancellation of the customs tariffs on national 
products of the states of the Council, for instance, 
will create a price priority for these products in 
regard to foreign products, thereby creating 
(rights) for the national producers which might be 
lost in the event a member state grants the same 
priority to a third party. This, in effect, is what 
the Unified Economic Agreement attempted to deal 
with when it indicated in paragraph (2) of Article 
4 that among the goods of the customs tariff was the 
protection of the products of the states of the 
Council in confronting competitive foreign 
products.,|35
34 Ibid.
35 See Decrees which have been issued and measures which 
have been adopted in implementing the UEA. G.C.C. Printing 
Press (1988), p.177.
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This decision, though, does not seem to refer to those
multilateral agreements to which a G.C.C. member state was a
party before the conclusion of the UEA (i.e. Arab Economic
Agreement) but it does clash with Article 25 of the UEA, which
does not restrict giving similar rights to any third party.
At any rate, the legal position of incompatibility which
arises from the application of the UEA and the Arab League
Economic Unity Agreement is a difficult one. On the one hand
the economic interests of the two groups may conflict with
each other. If this should occur the UEA cannot override the
Arab Economic Agreement as far as the obligations of Kuwait
and the United Arab Emirates are concerned, since they
ratified the agreement. The Arab Economic Unity Agreement
came into force in 1964 while the G.C.C.'s UEA has been in
operation since 1982.
According to Article 3 0.4(B) of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties:
"When the parties to the later treaty do not include 
all the parties to the earlier one...
(b) as between a state party to both treaties and a 
state party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to 
which both states are parties governs their mutual rights 
and obligations.11
It is to be noted here that rules laid down in Article 
30, especially paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, are intended to be
residuary rules operating in the absence of express provisions 
regulating priority.36
36 See Sinclair, I., The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. Manchester University Press (1984), pp.97-98.
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On the other hand, the type of economic cooperation which 
prevails today among the Arab countries cannot be described, 
as stated earlier, as a true implementation of the Arab 
Economic Unity Agreement, since in fact it did not achieve 
either a free trade area or a customs union or any other 
specific economic arrangement.37
It seems that the implementation of the Arab Economic 
Unity agreement which was concluded earlier is not possible. 
The question is to be asked whether any state party can
70
terminate the agreement on the grounds of material breach, 
or can treat it on the ground of de facto termination. But 
this raises a very sensitive political issue.
3. The G.C.C. and the GATT
Of the six member states of the G.C.C., only one, Kuwait, 
is a full contracting party of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The UAE, Bahrain and Qatar, to whom 
the GATT had applied before their independence, maintain a de 
facto application of GATT rules pending final decisions as to 
their future commercial policies. None of these three, 
however, has applied for full membership of GATT.39 Saudi
37 Makdis, loc.cit.
38 Article 60.2 (band c) and 60.3(b) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. See Brownlie, Basic 
Documents in International Law, op.cit.. p.373.
39 For UAE de facto application of the GATT Agreement, 
see BISD 21 Supp. (1973-4), p.23. As for Qatar and Bahrain, 
see BISD. 18 Supp. (1970-71), p.23. See also, McGovern, E., 
International Trade Regulation. GATT, the United States and 
the European Community. Globefield Press, Exeter (1986) ,
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Arabia has acquired observer status in GATT with the view of 
examining full membership.40
Should these governments decide to join GATT, they would 
have to consult GATT as to whether their plans for regional 
economic integration are consistent with the provisions of 
Article XXIV of GATT.
In a memorandum prepared by the G.C.C. Secretariat for 
the member states it assessed the benefits and the obligations 
of member states of GATT.41 There are three main benefits 
deriving from GATT membership:
First, the General Agreement establishes an 
internationally accepted and legally binding framework for the 
conduct of trading relations. This framework includes 
general, unconditional most-favoured-nation treatment of the 
trade of all contracting parties, national treatment of their 
trade as regards domestic taxes and other internal 
regulations, and uniform practices in such matters as freedom 
of transit, customs valuation, treatment of dumped or 
subsidised merchandise, and emergency restrictive actions to 
safeguard domestic economic interests from damage caused by
pp. 17, 536-37. It is to be noted that under Article XXVI 5(c) 
a state applying GATT regulations on a de facto basis may 
become a full contracting party.
40 See Petersmann, E., "The EEC as a GATT Member. Legal 
Conflicts between GATT Law and European Community Law", in The 
European Community and GATT. Hilf, M. , Jacobs, F. & 
Petersmann, E. (eds.), Kluwer-Deventer, The Netherlands 
(1986), p.25.
41 G.C.C. memorandum on major costs and benefits of GATT 
membership (July 1983), pp.1-10. (Unpublished).
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increased imports. It also includes a general commitment 
against the use of quantitative restrictions for trade 
regulation, with clearly defined exceptions subject to 
specified rules and procedures.
Second, the General Agreement provides non-discriminatory 
access to markets representing a preponderance of world trade 
under stable, bound tariff schedules and uniform, known 
trading practices. That is, every contracting party benefits 
as of right from the schedules of concessional duty rates 
maintained by all other contracting parties, bound against 
unilateral increase and protected by clearly specified 
procedures for the modification or withdrawal of concessions, 
subject to renegotiation and compensation.
Third, the General Agreement provides a multilateral 
forum with mutually accepted norms and procedures for 
consultation and negotiation on trade matters and settlement 
of trade disputes. Thus, the Contracting Parties as a 
consultative body may discuss a general trade problem such as 
protectionism, or establish guidelines for a major trade 
negotiation or, through the Council of Representatives, act 
to resolve a trade complaint brought by one or more 
contracting parties against action taken by another.
The principal burdens of GATT participation are the 
obligations corresponding to the above benefits. They are, 
first, to accept the internationally sanctioned discipline of 
the General Agreement in formulating and administering 
domestic policies that affect the trade interests of other
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contracting parties? second, to offer and guarantee access 
to domestic markets on the same terms as those accorded by 
other contracting parties in their markets? and third, to be 
prepared to be held accountable before the GATT Contracting 
Parties for any damage done to the trade of other contracting 
parties through actions contrary to General Agreement 
provisions, and to offer appropriate compensation.
Participation in GATT affairs as a full contracting party 
involves, among other things, having a voice, through the 
Contracting Parties and subsidiary bodies, in shaping 
important trade policy actions and an opportunity to negotiate 
on a basis of legal equality for the resolution of trade 
problems with other contracting parties or groupings, or for 
additional trade benefits. It also involves, in some degree 
at least, giving up total autonomy in the management of 
external trade relations.
The G.C.C. as a regional arrangement establishes 
preferential trading rules within the six member states such 
as a free-trade area, customs union and other forms of 
economic integration.42 The very nature of such arrangements 
involves a departure from the most-favoured-nation clause 
which entitles any contracting party to have the right to 
receive the same treatment that is accorded to the country 
which is treated most favourably.
42 See Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 21, 
22 and 2 3 of the UEA which include forms of integration.
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Article 1(1) of GATT provides:43
"With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind 
imposed on or in connection with importation or 
exportation or imposed on the international transfer of 
payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the 
method of levying such duties and charges, and with 
respect to all rules and formalities in connection with 
importation and exportation, and with respect to all 
matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, 
any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by 
any contracting party to any product originating in or 
destined for any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product 
originating in or destined for the territories of all 
other contracting parties."
Thus favourable treatment of an import from one GATT 
member country that is not extended to all other GATT members 
is a violation of Article 1 of the GATT and may subject the 
benefits accruing to the contracting party to nullification 
or impairment according to Article XXIII of the GATT.
A regional association of economic integration such as 
the G.C.C, if it acceded to the GATT, would meet the 
requirements of Article XXIV of GATT which permit the G.C.C. 
member states to grant preferences to trade with each other. 
Beyond that, a G.C.C. member state could not treat its foreign 
trade in a given product with other countries more favourably 
than it treated its trade in that product with any GATT 
member. The object of Article XXIV is precisely to exempt the 
various forms of economic integration from the most-favoured­
nation clause.
43 See the text in Sohn, L. , International Organisation 
and Integration. Martinus Nijhoff (1986), p.651.
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However, there is continuing difference of view as to the 
interpretation of Article XXIV of GATT among GATT contracting 
parties. The EEC Treaty conforming to this rule has been 
questioned, and some complaints raised about its application. 
One member of the working party stated that the compatibility 
of the Treaty of Rome itself with the provisions of the 
General Agreement remained an open question, since the working 
party which had examined the question had not reached any 
final conclusions in this regard. Similarly, the
compatibility of the 1973 enlargement with the General 
Agreement had also remained unresolved as that working party 
had issued a final report.44
In 1982 the USA complained under Article XXIII of GATT 
against "EC tariff treatment on imports of citrus products 
from certain countries in the Mediterranean region", and 
explained that the legal compatibility of the EEC's 
preferential arrangements with Mediterranean countries 
likewise continues to be put into doubt by third GATT 
contracting parties.45
This attitude overshadowed the G.C.C.-E.E.C. discussion 
during the period before the conclusion of the cooperation 
agreement in June 1988.46
44 See GATT, BISD. 30th Suppl. (1982-3), p.174.
45 See The European Community and GATT, op.cit.. p.36.
46 See supra. pp.229-230.
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Following an exchange of views on what could be covered 
in that agreement, the EEC maintained that it was not possible 
to envisage a preferential access agreement. Only two 
possibilities existed, either a free trade agreement based on 
Article XXIV of GATT or a non-preferential agreement involving 
most-favoured-nation treatment and a joint commitment to seek 
tariff reductions in the framework of a multilateral 
negotiation involving the USA, Japan and other interested 
parties. They further maintained that it was not realistic 
to conclude a free trade agreement at this stage in E.E.C.- 
G.C.C. relations, and the best solution was the second option 
which could be evolutionary and seen as a first step towards 
the road to free trade.47
The EEC side explained that a free trade agreement 
because of GATT regulations would not permit the granting of 
trade concessions outside multilateral negotiations. During 
the period before multilateral negotiations were concluded, 
the Community could seek to assure continuity of Generalised 
System of Preference (GSP)48 access to the EC market by the
47 These views were expressed to the author in an 
interview with the general coordinator of the G.C.C. in 
E.E.C.-G.C.C. negotiations, Mr. Kurdi in the Saudi Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 17 December 1987. See also Mr. Kurdi's 
remarks on the negotiations published in Al-Oabus newspaper, 
27.12.1987, Council of the European Communities, General 
Secretariat 7294/87 (Press 112). An interview by Al-Oabus 
newspaper with Dr. Al-Quaiz, the Secretary-General of the 
G.C.C. for economic affairs confirmed these views, 28/12/87.
48 GSP constitutes a framework within which the EEC 
countries are invited to offer non-reciprocal and non- 
discriminatory trade preference on manufactured and semi­
finished imports from G.C.C. countries.
The G.C.C. side thought this was not enough to meet its 
aspirations as it does not go beyond the codification of the 
status quo in the practical sense. The G.C.C. would rather 
prefer an agreement that inter alia takes into consideration 
the following:
The historic, strategic and geo-political importance of 
trade between the two region.
- The fact that G.C.C. members are developing countries and 
are therefore entitled to treatment in conformity with 
the provisions of Part IV of the GATT.
The G.C.C. believes that the application and 
implementation of the provisions of Part IV of the GATT 
should not be restricted and limited only to the GSP. 
The G.C.C. considers itself as a natural extension of the 
Mediterranean region and expects a treatment commensurate 
with the importance of its trade with the Community. 
This means a treatment similar to that extended to other 
Arab countries or Israel, it being understood that the 
G.C.C. considers the development dimension in trade 
agreements to be relevant to the level and extent of 
reciprocity.
The fact that a substantial part of the G.C.C.-E.E.C. 
trade is already liberalised de facto justifies a 
possible further liberalisation benefiting from Article
49 The interview with Mr. Kurdi, o p .cit.
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XXIV of the GATT.
The G.C.C. therefore expects an important improvement in 
access to market conditions. Consolidation of tariffs 
as well as additional reciprocal tariff concessions are 
not to be excluded.
Before an agreement was concluded it would be ready to 
accept duty free access based on what it had achieved in 
1985 under GSP.50
The compliance with GATT requirements in Article XXIV of 
GATT, however, is made for approval of exceptional cases. The 
terms of paragraph 5 of Article XXIV, which establishes the 
exception, apply only to regional arrangements between 
territories of contracting parties.51 It provides, inter 
alia:
"... the provisions of this agreement shall not prevent, 
as between the territories of contracting parties, the 
formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area or 
the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the 
formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area, 
provided that:
(a) With respect to a customs union, or an interim 
agreement leading to the formation of a customs union,
50 See Wilson, R . , European-Arab Trade Prospects to the
1990s. Special Report No.1105, The Economist Intelligence
Unit, U.K., (January 1988), pp.88-97. See also, Yorke, V. & 
Turner, L. , European Interest and Gulf Oil. Policy Studies 
Institute and Royal Institute of International Affairs (1986), 
Gower (1986), pp.91-97? Al-Shawa Khalid, "The Art of
Negotiation and the Arab Gulf States* Ability to Negotiate the 
Export of their Petrochemical Products", paper presented at 
the training programme on the Diplomacy of Negotiation, 
Political Science Section of the Department of Trade, 
Economics and Political Science, Kuwait University, 30 March- 
17 April, 1985.
51 Jackson, J., World Trade and the Law of GATT. The
Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., New York (1969), p.582.
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the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed at 
the institution of any such union or interim agreement 
in respect of trade with contracting parties not parties 
to such union or agreement, shall not on the whole be 
higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of 
the duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the 
constituent territories prior to the formation of such 
union or the adoption of such interim agreement, as the 
case may be.”
Since Kuwait is a GATT contracting party and entered
G.C.C. arrangement, it is obligated under Article XXIV,
paragraph 7 to "promptly notify the contracting parties” and
furnish information about the G.C.C. arrangement.
At an early GATT session, a question was raised whether
the contracting parties might establish a procedure for
implementation of Article XXIV. A GATT working party
discussed this question and reached the conclusion that:
"Consideration by the contracting parties of proposals 
for customs unions would have to be based on the
circumstances and conditions of each proposal and, 
therefore, that no general procedures can be established 
beyond those provided in the article itself."52
Article XXV, paragraph 5 of GATT also has a provision for
waiver of an obligation imposed upon a contracting party
provided that such decision is approved by a two-thirds
majority of the vote cast and that such majority shall
comprise more parties.53 According to the law of treaties
other G.C.C. member states who maintain a de facto application
52 GATT, 2 BISD (1952), p.181.
53 In 1952 the six ECSC states requested a "waiver" 
(Article XXV:5) from certain of their obligations under the 
General Agreement (e.g. Articles I, XIII) in order to permit 
them to fulfil their obligations under the ECSC treaty. See 
the report of the working party in BISD. 1st suppl., pp.85, 
88.
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of the GATT regulations could be regarded as third parties.
The GATT rules confer benefit but do not create 
obligations or rights for them. This type of de facto 
arrangement could be described as "non-binding" or "voluntary” 
agreements.54
Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties provides:
"A treaty does not create either obligations or rights 
for a third state without its consent.”
Article 35 supplements the above provision by providing:
"An obligation arises for a third state from a provision 
of a treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the 
provision to be the means of establishing the obligation 
and the third state expressly accepts that obligation in 
writing. "55
It should be noted that this article is carefully worded 
so as to make the legal basis of the obligation for third 
states not the treaty itself but the collateral agreement 
whereby the third state has accepted the obligation.56
The two articles reflect the maxim pacta tertiis nec 
nocent nec prosunt which is supported by general principles
54 Roessler, F. , "Law, De Facto Agreements and 
Declarations of Principle in International Economic 
Relations", 21 G.Y.I.L. (1978), p.41. For non-binding
agreements see also, Munch, F., "Comments on the 1968 Draft 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Non-binding Agreements", 
29 Zeitschrift fur Auslandisches offentliches Recht und 
Volkerrecht (1969), pp.1-11? Schachter, 0., "The Twilight 
Existence of Non-Binding International Agreements", 71
A.J.I.L. (1977), pp.296-304.
55 For the text of the Articles, see Brownlie, op.cit..
p. 364.
56 Sinclair, op.cit. . p. 101.
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of law that third states are clearly strangers to the
contract.57 However, third states are bound by the provisions
of a treaty only if such provisions become, in the course of
time, rules of customary law.
Article 38 of the Vienna Convention deals with cases of
obligations arising out of this source of law. It provides:
"Nothing in Articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth 
in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third state as 
a customary rule of international law."
It has long been affirmed by the ICJ in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases (1969) that a rule
"... while only conventional or contractual in its 
origin, has... passed into the general corpus of 
international law, and is now accepted as such by the 
opinio juris, so as to have become binding even for 
countries which have never, and do not, become parties 
to the Convention.1,58
In fact there is no evidence in the state practice of de 
facto application of GATT rules which suggests that 
international customary law has emerged therefrom.59
The decision of the GATT to allow governments of 
territories acquiring autonomy to apply the General Agreement 
de facto in their trade relations with contracting parties is 
only to permit new nations to experiment with GATT membership 
while they are formulating their initial commercial
57 Sinclair, ibid.. p.99? Elias, op.cit.. p.59 et seq.
58 See ICJ Reports of the Judgments (1969), p.41, 
paragraph 71. See also, Baxter, R. , "Treaties and Custom", 
I Recueil des Cours (1970), p.69.
59 Roessler, F. , "Law, De Facto Agreements and
Declarations of Principle in International Economic
Relations", op.cit.. pp.27-59.
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-i • • 6 0policies.
De facto arrangements are therefore generally only used 
to coordinate economic policies and can "because of their 
uncertain consequences, often only be experiments to be 
repeated if successful and abandoned if not. In such 
situations de facto agreements provide an ideal form of 
cooperation; they permit a step forward because they do not 
prevent steps backward".61
4. Supervision Within the G.C.C.
Supervision in general affords real influence for the 
fulfilment of an obligation and an effective means to prevent 
violations. It also serves as a corrective when violation has 
taken place.62
The UEA sets out a framework and occasionally gives 
details for the implementation of its provisions. The 
elaboration is primarily left to the policy-makers, through 
the gradual implementation of the treaty by adopting 
resolutions issued by the Supreme Council.
The UEA does not include a single article which regulates 
supervision or the body which implements the provisions of the 
treaty.
Yet, due to the legal linkage between the UEA and the
60 GATT BISD. 15th Suppl. (1966-67), p.64.
61 Roessler, op.cit. . p.54.
62 See Andretsch, H. , Supervision in European Community 
Law. 2nd rev.ed., North-Holland (1986), p.410.
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Fundamental Statute, which is clearly referred to in the 
preamble of the UEA, the organs stipulated in the Fundamental 
Statute are inter alia engaged in the supervisory machinery 
of the whole range of G.C.C. activities.
The functions of the supervisory organs are impliedly 
laid down in the Fundamental Statute, but there is no explicit 
reference to them in the provisions. Indirectly, however, 
these functions may be inferred from the competence of the 
Supreme Council, Ministerial Council and the Secretariat.
Article 8 of the Fundamental Statute, which includes the 
Supreme Council functions, provides broad terms for 
supervision to "review matters of interest to the member 
states", "lay down the higher policy for the cooperation 
Council and basic lines it should follow" and "review reports 
and studies which the Secretary-General is charged to 
prepare". Very similar supervisory functions are defined in 
Article 12 of the Fundamental Statute, which describes the 
Ministerial Council competence.
The Secretariat-General seems, however, to play the 
cardinal role in laying the foundation for eligible 
supervision in the implementation of the UEA. Competence in 
the field is based upon Article 15 (2) & (3) of the
Fundamental Statute, in which it is stipulated that the 
Secretariat shall "prepare periodic reports on the Cooperation 
Council's work" and "follow up the implementation by the 
member states of the resolutions and recommendations of the 
Supreme Council and Ministerial Council".
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In order to carry out these functions the Secretariat 
tends to request and receive the necessary materials and 
information from the member states. Sometimes the Secretariat 
on its own initiative, has "pioneered some steps” to make 
supervision more effective and "integration possible".63
It is the task of the Secretariat to report the 
information received on the progress of implementing the 
G.C.C. decisions, and especially when it is requested by the 
Supreme Council or the Ministerial Council for 
consideration.64
It has to be stressed that although according to the 
Fundamental Statute the Secretariat has no express power to 
address directly the competent bodies in the member states, 
the practice of the Secretary-General in following up 
compliance of the member states with Supreme Council decisions 
has encouraged it to write directly to the competent ministers 
in the member states to remind them of their obligations.
The aim of the Secretariat here appears to be to gain 
closer supervision and contact with the national authorities, 
unlike that of traditional organisations.
An explicit obligation on the member states to supply the
Secretariat-General with information about the implementation 
%
of the decisions is not provided for in the Fundamental 
Statute.
63 The Secretary-General Assistant El-Kuwaiz, The 
Cooperation Council of Arab States of the Gulf, op.cit.. p.12.
64 Article 15 (2) & (4) of the Fundamental Statute.
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This should not, however, give a G.C.C. member state the 
impression that they are completely free in deciding how to 
fulfil those obligations or to comply with the Supreme Council 
decisions. The member states are bound by generally 
recognised principles of international law, and in the present 
context, that they should fulfil their obligations in good 
faith.65 This would mean that a member state which voted in 
favour of the adoption of a decision of the Supreme Council 
should make a serious effort to show its intention and 
willingness to comply with it by providing enough information 
about it.
In practice, the knowledge of states parties to due 
performance by other parties is frequently ascertained as a 
result of debate between delegations. Something is agreed and 
put forward and will be a matter of expediency rather than 
legal requirement. Thus, the state concerned is apt to inform 
other parties about the difficulties it finds in fulfilling 
its obligation partly or wholly when it is called to account 
for its non-compliance.
The scope of supervision may extend to the conclusion of
65 See Lauterpacht1s Separate Opinion, appended to the 
1955 Advisory Opinion on South West Africa Voting Procedure.
I.C.J. Reports of Judgment (1955), p.120, who states: 
"Although there is no automatic obligation to accept fully a 
particular recommendation or series of recommendations, there 
is a legal obligation to act in good faith...". See also the 
"Declaration on Principles of International law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations", Resolution 2625(XXV) 
of the UN General Assembly. The text of this declaration has 
been published in Brownlie, I. (ed.), Basic Documents in 
International Law. 2nd ed., Oxford (1978), pp.32-40.
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bilateral treaties between a member state and a third party. 
An obligation upon a member state to provide the necessary 
information and have prior consultation with the other member 
states when concluding bilateral treaties can be inferred from 
the extensive interpretation of Article 7 of the UEA.66 
It provides:
"Member states shall coordinate their commercial 
policies and relations with other states and 
regional economic groupings and blocs with a view 
towards creating balanced trade relations and 
favourable circumstances and terms of trade 
therewith. To achieve this goal, the member states 
shall make the following arrangements.
1. Coordinate import/export policies and
regulations.
2. Coordinate policies for building up strategic 
food stock.
3. Conclude economic agreements collectively when 
and if the common benefit of the member states is 
realised.
4. Work for the creation of a collective 
negotiating position vis-a-vis foreign parties in the 
field of importation of basic needs and exportation of 
maj or products."
The true coordination of commercial policies, as required 
by Article 7, can only be effectively guaranteed if a member 
state is willing to consult with another about proposed 
arrangements with a third party. A mere good faith requested 
upon that member to have in mind UEA obligations will not 
suffice.
66 Oman in the seventh meeting of the Financial and 
Economic Committee has made a reservation on the Committee 
decision that prior consultation is a necessary procedure for 
the G.C.C. member states before entering any bilateral 
agreement, which might affect the privileges the members get 
from the UEA provisions. The reservation is referred to in 
the memo of the G.C.C. on the obstacles of implementing the 
UEA (unpublished).
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This sort of supervision, which is exercised by the
Secretariat or partially and indirectly by the other organs
of the G.C.C. (the Supreme Council and Ministerial Council)
remains political and does not have legal character.
Political discussion is the only way to correct the wrongful
behaviour of the member state.
However that may be, nothing can be said with certainty
about the real practice of this form of supervision, since the
debate of the organs is kept entirely behind closed doors and
no material is published relating to possible violations.67
The absence of judicial supervision is not surprising and
may be a result of the fact that its decisions are not binding 
68per se.
Considering the economic objectives of the G.C.C., which 
are provided by the UEA and range from free trade area 
(Articles 1-3) to establishing economic union (Articles 10- 
13, 21-23), it may be difficult to attain satisfactory results 
when the organs are not subject to any judicial system of 
supervision regarding their activity or decisions, with no
67 Neither the G.C.C. Annual Reports nor its regular 
publication on the gradual implementation of the UEA contain 
accurate supervision of possible violations of the agreement 
and the Secretariat-General role. For the significance of 
supervision using publicity see Landy, E., The Effectiveness 
of International Supervision. Thirty Years of ILO Experience. 
London, Stevens & Sons (1966), pp.151-52.
68 See Van Hoof, G. and De Vey Mestdagh, K., "Mechanisms 
of International Supervision", in "Supervising International 
Economic Organisations, ed. by Dijk, P. , Kluwer De Venter, 
Netherlands (1984), p.34. See also, Schermers, International 
Institutional Law, op.cit.. p.242.
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access for individuals to an autonomous judicial body which 
is capable of giving the right and unified interpretation of 
the UEA and eventually establish effective integrationist law. 
This, consequently, contributes to settling disputes between 
the member states impartially and giving proper remedies for 
states as well as for individuals.69
The gradual implementation of the UEA provisions, 
however, is the best demonstration of how effective is the 
present non-judicial supervision exercised by the Secretariat 
and to what extent judicial supervision is needed.
(i) The mechanism of supervision in the application and 
interpretation of the UEA
For this meaning see Vicuna, F., "Contemporary 
International law in the Economic Integration of Latin 
America. Problems and Perspective", Recueil des Cours (1971), 
op.cit. . p.168. See also Sundberg-Weitman, B., "The Legal 
Enforcement of Obligations Incumbent upon Member Sates under 
Treaties of the European Communities", Scandinavian Studies 
in Law (1975), pp.261-63; Rasmussen, o p .cit.. p.151 et seq. 
For the opposite view, see Hudson, M . , International Tribunals 
Past and Future. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Washington (1944), who states at p.213 that "A conviction 
seems to be widespread that judicial settlement is not the 
best way of handling economic disputes, and that disputes 
relating to commercial questions should be dealt with by 
specialist experts rather than by judges of general competence 
who may have had no special experience in the field of 
international commerce." This view, however, could have only 
considered at the time it was written. The judicial system 
which is integrated with the institutional structure of 
international economic organisations does not function only 
for the purpose of the settlement of disputes, but also for 
the supervision of the legality of the treaty and the 
decisions enacted by the institutions as a guarantee for the 
protection of the rights and obligations of both the states 
and the individuals. For criticism of this view see Vicuna, 
ibid.. pp.131-35.
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In international law, an interpretation is binding only 
if the organ concerned has been authorised to interpret and 
to make a binding interpretation of the constituent 
instrument. Otherwise, a purported interpretation will remain 
a political declaration.70
Apart from the commission for settlement of disputes 
provided in the Fundamental Statute71 which has not been 
established yet, there is no authority to interpret or to 
adjust the text in the process of application.
In practice, however, member states, private entities and 
individuals bring their complaints about a violation of the 
UEA to the G.C.C. Secretariat. These complaints are brought 
through either the diplomatic channels of the member states 
or directly lodged with the G.C.C. Secretariat.72 Yet one has 
to state that there is no set procedure to follow or specific 
authority in the treaty to tell how and to whom the complaints 
are to be submitted.
70 See supra, Chapter 5, pp.155-61. See also, Bos, M . , 
A Methodology of International Law. T.M.C. Asser Institute 
(1984), pp.130-33 who maintains that ”a purely political 
interpretation is no interpretation but a political act, 
gratuitous if emanating from someone devoid of political 
power. Interpretation must live up to good faith and 
observance of the principle of rational organisation".
71 Article 3 of the Fundamental Statute. See also, supra, 
Chapter 5 for the Commission of Settlement of Disputes, 
pp.181-87.
72 An interview with the Director General of the Legal 
Department in the G.C.C. Secretariat, dated December 1987.
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Between 14 June 1983 and 24 September 1987 more than a 
hundred complaints were received by the Secretariat-General.73 
Most of the complaints were submitted alleging violations of 
the UEA provisions, misinterpretation of the agreement 
provisions and non-fulfilment of certain procedures which are 
required by the G.C.C. organs or the national authorities to 
implement the agreement.74
Indeed, as a rule the G.C.C. member states do not 
intentionally violate their obligations. Usually it is a 
matter of carelessness. Sometimes the infringement is due to 
disagreement in the interpretation of the G.C.C. decisions and 
the substance of international obligation may be involved.
These complaints are filed in a list by the Secretariat 
and obtained by the author during his regular tours to the 
G.C.C. member states.
74 According to Articles 2 an 3 of the UEA the exemption 
of customs duties and other charges having equivalent effect 
is granted to products of national origin. A certificate of 
origin must be submitted and proves (1) the ownership of the 
product shall not be less than 51%; (2) the added value
arising out of the product shall not be less than 40% of its 
end value upon completion of production. The Committee of 
Economic and Financial Affairs added some other procedural 
conditions that are to be fulfilled (e.g. the name of the 
factory which is entitled to the exemption must be included 
in the industrial guide which provides the necessary 
information about the products of each factory within the 
G.C.C. Member state, otherwise the factory will not be 
entitled to such exemption). There are about 13 complaints 
from different national corporations and individuals against 
the G.C.C. member states for imposing customs duties on their 
products because of their failure to meet this requirement. 
Another procedural requirement which is imposed by Saudi 
Arabia is that certain regulations for packing of goods must 
be observed. Among the 101 complaints there are about 4 
submitted by G.C.C. member states on behalf of their citizens 
which claimed that these rules cause harm and increase the 
cost of export. All these complaints are found in the G.C.C. 
list. Ibid.
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The absence of an impartial body to give the right
meaning to the agreement provisions and the Supreme council
decisions is keenly felt. It adversely affects any move
towards integration.
Article 8(3) of the UEA for instance provides that:
"The member states shall agree on the executive 
rules which would ensure that each state shall grant 
the citizens of all other member states the same 
treatment granted to its own citizens without any 
discrimination or differentiation in the following 
fields:
1. ...
2 . ...
3. Freedom of exercising economic activity"
In accordance with the above provision, the Supreme 
Council in its third session in Bahrain decided that G.C.C. 
citizens may exercise economic activities in the fields of 
industry, agriculture, animal husbandry, construction and 
fishery.75
Oman has submitted a memorandum on its interpretation of
the exercise of economic activity in the field of fishing.
it stated that:
"Fishing is similar to oil which constitutes an 
important source of the state*s main revenues. The 
treatment of fishing in the same way as oil explains 
the basis on which Oman understands the phrase 
•exercising economic activities1.... Therefore 
fishing may not be a subject of joint property, but 
exercising this type of activity may only be 
confined to marketing, storage, canning and other 
similar activities."
75 See the decision in Decisions to Implement the UEA. 
G.C.C. Secretariat Publication (Arabic) (1987), pp.14-16.
76 A memorandum prepared by the Economic Department of 
the Secretariat (1985) (unpublished), p.3. An interview 
conducted by the writer in December 1987 with the director of 
the Legal Department of the G.C.C. Secretariat confirmed
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This interpretation has been received with 
dissatisfaction by the Secretariat, which does not regard 
fishing as outside the domain of economic activities covered 
by Article 8(3) .77
Interpretative disputes of opinion between the 
organisation and members are frequent. This may be 
illustrated by reference to the International Court of Justice 
Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962 in Certain Expenses Case of 
the United Nations, in which the scope of Article 17(2) of the 
UN Charter was decided upon. France and the Soviet Union, who 
had refused to contribute towards the expenses of certain 
United Nations operations in the Congo and the Middle East, 
kept to their own interpretation of Article 17 which is 
different from the one adopted by the Court.78
However, since there is no effective authorised body 
stipulated in the treaty to decide whether Oman has failed to 
fulfil an obligation under Article 8(3) of the UEA, Oman may 
argue that its interpretation of the Supreme Council decision 
does not amount to a breach of UEA provisions.79
Another example which indicates the unilateral
Oman's interpretation, which has not since been changed.
77 The interview, ibid.
78 See Bos, M. , op.cit. . p.129.
79 See in this meaning the opinion of the European Court
of Justice deciding on similar problems, in Schermers, G. ,
"The Law as it Stands against Treaty Violations by the 
States", The Legal Issues of European Integration (1974), 
p.117.
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interpretation by G.C.C. member states of the UEA provisions
is illustrated in the application of Article 1(a). Article
1(a) of the Unified Economic Agreement provides:
MThe member states shall permit the importation and 
exportation of agricultural, animal, industrial and 
natural resource products that are of national 
origin. Also, they permit exportation thereof to 
other member states."
The Financial and Economic Committee, at its fifth
meeting, held at the Headquarters of the Secretariat General 
in Riyadh on 11 May 1983, gave assurances on the 
implementation of Article 1(a), which requires allowing the 
importation and exportation of national products to and from 
the member states beginning on the first day of March 1983, 
without the need to undertake any procedures except
certificates of origin, and the manifest of exportation which 
was agreed upon in the third meeting of the directors general 
of customs.
At its seventh meeting, which was held in Riyadh on 18-
19 May, 1983, the Ministerial Council (the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs) approved the above recommendations and the 
Secretariat General issued a general circular to the concerned 
bodies in the member states to the effect that it would become 
operational on the first day of March 1983.
The Minister of Finance and National Economy of the State 
of Bahrain informed the G.C.C. Secretariat that the procedures 
applied in the state of Bahrain regarding Article 1(a) of the 
UEA were in conformity with what was agreed upon at the fifth 
meeting of the Financial and Economic Cooperation Committee
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and at the seventh meeting of the Ministerial Council, while 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia informed the 
Secretariat that their authorised bodies had agreed on the 
unrestricted freedom of export in relation to agricultural 
products and cattle, in accordance with Articles 1 and 27 of 
the Unified Economic Agreement, under the following
conditions:
"1. Continuing unrestricted freedom of export of 
agricultural products.
2. Unrestricted freedom of export of cattle and animal 
products of national origin to the states of the
Cooperation Council according to the following standards:
A. Female and Arab horses may not be exported 
except with special permission.
B. All other types of cattle and animal products 
of national origin may be unrestrictedly exported 
on condition that these exports be subject to the 
international health procedures and obligations 
which are currently in force.”80
Ironically, Article 27 of the UEA, which was referred to
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, provides:
"In case of conflict with local laws and regulations 
of member states, execution of the provisions of 
this Agreement shall prevail."
It seems, therefore, that an "obligatory method" by only 
an independent body with the task of interpretation, could 
restrain the freedom of auto interpretation.81
In this regard, it is worth mentioning that some maintain 
that member states are entitled to their own interpretation,
80 See Decrees which have been Issued and Measures which 
have been Adopted in Implementing the UEA. op.cit.. pp.170- 
171.
81 See Professor Sur, S., L 1 Interpretation en Droit 
International Public. Paris (1974), pp.237-238, cited by Bos, 
M . , op.cit.. p.129.
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differing from the organisation's, and this might even extend 
to binding decisions and judgments pronounced by the 
International Court of Justice.82 The right view, however, 
is that a binding decision by the political body or 
authoritative decision by the court will have compelling legal 
effect.
According to Article 3 of the UEA three conditions must
be fulfilled for a product to be exempted from customs duties.
(1) The value added to the national product shall not be less 
than 40% of their final value.
(2) The share of the citizens in ownership of the product
shall not be less than 51%.
(3) An authenticated certificate of origin to be submitted 
to the receiving state which is procedural and obtained 
as a result of fulfilling the first two conditions.1,83
82 This view is expressed by Professor Sur, ibid. . pp.133- 
38, cited by Bos, pp.128-29.
83 The Supreme Council at its third meeting, which was 
held in the state of Bahrain on 7-9 November 1982, issued the 
following exemption:
"1. To exempt products of national origin from customs 
tariffs and reciprocal tariffs as of the first day of March, 
1983.
2. To authorize that this exemption will include products 
of the industrial establishment in which the ownership by 
citizens of the member states has not yet reached 51 percent. 
This authorisation will be valid for the period of one year, 
beginning on the first day of March, 1983.”
This deadline, fixed by the Supreme Council, expired at the 
end of February 1984. See Decrees which have been Issued and 
Measures which have been Adopted in Implementing the Unified 
Economic Agreement. G.C.C. Secretariat (1988) p.59. See also, 
Gnichtel, W. , "The Arab States Gulf Cooperation Council: 
Unified Rules for Trade and Industry", 20 International Lawyer
(1986), pp.309-318.
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In the practice of the G.C.C., and through the complaints 
submitted to the Secretariat, it appears that on many 
occasions the contracting party has the final say as to 
whether there is or there is not fulfilment of these 
conditions, provided in Article 3. Consequently, the 
contracting party or the beneficiary of the rule has no 
effective means to challenge the alleged violations against 
him.
In a complaint to the G.C.C. Secretariat a dispute arose 
between the Ministry of Trade and Industry in Kuwait and a 
company specialising in producing chemicals in the United Arab 
Emirates. The latter claimed its entitlement to the exemption 
of the customs duty according to Article 3(1). The former 
claimed in return that the company is owned entirely by 
American associations. The G.C.C. Secretariat had only to 
write to the Kuwait Foreign Office explaining the view of the 
company through a memo it received from the UAE's Foreign 
Office.84
In a similar incident concerning the application of 
Article 3(1) of the UEA the Ministry of Finance and National 
Economy in Saudi Arabia wrote to the G.C.C. Secretariat that 
in future it would impose customs duty on some jewellery 
exported to Saudi Arabia from the United Arab Emirates. The
84 Complaint No.l in the list, o p .cit. There are other 
similar complaints focusing on fulfilling the three conditions 
of granting the exemption from customs duties, the role of the 
Secretariat is limited to the extent of writing what they 
received from and to the parties concerned. The List of 
Complaints. o p .cit.
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Saudi authorities claimed that the products' final value 
cannot exceed more than 5%, which is far less than the 
required percentage under Article 3(1). Furthermore, gold is 
not one of the United Arab Emirates' natural resources. The 
Secretariat merely wrote in its turn to the Ministers of 
Economy of the G.C.C. member states explaining to them the 
Saudi interpretation and requesting their comment.85
Again in February 1984 the Saudi authorities imposed 
customs duty on some imports coming from Kuwait as products 
of national origin. Saudi Arabia claimed that after careful 
verification the products proved to be owned entirely by 
foreign firms. The Kuwaiti authorities wrote to the 
Secretariat of the G.C.C. disputing the Saudi evaluation and 
ascertaining that the products were entitled to the exemption 
under Article 3(1) of the UEA.86
The receiving state as a result could take an arbitrary 
position in granting the exemption of customs duties.
Another problem relating to these conditions is that the 
national authorities may without accurate verification of the 
first and second condition issue the certificate of origin, 
sacrificing the community benefit for the sake of national or 
even individual benefits.87
85 Complaint No. 13, ibid.
86 Complaint No. 16, ibid.
87 According to some of the complaints the receiving state 
proved after verification that the products are completely 
foreign and accompanied by a certificate of origin. 
Complaints Nos. 5, 13, 16, 38 and 75.
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In one of the complaints which was submitted to the 
Secretariat in July 1985, the Omani Customs Department found 
after verification that 770 ice cream boxes and iced cakes 
exported as national products from the Emirate of Sharjah in 
the UAE were all produced in England. The goods were
accompanied by a certificate of origin, purporting them to
• 88 have been produced m  the UEA.
The demand for a certificate of origin has been 
criticised by some private entities on the ground that it is 
difficult to meet the first condition and itemize the 
product's final value which includes such variables as the 
original values, manufacturing costs, marketing and 
advertising expenses, and suggested sale price. Also these 
variables can be influenced by market conditions and by the
89psychological attitudes of customers.
The first condition, which requires that at least 40% 
value must have been added by the seller to the product's 
final value, has also been a matter of dispute between the 
member states. The problem is mainly due to the question of 
definition of the 40% value added to the product, which is 
entirely in the hands of those who issue the certificate of
88 • •Complaint No.32 in the list. Ibid.
89 In a newspaper interview following the implementation 
of Article 3 of the UEA on September 1, 1985, the executive 
director of the Bahrain Aluminium Sheets Company further 
objected to the certificate of national origin on grounds of 
confidentiality. He maintained that the information demanded 
in the certificate include highly sensitive company secrets 
that should not be revealed easily. See Nakhleh, E., The Gulf 
Cooperation Council, o p .cit.. pp.272-28.
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origin or the authorities which receive the product.
One of the complaints which relates to this kind of 
dispute concerns ready-made houses and whether they constitute 
40% of the added value locally or not. The Customs Department 
in Saudi Arabia has disputed the fact that this type of 
product is 40% locally produced and claimed that they are 
completely foreign. The Ministry of Trade and Industry in 
both Kuwait and UAE claimed the whole 40% cannot be added 
before installing these houses. Therefore some percentage of 
the value is not completed until it is received by the buyer 
and in this case in Saudi Arabia is to be added on the site
• t • 90at the time of installation.
Furthermore, when the G.C.C. applies Article 3 of the 
UEA, a state will not necessarily agree with a specific 
position taken by another state. However, often diplomatic 
considerations will lead them to remain silent rather than 
express their opposition, and thus the legal issue involved 
remains uncertain.91
Although there can be an adverse impact upon individuals 
as a result of actions by G.C.C. organs and consequential 
actions by national authorities, there is no remedy obtained 
by the individuals. Individuals on many occasions have 
suffered damages to their products. In one of the complaints,
90 • # . •Complaint No.5 in the list, o p .cit.
91 For the disadvantages of contracting party supervision, 
see Andretsch, H. , Supervision in European Community Law. 
op.cit.. pp.403-4.
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the Saudi customs authorities have imposed a regulation on the 
truck drivers carrying sheep from the United Arab Emirates to 
Saudi Arabia, providing that the sheep conveyors had to enter 
Saudi territory through the same road by which other products 
enter. Delay was bearable to these other goods but not in the 
case of sheep. This regulation was meant to check and 
investigate the contraband products coming from the northern 
borders with the United Arab Emirates. The result was the 
loss of those sheep, of which up to 19% perished, because of 
the difficulty of feeding them in the desert for more than 5 
days.92
According to the aforementioned list of complaints 
prepared by the G.C.C. Secretariat, all these complaints came 
to nothing as they did not come before the national courts for 
judicial settlement.
The absence of systematic examination of the policy of 
member states with a view to ascertaining the extent to which 
they have actually given effect to their obligations under the 
UEA means that violations of the general provisions of the 
agreement may have occurred without it being certain. This 
would also encourage further violation of UEA provisions. 
Article 27 of the UEA provides:
"In case of conflict with local laws and regulations 
of member states, application of the provisions of 
this Agreement shall prevail."
92 Complaint No.34 in the list, o p .cit.. For the right 
of individuals to claim damages in the light of the UEA see 
infra, pp.325-38.
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In three complaints some member states have not allowed 
products of national origin to enter their territories on the 
pretext that their health regulations do not permit them. As 
such the refusal of the authorities in Kuwait and Oman to 
grant the exemption of customs duties to products coming from 
Saudi Arabia is based on the ground that products of origin 
are not good enough for human consumption according to the 
laboratory results.93
Furthermore, other complaints have been focused on the 
specifications and measurements of the products of G.C.C. 
national origin, claiming that they are not up to the standard 
of domestic products.94
In July 1986 the Ministry of Economy and Commerce in 
Qatar complained to the G.C.C. Secretariat that both Saudi 
Arabia and Oman customs refused entry for mineral water 
accompanied with a certificate of origin which led to the 
damage of 350 cartons. Oman claimed that the goods did not 
comply with the specifications pertaining to similar local 
goods. The Qatari company in turn produced evidence prepared 
by the official bodies in Qatar, UAE and other bodies 
confirming the high standard of the mineral water (i.e. 
Evian) ,95
93 Complaint No. 17, ibid.
94 Complaints No. 29 and 59.
95 Ibid. . No. 59.
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This attitude by some G.C.C. member states has further
proved their loose commitment to other agreements in this
field specially concluded for such purposes. In 1982 the
Supreme Council at its third meeting held in Bahrain,
established the Board of Specification and Standards attached
as a subsidiary organ to the G.C.C. The Board, according to
Article 4 of its statute, will be concerned, inter alia, with
the following:
"1. Legislative affairs concerned with
specifications and standards in the states of the 
Council, and it alone will prepare, sanction and 
publish the Gulf Standard Specifications for 
commodities and products and the apparatus for 
measurements, verification, definition, symbols, 
technical terms, conditions for implementation and 
methods of inspection, testing and verification etc.
2. To prepare, print and publish the standard 
specifications in cooperation with the member 
states.
3. To follow up the implementation of the approved 
specifications through the evaluatory apparatus in 
each member state....
7. To set up regulations for granting marks of 
quality and certificates of conformity for products.
8. To publish guidance and information in 
measuring.".....96
The situation between G.C.C. member states may lead to 
the use of retaliatory measures, where some member states 
believe that another member state has violated its 
obligations.
However, under international law not every violation by
96 • • •See the Basic Statute of the Board of Specifications 
and Standards of the States of the G.C.C. in Decisions and 
Steps taken to Implement the UEA. op.cit.. pp.184-89.
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a member state entitles another party affected by the failure 
of non-compliance with the agreement obligations not to fulfil 
its own obligations.97 Only violations that render the 
agreement in essence different from the one entered into, or 
without purpose, would entitle a party to decline to fulfil 
its own obligation. That is opting to terminate the 
agreement.
(ii) The Priority in Governmental Purchase of National 
Products and Products of National Origin in the G.C.C. 
Article 1 of the UEA provides:
"The member states shall permit the exportation and 
importation of agricultural, animal, industrial and 
natural resources products that are of national 
origin. Also, they shall permit exportation thereof 
to other member states.
2. All agricultural, animal, industrial and natural 
resource products that are of national origin shall 
receive the same treatment as national products."
97 Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the law of 
Treaties entitles the party to invoke only material breach as 
ground for termination or suspension of the treaty.
"A material breach of a treaty, for the purpose of this 
Article, consists in: (a) a repudiation of the treaty not
sanctioned by the present Article; or (b) the violation of 
a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or 
purpose of the treaty".
In EEC law a violation cannot be justified by the fact that 
the other party first violated its obligations. The court has 
rejected the Belgian and Luxembourg argument in the Dairy 
Products Case that since the Community had failed to comply 
with its obligations to set up a common organisation of 
markets for dairy products, therefore they were justified in 
keeping their own (protected) measures in force. They argued 
that was possible in international law. The court replied, 
"this relationship between the obligations of parties subject 
to the treaty cannot be recognised within the framework of 
Community law". See Schermers, G., "The Law as it Stands 
against Treaty Violations by States", 2 L.I.E.I. (1974),
p.121.
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The above mentioned products, that are of "national 
origin”, shall be exempted from customs duties and other
• • Ofl
charges having equivalent effect.
The phrase "products of national origin" is defined as 
products in which the ratio of the added value arising out of 
its production in a member state shall not be less than 40% 
of its end value upon completion of production, and the 
percentage of ownership of the entity by nationals of G.C.C.
98 •Article 2(1) of the UEA. By contrast, the EEC treaty 
affords a cohesive formula to guarantee freedom of movement 
within Community markets. Article 3(a) provides:
"For the purpose set out in Article 2, the activities of 
the Community shall include, as provided in this treaty 
and in accordance with the timetable set out therein (a) 
the elimination, as between member states, of customs 
duties and of quantitative restrictions on the import and 
export of goods, and of all other measures having 
equivalent effect."
Thus, it is not only "customs duties and other charges having 
equivalent effect" as Article 2(1) of the UEA provides and 
makes products of national origin receive the same treatment, 
but also as Article 3(a) of the EEC treaty provides 
"quantitative restrictions and import and export of goods and 
all other measures having equivalent effect". The difference 
between the two provisions is very wide and the aims of each 
to grant Community products the same treatment is too far to 
be similar. As a result there are measures which are not 
governed by the UEA and applied by some member states with 
distinction to the intra-community trade, which may impede the 
latter, and must be regarded as prohibited measures (i.e. 
government subsidies to domestic products). Furthermore, the 
European Court of Justice has elaborated on the relevant 
concepts in the provisions of integration which cannot be 
defined by the treaty and only determined in various cases as 
whether a breach of the treaty has occurred as a result of 
imposing measures having equivalent effect. See in this 
regard, Lasok, D. and Bridge, J. , The Law and Institutions of 
the European Community, op.cit.. p.358. See also Timmermans,
C. , "The Free Movement of Goods", in Thirty Years of Community 
Law. Office for the Official Publications of the European 
Communities (1983), pp.254-58.
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states shall not be less than 51%."
In the line of these protectionist measures, and under 
rules recently issued by the G.C.C.,100 the G.C.C. member 
states must accord preference to goods produced by member 
states,101 and products of national origin over similar goods
produced by non-member states (i.e. foreign products) in any
102government procurement.
Furthermore, G.C.C. member states must purchase national 
products if they are no more than ten per cent higher in cost 
than similar foreign origin and 5% higher than products of 
national origin.103 If there are no available national 
products, products of national origin must be utilised if they 
are no more than 10% higher in cost than similar foreign
"  Article 3(1) of the UEA.
100 See the Unified Rules for Giving Priority in 
Government Purchases to National Products and Products of 
National Origin in the G.C.C., G.C.C. Publication (Arabic), 
reprinted Saudi Arabia, Section B, Middle East Exec. Rep. 
(June 1987), at p.22. See also Government Purchasing Priority 
Rules, Saudi Economic Survey (April 6, 1987), summarising the 
new G.C.C. procurement rules).
101 “National product" is defined as a "product produced 
in a member state and which is deemed a national product 
pursuant to the law of such member state", ibid.
102 Ibid. . Article 2(a). The procurement rules apply to 
procurement by "ministers, government corporations, public 
corporations and government companies or companies in which 
the government holds not less than 51% of capital...", idem.
103 Idem. For pricing purposes, the cost of delivery to 
the buyer*s warehouse is included in the price of the goods. 
Moreover, the value of all customs and other import fees must 
be added to the cost of a foreign product, even if the foreign 
product is exempt from such costs. Ibid.
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products.104 Therefore, assuming the price limitations are 
satisfied, a G.C.C. member state may not purchase foreign 
goods until it has first exhausted the supply of national 
products and then the supply of products of national origin.105
Therefore, when contracting with a government agency of 
a G.C.C. member state, the contractor must stipulate that it 
will adhere to the G.C.C.procurement rules in purchasing goods 
and materials.106
As far as supervision is concerned, it seems that the 
Secretariat has little role to play and it is for each member 
state to designate a competent authority to supervise the 
implementation of these rules.107
As such, the G.C.C. government agencies are permitted 
substantial administrative discretion in choosing sources of 
products required for any particular project. Therefore, the 
rule may be interpreted flexibly at the ministerial level to 
encourage foreign participation without apparent supervision
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid. It is evident that with the increase of 
government procurement, government preferences to domestic 
producers have become a serious impediment to international 
trade. In the mid-1960s government procurement as a barrier 
to trade was discussed within the OECD. Due to the stalemate 
it reached, the U.S.A. and a number of developing countries 
led by India urged successfully that negotiations be 
transferred to the GATT. See Courage-Van Lier, "Supervision 
within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade", in van 
Dijk, Supervisory Mechanisms in International Economic 
Organisations. op.cit.. p.157.
106 Article 4 of the Unified Rules for giving priority in
government purchases, op.cit.
107 Ibid. . Article 9.
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by G.C.C. organs.108
In fact, according to the list of complaints a Kuwaiti 
firm complained against the Public Department of Enterprise 
and Maintenance in the Ministry of Health in Saudi Arabia 
concerning instructions issued by the former to buy local 
products rather than products produced in G.C.C. member 
states, in order to build a hospital. The Kuwaiti firm 
claimed that this was in violation of Article 1(2) which 
requires all products of national origin to receive equal 
treatment. The G.C.C. Secretariat intervened and requested 
the Minister of Health to correct the wrongful act.109
(iii) Governmental Subsidies
Governments can influence domestic trade by granting 
subsidies or other kinds of aid to producers or consumers. 
However, international competition is likely to be distorted 
if domestically produced commodities were to receive these 
subsidies.110
Unfortunately, however, the UEA agreement does not 
provide for the regulation of subsidies. This loophole may 
have serious repercussions for economic integration, 
especially since a member can only complain of explicit 
violation of the UEA, rather than of an indirect benefit that
108 ,Wisner, G., "The Procurement Policies of the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia", 21 George Washington J. Int'l. L. & Econ.
(1987), pp.120-21.
109 • • •Complaint No.22 of the list, op.cit.
110 Courage-Van Lier, "Supervision within the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade" in van Dijk, o p .cit.. p.136.
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has been impaired.
A violation of an explicit provision of the UEA by a
member state is apparently a necessary condition to bring a
complaint. As such, the purpose and the intent of the
agreement may not be the criterion to be applied in
determining a violation. This position, however, does not
conform to well-established principles of interpretation in
the law of treaties. Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties provides:
"A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose.”
Article 32 furthermore provides:
"Recourse may be had to supplementary means of 
interpretation, including the preparatory work of 
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, 
in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the 
application of Article 31, or to determine the 
meaning when the interpretation according to Article 
31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure;
or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd 
or unreasonable.1,111
This may be illustrated by reference to governmental 
subsidies within the G.C.C., where no provision is stipulated 
in the U.E.A. to allow or prevent it. Yet it is possible that 
the objective of the agreement could be impeded when a 
government subsidises a national product, and consequently 
competition is upset.
111 See the text in Brownlie, I., Basic Documents in
International Law, op.cit.. pp.245-46.
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As such, a broad interpretation of Article 1(2) of the
UEA may not allow government subsidies to be given to national
products at the expense of G.C.C. products of national origin.
The Article provides:
11 All agricultural, animal, industrial and natural 
resources products that are of national origin shall 
receive the same treatment as national products."
However, Article 2(1) of the UEA seems not to support this
conclusion. It provides the treatment that G.C.C. products
of national origin receive is confined to the exemption of
customs duties and other charges having equivalent effect.
It states:
"All agricultural, animal, industrial and natural 
resources products that are of national origin shall 
be exempted from customs duties and other charges 
having equivalent effect."
Furthermore, the practice of the G.C.C. member states in 
this regard poses serious questions as to the right 
explanation of the agreement and how its provisions are 
observed.
In 1984 Kuwaiti producers raised the question of Saudi 
government aids to the Saudi producers exporting locally 
produced chicken to Kuwait, which distorted free competition 
and adversely affected trade between G.C.C. member states. 
Therefore Kuwaiti consumers preferred buying Saudi chicken for 
its lower cost.112 Not surprisingly, this issue has received
112 Complaint No.9 in the list, o p .cit. . This time the 
complaint was not brought to the Secretariat by the 
contracting party or the beneficiary, but raised in Al-Svassah 
newspaper in Kuwait who blamed the UEA for not finding a 
solution to the problem.
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little attention from the Secretariat as far as supervision 
is concerned. As such, it is uncertain whether Saudi Arabia 
is prohibited under the provisions of the agreement from 
subsidising its local products.
Neither is there a judicial body capable of giving the 
phrase "products that are of national origin shall receive the 
same treatment as national products" its proper 
interpretation.
This conclusion similarly applies to other direct 
governmental support to national products, such as taxation 
facilities, cheaper rents and indirect support such as 
facilities offered in the field of training, marketing and 
studies.113
5. The Private Citizen and G.C.C. Obligations
Although the UEA has an immense impact on individual 
citizens, there is no direct relationship between the UEA 
provisions and such private persons. The agreement only binds 
governments and through its authorised bodies it is applied
113 See in this regard Jackson, H., World Trade and the 
Law of GATT. Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., New York (1969), p.365. 
In the EEC state aids might amount to the equivalent of a 
quantitative restriction which is prohibited under the treaty. 
This argument might have some force if all state aids were 
prohibited by the EEC treaty, but that is not the case. 
Although Articles 92-4 impose Community control over state 
aids because they may affect competition and trade between 
member states, not all state aids are prohibited. Article 
92(2) for example, does not consider all types of aids 
incompatible with the policy of the common market. Article 
93(3) permits some aids to be compatible with the common 
market. See Burrows, F., Free Movement in European Community 
Law. Clarendon Press, Oxford (1987), pp.47-9,
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to citizens. Individuals in the G.C.C. member states, 
therefore, have no locus standi before any organ of the 
G.C.C., even where their rights have been breached.
In international law, there is no rule which precludes 
individuals from obtaining directly rights derived from a 
custom or a treaty provided that this is the intention of the 
parties.114
In its judgment in the Danzig Case, the Permanent Court
of Justice pointed out that:
"The very object of an international agreement, 
according to the intention of the contracting 
parties, may be the adoption by the parties of some 
definite rules creating individual rights and 
obligations and enforceable by the national 
courts."115
114 Lauterpacht, H., "The Subjects of the Law of Nations", 
64 L.O.R. (1948), p.112. See also, Friedmann, W. , The 
Changing Structure of International Law. Stevens & Sons, 
London (1964), p.278.
115 P.C. I. J. Rep. . Ser.B. No.15, pp.17-18. See also, 
Lauterpacht, H., "The Subjects of the Law of Nations", 64-65 
L.O.R. (1948-49), pp.97-8, who maintains that prior to this 
Advisory Opinion the question whether individuals were capable 
of acquiring direct rights was "answered in the negative - 
though even then some caution would have been indicated, 
having regard to the law of some countries, such as the United 
States, in which duly ratified treaties are a self-executing 
part of municipal law". But he argues that possibly it could 
have been said in reply that "this was so only by virtue of 
municipal law and not of international law - an argument the 
relevance of which is open to question." Henkin, H., 
"Resolutions of International Organisations in American 
Courts", in Essays on the Development of the International 
Legal Order, (ed.) Kalshoven, F., Kuyper, P. and Lammers, J., 
Sijthoff & Noordhoff (1980), pp.202-3.
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It is only through an exercise of the state*s will that such
is granted to individuals.116
Sometimes an individual*s interests arising from a treaty
may be revoked by a later treaty and the individual affected
by such revocation will not be able to invoke the protection
of the international forum established by earlier treaty.117
Therefore, under classical rules of international law
individuals may generally only have benefits conferred upon
them by states and cannot possess enforceable rights against
states. On a cursory reading this may also appear to be the
position under Article 1 of the UEA. It reads:
”1. The member states shall permit the importation 
and exportation of agricultural, animal, industrial 
and natural resource products that are of national 
origin. Also, they shall permit exportation thereof 
to other member states.
2. All agricultural, animal, industrial and natural 
resource products that are of national origin shall 
receive the same treatment as national products."
Furthermore, the UEA does not include provisions which
lay down the procedures for the individual to petition against
possible violations of the agreement.
It is not always necessary that the establishing treaty
explicitly confer rights corresponding with the obligations
116 Jessup, P. A Modern Law of Nations. Archon Books 
(1968), pp.17-18.
117 Seidl-Hohenveldern, "International Economic Law", 
Recueil des Cours. Ill (1986), p. 34. See also White, G. , "The 
Impact of the European Community on International Law", in 
International Law: Teaching and Practice, (ed.) Cheng, B. ,
Stevens & Sons, London (1982),pp.81-84, who states "In general 
treaties, do not create direct and enforceable rights or 
.obligations for individuals or other legal persons".
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of the states and refer directly to the individuals. In 
economic integration treaties a community rule is, as regards 
its form, directed to the states, does not of itself deprive 
individuals who have an interest in it of the right to require 
it to be applied in the national courts.
The position of individuals in the EEC basically is 
determined in the establishing treaty which includes three 
different kinds of provisions. The first category of 
provisions lays down the traditional concept of obligations 
which exist only between states. These obligations must be 
implemented by the member states in order to become effective. 
If they affect individuals, they can only do so indirectly. 
A second category addressed to community institutions only 
requires them to adopt implementing measures in order to 
pursue the objectives of the community included in the treaty. 
Individuals, therefore, are affected by the treaty provisions 
through these measures (the so-called secondary legislation). 
The implementing measures are divided into directly applicable 
and non-directly applicable. The latter may affect 
individuals only and after further procedures taken by a 
member to which the measures are addressed. The third 
category of provisions were originally addressed to and create 
obligations for the member states only, but were subsequently 
declared by the European Court to produce direct effects in 
the legal relations between the member states and individuals 
directly without legislative intervention by the member
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states.118
However, for a legal provision to be directly effective 
two requirements must be satisfied. First, the provision must 
be part of the internal law of the member state. This does 
not mean that legislation is needed to bring it into effect, 
but merely the national courts must recognise the provisions 
as valid and binding law. The second requirement is that the 
terms of the provision must be appropriate to confer rights
• • • 119on individuals.
120 , , .In the Van Gend en Loos Case. which is the first
decision by the European Court on the direct effect of the
treaty provisions, the main issue was whether Article 12 of
the EEC is directly effective. It reads:
"Member states shall refrain from introducing 
between themselves any new customs duties on imports 
or exports or any charges having equivalent effect, 
and from increasing those which they already apply 
in their trade with each other."
Although the provision imposes obligations on the member 
states and does not grant any corresponding right to 
individuals, the European Court took the view that a provision 
addressed to member states is not prevented from being
118 Only a few provisions of the EEC Treaty are of such 
a nature as to be directly applicable. See Toth, A., The 
Legal Protection of Individuals in the European Communities. 
Vol.l (The Individual and Community Law), North Holland 
(1978), pp.7-8, 11, 44 and 104-105. See also, Case 102/79, 
Commission v. Kingdom of Belgium [1980] E.C.R. 1473.
119 Hartley, T. , The Foundations of European Community 
Law (1988), op.cit.. pp.183-185.
120 Case 26/62 [1963] E.C.R. 1. C.M.L.R. [1963], p.105.
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directly effective and conferring rights on private
• • • 121 • * • individuals. The Court instead laid down a different test,
stated as follows:
(1) The provision must be clear and unambiguous.
(2) It must be unconditional.
(3) Its operation must not depend on further action being 
taken by community or national authorities.122
As such, the EEC treaty regards the free movement of 
workers, freedom to provide services and freedom of 
establishment for self-employed workers as fundamental rights 
and protects them against any infringement by sovereign power 
of the member state. The treaty provisions relating to these 
rights (Articles 48, 52 and 59 EEC) are directly applicable
• 123m  the member state.
The European Court of Justice has made it clear on many 
occasions that when a legal provision is regarded as being 
directly effective it is meant that individuals have rights 
and must be upheld by the national courts. These rights are 
enforceable by individuals rather than by public
121 • «The principle was affirmed in Defrenne v. Sabena. Case
43/75, [1976] E.C.R. 455 at paragraph 31 of the judgment.
122 Dashwood, A., "The Principle of Direct Effect in 
European Community Law", 16 Journal of Common Market Studies 
(1978), pp.231-234. See also, Kovar, R . , "The Relationship 
between Community Law and National Law", in Thirty Years of 
Community Law, o p .cit.. pp.137-149.
123 •Ress, G. , "Free Movement of Persons, Services and 
Capital", in Thirty Years of Community Law, o p .cit.. p.183.
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authorities.124 Thus, a private individual may invoke
community law against another private individual or against 
a national government and it is also possible that a national 
government can enforce community law against a private
• • • 125individual.
The possibilities for individuals within the EEC with 
respect to alleged failures are the following:
(1) They may submit a complaint to the Commission.
(2) They may institute proceedings against the Commission 
under the ECSC Treaty (Article 35 in conjunction with 
Article 88 ECSC).
(3) They may rely before the national authorities (especially
the national judge) on community law and its priority
• • • 126over conflicting national law.
As regards the G.C.C., since it lacks a court or 
supranational decision-making body, it cannot follow the path 
of the EEC. Still, individuals have not been deprived of 
direct rights under the UEA provisions and they could invoke 
the UEA provisions against a government body or against a 
private party in the national courts, alleging a violation of 
the agreement.
The UEA provisions have been incorporated into the legal
124 Hartley, o p .cit. . p. 183.
125 Idem.
126 Andretsch, H . , Supervision in European Community Law. 
op.cit.. pp.240-247. For the locus standi of private parties 
see also Lasok, D. and Bridge, J., The Law and Institutions 
of the European Communities, op.cit.. pp.266-269.
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systems of the member states by virtue of domestic legislation 
and further decrees implementing the Supreme Council
• • 127 • •decisions. Nevertheless, rulings of the national courts to 
affirm these rights and to create precedents to protect them 
are greatly needed.
Local remedies in the form of compensation against 
administrative decisions of the member states could be 
obtained, in spite of the defendant's argument that ordinary 
courts have no jurisdiction to hear cases involving the 
challenges to administrative decisions.
In a case which was brought before the ordinary courts 
for the first time in Qatar, the plaintiff, Mr. Al-Ansari who 
works for Qatar University, challenged the legality of a 
decision taken by the director of the university to transfer 
him from his post to another outside the university as a 
disciplinary measure. The defendant argued, inter alia that 
the jurisdiction of the civil courts does not include any 
provision to hear cases of an administrative nature. The 
judge, accepting the plaintiff's argument, has maintained that 
although the legislature has not given the civil courts 
explicitly the right to hear cases against administrative 
decisions, in principle the ordinary courts have general 
jurisdiction to hear the whole gamut of cases, a rule which 
is well established in law and the practice of the courts, 
especially in the Anglo-Saxon system where there is no
127 See G.C.C. Legal Gazette. Edition 3 (1983), pp.31-48.
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administrative court to scrutinise the acts of the
• • • 1?Aadministration.
In principle there are other possible remedies which 
could be obtained by individuals, that is the annulment of the 
decision which infringes upon their rights.129 However, the 
latter form of remedy may not be accessible in all G.C.C. 
member states.
Under the Kuwait legal system a distinction is made 
between cases of private appeals against administrative acts, 
to be dealt with by the administrative courts, and other types 
of cases to be dealt with by ordinary courts. Under such a 
system appeals against government actions in the field of 
application of the UEA are not, however, open to challenge as 
illegal actions affecting individual interests, since the 
jurisdiction of the administrative courts is confined to 
hearing disputes concerning public recruitment, staff 
salaries, rewards, allowances, promotion, the administrative 
actions and administrative contracts.130
The only alternative left for any party seeking 
satisfaction for an alleged violation by Kuwait authorities
128 Judgment of 5 April 1982, The Civil Court of Qatar, 
Second Circuit (unpublished).
129 • t • ■Riphagen, W . , "National and International Regulation 
of International Movement and the Legal Position of Private 
Individuals”, III Recueil des Cours (1970), pp.577-78.
130 See Article 3 of the Decree No.20, 1981, establishing 
the administrative court, in Collection of Legislation issued 
during the Constitutional Revision. Book 1, Part 6 (1981),
p p .2 2 2 6.
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at the UEA is to bring his case before the ordinary courts
• . . . .  131which have a general jurisdiction.
In the United Arab Emirates the Federal Court of First 
Instance, of which there may be more than one, sitting in 
several sites in the capital of the Union or in the capital 
of the other Emirates, has jurisdiction, in terms of Article 
102 of the provisional constitution 1971, to hear inter alia 
disputes of an administrative nature between the union and 
individuals. This jurisdiction appears to accommodate 
complaints from G.C.C. citizens and corporations against the 
Federal Government or any of its Emirates in cases of a breach 
of G.C.C. decisions which are incorporated in the municipal
• 132law as union law.
131 See Rakhib, W. and Abdulfatah, A. , Principles of 
Kuwait Civil Jurisprudence. 1 ed. , Dar-Al-Kotob Foundation, 
Kuwait (1984), pp.112-113. See also, Saif, R. , The Law of 
Civil and Commercial Procedures in accordance with Kuwait Law. 
Kuwait Print, Faculty of Law and Sharia (1974), p.23. Article 
1 of the decree organising jurisprudence provides that 
ordinary courts have general jurisdiction to hear all cases 
except those excluded by a provision. The appeal of the 
Supreme Court, Kuwait, 124/84, Commercial Division, 27 
February 1985.
132 For the techniques of incorporation see supra, Chapter 
3, pp.113-116. See Article 3 of the Union Decree No.6, 1978 
establishing federal courts and transferring the jurisdiction 
of domestic courts in some Emirates to it. Published in the 
UAE Official Gazette. 58 edition dated 15 June 1978. It is 
to be noticed that according to this decree, and due to the 
federal structure of the state, there are some Emirates which 
have independent judicial systems and do not have full 
jurisdiction (Dubai, Umm Al-Qaiwain, Ras Al-Kaimah) and 
therefore they still have their own court jurisdiction. Dubai 
in 1972 issued an order stating that claims against the 
government cannot be brought without its consent. See the 
Structure of Dubai Courts. Government of Dubai, Dubai Print 
(1972) (Arabic), p.31. As far as the G.C.C. Unified Economic 
agreement is concerned, this order should not become an 
obstacle for the injured party to sue the government, since
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In Saudi Arabia, by the Royal Decree NO.M151 (1982) the 
Board of Grievances was constituted as an independent judicial 
authority to adjudicate all disputes between the government 
and private parties. The jurisdiction of the Board includes: 
the legality of administrative rulings, government contracts, 
and other administrative acts. Thus in Saudi Arabia the 
injured party may raise the issue of the Saudi government 
liability as a result of the application of the UEA.133
In Bahrain law, the legality of administrative decisions 
may be challenged,134 but the legality of government acts 
cannot be challenged.135 Thus, this rule is an exception to
the agreement is incorporated in the municipal law as union 
law. According to the UAE constitution the Emirates are bound 
to implement any regulation or laws assigned to execute 
international obligations of the union (the federal state) 
(Article 125). If a court in one of those Emirates which are 
excluded from the federal system (has its independent judicial 
system) refused to hear a claim against the Emirates 
concerning violation of the UEA, then it is quite possible in 
law to sue the federal government in the federal capital court 
(the first instance) since it is the party to the agreement 
(Article 3 of Union Decree No.6, 1978).
133 See the Royal Decree No.M151 of 1402 A.H. See also, 
Steelman, J. , "The Grievance Board in Saudi Arabia - An 
Overview of Royal Decree M151", Middle East Executive Reports. 
Vol.6 No.5 (May 1983), p.8.
#
134 The legal principle No. 74 in Case No. 642-1984 
pronounced by the Upper Court of Appeal in its session dated 
18.7.84. The court stated the jurisdiction of the civil court 
to hear cases challenging the legality of administrative 
decisions including both the annulment of the decision and 
compensation of the injured party. Yet sovereign acts are 
immune from judicial scrutiny. See the principle in The 
Collection of the Legal Principles according to the Judgments 
of Upper Civil Appeal Court (January 1980-December 1985), The 
Government of Bahrain Print, p.103.
135 The legal principle No.75 in Case No. 1148, ibid.
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the general rule that a citizen who suffers a civil damage is 
entitled to compensation.136
The problem, however, is not so much the access of the 
individual to the national court, but rather their ability to 
get the other defendant party before their national court, 
where the other party, in the practice of the G.C.C., is often 
a government who may well plead that certain acts enjoy 
sovereign immunity.137
The delicacy and complexity of these issues will give the 
national courts the opportunity to interpret and apply both 
its national laws and international obligations of the member 
states in order to respond to individuals' claims.138 This 
development will consequently enhance the role of supervision 
of the UEA provisions and protect the interests of 
individuals.
A G.C.C. member state can file a complaint with the
136 ibid.
137 See supra. notes 132 and 134 as examples. In this 
meaning see Higgins, R. , "Conceptual Thinking about the 
Individual in International Law", 114 British J. International 
Studies (1978), pp.8-9.
138 Idem. According to the interview the writer conducted 
in December 1987 with the Director of the Legal Department of 
the G.C.C. Secretariat, he confirmed the fact that only on one 
occasion an Omani citizen had applied to the national court 
in Saudi Arabia. That was in order to challenge an 
administrative decision precluding him from opening a pump 
station in accordance with Article 8(3) of the UEA and the 
relevant decision, that G.C.C. citizens are entitled to 
exercise economic activities. The court consulted the G.C.C. 
Secretariat before taking any legal procedure and the dispute 
was settled in the claimant's favour by merely contacting the 
concerned bodies in Saudi Arabia. This complaint is filled 
as well in the Secretariat's list of complaints No.96.
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Secretariat on grounds of violation of the UEA provisions by
another member state which results in injury to individuals
• • • 139without alleging its effect on them.
The preferable remedy for individuals, however, would be 
to take their claim themselves from the diplomatic channels 
to the judicial level, through the establishment of an
international body to enable the individuals, either directly 
or after exhausting the legal remedies before the national 
authorities, to submit claims for judicial review rather than 
diplomatic settlement between the member states.140 This is
139 • » • • • •At first sight this view looks similar to what Judge 
Jessup said in his concurring opinion in the South West Africa 
Cases. He used the ILO Charter provisions and procedures 
concerning a government filing a complaint alleging failure 
of any other member effectively to observe the treaty to 
demonstrate that
"... a state may have a legal interest in the observance, 
in the territories of another state, of general welfare 
treaty provisions and that it may assert such interest 
without alleging any impact upon its own nationals or its 
direct so-called tangible or material interest... [and] 
that the basic situation of a difference of opinion 
concerning the application of a treaty provision on the 
general welfare of the inhabitants might perfectly well 
be the subject of negotiations between two states."
See the separate opinion of Judge Jessup in the South West 
Africa Cases. I.C.J. Reports of Judgments (1962), pp.526-428. 
But this is quite different from an economic integration 
treaty. However, according to the list of complaints some 
national authorities in the G.C.C. member states claimed on 
behalf of the individuals concerned their entitlement to some 
rights when applying the UEA provisions and the relevant 
decisions adopted by the Supreme Council, but never claimed 
that the member state has breached the agreement.
140 See in this meaning, Friedmann, W. , The Chancing 
Structure of International Law. o p .cit.. p.238. The 
possibility of individuals bringing their claims to a 
specialised body is not excluded. In 1983 the government of 
Bahrain has made proposals to the G.C.C. that an arbitration 
centre be established in one of the member countries. The 
proposal has been considered by the justice ministers of the 
member states, the Trade Cooperation Committee of the G.C.C.,
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important especially when there will be situations, as between 
the G.C.C. member states, when governments are disinclined to 
sacrifice their relations with each other, which are of more 
strategic significance than protecting interests of 
nationals.141
6. The Implementation of G.C.C. Decisions in the United Arab 
Emirates
A. The Distribution of Jurisdiction in the UAE Constitution 
The United Arab Emirates is a unique creation, the only 
one of its kind in the Arab world, which managed to emerge 
despite extremely difficult circumstances.
The division of powers between the federal government and 
the individual Emirates is one of the major factors which has 
influenced and confronted the progress of the Union since 
independence in 1971.142
The United Arab Emirates constitution delegates specific 
powers to the union government, leaving the rest (i.e. any 
areas that are not assigned) to the jurisdiction of the
and most recently was discussed by the Supreme Council at the 
November 1985 summit. However, consideration for such a 
centre is not at an advanced stage. No rules of procedure 
have been agreed upon, though it is understood that there is 
serious consideration being given to the use of UNCITRAL 
rules. See The Gulf Cooperation council, ed. by Sandwick, 
op.cit.. p.141.
141 See in this meaning Friedmann, W. , o p .cit. . p.238.
142 See Taryam, A. , The Establishment of the United Arab 
Emirates. 1950-85. Croom Helm, London (1987), p.207.
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Emirates.143
The constitution, however, affirms the independence and 
internal sovereignty of the individual Emirates. Article 3, 
for instance, provides that the member Emirates shall exercise 
sovereignty over their respective territories and territorial 
waters in all matters not pertaining to the Union in 
accordance with the constitution.
Article 123 accords the member Emirates the right to 
conclude limited agreements of a local administrative nature 
with neighbouring states provided the Supreme Council is
143 Article 12 0 of the constitution provides that:
"The Union shall have legislative and executive jurisdiction 
in the following:
1. Foreign affairs.
2. Defence and the United Armed Forces.
3. Protection of Union's security against internal or
external threat.
4. Matters pertaining to security, order and jurisdiction 
in the permanent capital of the Union.
5. Matters relating to Union officials and Union judges.
6. Union finances and Union taxes, duties and fees.
7. Postal, telegraph, telephone and wireless services.
9. The construction, maintenance and improvement of Union 
roads which the Supreme Council has determined to be 
truck roads.
10. Air traffic control and the issue of licence to aircraft 
and pilots.
11. Education.
12. Public health and health services.
13. Currency notes and coins.
14. Weight, measures and standards.
15. Electricity.
16. Union nationality, passports, residence and immigration.
17. Union property and all matters relating thereto.
18. Census matters and statistics relevant to Union purposes.
19. Union information."
For the text of the UAE constitution in English, see The 
Constitutions of the Countries of the World, eds. Albert P. 
Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz, Oceana Publications, Dobbs 
Ferry, New York (1982) . The text in Arabic is found in G.C.C. 
Legal Gazette, ed.3 (1983).
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notified in advance. The same Article entitles individual 
Emirates to maintain membership in, or to join the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the 
Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC).
Each Emirate might maintain its own legislative, 
executive and judicial authorities.144
Article 23 provides that the "natural resources and 
wealth in each Emirate shall be considered the public property 
of the respective Emirates". Article 142 points out that the 
individual Emirates are empowered to raise and maintain their 
security forces.
Thus, the provisions of the United Arab Emirates 
constitution apparently do not help to enhance the spirit of 
federation, but rather encourages independence and 
disintegration of the individual Emirates.145
The distribution of powers between the federal authority 
and the individual Emirates was worked out in a manner that 
makes the former's functions secondary and the latter's 
functions primary.146
Such distribution envisages minimal relinquishing of 
sovereignty by the Emirates to the federal government and may 
lead some writers to deny the federal structure of the United
144 Article 118 of the constitution.
1/5 ,
Taryam, op.cit.. p.202.
146 Al-Sayyid, J. , The Foundation of Policies and 
Constitution of the United Arab Emirates. Documentation and 
Study Centre, Abu Dhabi (Arabic) (1971), p.64.
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Arab Emirates.147 According to this view the acceptance of 
the United Arab Emirates into the UN as a state was considered 
mainly for practical reasons rather than for legal ones.148
When the G.C.C. was established in 1981 the United Arab 
Emirates joined the organisation and participated in its 
activities which touched upon various aspects of life. The 
decisions to implement the UEA particularly posed a challenge 
for the federal government to fulfil its international 
obligations amid its constitutional arrangements in favour of 
the individual Emirates.
Rousseau, C., "Federation de Emirates du Golfe 
Persique", 76 Revue General de Droit Public (1972), p.865. 
For a detailed legal study of the UAE federation, see Al- 
Tabtabai, A., The Federation System of the United Arab 
Emirates, A comparative study, Cairo (1978). In practice, 
there have been many initiatives by the Supreme Council of the 
Union and its committees to consolidate the Union giving the 
federal government more power in fields of armed forces, 
general security, contribution to the federal annual budget, 
federal Supreme Council, the provisional constitution and 
federal legislation, immigration and population policy and 
even the amendment of the constitution to give the federal 
government more powers to enable it to discharge its 
responsibilities, mainly in the sphere of external affairs, 
cooperation of oil policies and observance of resolutions to 
which the state committed itself at international 
organisations. But due to political factors many obstacles 
remain in the way of stronger union. For more details, see 
Taryam, op.cit.
148 Rousseau, ibid. . He states "L1 affirmative a ete 
admise, sans doute moins pour des considerations de technique 
juridique - car l'Union des Emirates du Golfe Persique peut 
difficilement passer pour un Etat federal authentique - que 
pour des raisons d'ordre pratique, une fragmentation de la 
representation des Etats exigus risquant de donner a ceux-ci 
au sur de 1 1 organisation une importance disproportions a leur 
consistance effective."
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B. Some Problems of Implementing G.C.C. Decisions in the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE). Main Facts and Arguments
1. In accordance with the gradual implementation of 
Article 8(3) of the UEA the GCC Supreme Council decided in its 
third session held in March 1983 in Bahrain that freedom of 
economic activity will be practised in the industrial, 
agricultural, fishing and animal husbandry fields. This 
freedom will be allowed to both G.C.C. citizens and 
corporations.149
The Ministry of Agriculture and Fishing in the United 
Arab Emirates issued a decision to implement the G.C.C. 
decision referring to a Union decree in this regard, pending 
the application of the G.C.C. decision to the rules and 
regulations concerned issued by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Fishing and the local authorities in the Emirates.150
In a further step, in the course of implementing the 
decisions and particularly after a draft prepared by the 
G.C.C. Secretariat for a unified system of utilisation and 
protection of living resources, the United Arab Emirates 
raised doubts about the possibility of allowing G.C.C. 
citizens or corporations to exercise fishing rights. The 
Federal government stated that the constitution of the United 
Arab Emirates gives the right of utilisation of living 
resources to the local authorities in the individual
149 See the decision in Decisions and Steps taken to 
Implement the Unified Economic Agreement, o p .cit.. pp.14-15.
150 Ibid. . pp.20-21.
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Emirates.151
In a further explanation to the Secretariat they 
submitted that the exercise of economic activities does not 
include the actual catching of fish, but rather having access 
to the fishing industry through the national policy of the
152 • • •country. This would include, for instance, canning,
training, researching and buying fishing vessels and 
equipment.
2. Another problem which weakened the United Arab
Emirates obligation towards the G.C.C. Supreme Council
decisions is the customs policy in each individuate Emirate,
a matter which the G.C.C. Secretariat viewed as within the 
jurisdiction of the Emirates and not the federal state.153
In accordance with Article 4 of the UEA, which
established a uniform customs tariff gradually applicable to 
the products of third countries, the Ministerial Council
decided in its seventh session 1983 the following:
(1) The minimum customs tariff applied to the foreign
products received by the G.C.C. member states shall be 
4%.
(2) The maximum customs tariff charged to the same products
151 A letter sent by the federal Minister of Agriculture 
and Fishing to the G.C.C. Secretary-General, dated 22.6.1985.
152 •An interview by the author with the Director of the 
G.C.C. Legal Department, Dr. Al-Syaari, in December 1987.
153 This view expressed by the Director-General of the 
Legal Department, Al-Sayari, M . , G.C.C. Secretariat-General. 
An interview conducted by the author on 1st June 1988 in the 
headquarters of the G.C.C.
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shall be 20% starting from September 1983.154
The rulers of the Emirates issued Amiri Decrees raising 
the customs tariff from 1% to 4%, beginning on the first day 
of September, 1983.155 In practice, however, non-compliance 
with the above decision results from alleged constitutional 
handicaps in the United Arab Emirates and a lukewarm attitude 
by some Emirates, since supervision is absent.156
The provisions of the United Arab Emirates constitution, 
however, do not support the Secretariat view that customs 
tariff falls within the jurisdiction of each individual 
Emirate.
Article 120(6) of the constitution provides:
"The Union shall have exclusive and executive
jurisdiction in the following matters......
6. Union finances and Union taxes, duties and fees."
154 See the Decision and Steps taken bv the G.C.C. Member 
States to Implement the UEA. o p .cit.. pp.174-75.
155 See Decrees which have been Issued and Measures which 
have been Adopted in Implementing the UEA. op.cit.. p . 174.
156 A letter sent by the Saudi Minister of Finance and 
Economy to the Secretary General dated 5.2.1407 AH, No. 3 1973, 
regarding the reduction by Abu Dhabi of its customs tariff 
from 4% (the minimum agreed percentage by the GCC member 
states) to 2%, in defiance of the G.C.C. decisions. The 
letter refers to the Middle East newspaper issued 23.9.1986 
as the source of information and inquires about the 
possibility of including the issue on the agenda of the 
Ministerial Committee for Financial and Economic Cooperation. 
This situation in fact does not indicate the United Arab 
Emirates is the only member state which has not complied with 
the decision concerned. Other member states, due to weak 
supervision, have evaded their obligations as far as Unified 
Tariff on foreign products are concerned. Private information 
of the author.
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C. Analysis of the United Arab Emirates Claims as a Federal 
State within the G.C.C.
After the ratification of the UEA, the United Arab
Emirates government indicated, as shown above, that there are
certain rights which are reserved for the individual Emirates
according to the constitution and therefore, exclude the
application of the UEA. One of those rights which Article 2 3
of the constitution impliedly includes is fishing.
"The natural resources and wealth in each Emirate 
shall be considered the public property of that 
Emirate. Society shall be responsible for the 
protection and proper exploitation of such natural 
resources and wealth for the benefit of the national 
economy."
From the above article it is apparent that any G.C.C. 
decision dealing with the national wealth of the United Arab 
Emirates ought to be determined with the consent of each 
individual Emirate. This will lead us to deal with two main 
issues, the United Arab Emirates' responsibility as a federal 
state towards the G.C.C. in general, and another issue which 
is closely related to it, coastal jurisdiction of the United 
Arab Emirates over its natural resources.
1. The United Arab Emirates' responsibility as a Federal 
State within the G.C.C.
Under international law it is a generally accepted 
principle that a federal state is responsible for the conduct 
of its constituent units and cannot, therefore, evade its 
international obligations by alleging that its constitutional
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powers do not enable it to exercise control over their units 
in order to comply with such obligations.157
Yet in certain federations the federal government is not 
capable of ensuring the fulfilment of all its treaty 
obligations. This is the case with Canada, for example.
In 1937, in the Labour Convention Case, the Privy Council 
decided that international obligations undertaken by the 
federal government over subjects belonging to the provinces 
could not be implemented internally without the cooperation
158 • * •of the latter. Nevertheless, the ratifications of the 
Labour Conventions are not considered invalidated under
• • 159international law.
157 Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, 1969. Oppenheim, L., International Law. 6th ed., 
Vol.I, London (1947), p.3 08. See also, Hyde, C. ,
International Law. 2nd ed. , Vol.II, p.941; Hackworth, G., 
Digest of International Law. Vol.V (1940-44), pp.593-97; 
Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on 
responsibility of States, 1929, Art.3, A.J.I.L.. Special 
supplement, Vol.23 (1929), p.45; League of Nations.
Conference for Codification of International Law. Bases of 
Discussion. Vol.Ill, pp.121-124 (1929); Sorensen, M . ,
"Federal State and the International Protection of Human 
Rights", 46 A.J.I.L. (1952), p.210; The Advisory Opinion on 
Treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzig. P.C.I.J., Ser.A/B, 
No. 44 (1932) at 22; The Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on 
Application of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 
of the United Nations Headguarters Agreement of 26 June 1947
(1988), the UN General List No.77 at p.24.
158 •Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney for Ontario 
(1937), A.C. 362.
159 •See Sorensen, M . , op.cit.. p.201. See also, Jenks, 
W. , "The Present Status of the Bennett Ratification of the 
International Labour Conventions", 15 Canadian Bar Review 
(1937), pp.464-77.
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In 1957 the Constitutional Court of Germany adopted a
similar attitude on the Reichskonkordat:
"Legal obligations deriving from an international 
treaty which is binding upon a federal state can 
create legal duties for its constituent states only 
in accordance with the provisions of constitutional 
law... We need not consider the question whether 
the German Federal Republic is liable to the Holy 
See for the acts of a Land which are contrary to 
the provisions of the Concordat.1,160
The American federal government, though it is empowered 
to give effect to its treaty obligations, was not able on some 
occasions to fulfil its treaty obligations.
In 1894 a treaty was made between Japan and the United 
States, which prescribed equality of treatment for Japanese 
citizens in America. Some years later the school authorities 
of San Francisco violated the treaty by admitting Japanese 
children only to special schools. This occurred because 
education was a subject reserved to the state, and the federal 
government could only try to persuade the school authorities 
to change their attitude. In the end, the school authorities 
yielded after Japan's approval to limit the immigration of 
Japanese subjects to the United States.161
However, the federal government has the constitutional 
power to give effect to its treaty obligations. Sometimes 
this power results from a judicial interpretation of the
160 International Law Reports (1957), at p.594.
161 See Bernier, I., International Legal Aspects of 
Federation. Longman Group, London (1973), pp.97-100.
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• • • • 16? constitution. In the famous Migratory Birds Case. the
American Supreme Court upheld federal legislation which was
enacted by Congress in order to give effect to a treaty with
Canada for the protection of migratory birds, irrespective of
the fact that legislation for such a purpose would otherwise
come within the reserved power of the state. The court
stated:
"If it had even been suggested that, although 
Congress had no power to control the taking of wild 
game within the borders of any state, yet indirectly 
by means of a treaty with some foreign power it 
could acquire the powers and by this means its long 
arm could reach into the state and take food from 
the tables of their people, who can for one moment
believe that such consultation would have been
ratified?"
In international law the obligations of the United States
remain and the federal government cannot plead its failure to
carry out its international obligations on the ground of its
unconstitutionality.163
"As such... the United States remain bound
internationally when a principle of international 
law or a provision in an agreement with the United 
States is not given effect because of its 
inconsistency with the constitution. A state cannot 
adduce its constitution or its laws as a defence for 
failure to carry out its international
obligations."164
However, there is no rule in international law which can 
be adduced against the inclusion in the treaty of a "federal
162 Missouri v. Holland (1920), 252 US 416.
163 See American Law Institute. Restatement of the Law. 
The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Vol.l (1986), 
p.43.
164 Ibid. at p. 64.
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clause” which limits the obligations of the signatory federal 
state with respect to subject matters falling within the 
jurisdiction of its member states.165
Yet, it is not the federal state itself that invokes the 
clause to justify its failure to perform the treaty, but it 
is the treaty that allows the state to invoke the rule.166 If 
there is no rule in the treaty, then there is no question of 
invoking the clause due to the federal structure of the party. 
As such, the claims of the United Arab Emirates that there are 
certain rights or powers which constitutionally must be left 
to the individual Emirates do not receive recognition under 
international law.
The UEA has been signed by the President of the United 
Arab Emirates, ratified by the Union Supreme Council and 
incorporated into the municipal law by Union decree.167 The 
Supreme Council of the Union can be viewed as a body of 
collective leadership that has the final say in the most 
important matters in the Union. It stands at the top of 
both legislative and executive authorities in the Union. The 
Council is composed of the seven rulers of the member
Sorensen, o p .cit. at p.75. See also Bernier, o p .cit. 
at p.172; Looper, B., "Federal State Clause in Multilateral 
Instruments", 32 B.Y.I.L. (1955-56), p.162.
166 Elias, T., the Modern Law of Treaties. A.W. Sijthoff, 
Leiden (1974), pp.45-46.
167 See Decisions and Steps taken to Implement the Unified
Economic Agreement (1987), o p .cit.. p.17.
168 Article 47 of the UAE constitution.
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Emirates. Each Emirate has tremendous influence in the 
conduct of Union affairs through its chief executive (the 
ruler) .169
Article 47 of the constitution provides:
"The Supreme Council of the Union shall be 
responsible for the following matters....
3. The ratification of decrees connected with 
matters which by virtue of the provisions of this 
constitution are subject to the ratification or 
agreement of Supreme Council. Such ratification 
shall take place before the promulgation of these 
decrees by the President of the Union."
Thus, the federal state distribution of powers set forth
in the constitution of the United Arab Emirates is not an
obstacle for the treaty implementation, since the treaty-
making and treaty implementation powers are vested in the
Supreme Council of the Union.
The fact is then that by virtue of having ratified an
agreement, the Supreme Council of the United Arab Emirates
might be held to possess the power to enact legislation which
would otherwise be ultra vires.
The Committee of Experts with Lord McNair as its
Rapporteur, in its report of 10 April 1937 to the governing
body of the I.L.O., severely criticised the practice of some
states of ratifying conventions in advance of their ability
to give internal effect to them, expecting that this would be
169 Khalifa, A., The United Arab Emirates. Unity in 
Fragmentation. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, Croom Helm, 
London (1979), pp.42-43.
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possible at an early date.170 This position, however, did not 
take notice of the possibility that some federal governments, 
as in the case of the United Arab Emirates, by the very act 
of ratifying conventions may confer upon its executive and 
judicial authority the right to give internal effect to the 
agreement so ratified.171
The matter is even more clearly emphasised in the United 
Arab Emirates constitution structure where the Federal 
National Council (the legislature) has no role to play in
• • • • • 172incorporating the treaty into the municipal system.
Furthermore, Article 124 of the constitution confirms the
obligation of consultation on the part of the federal
government before concluding any agreement. It states:
"Before the conclusion of any treaty or 
international agreement which may affect the special 
position of any one of the Emirates, the competent 
Union authorities shall consult that Emirate in 
advance. In the event of disputes they shall submit 
the matter to the Supreme Court of the Union for a 
ruling."
The fact that the Supreme Council ratified the UEA and issues 
a decree for its implementation must be taken as prima facie 
evidence that consultation has taken place.
170 International Labour Conference, 23 session 1937, 
Summary of Annual Reports under Article 22 of the 
International labour Organisation, Appendix Report of the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions.
171 In this meaning, see Looper, R . , "Federal State 
Clauses in Multilateral Instruments", o p .cit. at p.178.
172 . . .Article 71 of the UAE constitution.
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On the contrary, Article 125 of the United Arab Emirates*
constitution binds the governments of the individual Emirates
to make all the necessary arrangements to implement all the
treaties the Union concludes through laws, regulations,
decisions and domestic instruments. Furthermore, Article 29
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) seems
not to support the UAE position. It provides:
"Unless a different intention appears from the 
treaty or otherwise established, a treaty is binding 
upon each party in respect of its entire territory."
2. The Dilemma of the United Arab Emirates Coastal 
Jurisdiction
Another point of law which was raised by the United Arab 
Emirates is that fishing rights cannot be exercised by G.C.C. 
citizens, due to constitutional arrangements between the 
individual Emirates.173
It is evident that as long as each Emirate maintains its 
individual entity as regards coastal jurisdiction, there can 
be no federal policy for the United Arab Emirates to comply 
with international law obligations, and in particular with 
G.C.C. decisions. This situation is explicit in the United 
Arab Emirates constitution, and is supported by the practice 
of the individual Emirates.
According to Article 121 the federal government itself 
has the power to define territorial waters, but the matter is
173 The letter of the UAE Minister of Agriculture and 
Fishing. See supra. note 151.
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extremely complicated by Article 4 which obliges the Union not
to abandon its sovereignty over any part of its lands or
waters, which latter are in turn defined in Article 2 as those
within the international boundaries of the member Emirates.174
Article 2 provides:
•'The Union shall exercise sovereignty in matters 
assigned to it in accordance with this constitution 
over all territory and territorial waters lying 
within the international boundaries of the member 
states."
Article 3 makes it more difficult to recognise the
jurisdictionary power. It provides:
"The member Emirates shall exercise sovereignty over 
their own territories and territorial waters in all 
matters not within the jurisdiction of the Union as 
assigned in this constitution."
The position of the territorial sea after the 
establishment of the federation has not yet changed and is 
still unclear. Of the seven constituent Emirates, six appear 
to have adhered through proclamations in the period before the 
Union to the three-mile standard, but Sharjah in March 1970
• • 175 • •published a claim to a 12-mile limit. In similar
174 See Young, R . , "The Persian Gulf" in New Directions 
in the Law of the Sea, ed. by Churchill, R. , Simmonds, K., and 
Welch, J. London, Vol.Ill (1973), pp.238-39.
175 Amin, S., International and Legal Problems of the 
Gulf. London (1961), p.156. Despite the fact that the 
individual Emirates reject attempts to unify the laws of the 
Union for coastal jurisdiction, there is a new draft, prepared 
as the Unified Offshore Boundaries Law. The federal 
government, realising the problems relating to its coastal 
jurisdiction, especially after the conclusion of LOSC (1982), 
has proposed 12 nautical miles for the territorial sea, 50 
miles for the EEZ and 18 for contiguous zone. The proposed 
law has given to the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fishing the right to issue regulations for fishing. It also 
includes an important article which provides the right of each
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proclamations they asserted individually their rights in the 
continental shelves adjacent to their coasts. All these 
proclamations are constitutionally valid even after the 
establishment of the Federation.176
Within these arrangements, the president of the Union, 
who is the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan Al- 
Nahyan, signed Abu Dhabi's Ownership of Gas Law (1976). 
Article 1 of this law states that all gas discovered, 
recovered, or produced within Abu Dhabi's "territorial 
property" (defined as Abu Dhabi's land, territorial waters, 
and continental shelf), shall be solely owned by the Emirate 
of Abu Dhabi, rather than the federal state.177
As a result of the attachment of the continental shelf 
to each individual Emirate, Dubai concluded an agreement with 
Iran in 1975 on the demarcation of their continental shelf 
boundary,178 despite the fact that the United Arab Emirates 
constitution reserves the power of treaty-making to the
individual Emirate to settle disputes regarding the islands 
which belong to it historically. An interview with the legal 
advisor of the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25.12.1987.
176 Article 148 of the UAE constitution.
177 For the text of this law, see OPEC, Selected Documents 
of the International Petroleum Industry. Vienna, OPEC (1977), 
p. 19.
178 Amin, International and Legal Problems of the Gulf. 
op.cit.. p.132.
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federal government.179
This position, however, needs examination under 
international law. It is international law that ensures 
general recognition of authority for a sovereign state over 
its territorial sea and continental shelf, but it is for 
constitutional law to determine the degree and extent of that 
authority.180
It is true that whenever a dispute arises concerning the 
territorial sea or the continental shelf, it is the federal 
government rather than individual units which is responsible 
for the conduct of external relations. This, however, has no 
effect on the question of allocation of rights in these 
areas.181
The detachment of the continental shelf from the state
is consistent with the tendency to increase maritime power and
182 •responsibility vested in federal authorities. This tendency 
was affirmed by the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in
179 t • • •Article 147(4) of the constitution. There is 
exception, however, for treaties signed before the 
establishment of the federation and those of an administrative 
nature (Article 147).
180 •O'Connell, D., International Law of the Sea. Clarendon
Press, Oxford, Vol.l (1982), p.83 and p.483.
181 Churchill, R. and Lowe, V . , The Law of the Sea. 
Manchester University Press (1985), p.122.
182 •O'Connell, D. , "The Problems of Australian Coastal
Jurisdiction", 42 The Australian Law Journal Reports (1968),
p. 45.
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November 1967. The offshore mineral rights issue arose as 
a dispute between the federal government of Canada and those 
provinces bordering on the sea, concerning the respective 
federal and provincial competence and legislative jurisdiction 
in regard to the development and exploitation of mineral 
resources, especially oil, under the territorial waters, 
contiguous zones, and the continental shelf of Canada. The 
substance of the dispute was an economic conflict over the 
respective rights to collect the licensing fees and royalties 
accruing from such development by private companies. The 
federal government claimed a federal monopoly of 
constitutional competence over the submarine oil and mineral 
deposits.
The court found Canada alone competent (although Canada
has not ratified the Geneva Convention), saying:
” (1) The continental shelf is outside the boundaries 
of British Columbia.
(2) Canada is the sovereign state which will be 
recognised by international law as having the rights 
stated in the Convention of 1958, and it is Canada, 
not the province of British Columbia, that will have 
to answer the claims of other members of the 
international community for breach of the 
obligations and responsibilities imposed by the 
Convention.,|184
Again, in relation to the territorial sea, the Supreme Court 
stated:
” ... the right in the territorial sea arises by 
international law and depends upon recognition by
183 •Case of Reference the Ownership of Offshore Mineral 
Rights. in 65 Dominion Law Reports (1968), p.353.
184 Ibid. . p.380.
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other sovereign states. Legislative jurisdiction 
in relation to the lands in question belongs to 
Canada, which is a sovereign state recognised by 
international law and thus able to enter into 
arrangements with other states respecting the rights 
in the territorial sea."185
In the United States, Congress alone has legislative
• 186 • • power over the continental shelf. Regarding the question
of the territorial sea jurisdiction, the United States Supreme
Court has asserted the primacy of the Union over the
territorial sea in the virtue of the Union's inherent
• • 187"paramountcy" in the field of foreign relations.
In Australia, the Commonwealth parliament in the Seas and 
Submerged Land Act, 1973 vested all rights in the internal 
waters of the Commonwealth, in the territorial sea, including 
the super-incumbent airspace and the seabed and subsoil
thereof, as well as the continental shelf, in the federal
government. The Act also reserves the power to the federal
government to set all maritime boundaries imposed on Australia
by virtue of her becoming a party to the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and 
the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.
185 Ibid. . p.376.
186 O'Connell, Australian Law Journal Reports (1968), at 
p.45. He refers to the United States Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act, 67 Stat. 462; 43 U.S.C., S1331 vests in the United
States land on the continental shelf seaward of lands granted 
to the states by the Submerged Land Act.
187 See: U.S. v. California. 332 U.S. 19 (1947); U.S.
v. Louisiana. 339 U.S. 69 (1950), U.S. v. Texas. 339 U.S. 707 
(1950); U.S. v. Louisiana. 363 U.S. 1 (1960); U.S. v.
California. 382 U.S. 448 (1965).
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As a result of this federal legislation all six state of 
Australia brought actions in the High Court against the 
Commonwealth, seeking to invalidate the Act.
On behalf of the plaintiff states it was submitted, inter 
alia. that both prior to and after federation they had enjoyed 
sovereignty and legislative power over the territorial sea 
adjacent to their coasts up to the three-mile limit, including 
the seabed, subsoil, and superadjacent airspace thereof, as 
well as the continental shelf. The defence of the 
Commonwealth was based on the argument that even if such 
rights were found to exist prior to the enactment of the 
Commonwealth constitution, these rights passed to the 
Commonwealth upon the commencement of the federation, or at 
least upon Australia*s becoming a fully independent nation.
Thus the issue was substantially whether the states had
been deprived of this common law right by the Act. For the
majority of the judges the decision was that the territory of
the states did not encompass the "league seas", and they
therefore concluded that the Commonwealth's status as an
international person entails the lack of the state's such
status and the accretion to the Commonwealth of maritime zones
188attributable in international law to Australia crua nation.
188 New South Wales v. Commonwealth (1975) 135 C.L.R. 338 
et seq. For a study of O'Connell's position on these issues 
see Crawford, J., "The Contribution of Professor D.P. 
O'Connell to Discipline of International Law" 51 B.Y.I.L. 
(1980) 1 at pp.47-61. For a similar conclusion see also
Bonser v. La Macchia (1969) 122 C.L.R. 177, pp.186-87, 189- 
90, 197-98.
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In the case of the UAE the provisions of the constitution 
do not offer help as to the question whether the federal 
government has control over coastal jurisdiction, and if so, 
whether G.C.C. citizens need not obtain any fishing licence
• • • • 1R9from an individual Emirate.
Article 2 3 of the constitution does not explain clearly 
where the natural resources and wealth that each Emirate is 
entitled to own is located. Does the Article impliedly refer 
to those in land, inland waters, territorial sea, or the 
continental shelf?
This is not a question concerning the distribution of 
rights of ownership or control between the federal government 
and the individual Emirate, which is left entirely to the 
municipal law. The issues surrounds the identity of the party 
responsible for claims involving such resources in those
In the UAE almost all fishing enterprises are 
undertaken by private individuals and are based essentially 
upon fishmeal operations. The Ras al-Khaimah first company, 
which had earlier established a 1250 ton a day raw materials 
plant, later ran into financial difficulties. In Ajman a 
similar plant called the Ajman Marine Products Company (owned 
jointly by the Ajman Government with 60% of shares and the 
balance to a Pakistani-American consortium) is designed to 
have a capacity of about 1,400 tons a day of raw materials. 
In Fujairah a Japanese company has been granted fishing rights 
within the jurisdiction of waters of this Emirate by its 
ruler. In the UAE, however, a Federal Fisheries Department 
located in the Emirate of Dubai works under the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries, yet each individual Emirate 
develops its own fisheries and is involved in joint 
enterprises without taking the consent of the Federal 
Department. See in this regard, Amin, S., "Fisheries in the 
Gulf", Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law (1983), pp.673-75. 
Amin points out that this position is permitted under the UAE 
constitution which maintains the identity of each Emirate", 
idem.
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areas.
The limitation on the sovereignty of the individual 
Emirates in Article 3, which excludes matters within the 
jurisdiction of the Union, is contradicted by both Article 2 
of the constitution and the practice of the individual 
Emirates.
Article 2 envisages international borders for each 
Emirate. The attitude of the constituent Emirates as 
indicated earlier, affirms the tendency, which was embodied 
in the proclamation long before the establishment of the 
federation, that each Emirate has its own continental shelf 
and territorial waters. These assertions of constituent 
sovereignty do not receive recognition under the Geneva 
Conventions on the Law of the Sea, 1958, and the Law of the 
Sea Convention 1982 since it is for the whole state to become 
party to those Conventions, and not its constituent units. 
The United Arab Emirates is not a party to any of the Geneva 
Conventions, yet many provisions of these conventions have 
passed into customary law and so become binding upon states
• 190not party to the conventions.
Article 1 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial 
Sea, for example, provides that the sovereignty of the coastal 
state extends over the territorial sea. No-one would have 
envisaged that this meant the sovereignty of each federal unit
190 .See Churchill and Lowe, o p .cit.. pp.7-11.
362
• 191rather than the sovereignty of the entire state.
The fact that the UAE has not yet ratified the Law of the 
Sea Convention 1982,192 or the treaty itself has not yet 
entered into force for the lack of members for ratification 
prescribed by the treaty193 does not undermine the UAE 
obligation under customary international law to be responsible 
for its coastal jurisdiction.
One may argue that a rule of customary international law 
has been established which recognises the coastal state*s 
responsibility over the continental shelf and its sovereign 
rights over the territorial sea, regardless of potential 
conflicts on the location of natural resources between the
• • 194
federal government and its component units.
The process by which rules included in a multilateral 
convention may come to be recognised and accepted as rules of
191 *O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea, o p .cit..
p.118.
19? •United Nations, Law of the Sea Bulletin (November 
1987) , p.5.
1QT ,
Article 308 of the Law of the Sea Convention, 1982. 
See the text in The Law of the Sea. United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea. United Nations, New York (1983).
19/ # #
State practice shows competing claims between the 
federal government and the provinces over the sovereignty of 
the territorial sea and continental shelf in order to control 
their resources. "The constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Germany creates a federal system under which every part of 
the nation is under the dual territorial sovereignty of both 
the laender (states) and the federal government. This system 
of dual sovereignty extends into the territorial sea, and 
there has been a continuing controversy over whether this 
duality also extends into the continental shelf." See 
Westernman, G. , Juridical Bay. Clarendon Press, Oxford (1987), 
pp.189-91.
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customary international law to which states are subject
independently of the convention, has been emphasised by the
International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases (1969):
"The court must now proceed to the last stage in the 
argument put forward on behalf of Denmark and the 
Netherlands. This is to the effect that even if 
there was at the date of the Geneva Convention no 
rule of customary international law in favour of 
the equidistance principle and no such rule was 
crystallised in Article 6 of the Convention, 
nevertheless such a rule has come into being since 
the Convention, partly because of its own impact, 
partly on the basis of subsequent state practice - 
and that this rule, being now a rule of customary 
international law binding on all states, including 
therefore the Federal Republic, should be declared 
applicable to the delimitation of the boundaries 
between the parties* respective continental shelf 
areas in the North Sea."
Furthermore, the UAE under both international law and 
constitutional law signs international agreements and ratifies 
them for the nation as a whole and not for each individual 
Emirate.196
7. Safeguard Clauses in the UEA
Safeguard clauses are a common mechanism which has been 
frequently used in many treaties dealing with international 
economic organisations, in order to overcome economic
195 .The nudoment of the court in the I.C.J. Report (1969),
p. 42.
196 Article 47(4) of the UAE constitution.
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• • • • • • 197difficulties or political crises.
The safeguard clause in the UEA provides for a derogation
from the agreement provisions on very broad grounds, described
in Article 24 as "differences in the development priorities
of each member state", "temporary local situations" or
"specific circumstances faced by it". Article 24 provides:
"In the execution of the agreement and determination 
of the procedures resulting therefrom, consideration 
shall be given to differences in the levels of 
development between the member states and the local 
development priorities of each. Any member state 
may be temporarily exempted from applying such 
provisions of this agreement as may be necessitated 
by temporary local situations in that state or 
specific circumstances faced by it. Such exemption 
shall be for a specified period and shall be decided 
by the Supreme Council of the Gulf Arab States 
Cooperation Council."
Due to the fact that economic integration treaties 
include great restrictions on sovereignty, it is necessary 
for the state party to maintain some power to intervene to
• 198safeguard the interests of its economy and nationals.
The general result of the application of these clauses 
is to suspend some treaty obligations for a limited period of 
time until the benefiting party adjusts itself to the new
197 • • ■Weber, A. , "Safeguards in International Economic 
Organisations in Times of Crises with Special Reference to the 
European Economic Community", 27 G.Y.I.L. (1984) p.212. See 
also, Seidl, M . , "Escape Clauses in European Community Law, 
with Special Reference to Capital Movement", 15 Common Market 
Law Review. (1978), p.283; Sauermilch, T . , "Market Safeguards 
against Import Competition. Article XIX of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade", 14 Case W.Res.J. 
International Law (1982), pp.88-90.
198 •Akiwumi, A., "Judicial Aspects of Economic Integration 
Treaties in Africa", Hague Academy of International Law 
(1971), op.cit.. p.52.
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regime. To that extent, safeguard clauses raise some delicate
issues with respect to the law of treaties, for they may limit
the effect of treaties between the parties.
Safeguard clauses may be applied without reciprocity,
unless reciprocal sanctions are involved as an answer to
unlawful recourse to such exemptions.199 While safeguard
clauses allow the suspension of treaty obligations temporarily
after consent is given by the competent organ, denunciation
on the other hand by any party terminates its obligations in
relation to all parties.200
Safeguard clauses provide for the parties the opportunity
to adapt to the new circumstances which were not clearly
foreseen at the time of conclusion of the treaty, without
breaching it. A kind of rebus sic stantibus clause seems to
201appear, although with different effects. Safeguard clauses
are necessarily included in the treaty and do not terminate
• • 202 the party's obligations.
199 •For the effect of reservation and safeguard clauses 
on treaties, see Weber, A., op.cit.. p.231. See also, Vicuna,
F., "Contemporary International Law in the Economic 
Integration of Latin America. Problems and Perspectives", 
op.cit.. pp.123-4.
200 Weber, idem.
201 • • • • • Vicunna, o p .cit.. p.124. See also m  this meaning,
Mercia, P., "Safeguard Measures in GATT", 15 Journal of World
Trade Law (1981), p.41.
202 ,See Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. It provides:
"1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred 
with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion 
of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may 
not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from 
the treaty unless:
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However, one may notice that Article 24 of the UEA is 
laid down in rather general terms which do not establish an 
objective criterion or even the unforseen circumstances to 
justify its application.
Since escape clauses or safeguard clauses arise from the 
very nature of obligations brought about under economic 
integration, the obligation from the treaty cannot easily be 
fulfilled if the clauses were to be invoked subjectively. 
Yet, with the UEA safeguard clauses the party will be more 
inclined either to leave the issue for the diplomatic courtesy 
and not invoke the provision, or to invoke it as retaliation 
if it feels its interests have not received any protection. 
In this event the affected party is then free and capable of 
blocking the Supreme Council decision arbitrarily against the 
interest of another member state who needs the exemption 
badly.
By contrast, the GATT does not seek to achieve economic 
integration, rather mutual cooperation in economic and trade 
fields. The application of the safeguard clauses is subject 
to some conditions.
The principal clause of Article XIX provides that certain 
protective action can be taken
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an 
essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by 
the treaty; and
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform 
the extent of obligations still to be performed under the 
treaty."
See the text in Brownlie, I., Basic Documents in International 
Law, op.cit.. pp.374-75.
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” [i]f, as a result of unforseen developments and of 
the effect of the obligations incurred by a 
contracting party under this agreement, including 
tariff concessions, any product is being imported 
into the territory of that contracting party in such 
increased quantities and under such conditions as 
to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic 
producers in that territory of like or directly 
competitive products...1,203
Therefore, in order to invoke Article XIX, the following 
must be shown:
(1) Imports in increased quantities. Neither an 
absolute increase in imports, nor a difference between the 
price of imports and the price of similar domestic products 
are required.204 The "relative” increase concept appears to 
be inappropriate since countries would tend to use it as a
• • • 205protective device and very often invoke the escape clause.
(2) The increased imports are a result both of (a) 
unforseen developments, and (b) the effect of GATT 
obligations. There must be a causal relation or at least 
coincidence between the increased imports and both GATT 
obligations and unforeseen developments at the time that the
See Article XIX of the GATT in International
Organisation and Integration, ed. Sohn, L., o p .cit.. pp.684-85
204 Jackson, J., World Trade and the Law of GATT. Bobbs- 
Merrill Co. Inc. (1969), pp.555-57. See also, Mercia,
op.cit.. p.44; McGovern, E., International Trade Regulation. 
op.cit.. pp.291-92? Bronckers, M . , "The Non-Discriminatory 
Application of Article XIX GATT: Tradition or Fiction?",
Legal Issues of European Integration (1981-82), pp.36-39?
Pogany, I., "'Steel Wars' vs. 'Star Wars': the impact of
voluntary export restraints on the GATT", in Current Issues 
in International Business Law, (eds.) Perrott, D. & Pogany, 
I., Avebury, England (1988), pp.79-82.
205 Jackson, ibid. . p.559.
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concession was made.206
However, the condition of "unforseen development” was a
controversial issue in the GATT proceedings. In 1950 the
United States, through its Tariff Commission procedures, found
that increased imports of fur hats fulfilled the criteria of
the escape clause, so it withdrew a concession negotiated at
Geneva in 1947. The action was challenged by Czechoslovakia,
and GATT set up a working party to review the matter. The
increased imports had resulted from a change of ladies' hat
styles and the United States contended that this was an
"unforseen development". The working party drew a line. All
members except the United States agreed that:
"'Unforseen development' should be interpreted to 
mean developments occurring after the negotiation 
of the relevant tariff concession which it would not 
be reasonable to expect that the negotiators of the 
country making the concession could and should have 
foreseen at the time when the concession was 
negotiated."207
These members also agreed with the Czechoslovakian 
argument that "it is universally known that fashions are
subject to constant changes" and that the United States
• 208negotiators should have known that fashions might change. 
But all members of the working party except Czechoslovakia
206 See Report on Withdrawal by the United States of a 
Tariff Concession under Article XIX of the GATT, Geneva, 
November 1951, Sales No. GATT/1951-3, p.12; reproduced in part 
in Jackson, J. , Legal Problems of International Economic 
Relations, 2nd ed. , West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn. 
(1986), pp.556-59.
207 ibid.
208 Ibid. . at p. 10.
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felt that "the degree to which the change in fashion affected 
the competitive situation could not reasonably be expected to 
have been foreseen by the United States authorities in 1947", 
and therefore the Article XIX condition of "unforeseen 
developments" was fulfilled.
(3) The increased imports cause serious injury or 
threaten serious injury.
There is no firm definition for the term "serious injury" 
and the subsequent practice of some countries reveals that 
both an "actual prejudice and a mere threat of damage" may 
fall within the scope of Article XIX.210
Article XIX does not provide which party has the burden 
of proving that Article XIX provisions have not been applied 
in a given case. But according to the Hatter's Fur Case, the 
working party of GATT was of the view that the plaintiff 
exporting countries demonstrated that the safeguard measures 
enacted by an importing party were ill-founded. The importing 
party which invokes Article XIX will therefore be "entitled 
to the benefit of any reasonable doubt".211
If no agreement is reached the invoking country has the 
right to start withdrawing its concession under Article XIX 
and the exporting country has the right as well to
209 Ibid. . at p. 12.
210 • • Jackson, op.cit.. pp.557-563. See also Mercia,
op.cit.. p.44.
211 See GATT, 1951-53, op.cit. . p. 23.
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• 212 • * • retaliate. The party wishing to take escape clause action
is thus likely to be compelled to pay for it, either by
• • • # • 213granting compensation or by facing retaliation.
Thus safeguard action in Article 24 of the UEA is subject 
to the approval of the Supreme Council of the G.C.C., whereas 
Article XIX of the GATT permits such action to be taken 
unilaterally.
However, the EEC comes with a more developed arrangement, 
which includes an elaborate system which avoids the lack of 
precision, providing for suspension by contracting parties, 
and risk interpretation of Article XIX, that makes protection 
measures easy to be circumvented.214
The safeguard clause most frequently used in the 
experience of the EEC is Article 115. The Article deals only 
with two kinds of difficulties, the deflection of trade caused 
by unequal measure of commercial policy of the member states,
• • . • 215 # •and the rise of economic difficulties. Those objective
212 Jackson, o p .cit. . at pp.555-57.
213 t ,Dam, W. , The GATT Law and International Economic 
Organisation. University of Chicago Press (1970), p.104. See 
also, Graham, R. , "Reforming the International Trading System: 
the Tokyo Round Negotiations in the Final Stage", 12 Cornell 
Journal of International Law. No.l, (Winter 1979), p.24.
214 For criticism of the GATT mechanisms, especially 
Article XIX, see Mercia, , o p .cit.. pp.46-53. See also, Long,
O. , Law and Limitations in the GATT Multilateral Trade System. 
Nijhoff (1985), pp.59-61.
215 Kapteyn and Themaat, V. , Introduction to the Law of 
the European Communities. London, Sweet & Maxwell (1973), 
pp.228-229. See also, Wyatt, D. & Dashwood, A., The 
Substantive Law of the EEC, op.cit.. pp.78, 108.
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conditions are placed upon recourse to these clauses, which 
cannot simply be unilaterally invoked by a member. It is the 
Commission which recommends the methods of cooperation and if 
it fails, the member states can take protective measures, 
provided an authorisation from the Commission has been 
obtained. In case of urgency member states could take the 
necessary measures and notify them to the other parties. The
Commission in this case also decides whether the state
• 216 concerned must amend or abolish these measures.
In the case of the G.C.C., Oman and Qatar consecutively
invoked the application of Article 24 of the UEA and obtained
• 217the Supreme Council approval.
Oman, due to the status of its infant industry, fearing 
competition, has been inclined to restrict the flow of
investment capital from other G.C.C. member states and
# 218 protects its market from less expensive regional products.
As such, Oman is given an exemption in accordance with
Article 24 of the UEA in order to enable it to levy duties on
some G.C.C. products, excluding the effect of Article 2 of the
economic agreement, which provides an exemption from customs
duties on agricultural, animal, industrial and natural
216 Ibid. . pp.220-221.
217 see Decisions and Steps taken to Implement the UEA. 
op.cit., p p .34 and 86.
218 • • See Twinan, J . , "Reflections on Gulf Companies with
Focus on Bahrain, Qatar and Oman", in The Gulf Cooperation
Council. Moderation and Stability in an Interdependent World.
ed. by Sandwick, J., Westview Press, American-Arab Affairs
Council, p.35.
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• t 219resources products of G.C.C. origin.
Another G.C.C. Member state, Qatar, has invoked Article 
24 and obtained the exemption from some UEA provisions for 
five years.220
In accordance with Article 8(2) of the UEA, the Supreme 
Council decided in its fifth session in Kuwait, 1984, to
regulate the ownership of real estate by individuals in the
221 • • • •G.C.C. member states. The decision allows the citizen of
member states (both native-born and naturalised, with
different conditions) to own up to 3,000 square metres of
residential property, with construction of a residential
dwelling on unimproved land to be completed within five
219 • • • •The exemption applies to cement and its derivatives, 
asbestos products, plastics and polythene products, paints, 
plant oil and fat, industrial cleaners, car batteries and 
electric bulbs. See Decisions and Steps Taken to Implement 
the U E A . o p .cit.. p.34.
220 Ibid. , p .86.
221 Ibid. . p.74.
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According to Qatari laws, only native-born citizens are 
entitled to own property, while naturalised citizens do not 
have such a right.223
This tendency in Qatari legislation reflects the policy 
of its political leadership which ensures that indigenous 
Qataris dominate the ownership of real estate.
222 • •There are other requirements for the right of real
estate ownership to be fulfilled. These are, inter alia:
(1) The ownership is only for the purpose of housing for 
the owner or his family.
(2) The owner can sell the property only with the lapse 
of 8 years (exception is given in extreme conditions).
(3) If the owner has obtained his nationality through 
naturalisation then the lapse of 10 years from the date of 
obtaining nationality is a required condition before he is 
entitled to ownership.
(4) The properties in the area of Mecca and Medina are 
excluded from this regulation.
(5) The regulation does not prejudice the right of the 
member states to expropriate the property for public utility, 
offering adequate compensation. It also does not prejudice 
the right of the state to prohibit ownership for security 
reasons. See ibid.. pp.74-6.
223 • •Article 1 of the decree No. 5 (1963) concerning
foreigners' non-entitlement to own property in Qatar. See 
also Article 3 of the Decree No.14 (1964) regarding the
Registration of property. The decrees make an exception which 
allows non-Qataris to own properties, provided it is for the 
purpose of facilitating the performance of public utility or 
interest and accompanied by a consent of the deputy ruler. 
In the above decree No.14 (1964) it provides that ownership 
by other Arabs must be subject to the reciprocal treatment to 
Qataris. In the decree No.l (1980) concerning the regulation 
of ownership by foreign diplomatic missions in Qatar, the Amir 
exempted embassies from the above decree No.5 (1963) which 
restricts ownership to Qataris. This is, however, based on 
the reciprocity principle. The exemption also applies to 
international organisations existing in Qatar. For the above 
decrees see Qatar Official Gazette No.2 1983, No.l (1984) and 
No.2 (1980).
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However, Qatar has amended its present law in order to 
comply with the G.C.C. Supreme Council decision and issued a 
decree providing naturalised people with the right to own real 
estate after 10 years of obtaining citizenship (that is in 
accordance with the G.C.C. decision), starting from November 
5, 1991.224
224 See G.C.C. Official Gazette, ed.20 (1987), pp.153-55. 
See also Decrees which have been Issued and Measures which 
have been adopted in implementing the Unified Economic 
Agreement. G.C.C. Secretariat (1988), pp.72-76.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SECURITY IN THE GULF: SOME LEGAL ISSUES
1. G.C.C. Searches for Security
Although the G.C.C. member states at the establishment 
of the organisation in May 1981 avoided using expressions 
conferring military character to their cooperation, it was 
clear from the beginning that political and strategic factors 
had been primarily responsible for bringing the states 
together.1
Producing more than half of OPEC total oil exports, and 
controlling the strategic Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf region 
has always been vulnerable to outside pressure. The 
revolution in Iran, with the resultant upset in the balance 
of power in the Gulf, combined with Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan and U.S. efforts to strengthen its presence in the 
Gulf region, emphasised the vulnerability of the Gulf states 
to foreign intervention.2
1 The Fundamental Statute of GCC refers to Gulf security 
only implicitly in the terms of cooperation and coordination 
in "all fields". See supra, Chapter 3, p.116 et seq.
2 For the background on security issues within the G.C.C. 
there is vast literature. On the political aspects, see, for 
example, Al-Nafisi, A., The Gulf Cooperation Council: The 
Political and Strategic Framework. London, Taha Publishers 
(Arabic) (1982); Cordesman, A., The Gulf and the Search for 
Strategic Stability. Boulder Co., Westview Press (1984); 
Darius, R . , Amos, J. and Magnus, R. (eds.), Gulf Security into 
the 1980s. Stanford, CA, Hoven (1984); Hunter, S. (ed.), Gulf 
Cooperation Council. Problems and Prospects. Washington,
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In 1973 the Gulf states feared intervention3 as a result 
of the 1973 war between the Arab states and Israel and there 
was a call in the Arab world for the use of the "oil weapon" 
against the western countries who supported Israel.
The Gulf states justified their action as legitimate to 
discourage third countries from violating their obligations 
of neutrality towards the belligerents.
The Arab oil embargo was initiated at a time when many 
of the states applying it were in an actual situation of war 
with Israel. Egypt and Syria were the major belligerents 
against Israel and other Arab states, including some Gulf 
states, participated in the war as co-belligerents.4 The Arab 
states were bound with Egypt and Syria by regional
Georgetown University, OSJS (1984)? McNaugha, Arms and Oil: 
U.S. Military Strategy and the Persian Gulf. Washington, 
Brookings Institution (1985); Kechichian, J., "The Gulf 
Cooperation Council: Search for Security", Third World
Quarterly. Vol.l, No.4 (October 1985), pp.853-81; Hameed, M. , 
Arabia Imperilled; The Security Imperatives of the Arab 
States, Washington, Middle East Assessment Group (1988); and 
Peterson, J . , Defending Arabia. London, Croom Helm (1986).
3 In 1975 Henry Kissinger threatened that the United 
States would intervene in Arab oil fields in the event of some 
actual strangulation of the industrialized world, 72 
Deot.State Bull.. 97, 101 (1975). See also, Ramazani, R. , The 
Gulf Cooperation Council: Records and Analysis. University
Press of Virginia, Charlottesville (1988), p.9. See also, 
"Kissinger says a continuation of the Arab Oil Embargo would 
be blackmail", N.Y. Times. Feb.7, 1974, at 1, col.4.
4 See Shihata, I., "Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: 
its Legality under International Law", in Economic Coercion 
and the New International Economic Order, ed. Lillich, R. , The 
Michie Co., Virginia (1976), pp.180-192.
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arrangements including a mutual defence pact.5
Israel formally denounced the existence of a state of war
between her and the Arab belligerent states and contended
before the Security Council that the state of war is
incompatible with the U.N. Charter and cannot exist.6
However, in 1979 Israel, in its Peace Treaty with Egypt,
acknowledged the existence of a state of war in Article 1(1),
which provides:
•'The state of war between the parties will be terminated 
and peace will be established between them upon the 
exchange of instruments of ratification of this treaty."7
Furthermore, the Gulf states felt that unchecked 
production of oil would jeopardize their economic future and 
therefore it was necessary to act on the basis of economic 
rationality and cut back their production to suit their 
economic needs.8 This attitude was regarded by some as 
economic coercion amounting to a violation of the U.N. Charter 
and particularly Article 2 (4).9
5 For the Arab League defence arrangements, see infra, 
pp.428-434.
6 S.C.O.R. 549th Mtg., 26 July 1951, paras.40-41.
7 Treaty of Peace between the Arab Republic of Egypt and 
the State of Israel (1979) . See the text in XVIII I .L.M. . 
p. 362. For the discussion of war in state practice, see 
Greenwood, C., "The Concept of War in Modern International 
Law", 36 I.C.L.O. (1987), pp.290-94.
8 See Shihata, o p .cit.. pp.172-75.
9 Paust, J. and Blaustein, A., "The Arab Oil Weapon. A 
Threat to International Peace", in ibid.. pp.140-152. For the 
relevant documents concerning the embargo, see Paust, J. and 
Blaustein, A., The Arab Oil Weapon. Oceana Publications, New 
York (1977). For the relevance of Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter to economic coercion, see Blum, Y., "Economic Boycotts
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The relevance of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter is,
however, questionable. In the course of the debate in the
Committee on Friendly Relations, the consensus which emerged
was that Article 2(4) should not cover economic coercion.10
Indeed, the Declaration on Friendly Relations characterises
economic coercion as intervention in matters within the
domestic jurisdiction of the member states. It declares that
the duty of states to refrain from political, economic or any
other form of coercion in order to obtain any kind of
advantage. It, inter alia, states:
"No state may use or encourage the use of economic, 
political or any other type of measures to coerce 
another state in order to obtain from it the 
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign 
rights and secure from it advantages of any 
kind.. ."11
The Declaration does not deprive states of the right to resort 
to economic measures as self-defence or reprisal.12 As has
in International law", 12 Texas International Law Journal 
(1977), pp.11-13; Parry, C., "Defining Economic Coercion in 
International Relations", ibid.. pp.1-4? Fawcett, J., Law and 
Power in International Relations. Faber & Faber, London 
(1982) , p.115.
10 Bowett, D., "International Law and Economic Coercion", 
in Economic Coercion and the New International Economic Order. 
Ed. Lillich, R. , The Michie Co., Virginia, pp.8-11; Blum, 
ibid.. p.10; Brosche, H., "The Arab Oil Embargo and United 
States Pressure Against Chile: Economic and Political 
Coercion and the Charter of the United Nations", 7-8 Case W. 
Res. J. International Law, p.22.
11 UN G.A. Res. 2625(XXV), Oct., 241, 1970, GAOR, 25th 
Sess. Supp. No.28 at 24 (A180 28).
12 Bowett, D., "Economic Coercion and Reprisals by 
States", 13 VA.J. Int.L. (1972), pp.7-9. See also, Elagab,
O. , The Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures in 
International Law. Clarendon Press, Oxford (1988), pp.205-6.
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been suggested by McDougal and Feliciano, ”... a certain
degree of coercion is inevitable in states* day-to-day
interactions for values. Fundamental community policy does
not seek to reach and prohibit this coercion".13
In response to the Soviet military intervention in
Afghanistan, the American administration under President Jimmy
Carter issued what was called "the Carter doctrine":
"Let our position be absolutely clear. An attempt 
by any outside force to gain control of the Persian 
Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the 
vital interest of the United States of America, and 
such an assault will be repelled by any means 
necessary, including military force."1
In 1984 the U.S. Secretary of Defence, Weinberger, 
described six tests to govern the use of force abroad by the 
United States.
1. Force should be used for vital interests.
2. If used, then it should be dedicated to winning.
3. Winning should be clearly defined in relation to
political and military objectives.
4. The military capabilities required to win should be
provided, and adjusted during the course of combat as 
necessary.
13 McDougal, M. and Feliciano, F., Law and Minimum World
Public Order. The Public Regulation of International
Coercion. Yale University Press (1961), p.197. See also,
Higgins, R. , "The Legal Limits to the Use of Force by 
Sovereign States. United Nations Practice", 37 B.Y.I.L. 
(1961), pp.276-77.
14 16 Weekly Comp, of Press. Doc.197 (Jan.23, 1980).
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5. The whole undertaking should not be attempted without 
some reasonable reassurance of broad backing by the 
American people and Congress.
6. The commitment to force should be a last resort.15 
Similarly, the U.S. Secretary of State Shultz claimed
the discretionary right of the United States to combat with
force any terrorist threats abroad, including the right to
pre-emptive strikes.16
In similar terms the Soviet Union also appears to lay
claim to a security zone, although this was based on legal
principles rather than political doctrine. Professor Tunkin
explains it thus:
"The Soviet state, as the ‘oldest1 socialist state 
whose historic fate has been the task of paving the 
way for a new socio-economic formulation, always 
precisely fulfils its duties arising from the 
principle of socialist internationalism. A vivid 
manifestation of this policy is the assistance of 
the Soviet Union to the Hungarian people in 1956 and 
the assistance, together with other socialist 
countries, to the people of Czechoslovakia in 1968 
in protecting socialist gains and, ultimately, in 
defending their sovereignty and independence from 
sudden swoops of imperialism..."17
In fact, the American and Soviet claims are based on 
security and defensive considerations, and neither of them are 
lawful.
15 New York Times. November 29, 1984.
16 Ibid. . October 26, 1984.
17 Tunkin, G. , Theory of International Law. George Allen 
& Unwin, Butler, W. translation (1974), pp.435-36.
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Both claims assert the right of states to intervene to 
act in alleged self-defence against threats to their vital 
interests, and undoubtedly in a direct conflict with the 
unlawful use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which 
reads:
11 All members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the purpose of the United Nations."
Moreover, these claims are much broader than the concept of
self-defence in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Article 51
does not permit the stretching of either the strict notion of
"prior armed attack" or even "the inherent right" of self-
defence in the form of imminent attack as it is established
in customary law to cover areas such as threatened vital
interest or economic coercion.18
As Professor Thomas Franck has shown, new rules derived
from the practice of states have severely undermined Article
2(4). This has occurred through their temptation from time
to time to "settle a score, to end a dispute or to pursue
their national interest" by the use of force.19
Falk similarly observes the disparity between state
18 See in this regard Farer, T. , "Political and Economic 
Aggression in Contemporary International Law", in Cassese, A. 
(ed.), The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force. 
Martinus Nijhoff (1986), pp.124-125. See also, Bowett, D. , 
"Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States", o p .cit.. p.7; 
Waldock, C. , "The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual 
States", Recueil des Cours II (1952), p.503.
19 Franck, T. , "Who Killed Article 2(4)?", 64 A.J.I.L.
(1970), p.809.
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practice of the use of force and international law rules by 
stating:
”What is striking is the absence of any 'test* to
reconcile a proposed use of force with international
law requirements.1,20
Some, however, attempt to justify allegedly new rules 
which emerged from state practice and undermined Article 2(4) .
Reisman as such, likens the U.N. Charter to a wild town 
in the 19th century when a sheriff arrives announcing that he 
will enforce the law and that citizens no longer need carry 
weapons or resort to personal force to protect their rights. 
However, he concludes that if the sheriff is utterly incapable 
of maintaining order "even the best of citizens” will no 
longer refrain from the techniques of self-help that prevailed 
before the sheriff's arrival.21
Professor Schachter takes a sharp criticism of Reisman's 
view. He replied that "[a] community might allow the citizen 
a gun to defend himself and his household, but it would not 
follow that he could legitimately use the weapon to impose 
behaviour (however good) on another household.”22
Reisman further attempts to evaluate the lawfulness of 
a particular activity without basing it on some authoritative
20 , • • • Falk, R . , "The Decline of Normative Restraint m
International Relations”, 10 Yale Journal of International Law
(1985), p.266.
21 Reisman, M. , "Coercion and Self-determination: 
Construing Charter Article 2(4)", 78 A.J.I.L. (1984), pp.642-
3.
22 Schachter, O., "The Legality of Pro-Democratic 
Invasion", 78 A.J.I.L. (1984), pp.645-6.
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text of the Charter. Instead he uses the maintenance of 
minimum order criteria to justify particular actions. He 
states:
"If an evaluation of the international lawfulness 
of a particular activity is based only on its 
congruence with some authoritative text, one need 
proceed no further. Under textual inquiry neither 
the Brezhnev nor the Reagan doctrine is lawful.
But if an assessment of lawfulness includes an 
examination of the probable consequences of the 
activity and of its feasible alternative in terms 
of maintenance of minimum order in international 
community and their contribution to other authorised 
goals, then such an inquiry has perforce only 
begun. "23
Such a view would necessarily lead to the adoption of the 
doctrine of necessity that might allow a state to cause injury 
to another state on the ground that its military, economic or 
political interest is at stake. This concept cannot be "kept 
within proper bounds".24
The International Law Commission has dealt with the 
question of necessity apart from the concept of self- 
defence.25 The Special Rapporteur outlined that in both cases 
the state would act in response to an imminent danger, which
23 Reisman, M. , "Old Wine in New Bottles: The Reagan and
Brezhnev Doctrines in Contemporary International law and 
Practice", Yale Journal of International Law (Winter 1988), 
p. 182. See also his article, "Critical Defence Zone and 
International Law: The Reagan Codicil", 76 A.J.I.L. (1982),
p. 589.
24 Higgins, R. , The Development of International law 
through the Political Organs of the United Nations, op.cit., 
pp.218-219. See also, Waldock, C. , "The Regulation of the Use 
of Force by Individual States in International Law", Recueil 
des Cours II (1952), p.462.
25 Report of the International Law Commission, 3 2nd 
session, 11(2) I.L.C. Yearbook (1980) at pp.44 and 57.
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must be in both cases serious, immediate and incapable of 
being countered by other means. But in the case of necessity 
there was no internationally wrongful act committed by the 
state against which justified action may be taken. That state 
was in no way responsible by any of its own actions for the 
danger threatening the state invoking necessity. By contrast, 
in self-defence the target state would be responsible for the 
injury caused to the state acting in self-defence by breaching 
the general prohibition of the use of armed force.26
Similarly different from the concept of self-defence is 
the claim of "vital interest", which was the main one on which 
the United Kingdom based its right to intervene forcefully in 
the Suez dispute of 1956.27 The then Legal Adviser to the 
British Foreign Office, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, warned the 
Foreign Office that the use of force on the ground of
protecting vital interests abroad would be "a breach of
• 28 general international law". He wrote:
"It is certainly tempting to try and extend the 
notion of self-defence to the defence of e.g. one's 
property and interest abroad, and I have myself 
tried to argue that way in the past, but it is
26 Ibid.. Vol.11(1), pp.15-16.
27 See the view of Professor Goodhart, the only one who 
supported the use of force as self-defence to protect the 
British vital interest in Egypt in 1956, in Marston, G. , 
"Armed Intervention in the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis: The Legal
Advice Tendered to the British Government", 37 I.C.L.O. 
(October 1988), p.778.
28 FO 371/119727 (JT 1053/89G) cited by ibid.. p.783. 
See also Fawcett, J . , Law and Power in International 
Relations. Faber & Faber (1982), p.75, who states that the 
British reasoning of vital interest convinced nobody. Bowett, 
D., Self-Defence in International Law, op.cit.. pp.14-15.
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impossible to get very far with the argument. It 
inevitably results in an extension of the notion of 
self-defence so great as to let in almost anything 
that a country chooses to regard as involving the 
protection of its interest. There is not a single 
modern authority that supports so wide an 
interpretation of the idea."
However, it must be admitted that as far as G.C.C. 
security is concerned, the opposed intervention doctrines, as 
President Carter himself has admitted, could not be 
effectively implemented without the support of the local 
states.30 The Gulf states, also, did not really seem to 
believe that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or the 
American threat of intervention posed an immediate threat to 
the security and stability of the region.
The real threat viewed by the G.C.C. member states which 
impelled them to band together and establish their 
organisation, was the imminent threat of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran to export the revolution to the region and the call 
for the establishment of a new "Islamic world order11.31
2 Cited by Marston, G., "Armed Intervention in the 1956 
Suez Canal Crisis: The Legal Advice Tendered to the British
Government", o p .cit.. p.785. Fitzmaurice's view is shared by 
McNair, who was unable to see the legal justification of the 
threat or the use of force by Britain, ibid.. pp.809-13.
30 G.C.C. member states rejected strongly all foreign 
intervention in the Gulf, no matter what its origin. See 
Ramazani, o p .cit.. p.9.
31 For the discussion of this most critical 
interpretation, see Ramazani, R., "Khumayni's Islam in Iran's 
Foreign Policy", in Adeed Dawisha (ed.), Islam in Foreign 
Policy. Cambridge University Press (1983), pp.9-33. Similar 
fears were expressed by Butler, W. , "Regional and Sectional 
Diversities in International Law", in Cheng, B. (ed.), 
International Law: Teaching and Practice. London, Stevens
(1982), p.46. See also, Bassiouni, M. , "Protection of 
Diplomats under Islamic Law", A.J.I.L. (1980), pp.609-633 who
386
2. International Law Versus Systems of Public Order
According to the classical law of Islam, the ultimate 
objective was that Islamic law would dominate the whole of 
mankind and become supreme over the world.32 However, some 
jurists point out that Islam found itself entirely adjusted 
to the western system, which itself had undergone radical
maintains that the way the Iranians dealt with the American 
hostages is not compatible with Islamic Law. Chubin, S., Iran 
and its Neighbours. The Impact of the Gulf War. The Centre 
for Security and Conflict Studies (1987), p.2.? Daraz, M . , 
"Public International Law and Islam", 5-6 Revue Eavptienne de 
droit international (1949-50) (Arabic), states at p.6 that 
lawful use of force in Islam is confined to self-defence, 
either individual or collective, if another Muslim country 
requested support to defend itself. Abu Zahra, M . , "The 
Theory of War in Islam", in 14-15 Revue Eavptienne de droit 
international (1958-59) points out that Islam is against 
intimidation and forcing others, including atheists, to 
believe in Islam. The other important issue is that the 
Muslim state does not permit war unless it is a self-defence, 
pp.6-21 (Arabic). Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations. Johns 
Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland (1966), explains that 
Islamic law, like all ancient laws was inherently personal 
rather than territorial, since it is intended for all mankind. 
Yet Islamic legal schools accepted with different degrees the 
territorial limitations. The opposite view is found in the 
Iranian revolution practice of opposing the territorial state 
and its conception of Islamic government and reviving and 
reconstituting the universal pan-Islamic state under spiritual 
and political leadership. See in this regard, Algar, H. 
(trans. and ed.), Islam and Revolution: Writings and
Declarations of Immam Khomeini. Berkeley, Mizan Press (1981). 
See also Iran’s President’s statement in Washington Post. 
April 13, 1982 where he declared that "there is no
geographical border for Imam Khomeini".
32 Bozeman, A. , The Future of Law in a Multicultural 
World. Princeton Press (1971), pp.81-87. See also, 
Mahmassani, S., "The Principles of International Law in the 
Light of Islamic Doctrine", 117 Recueil des Cours (1966), 
pp.232-237; Daraz, M . , "Public International Law and Islam", 
in 5-6 Revue Eavptienne de droit international, ibid.. p.6.
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changes from its medieval Christian heritage.33 Not only do
Muslim states accept international law rules and participate
in international organisations, but Islamic rules could in
principle be part of international law as Article 38 of the
Statute of the I.C.J. permits the adoption of general
principles of law.34
International law, as Professor Higgins rightly put it:
” ... is intended to bind all states and to provide 
normative guidance to behaviour for all 
international actors in their transnational 
relationships. Its reach extends to democracies 
and dictatorships alike, to developed and developing 
economies, to capitalism and socialism. The norms 
of international law are said to be applicable to 
all."35
33 Khadduri, M. , "The Islamic System: Its Competition 
and Co-existence with Modern Systems", 50-53 Proceedings of 
the American Society of International Law (1956-59), pp.49- 
52. See also his book The Islamic Law of Nations. Johns 
Hopkins Press, op.cit.. pp.4-7.
34 Khadduri, "The Islamic System: Its Competition and 
Co-existence with Modern Systems", ibid.. p.52.
35 Higgins, R. , "Contending Systems of World Public Order 
and International Law: An Overview", The Atlantic Community 
Quarterly (Summer 1987), p.145. There is a vast literature 
on diverse public order systems and international law. See, 
for example, Jenks, W . , The Common Law of Mankind. Chapter 2, 
"The Universality of International Law", London, Stevens 
(1958); Northrop, F., "Contemporary Jurisprudence and 
International Law", 61 Yale L.J. (1952), pp.623-654? Fifield, 
R . , "The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence", 52 A.J.I.L.
(1958), pp.504-510? Kunz, J . , "Pluralism of Legal and Value 
Systems and International Law", 49 A.J.I.L. (1955), pp.370- 
376? McDougal, M. and Lasswell, H . , "The Identification and 
Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order", 53 A.J.I .L.
(1959), pp.1-29, Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law. April 30-May 29 (1959)? "Diverse Systems 
of World Public Order Today", pp.1-185? Kulski, W. , "The 
Soviet Interpretation of International Law", 49 A.J.I.L.
(1955), pp.518-534? Badr, G., "Law in a Changing Community 
of Nations", 37 Revue Egyptienne de droit international 
(1981), pp.1-11? Cassese, A., International Law in a Divided 
World. Clarendon Press, Oxford (1986), especially chapters 5,
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There are, however, a number of systems of public order,
each demanding and embodying different values and standards
of human life. The meaning of public order systems given by
McDougal and Lasswell:
"The reference is to the basic features of social 
process in a community - including both the identity 
and preferred distribution pattern of basic goal 
values and implementing institutions - that are 
accorded protection by the legal process. Since 
the legal process is among the basic patterns of a 
community, the public order includes the protection 
of the legal order itself, with authority being used 
as a base of power to protect authority."36
In order to achieve a universal order it is necessary to
conform to the basic rules of international law. The
existence of severe regional diversities in the interpretation
of universal values and principles if allowed to exist will
certainly weaken the universal perspective and the application
of international law.37
International law, as Clive Parry defines it:
"... is a strict term of art, connoting that system 
of law whose primary function it is to regulate the 
relation of states within one another. As states 
have formed organisations of themselves, it has also 
come to be concerned with international 
organisations... And because states are composed of 
individuals and exist primarily to serve the needs
10, 12 and 15? Butler, W . , "Regional and Sectional
Diversities in International Law", in Cheng, B. (ed.), 
International Law: Teaching and Practice. Chapter 4, p.45.
36 McDougal, M. and Lasswell, H. , "The Identification and 
Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order", 53 A.J.I.L.
(1959), p.10.
37 Lasswell, H. , "Universality in Perspective", 50-53 
Proceedings of American Society of International Law. April 
30 (1956-59), pp.4-5. See also McDougal and Lasswell, ibid.. 
pp.1-3.
389
of individuals, international law has always had a 
certain concern with the relations of the 
individual, if not to his own state, at least to 
other states... even if the relations between the 
individual and his own state have come to involve 
questions of international law... Nevertheless, 
international law is and remains essentially a law 
for states and thus stands in contrast to what 
international lawyers are accustomed to call 
municipal law”38
3. Iran's View of World Order
The influence of religion represented in Khomeini's 
thoughts on Iran's foreign policy has been remarkable. 
According to Khomeini's order, authority should be taken from 
the "privileged few" to be given to the "under-privileged 
masses". This in turn would reorganise the political 
structure of the Muslim state.39
Among the G.C.C. states, Khomeini's Islamic revolutionary 
ideology is viewed as a direct threat to the peace and 
stability in the region. Furthermore, Khomeini has 
consistently questioned the contemporary international order. 
The earliest indication of this strong view is found in his 
book, Revealing of Secrets, in which he stated that modern 
states "are the products of man's limited ideas" and the world 
is the "home of all the masses of people under the law of
The definition is found in Sorensen, M. (ed.), Manual 
of International Law. St. Martin's Press, London (1968), pp.l- 
2
39 Ramazani, R . , "The Gulf Cooperation Council: A Search
for Security" in Dowdy, W. and Trood, R. (ed.), The Indian 
Ocean: Perspectives on a Strategic Arena. Duke University,
Durham (1985), p.179? Abdulghani, J . , Irag and Iran. Years 
of Crisis. Croom Helm, London (1984), pp.180-81.
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God".40
Iran views the existing order as unjust, reflecting an 
imbalance of power which gave the Western states advantage in 
the formulation of rules that govern international relations. 
It asserts the right to deal directly with and assist the 
"people" in their struggle, claiming that its own 
revolutionary model has universal applicability.41
In a statement to Iranian students abroad Khomeini 
declared:
"Iran's Islamic Revolution, with the support of the 
gracious Almighty, is spreading on a world scale and 
God willing, with its spread the satanical powers 
will be dragged into isolation and governments of 
the meek will be established."42
Khomeini thought that Islam is a universal ideology and should
be exported to the whole world. He told the people he met in
the pilgrimage rituals:
"... what is to be said is that the moslem nation 
of Iran has arisen for the obliteration of tyranny 
throughout the world and will not cease its struggle 
until a global Islamic government is established.1,43
40 See Haj Ruhollah Mussavi Khomeini, Kashf-el Assrar, 
Tehran, n.p. (1944), p.267. See also his classic work, 
Islamic Government, translated by Joint Publications Research 
Service, Arlington, Virginia; New York, Manor Books (1979), 
in which he sets forth his conception of society and 
government, pp.14-32.
41 Chubin, S., Iran and its Neighbours. The Impact of 
the Gulf War. The Centre for Security and Conflict Studies
(1987), p.2.
42 For the text see Foreign Broadcast Information Service
(F.B.I.S.), Daily Report. South Asia. 4 November 1981, 
Vol.VIII, No.213.
43 Ibid. . 25 October 1981.
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In a major speech to the Iranian people on the occasion
of the Iranian New Year in 1980, he declared unequivocally:
•'We should try hard to export our revolution to the 
world. We should set aside the thought that we do 
not export our revolution, because Islam does not 
regard various Islamic countries differently and is 
the supporter of all the oppressed people of the 
world."
These pronouncements do not represent vaguely the
official policy of the revolutionary regime. Article 154 of
the Iran constitution provides in the same rhetoric line:
"Therefore, while practising a policy of complete 
non-interference in the internal affairs of other 
nations, it will support the just struggle of the 
oppressed against their oppressors anywhere in the 
world."45
As has been shown, Iran advocates the export of the 
"Islamic Revolution" as a mean of promoting the idea of 
establishing Islamic government on earth, and rejects the very 
concept of contemporary international order, and has instead 
resorted to the use of force.46
44 Ibid.. 9 March 1982, Vol.VIII, No.046. See also Sadun 
Hamadi's speech (Iraq Foreign Minister), United Nations 
Records, S/PV2250, Foreign Office (Iraq). Documentary Dossier, 
pp.238-9.
45 See the text of the Iran Constitution in Constitutions 
of the Countries of the World, op.cit.. Article 154, at p . 66.
46 See Ramazani, R., "Khumayni's Islam in Iran's Foreign 
Policy", o p .cit.. pp.29-30. In December 1981 the Saudi 
Interior Minister said, and according to the evidence they 
have explained beyond doubt, that the Iranian Government 
plotted to overthrow the Bahraini government and destabilise 
security by using armed force. FBIS-MEA. V-81-240, 15 
December. See also the G.C.C. Ministerial Council first 
extraordinary meeting which was held to review the abortive 
coup d'etat in Bahrain, FBIS-MEA. V-81-026, 8 February 1982, 
p p .C5-C6. Another incident took place in Kuwait on December 
12, 1983 in which the perpetrators carried out a bombing raid 
at the U.S. and French embassies, Kuwait airport control
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Iran, furthermore, did not rely on international law to 
uphold its sovereign rights, since it views international law 
as being one-sided and without the capacity to provide 
authoritative guidelines for the behaviour of states in the 
"post-colonial contemporary world system".47
In the case concerning United States Diplomatic and 
Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), 
Iran relied on the above-mentioned argument as an essential 
one to justify its refusal to take part in the judicial 
proceedings brought by the U.S. to resolve the dispute of 
taking hostages at the ICJ.
tower, Electricity and Water Ministry's control centre, the 
Shuaybah industrial area offices and residences of American 
firms in Kuwait. Responsibility for the bombings was claimed 
by Islamic Holy War organisation, a militant group widely seen 
as having close links with Iran. The same group carried out 
a car bomb attack mounted on a motorcade containing the Amir 
and other senior officials on May 25, 1985. Further attacks 
on two seaside cafes in Kuwait City on July 11 killed nine 
people and wounded a further 89. For Kuwait State Security 
Court statement on bombing suspects, see FBIA-MEA-V-84 24 
January 1984. See also the report on the Trial of Embassy 
Bombings in Kuwait, 11 February 1984, in FBIS-MEA. V-84-030, 
13 February 1984, pp.Cl-C2. See also an interview with 
Kuwait's Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign and Information 
Minister, Shaikh Sabah A1-Ahmed on the involvement of Iran in 
the subversive activities in the region. Al-Tadaman Magazine 
(London), 16 June 1984, as translated in FBIA-MEA. V-84-118, 
18 June 1984, pp.C2-C3.
47 Falk, R., "International Law and the Peaceful 
Settlement of the Conflict", in The Iraq-Iran War. Issues of 
Conflict and Prospects of Settlement, (ed.), by Dessouki, A., 
Centre of International Studies, Princeton University (1981), 
p.79. See also his article, "The Iran Hostage Crisis: Easy
Answers and Hard Questions", 74 A.J.I.L. (1980), pp.411-417. 
Higgins, R. , "Legal Response to the Iran Crisis", 
Proc.A m .Soc.Int.Law (1980), p.251, who states that "the 
seizure of the hostages had to be categorized not only as a 
violation of international law but as a threat to 
international peace."
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The Iranian Government in its letter of 9 December 1979
drew attention to what it referred to as the
••deep rootedness and essential character of the 
Islamic Revolution of Iran, a revolution of a whole 
oppressed nation against its oppressors and their 
masters, the examination of whose numerous 
repercussions is essentially and directly a matter 
within the national sovereignty of Iran."48
Iran's claims were unanimously repudiated by the court,
while, as the court pointed out in its order of 15 December
1979:
"A dispute which concerns diplomatic and consular 
premises and the detention of internationally 
protected persons, and involves the interpretation 
or application of multilateral conventions codifying 
the international law governing diplomatic and 
consular relations, is one which by its very nature 
falls within international jurisdiction11.4
Iran, in its dealing with some territorial disputes with
its G.C.C. neighbouring states, sought to generalise the
48 See the Reports of the ICJ Judgments (1980), at p.9. 
The judgment took particular account of the traditions of 
Islam, which contributed along with others to the elaboration 
of the rules of contemporary public international law on 
diplomatic and consular inviolability and immunity. See the 
dissenting opinion of Judge Tarazi, p.59. See also, 
Bassiouni, M . , "Protection of Diplomats under Islamic Law", 
A.J.I.L. (1980), pp.609-633. In connection with Iran's 
violation of diplomatic immunity it is worth stating that in 
1987, after the deaths of Iranian pilgrims in Mecca, a crowd 
of demonstrators stormed and ransacked the Saudi and Kuwaiti 
embassies in Tehran. A Saudi diplomat as a result died, 
suffering from injuries. The French embassy also came under 
attack. The Islamic Republic's News Agency (IRNA) commented 
on the latter attack: "The assailants were demonstrating 
their hatred of the French Government for its support of 
reactionary Arab regimes". See Keesings, Vol.XXXIV, (January 
1988), pp.35676-7.
49 ICJ Reports of Judgments (1979), p.16, para.25. See 
also Gross, L. , "The Case Concerning United States Diplomatic 
and Consular Staff in Tehran: Phase of Provisional Measures, 
74 A.J.I.L. (1980), pp.400-402.
394
validity of its own revolutionary doctrine to justify the 
continuation of unlawful occupation of three UAE islands.
The dispute was over the three islands (Abu Musa and the 
Greater and Lesser Tumbs) in the Strait of Hormuz, which were 
militarily occupied by Iran on the eve of UAE independence on 
30 November 1971. Before that date, the islands were 
generally recognised as belonging to the Emirates of Sharjah 
and Ras al-Khaimah respectively.50 In the case of Abu Musa, 
which was under the control of the Emirate of Sharjah, Iranian 
occupation was made in pursuance of an agreement made between 
the Government of Iran and the Ruler of Sharjah. Regarding 
the two islands of Tumb, which were under the control of Ras 
al-Khaimah, Iran resorted to their occupation by means of 
military action. The Iranian government was reported to have 
made its forcible landings on the islands after failing to 
negotiate a peaceful arrangement with the Ruler of Ras al-
50 For Iran's annexation of the three islands on 3 0 
November 1971, see Abulghani, Iraq and Iran. Years of Crisis. 
op.cit.. pp.89-94. For Iran's official and non-official 
pronouncements towards its intention to keep the control over 
these islands, see The Policy of Iran Expansion: Ambitions
Towards the Arab States. Attitudes and Pronouncements against 
the Arab Nation. Baghdad (1987), pp.14-15; The Iraai-Iranian 
Dispute. Facts v. Allegations. Ministry of Foreign affairs 
of the Republic of Iraq (1981), p.51; El-Azhary, M. , The Gulf 
Cooperation Council and Regional Defence in the 1980s. Centre 
for Arab Gulf Studies, University of Exeter (1982), p. 14; 
Shaikh Zaid, the President of the UAE, explained his country's 
position on the islands issue in a way avoiding antagonising 
Iran. For his statement, see ibid. For a legal analysis of 
the dispute before the revolution, see Shaukri, M . , The 
Question of Islands in the Arabian Gulf and International Law
(1972) (Arabic).
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Khaimah on the transfer of the islands to Iran.51
On 3 December 1971, four Arab states (Algeria, Iraq, 
Libya and Southern Yemen) requested the Security Council to 
consider, on an urgent basis, the question of the 
occupation.52 In the discussion of the situation on 9 
December 1971, the representative of the United Arab Emirates 
explained that "Iran had never presented any convincing 
evidence of its claim to the islands. It had refused to 
negotiate the matter with the UAE and had chosen to use force 
to settle is claim".53 The Iranian representative said:
"The Iranian title to the islands was long-standing
and substantial: both maps hundreds of years old
and modern, highly authoritative encyclopaedia,
treated the territories as belonging to Iran."54
The representative of the United Kingdom (the protecting 
state before the occupation) explained that his Government was 
satisfied with the agreement reached between the ruler of 
Sharjah and Iran on Abu Musa. As regards the two islands of 
Tumb, he stated that "the United Kingdom had declared that it 
could not protect them if agreement was not reached by the 
time of withdrawal".55
In fact the Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah in 1971 presented to
51 Keesing's Contemporary Archives. (1971-72), p.25010A.
52 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the 
Work of the Organisation. 16 June 1971-15 June 1972 (Official 
Records, 27th session), p.76.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid. . pp. 76-7.
55 Ibid. . p.77.
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the Council of the League of Arab States 18 historical 
documents to substantiate his title to the Tumb islands, which 
may be regarded as valuable evidence in support of his 
claim.56 As regards Abu Musa island, evidence of continued 
and uninterrupted control of Sharjah over it is also not 
lacking. A report prepared by a group of British lawyers, on 
the instructions of the Ruler of Sharjah, reveals abundant 
British documentary evidence which supports Sharjah*s legal 
title to the island for at least 100 years.57
However, the reason put forward by some writers for the 
continuation of occupation by the new regime in Iran is that, 
after the overthrow of the Shah, the new revolutionary regime 
viewed the entire Muslim world as its legitimate constituency 
and thereby it could gain a broader international influence 
by keeping them.58 This is a matter which has been supported 
by Iranian official statements.59
56 Official Records of the League of Arab States on the 
Gulf Islands. Document presented by Ras al-Khaimah on 6 
December 1971.
57 Interim Report to the Ruler of Sharjah, prepared by 
Coward Chance and Associates of St. Swithin's House, London 
(unpublished), 23 July 1971. For a legal analysis of the 
claims of the concerned parties, see Al-Baharna, H. , The 
Arabian Gulf States. Their legal and political status and 
their international problems. Beirut (1975), pp.341-48. See 
also Amin, S., Political and Strategic Issues in the Persian 
Arabian Gulf, op.cit.. pp.53-54.
58 See Chubin, op.cit. . p. 3.
59 In March 1980 the then President Bani Sadra reiterated 
Iran's categorical refusal to return the islands to the UAE 
merely on the grounds that the Gulf states were not 
independent and that they were controlled by the USA. 
Furthermore, he claimed that, historically, all the Gulf 
states were part of Iran. See Kuwait Newspaper, Al-Rai al-
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4. Acts of Iran Which Have Been Complained Of
(A) Re Iraq and Iran's Counter Argument
The war between Iraq and Iran erupted in September 1980.
The main argument put forward by Iraq in support of her 
abrogation of the 1975 Treaty was that Iran had herself 
"terminated" the agreement by "word and deed" prior to Iraq's 
more formal abrogation. The reasoning put forward is that 
Iran had secured the thalweg boundary in Shatt-al-Arab, a 
cession of considerable importance to her, by agreeing to 
refrain from fomenting and aiding the Kurdish rebellion in 
Iraq. It was contended that Iran's guarantee regarding the 
Kurdish insurgency was a quid pro cruo regarding the cession 
of the thalweg line extended by Iraq. The latter argued that 
Iran had disregarded this obligation and provided Kurdish 
rebels with the facility of using parts of Iranian territory 
as bases for operations against Iraq. It was further claimed 
that Iran's leaders were trying to export their revolution to 
Iraq through subversive activities carried out by the Al- 
Da'awa Party (The Call Party). They further claimed when the 
policy of subversion and sabotage had failed, Iranian military 
action began. The Iranian indiscriminate military acts have 
been especially directed against cities and populated areas.60
Am. March 15. 1979? Al-Nahar al-Arabi wa al-Dowali. March 24- 
30, 1980, p.31. UAE newspaper, Al-Itihad. May 1, 1980.
60 For a legal discussion of the parties' claims on the 
abrogation of the 1975 treaty, see Kaikobad, K., The Shatt- 
al-Arab Boundary Question. A Legal Reappraisal. Clarendon 
Press, Oxford (1988), pp.93-115. See also A Review of the
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Iran in return argued that the war was imposed upon her 
in the form of military aggression organised by Iraq. Iraq 
unilaterally abrogated the Algiers Agreement, 1975. This is 
against Article 6 of the Agreement which requires the parties 
in case of difference regarding interpretation and application 
to have recourse to negotiation, mediation and arbitration 
involving even the International Court of Justice, and 
according to a clear timetable. The Vienna Convention they 
argued, disallows annulment of a border treaty even after 
substantial change of circumstances may occur. 
Definitiveness, permanence and unalterability are three 
Lntegral elements of any border treaty. Iran further claimed 
rhat since 1980, Iraqi forces attacked numerous Iranian towns, 
yillages and border posts. The United Nations, they 
emphasised, should look upon the Iraqi aggression within the 
framework of the definition of aggression adopted by the 
Seneral Assembly in Resolution 3314(XXIX) of December 14, 
1974.61
(B) Re Some G.C.C. Member States
A main feature of Iranian foreign policy was the 
interference in the internal affairs of G.C.C. states. This 
intervention took various forms, ranging from non-armed
Imposed War. Legal Dept., Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Iran 
(February 1983), pp.xvii-xviii, xx, 5, 77. Amin, S.,
International and Legal Problems of the Gulf. Middle East and 
tforth African Studies Press Ltd. (1981), pp.83-88; The Iraai- 
Iranian Dispute. Facts v. Allegations. Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Iraq (1981).
61 Ibid.
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intervention to indirect armed aggression. Non-armed 
intervention consisted of hostile propaganda62 accompanied by 
incitement of the people to rise against their governments.63
Another form of intervention some G.C.C. member states 
complained of is training, financing and arming nationals and 
non-nationals of the G.C.C. member states to overthrow the 
national regimes and destabilise security through subversive 
activities.64
62 The Kuwaiti Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, 
Shaikh Sabah Al-Ahmad was asked whether be believes that the 
Iran regime is still trying to export its revolution. He 
answered, "We had hoped that Iran would not harbor such 
designs, but when we hear the statements coming out of Iran 
in Friday sermons and statements by Iranian officials, we 
discover they still harbor this idea of exporting revolution." 
Al-Hawadith. London, 15 June 1984, pp.26-27, as translated in 
FBIS-MEA. V-84-117, 15 June 1984, pp.Cl-C3.
63 For hostile propaganda to be regarded as a form of 
illegal intervention, see Thomas, A. and Thomas, A., Non- 
Intervention. Southern Methodist University Press, Dallas
(1956), p.273. See also Lauterpacht, H. , "Revolutionary 
Activities by Private Persons against Foreign States", 22 
A.J.I.L. (1928), p.105; Whitton, J. , "Propaganda and 
International Law", 72 Recueil des Cours (1948), p.565; 
Stowell, E., Intervention in International Law. Washington, 
D.C., J. Byrne & Co. (1921) at p.378 stresses that calling on 
subjects of a foreign state to revolt is a "violation of the 
sovereign rights of a friendly state". Fawcett, J., Law and 
Power in International Relations. op.cit.. pp.111-16; 
Higgins, R., "Intervention and International Law", in 
Intervention in World Politics, ed. by Bull, H., Clarendon 
Press, Oxford (1984), pp.36-38; Schwebel, S., "Aggression, 
Intervention and Self-Defence", Recueil des Cours. II (1972), 
pp.452-55.
64 According to Kuwait*s State Security Court statement 
on bombing suspects (23 January 1984), the accused included 
17 Iraqis, 3 Lebanese, 3 Kuwaitis and 2 stateless persons. 
The 19 main defendants, according to the spokesman, along with 
one perpetrator who died while carrying out the bombing raid 
at the U.S. Embassy, would stand trial for responsibility for 
the blasts at all seven locations, the US and French 
Embassies, of the charges against the defendants illegal 
possession and importation of unlicensed ammunition. The
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The however, in the Case Concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities Against Nicaragua, has drawn a 
distinction between "intervention" and "use of force" in terms 
of aid to insurgents in another state. Accordingly, the Court 
found that
"... while the arming and training of the Contras can 
certainly be said to involve the threat or use of force 
against Nicaragua, this is not necessarily so in respect 
of all the assistance given by the United States 
Government. In particular, the Court considers that the 
mere supply of funds to the Contras, while undoubtedly 
an act of intervention in the internal affairs of 
Nicaragua... does not in itself amount to a use of 
force.1,65
Furthermore, G.C.C. member states were under immense 
pressure felt because of Iranian pronouncements that as soon 
as Iraq collapsed a military intervention was imminent.66
This position moreover worsened and the interests of some 
G.C.C. member states came under fierce attacks. Ships, ports, 
islands and installations were hit in act of reprisal against 
the policy of funding Iraq in the Gulf war.67
The combination of these acts and pronouncements against
Kuwaiti Deputy Prime Minister in an interview confirmed 
Iranian links with the bombing attacks against Kuwait 
installations and the foreign embassies. Al-Tadamun. London, 
16 June 1984, as translated in FBIS-MEA-V-84-118. June 1984, 
p p .C2-C3. As far as Bahrain is concerned, the Iranian 
abortive coup d'etat in 1981 was denounced by the Saudi 
Interior Minister which pointed at the Iranian Government as 
responsible for the act, FBIS-MEA-V-81-240. 15 December 1981, 
p.C.4.
65 See the case in the I.C.J. Reports of Judgments (1986) , 
p.109, para.228.
66 See infra, p.424.
67 See infra, p.423.
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G.C.C. member states, which represented Iranian foreign 
policy, has brought them into a direct clash with the rules 
of international law which need to be discussed under the 
terms of intervention, armed attack in the form of indirect 
aggression and reprisal.
(i) Intervention
Intervention is a term often applied to any act of 
interference by one state in the affairs of others.68 The term 
for some seems to include the notion of any interference at 
all in the state's affairs and for others the notion of
• • • • £%Qmilitary intervention.
However, the balance should exist between the respect for 
sovereignty and political independence of states on the one 
hand and the reality of an interdependent world and 
international obligations, especially to human rights, on the 
other.70
Certain acts will not constitute intervention if the
68 Thomas, A. and Thomas, A., Non-Intervention. o p .cit.. 
pp. 67-68; Brownlie, I., International Law and the Use of 
Force bv States. Oxford, Clarendon Press (1963), p.44.
69 Higgins, R . , "Intervention and International Law", in 
Intervention in World Politics, ed. by Bull, H. , op.cit.. 
p.30. Some writers, however, restrict it to the narrow sense 
of the term and that of dictatorial interference. See 
Lawrence, J., Principles of International Law. 5 th ed., London 
(1913), at p.124. Similar views are expressed by Oppenheim, 
J., International Law. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. , Longman Green 
(1948), pp.272-73; Brierly, J . , The Law of Nations. 6th ed., 
Clarendon Press, Oxford (1963), p.402; Kelsen, H . , Principles 
of International Law. New York (1952), p.64.
70 Higgins, R. , "Intervention and International Law", 
idem. See also, Schwebel, S., "Aggression, Intervention and 
Self-Defence", op.cit.. pp.453-454.
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methods fall short of the use of armed force as stipulated in 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, or the active support of 
groups aiming at overthrowing a regime as the UN resolutions 
indicate.71 Therefore rhetorical statements by a regime 
portraying its political system as an ideal which should be 
followed by others may not be regarded as intervention unless 
it deliberately foments civil unrest in other countries.
Under the UN Charter intervention in its wide sense has 
not been condemned and Article 2(4) is primarily directed 
against the use of force.72
However, for some one way of providing criteria for 
unlawful non-military intervention is to tie the concept to 
state jurisdiction and any minor act against that is 
unacceptable.73 Another way of adjusting the concept is to 
adhere to the UN General Assembly Declarations and 
Resolutions.
After prolonged debate and controversy in the UN the 
principle, including the duty not to intervene in matters
71 See Resolution 2131-XX (1965) entitled Declaration on 
the Inadmissibility of Intervention into Domestic Affairs of 
States and the Protection of their Independence and 
Sovereignty, General Assembly Res. 2131(XX) 20 G.A.O.R. 
Supp.14, Declaration on Principles of International law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 25 G.A.O.R. 
Supp.18, at 122, UN Doc.A/8028 (1970), Helsinki Final Act, 14
I .L.M. (1975), p.1292. For supporting view see Fawcett, J., 
Law and Power in International Relations, op.cit.. p.113.
72 Fawcett, Ibid. . p. 114.
73 Higgins, R., "Intervention and International Law", 
op.cit.. p.30.
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within the domestic jurisdiction of any state in accordance 
with the Charter, was formulated as a General Assembly 
Resolution 2131-XX(1965), adopted on its recommendation, 
entitled "Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention 
into the Domestic Affairs of states and the Protection of 
their Independence and Sovereignty".74
The principle of non-intervention as stated in the above 
Resolution was repeated in similar terms and without essential 
change in the Declaration on Principles of International law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations75 and also 
in the Helsinki Final Act.76
According to these resolutions and declarations, any form 
of interference or attempted threats against the political 
independence of the state, as well as armed intervention, are 
condemned.
Declaration 2131 on the inadmissibility of intervention 
for instance, states:
"1. No state has the right to intervene, directly
or indirectly for any reason whatever, in the
74 See General Assembly Res. 2131(XX) 20 G.A.O.R. Supp.14, 
at 11, UN Doc. A/6014 (1965). This resolution was adopted by 
the vote of 109 to 0, with 1 abstention (the United Kingdom) . 
In explaining his favourable vote, the Representative of the 
United States characterised the resolution "as a political 
message, not as a declaration or elaboration of the law 
governing non-intervention" Official Records of the G.A.. 20th 
session, First Committee, Verbatim Record of the 143rd 
Meeting, AIC 2/PU, 1422, p.12.
75 General Assembly Res. 2625, 25 G.A.O.R. Supp.18, at 
122, UN Doc. A/8028 (1920).
76 See the text in 14 I.L.M. (1975), p.1292.
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internal or external affairs of any other state. 
Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms 
of interference or attempted threats against the 
personality of the state or against its political, 
economic and cultural elements, are condemned.
2. No state may use or encourage the use of economic, 
political, or any other type of measures to coerce 
another state in order to obtain from it the 
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or 
to secure from it advantages of any kind. Also, no state 
shall organise, assist, foment, finance, incite or 
tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities 
directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of 
another state.”77
The ICJ in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua firmly emphasised that;
"Expressions of an opinio juris regarding the 
existence of the principle of non-intervention in 
customary international law are numerous and not 
difficult to find. Of course, statements whereby 
states avow their recognition of the principle of 
international law set forth in the United Nations 
Charter cannot strictly be interpreted as applying 
to the principle of non-intervention by states in 
the internal and external affairs of other states, 
since this principle is not, as such, spelt out in 
the Charter. But it was never intended that the 
Charter should embody written confirmation of every 
essential principle of international law in force.
The existence in the opinio juris of states of the 
principle of non-intervention is backed by 
established and substantial practice. It has 
moreover been presented as a corollary of the 
principle of the sovereign equality of states. A 
particular instance of this is General Assembly 
Resolution 2625(XXV), the Declaration on the 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Cooperation among States”78
77 See supra. note 71.
78 See ICJ Reports of the Judgments. Advisory Opinions 
and Orders (1986), Nicaragua v. United States of America, 
p.106, para.202. Professor Brownlie has described the 
Declaration of Friendly Relations, 2625(XXV) and the 
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, 2131(XX) 
as "part of the subsequent practice of the member states of 
the U.N. and must be given appropriate weight for the purpose 
of interpreting the provisions of the Charter", but they
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In the Corfu Channel Case, in which Britain claimed a
right of intervention in order to obtain evidence in the
territory of another state for submission to an international
tribunal, the court observed that:
"The alleged right of intervention is the 
manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in 
the past, given rise to most serious abuse and such 
as cannot, whatever be the present defects in 
international organisations, find a place in 
international law. Intervention is perhaps still 
less admissible in the particular form it would take 
here: for, from the nature of things, it would be
reserved for the most powerful states, and might 
easily lead to perverting the administration of 
international justice itself.”79
It is apparent that various acts which have been 
attributed to the Iranian Government, such as the very hostile 
propaganda through inflammatory radio broadcasts inciting the 
people to rise against their governments, may fall within the 
limits of intervention as indicated in the above Declarations 
and Resolutions. This applies more positively to those acts 
indirectly carried out by Iranian agents in the form of 
subversive activities.
However, the acts of the Iranian agents in the form of 
threats to the political independence of the G.C.C. member 
states or the use of force by irregular groups to weaken or 
overthrow their established political order, may fall within
"cannot have a legislative effect". See his article, "The 
United Nations Charter and the Use of Force", in Cassese 
(ed.), op.cit.. p.494. See also his book, Basic Documents in 
International Law. 3rd ed. (1985), p.35.
See I.C.J. Reports of the Judgments (1949), p.35.
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Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.80
According to Judge Schwebel the Declaration on
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of
States and the Protection of their Independence and
Sovereignty considers that "armed intervention is synonymous
with aggression”.81
The Charter of the UN speaks in Article 2(4) of the "use
of force" in international relations and does not
differentiate between the various kinds of illegal use of
force, attributing to them certain degrees of illegality
according to the methods used.
As the US Representative to the Special Committee on the
Question of Defining Aggression stated:
"There is simply no provision in the Charter, from 
start to finish, which suggests that a state can in 
any way escape or ameliorate the Charter's 
condemnation of illegal acts of force against 
another state by a judicious selection of means to
80 • • •For similar view on subversive activities, see Fawcett,
J., "Intervention in International Law: A Study of Some
Recent Cases" in Recueil des Cours II (1961), pp.353-57. The 
Secretary General of the G.C.C. in this regard made a 
distinction between the rhetoric of the Iranian government 
and its actual recourse to the use of force. He stated: "the
GCC has not been hostile to the revolution, nor even to the 
rhetoric of the revolution. In the beginning, Iran called for 
the overthrow of the moderate regimes in the area, but we can 
tolerate hostile propaganda. It did not represent a real 
threat to us. But it soon became clear that the Iranian 
government wanted to change the political texture of the 
region by resorting to force". See Bishara, A., The Gulf 
Cooperation Council: Its Nature and Outlook. No.l, National
Council on US-Arab Relations (1986), p.5.
81 Schwebel, S., "Aggression, Intervention and Self- 
Defence in Modern International law", II Recueil des Cours 
(1972), p.452.
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its illegal ends.”82
It is hard to maintain that when a state sends 
individuals or groups of individuals not belonging to the 
regular armed forces to perform military operations in the 
territory of another state for acts of terrorism or sabotage, 
this does not constitute unlawful use of force according to 
Article 2(4).83 Furthermore, the I.C.J. in the Nicaragua Case 
emphasized that arming and training Contras could involve the 
use of force.84
However, one has to make it clear that "intervention is 
not aggression in its entirety, whereas the first term 
involves various ranges of intrusions from minor or major 
ones, the latter term is confined to the unlawful military use 
of force."85
Yet, the definition of aggression operates only as a 
guidance to the Security Council and does not deprive the 
Council's own discretion in determining whether the 
requirements of Article 39 have occurred.86 Article 39
82 The statement by Lawrence Hargrove, United States 
Representative to the Special Committee, Press Release US UN 
32 (69), p.5, cited by Schwebel, ibid.. p.458.
83 Zanardi, P., "Indirect Military Aggression", in The 
Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, ed. Cassese, A., 
Martinus Nijhoff (1986), pp.111-112.
84 See I.C.J. Reports of Judgments (1986), o p .cit.. p.119, 
para.228.
85 See Higgins in Bull (ed.), o p .cit.. pp.37-40.
86 Schwebel, o p .cit.. p.448. See also his article "Law- 
Making in the United Nations", Federal Law Review of the 
Australian National University (1970), Vol.4, No.l, pp.118-
119? Brom, B., "The Definition of Aggression", 2 Recueil des
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provides:
"The Security Council shall determine the existence 
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression and shall make recommendations, 
or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance 
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security".
In fact, the Security Council has dealt with many 
situations which involved a high degree of violence without 
classifying them as acts of aggression.87
The characteristic of indirect aggression appears to be 
that the aggressor state, without itself committing hostile 
acts as a state, operates through third parties who are either 
foreigners or nationals seemingly acting on their own
• • • • OQ
initiative.
It has been argued that it is more difficult and 
necessary to define indirect aggression and subversion than
COUrS f19771. pp.369-73.
87 Garvey, J., "The UN Definition of *Aggression'. Law 
and Illusion in the Context of Collective Security", 17 
Virginia Journal of International Law. (1976-77), p.186. See 
also Higgins, R. , "The Legal Limits to the Use of Force by 
Sovereign States. United Nations Practice", 37 B.Y.I.L. 
(1961), p.274.
88 See The Report of the Secretary General. UN Doc. 
A/2211, p.72. Aggression not involving the use of armed force 
can be mounted by indirect as well as direct means. See the 
discussion in McDougal, M. and Feliciano, F., Law and Minimum 
World Public Order. Yale University Press, New Haven and 
London (1961), which describes as "indirect aggression" 
exercise of coercion emphasising political or ideological
instruments, with military instruments "in a muted and 
background role", pp.l90ff.; Zanardi, P., "Indirect Military 
Aggression in Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force", 
op.cit.. p.lll.
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direct aggression.89 This is mainly because of the radically 
different outlook in law of the contending systems, which 
leads to different interpretations of what is permitted or 
prohibited.90
Such outlook was reflected in the states' attitudes
towards the definition of aggression when the work began in
1968 (the latest Special Committee on the Question of Defining
Aggression) to the extent that some states did not define
aggression to include indirect as well as direct uses of
force. These proposals spoke only of the "use of armed force
by a state against another state".91
Nevertheless, Article 3 of the definition of aggression
came to include explicitly indirect aggression in paragraph
(g). It provides:
"Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration 
of war, shall, subject to and in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 2, qualify as an act of
on # #
Falk, R. , Legal Order in a Violent World. Princeton 
U.P. (1968), p.508.
on . • •
See McDougal, M. and Lasswell, H . , "The Identification 
and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order", in The 
Strategy of World Order. Vol.2, World Law Fund, Falk, R. and 
Mendlovitz, S. (ed.) (1966), p.67. See also, Henkin, L. ,
"Force, Intervention and Neutrality in Contemporary 
International Law", in ibid.. pp.344-46; Dore, I., 
International Law and the Superpowers. Normative Order in a 
Divided World. Rutgers University Press (1984), pp.45-49.
91 The thirteen countries who maintained that self-defence 
to indirect aggression is unjustified are Colombia, Cyprus, 
Ecuador, Ghana, Guyana, Haiti, Iran, Madagascar, Mexico, 
Spain, Uganda, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. See Schwebel, S., 
op.cit.. pp.455-57 and p.482. See also, Ferencz, B., 
"Defining Aggression: Where it Stands and Where It Is Going",
66 A.J.I.L. (1972), p.499. For the relevant documents on the 
issue see UN Doc. A/AC. 134/L. 37, Annex I, p. 2,' UN A/AC.134/L, 
3 7, Add.1, p .3.
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aggression:....
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a state of armed 
bands, groups, irregular or mercenaries, which carry out 
acts of armed force against another state of such gravity 
as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial 
involvement therein."92
It should be stressed that the notion "sending" 
presupposes close links between the sending state and the 
armed group, in view of which the acts of sending could be 
attributed to the sending state or its organs.93
According to Zanardi, if the acts are isolated and 
sporadic, then they may not meet the requisite and extent of 
gravity characteristic of aggression.94 Similarly, according 
to Article 3(g) of the definition giving assistance to the 
armed groups or acquiescing in their activities only may not 
constitute aggression95 but it may be considered as 
intervention.
Yet the link between the target state and the armed group 
when these are its nationals does not exclude the application
92 For the text and the discussion of the definition, see 
Ferencz, B., Defining International Aggression. Oceana 
Publications, New York (1975).
93 Zanardi, op.cit. . p. 112.
94 Zanardi, idem. See also Bowett, D., Self-Defence in 
International Law. Manchester (1958), p.192, who regards 
assistance to revolting minorities as a form of indirect 
aggression, but not armed attack according to Article 51 of 
the UN Charter.
95 See the statement of Mr. Bessou (France) in the Special 
Committee, who states "Until they had been dispatched, no act 
of aggression had occurred; the mere fact of organising or 
preparing armed bands did not itself constitute an act of 
aggression". In Ferencz, Vol.2, op.cit.. p.577.
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96 • •of paragraph (g) , provided that those nationals act under 
the influence of the aggressor state.
Thus, the acts of the Iranian Government in the form of 
arming, training and sending irregular groups both of G.C.C. 
nationals and non-nationals, to engage in subversive 
activities may fall within the definition of aggression.97
In 1981 assistance given by Iran to internal groups in 
Bahrain took a very subtle form, including the training, 
exportation of ammunition and financing, then sending some 
Bahraini nationals with the aim of overthrowing the regime of
# O f t  # •  •  •  •
Bahrain. As evidence of Iran's complicity m  the abortive
96 The Report of the Secretary General, supra, note 88. 
See also McDougal and Feliciano, o p .cit.. p.190.
97 See supra, note 64.
98 •On 17 December 1981 an Iranian-backed coup d'etat 
attempt in Bahrain was foiled by the security services. The 
Bahraini government announced that with the help of Saudi 
Arabia 64 plotters had been arrested. The plot aimed at 
overthrowing the Bahraini Government and the state radio 
accused Iran of "sending saboteurs... to carry out acts of 
violence against vital installations and [high] ranking 
Bahraini defence security and other government officials". 
The arrested plotters, who were reported to have been trained 
in Iran, belonged to the Islamic Front for the Liberation of 
Bahrain, and the operation had been coordinated with Iranian 
officials: New York Times. December 17, 1981, Washington
Post. March 31, 1982, Middle East Economic Survey. 25-29
(1983), p.17. The Bahrain Prime Minister confirmed that and 
accused Iran of helping the Shiites in the Gulf to overthrow 
the Gulf regimes. See also the statement of Saudi Arabian 
Minister of the Interior which confirmed the link between the 
plotters in the coup d'etat and the Iranian government. He 
emphasised that Saudi Arabia was targeted by such acts. See 
FBIS-ME-A-V-81-24 0, 15 December 1981, p.C4. As a result of 
the abortive coup d'etat a security agreement with Saudi 
Arabia was signed, and though Bahrain itself appears to have 
reverted to a more low key approach, the Saudis attacked Iran 
in the harshest terms after signing the agreement in Manama. 
The Saudi Arabian Minister directly accused Iran of being 
responsible for the plot and that it had become the "terrorist
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coup, a message was delivered to the Bahrain embassy in Tehran 
demanding the immediate release of the arrested plotters.99
Another abortive attempt in the form of a coup d'etat 
disguised as a purely domestic change, was directed and 
carried out against the regime of Bahrain in 1984.100
Some other G.C.C. member states (i.e. Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia) have been similarly subjected to Iranian indirect 
aggression and interference.101
of the Gulf". Summary of World Broadcast (SWB) ME/7256/A/3, 
12-2 (1963).
99 New York Times. December 17, 1981.
100 The charges brought against the 19 persons accused by 
the Bahrain Attorney-General in the case No.1105/1984 dated 
2 0/6/1984 (not published). All the accused were of Bahraini 
nationality. The charges brought were, inter alia, the 
overthrow of the Bahraini Government using military force in 
violation of Articles 159 (1.2), 164, 185 of the
law. The attempt was carried out with the cooperation and 
coordination of some organs in the Iranian government. The 
Supreme Appeal Court in Bahrain upheld the charges brought by 
the Attorney-General concerning the link with Iranian 
officials and their role in training and sending them to 
Bahrain. The Security of the State Case 12, Session 24.12.84. 
Private information of the author.
101 • • • •Convinced of his religious mission and his supreme
spiritual power, Khomeini began appointing personal religious 
envoys to the Gulf states in order to propagate his hostile 
teachings. In early 1979 the Kuwait Government uncovered an 
arms depot in a suburb of the Kuwaiti capital and arrested a 
group of individuals regarded as pro-Khomeini. On June 12 
1980 explosions occurred at the office Public Opinion, a daily 
Kuwaiti newspaper known for is criticism of Iran. Since the 
Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has used the annual 
pilgrimage as an occasion to propagate its revolutionary ideas 
in one form of violence or another. To these ends it has been 
reported in March 1980 that the Iranian Government would 
allocate approximately one billion Iranian riyals to promote 
and support various national liberation fronts. For these 
charges see consecutively, Al-Nahar. Sept.26, 1979? Christian 
Monitor. Jan. 22, 1979; Khadduri, M . , The Gulf War. Oxford
(1988), pp.126-29? Iran subsidiary to subversive activities 
cited by MacDonald, C., "Iran as a Political Variable", in
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It should be noted here that even if it were the case 
that Iran did not send irregular groups to some G.C.C. member 
states, it had been "substantially involved” in the operation 
as the evidence has already been shown.102 According to 
Article 3(g) of the Definition of Aggression, "the substantial 
involvement" in the sending of armed bands constitutes an 
autonomous provision of the paragraph. As Professor Stone 
concludes, while Article 3(g) "requires there to have been" 
sending into the target state, it inculpates the host state 
not merely when that state did the sending, but also when it 
has a "substantial involvement therein".103
(ii) Armed attack in form of indirect aggression
In applying Article 3(g) of the Definition of Aggression 
to the incidents which took the form of indirect aggression 
as explained before, one should refer to the doubts that were 
raised by some government delegates in the UN Special 
Committee as to the relationship between Article 3 (g) and 
self-defence.
The Mexican delegate, for instance, pointed out that the 
above paragraph should not be interpreted under any 
circumstances "as adding to the number of situations in which
Koury, E. and MacDonald, C. (ed.), Revolution in Iran. 
Institute of Middle East and North African Affairs (1982), 
p. 56.
102 See supra. note 100.
103 See the dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel in Case 
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities, op.cit.. 
p.344, para.166.
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the right of self-defence in accordance with the Charter could
be invoked” . He stated:
”No state must be permitted to use that provision 
to invoke the right of self-defence against another 
state when acts of subversion or terrorism took 
place in its territory, since the definition of 
aggression, instead of discouraging the use of armed 
force, would then serve to legitimate it.”104
Rosenstock, the US representative, contended that Article
3(g) correctly stated the view that not every act of force in
violation of the Charter constitutes aggression. He
maintained that this followed as well from Article 1, which
defines aggression as "the use of armed force... as set out
in this definition". The provision of Article 2 of the
Charter, that the Security Council may conclude that the use
of force in contravention of the Charter "does not comprise
an act of aggression", moves in the same direction.
Especially one had in mind hereby "the fact that the acts
concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient
gravity".105
The attitude of the United States Government in this 
regard is quite significant in relation to the Vietnam War. 
The US, in its argument justifying the use of force against 
North Vietnam under Article 51 of the UN Charter, avoided the 
invocation of the notion of indirect aggression to justify its 
action against North Vietnam, and on the contrary made it
104 See A.AC. 134 SR 113, in Ferencz, o p .cit. . Vol. 2,
p.594.
105 Ibid. . p.578.
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clear that it only regarded it an armed attack when North
Vietnam had sent thousands of armed infiltrators, followed by
regular troops.106
In the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (1986), the court, on the
critical question of whether aid to irregulars may be
tantamount to an armed attack, regrettably departed from
accepted and desirable rules which reflect progressive
development of the law on the use of force. The court accepted
that the "description, contained in Article 3, paragraph (g)
of the Definition of Aggression annexed to General Assembly
resolution 3314(XXIX) may be taken to reflect customary
international law".107 It was not, however, satisfied that
"assistance has reached the Salvadorian armed 
opposition, on a scale of any significance, since 
the early months of 1981, or that the Government of 
Nicaragua was responsible for any flow of arms at 
either period. Even assuming that the supply of 
arms to the opposition in El Salvador could be 
treated as imputable to the Government of Nicaragua, 
to justify invocation of the right of collective 
self-defence in customary international law, it 
would have to be equated with an armed attack by 
Nicaragua on El Salvador... The court is unable to 
consider that, in customary international law, the 
provision of arms to the opposition in another state 
constitutes an armed attack on that state. Even at 
a time when the arms flow was at its peak, and again
106 See the State Department Memorandum of March 4, 1966, 
which is to be found in Falk, R. , The Vietnam War and 
International Law. Princeton (1968), p.583. On the legal 
problems arising from the American military intervention in 
Vietnam, see the numerous articles in the four-volume work 
edited by Falk, ibid.. (1968, 1969, 1972, 1976).
107 See the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America) . ICJ Reports of Judgments (1986), p.103, 
para.195.
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assuming the participation of the Nicaraguan 
Government, that would not constitute such armed 
attack.1,108
The court*s interpretation of Article 3(g), which 
recognises indirect aggression as armed attack only if carried 
out on a large significant scale, has narrowed the concept of 
use of force. Thus, the court has laid down a distinction 
between a relatively low level of use of force and armed 
attack as referred to in Article 51 of the UN Charter. It 
states that not every use of force is an armed attack.
The distinction is not compatible with the purposes of 
the preamble, nor Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Both are 
directed to reducing tension and preventing the use of force 
in international relations. The realities of the use of force 
in international relations have brought profound affliction 
to the stability and peace in the world, and to adopt such an 
interpretation of the use of force is more likely to promote
108 Ibid. . p.119, para.230.
For the operation of indirect aggression to be on a
significant scale in order to be regarded as armed attack,
does not match the realities of use of force. Such a rule
cannot be taken in its entirety as state practice.
As Fawcett points out, the activities of armed bands
which constitute armed attack
"...depend upon difficult questions of fact, for 
example, armed bands, self-organised and irregularly 
equipped, may constitute no threat at all to a 
powerful state, but their operations may well amount 
to an 1 armed attack1 upon a militarily weak or 
politically unstable state."110
Thus, there is a distinction between the situation in 
Central America as indicated in the Nicaragua Case and the 
political and economic realities of the Gulf region. The 
small size of some of the G.C.C. countries, coupled with the 
fact that they are entirely dependent upon one product, namely
109 • • • • •See the dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel, o p .cit.. 
p.332. For the interpretation of Article 51 the views of the 
jurists are divided between narrow interpretation which 
requires the prior occurrence of armed attack, and wide 
interpretation which allows anticipatory self-defence. Those 
who adopt a narrow definition of the Article: Higgins, The
Development of International Law through the United Nations 
Organs, op.cit.. p.199; Brownlie, International Law and the 
Use of Force, op.cit.. pp.258-9; Jessup, A Modern Law of 
Nations (1948), op.cit.. pp.165-168; Skubiszewsky, K., "Use 
of Force by States. Collective Security. Law of War and 
Neutrality", in Manual of Public International Law. Sorensen 
(ed.), op.cit.. p.767. Those who think that Article 51 should 
be widely construed: Bowett, Self-Defence in International
Law, o p .cit.. pp.182-199; McDougal and Feliciano, o p .cit.. 
pp.231-241; Waldock, "The Regulation of the Use of Force by 
Individual States in International Law", o p .cit.. p.496.
110 Fawcett, "Intervention in International Law", o p .cit.. 
p.363.
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oil, and the exposed nature of the oil installations, means
that a minor act of subversion could jeopardize the entire
economic future of those countries. Furthermore, the court's
judgment departs from the progressive development on the law
of force, either through the writings of the jurists or the
work of the International Law Commission.
That the direction and control of armed bands by a state
is attributable to that state for purposes of determining its
liability is an elementary principle of international law.
The principle has been codified in draft form by the
International Law Commission. Article 8 of the draft articles
on State Responsibility reads:
"The conduct of a person or group of persons shall 
also be considered as an act of the state under 
international law if, (a) it is established that 
such person or group of persons was in fact acting 
on behalf of that state.."111
Commenting on this draft article in the Third Report on
State Responsibility to the I.L.C., Special Rapporteur, Judge
Roberto Ago writes:
"The attribution to the state, as a subject of
international law, of the conduct of persons who are
in fact operating on its behalf or at its
instigation is unanimously upheld by the writers on
international law who have dealt with this • 11? question."
Judge Ago states further:
"Private persons may be secretly appointed to carry 
out particular missions or tasks to which the organs 
of the state prefer not to assign regular state 
officials: people may be sent as so-called
111 See Y.I.L.C. II (1974), Part I, p.277.
112 Ibid. . Vol.II (1971), Part I, p.266.
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'volunteers* to help an insurrectional movement in 
a neighbouring country - and many more examples 
could be given.”113
Professor Higgins takes the position that the use of
irregular groups to carry out armed attacks against another
state is "from a functional point of view, a use of force".114
She develops the historical background for the growing
emphasis on indirect uses of force in UN practice at San
Francisco. She points out the main thrust was on conventional
means of armed attack, but "the unhappy events of the last
fifteen years" precipitated a substantial re-evaluation of the
concept of the use of force.115
Brownlie notes that although sporadic operations by armed
groups might not amount to armed attack,
"it is conceivable that a coordinated and general 
campaign by powerful bands of irregulars, with 
obvious or easily proven complicity of a government 
of a state from which they operate would constitute 
an 'armed attack1."116
Rifaat also points to the growing practice of state
covert operations in an attempt to circumvent the prohibition
of Article 2(4):
"States, while overtly accepting the obligation not 
to use force in their mutual relations, began to
113 Ibid. . p.283.
114 Higgins, R . , "The Legal Limits to the Use of Force by 
Sovereign States. United Nations Practice", 37 B.Y.I.L. 
(1961)., p.278.
115 Ibid. . pp.288-289.
116 See Brownlie, I., International Law and the Use of
Force bv States. Clarendon Press, Oxford (1963) p.279. It
should be noted here that Professor Brownlie was counsel for
Nicaragua before the ICJ in 1986.
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seek other methods of covert pressure in order to 
pursue their national policies without direct 
confrontation. The incompatibility of the classical 
external armed aggression with the present rules 
regulating international relations, led to the 
development of other methods of covert or indirect 
aggression. ”117
Thus, there is a strong ground for arguing that "the use 
of force" by way of covert operations may well fall within 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.118
The consequent result of that is that the victim state 
shall be entitled to use its right of self-defence according 
to Article 51 of the UN Charter.
Professor Higgins states:
"The right of self-defence is available equally to 
an indirect use of force as well as a direct use of 
force.1,119
Fawcett similarly maintains that the action by irregular 
groups, armed and organised for the political purpose of 
overthrowing a government, may constitute an armed attack for
117 Rifaat, A. , International Aggression: A Study of the
Legal Concept:______Its Development and Definition in
International Law. Almquist & Wiksell, Stockholm (1979), 
p.217.
118 For similar views, see Higgins, o p .cit. . p.278; 
Fawcett, J., "Intervention in International Law", o p .cit.. 
p.356? Schwebel, o p .cit.. p.482. See also his dissenting 
opinion in the Military and Paramilitary Case, o p .cit.. 
pp.332-335. Bowett, o p .cit.. pp.45-6. At p.279 he maintains 
that "new techniques of subversive activities and ideological 
propaganda... call for a specific regulation? the right of 
self-defence in relation to these new techniques will only 
have judicial connotation when their use can be characterised 
as delictual".
1 1 Q  • » »Higgins, m  B.Y.I.L. (1961), o p .cit.. p.204.
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• 120 the purpose of Article 51 of the Charter.
So the Special Committee on the Question of Defining
Aggression observed that "support of invading armed bands,
though not included in the concept of aggression, was serious
enough to be placed on the same footing as armed
• 121 • • aggression”, and in that Committee the Netherlands put
forward a definition of "armed attack” which included armed
intervention by irregular forces and justified accordingly
the use of the right of self-defence.
"Armed attack, as this form is used in Article 51, 
is any use of armed force which leaves the state, 
against which it is directed, no means other than 
military means to preserve its territorial integrity 
or political independence.”122
Schwebel argues that:
"The Charter proscribes the threat or use of armed 
force, without specifying the means by which that 
force is exerted. Even if, arguendo, one construes 
Article 51 as confining the exercise of self-defence 
to response to armed attack, subversive or terrorist 
acts carried out by irregular, volunteers or armed 
bands with the organisation and support of a foreign 
state comprehend forms of armed attack."123
Brownlie, though he accepts that a "coordinated and
general campaign by powerful bands of irregulars" could
constitute an "armed attack", warns that a right to use force
against various forms of indirect aggression cannot be derived
120 . . . • Fawcett, "Intervention m  International Law", o p .cit..
p.357.
121 G.A.O.R. (1957) A/3574, para.51-52.
122 Ibid. . 208.
123 ■Schwebel, S., "Aggression, Intervention and Self- 
Defence", o p .cit.. p.482.
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from Article 51 if the proportionality rule is strictly 
observed.124
Yet, as demonstrated earlier,125 the I.C.J. in the
Nicaragua Case did not accept the view that "armed attack” and
the use of force are synonymous, and limited the circumstances
in which a state may resort to the right of self-defence. The
Court emphasised that the alleged intervention by Nicaragua
in the internal affairs of neighbouring states could not
justify U.S. counter-measures against Nicaragua involving the
use of armed force:
"While an armed attack would give rise to an entitlement 
to collective self-defence, a use of force of a lesser 
degree of gravity cannot ... produce counter-measures 
involving the use of force. The acts of which Nicaragua 
is accused, even assuming them to have been established 
and imputable to that state, could only have justified 
proportionate counter-measures on the part of the state 
which had been the victim of these acts ...”126
However, the duty imposed upon Iran to prohibit the
initiation of hostile expeditions by persons within its
territory or funding and arming nationals of other states,
does not only raise the issue of self-defence, which is basic
policy, "but also international collaboration in the
prohibition of the use of force by entities not associated
124 Brownlie, I., The Use of Force and International Law. 
op.cit.. p.279.
125 See supra. p.414.
126 I.C.J. Reports (1986), o p .cit. . p.127, para.249.
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• • * * 1 2 7with or operating under the delegation from a nation state."
Yet, one has to examine other requirements laid down in 
the Nicaragua Case (1986) concerning self-defence.
The court found that in customary law there is no rule 
permitting the exercise of collective self-defence in the 
absence of a request by the state which regards itself as the 
victim of an armed attack. The court concludes that the 
requirement of a request by the victim state for collective
self-defence is additional to the requirement that it had
• 128 declared itself to have been under attack.
Another stringent condition has to be met, that is, in
accordance with the UN Charter, the measures taken by states
in exercise of the right of self-defence must be "immediately
• * 1 2 9reported" to the Security Council.
As far as the requirement that a state should declare 
itself to have been attacked is concerned, Bahrain has 
publicly announced the incident.130 However, the requirement 
of a request for collective self-defence apparently has not 
been made. This condition, as Sir Robert Jennings points out,
127 • • •Reisman, M . , "Private Armies in a Global War System: 
Prologue to Decision", in Law and Civil War in the Modern 
World. Moor, N. (ed.), Johns Hopkins University Press (1974), 
p. 257.
128 • •See the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua, o p .cit.. paragraph 199,
p.105.
129 • • •Ibid.. See also Bowett, Self-Defence in International 
Law, o p .cit.. p.197.
130 See supra. note 98.
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• • • • 131 •"might sometimes be unrealistic". For Bahrain to make such 
a formal declaration and request the right of collective self- 
defence in itself could have adversely antagonised Iran.
(iii) Reprisal
Iran, in an act of armed reprisal, escalated its air 
raids on Kuwait territory and installations, commercial ships 
en route to and from the ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
The Iranian Government in a letter to the Security 
Council emphasised that the security of the Gulf was 
indivisible. Either there was security for all, or there was 
no security for anyone. It claimed that some states in the 
area and beyond attempted to impose an "unacceptable 
situation" on Iran. They "pour extensive financial and 
material resources" into Iraq, encouraging it to threaten 
commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf, "and yet they wish 
to remain secure from the consequences of their obvious 
backing of the aggressor Iraq". Those states, therefore, 
contribute to the internationalisation of a conflict "from 
which they can hardly remain secure". For that, only they
132themselves were to be blamed "next to Iraq."
One should realise that the involvement of the G.C.C. 
member states by funding Iraq in the Gulf war,133 mainly
131 Sir Robert Jennings, dissenting opinion in Nicaragua 
Case. op.cit.. p.545.
132 UN Chronicle. No.5, Vol.XXI (1984), p.5.
133 For the evidence of funding Iraq financially, see 
infra. note 159.
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stemmed from the fear that Iran was bent on exporting its
revolution to them by all means. The aim, as the leader in
Iran made clear, is to establish an Islamic government and
each country either to be associated with Iran or in a
subordinate relationship.134
Such fears were fed by Khomeini himself who appeared to
expect the G.C.C. member states to fall under Iran's
dominance, once Iraq had been overcome:
"If the war continues and if in the war Iran defeats 
Iraq, Iraq will be annexed to Iran; that is, the 
nation of Iraq, the oppressed people of Iraq, will 
free themselves from the talons of the tyrannical 
clique and will link themselves with the Iranian 
nation. They will set up their own government 
according to their wishes - an Islamic one. If Iran 
and Iraq can merge and be amalgamated all the 
diminutive nations of the region will join them."135
Such a statement, however, does not justify G.C.C. member
states in claiming that there was imminent danger and thereby
they decided to side with Iraq as an exercise of their right
of self-defence. This claim cannot be asserted even if the
statement included the threat of use of force.
As Professor Higgins states:
"The prohibition against the use of force is 
balanced by permission to engage in individual or 
collective self-defence. But individual and 
collective self-defence appears to be limited to 
armed attacks, whereas the prohibition clause is 
drafted more widely. Article 2(4) prohibits the
134 Khadduri, The Gulf War, op.cit. . p. 117. See also 
Abdulghani, op.cit.. p.197; Ramazani, The Gulf Cooperation 
Council. o p .cit.. p.193; Chubin, "Iran and its Neighbours", 
op.cit.. p.7; the Report on Iran-Iraq War and Navigation in 
the Gulf, May 17-August 11, 1987, 26 ILM (1987), p.1448.
135 Khomeini, 21 June 1982, in FBIS. VIII, 11-3, 22 June
1982.
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threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of a state.
The two sides of the coin do not entirely match."136
Furthermore, if there is to be no linkage between funding 
Iraq by G.C.C. member states and the indirect aggression by 
Iran against certain G.C.C. member states (which is apparently 
the ground to invoke the right of self-defence) then the 
G.C.C. states would be guilty of indulging in acts of 
reprisal.
This presumption may be held if the indirect aggression 
by Iran had stopped before the war began.
The view that armed reprisal is forbidden under the 
Charter of the UN is widely held by most authors.137
However, economic reprisals short of the use of armed 
force are not prohibited by Article 2(4) of the Charter, but 
are only legitimate insofar as there is prior international 
delinquency against the claimant state, redress is not
136 Higgins, "Intervention and International Law", in 
Intervention in World Politics, o p .cit. at p.32.
137 See Bowett, "Reprisals involving Recourse to Armed 
Force", 66 A.J.I.L. (1972), p.l; Goodrich and Hambro, Charter 
of the United Nations. Stevens and Sons, London (1949), pp.95- 
96; Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by 
States. op.cit.. pp.219-23; Higgins, The Development of 
International Law through the Political Organs of the United 
Nations, o p .cit.. pp.202-205, 217-218; Waldock, "The 
Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in 
International Law", 81 Recueil des Cours. II (1952), pp.475- 
494; Sorensen, M . , "Principes de droit international public", 
in ibid.. Ill (I960), p.219; Skubiszewski in Sorensen, Manual 
of Public International Law, o p .cit.. pp.754-55. The authors 
maintaining a contrary view, i.e. accepting a continuing 
permissible role for armed reprisals are Colbert, S., 
Retaliation in International Law. King's Crown Press, New York 
(1948) and Stone, J., Aggression and World Order. King's Crown 
Press, New York (1958), pp.43, 94-98.
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available and the principle of proportionality is observed. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of economic reprisals must
• • • 158cease when their objective has been achieved.
The International Law Commission (ILC) has accepted that,
if the necessary conditions are fulfilled, "there is nothing
to prevent a state which has suffered an internationally
wrongful act from reacting against the state which committed
the act by a measure consisting of unarmed reprisals".139 The
ILC states that economic reprisals
"... even though it does not involve the use of armed 
force, such a measure nevertheless constitutes 
conduct not in conformity with what would be 
required under an international obligation towards 
the state against which it is directed. In such a 
case, therefore, the fact that the measures in 
question were taken as legitimate reaction on the 
part of the state wronged by an international 
offence, against the state which had committed that 
offence earlier, precludes the wrongfulness that 
such a measure might otherwise entail."140
This tendency of the ILC was clear when it formulated the
draft of Article 34 on state responsibility. It reads:
"The wrongfulness of an act of a state not in 
conformity with an international obligation of that 
state is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful 
measure of self-defence taken in conformity with 
the Charter of the United Nations."141
158 Bowett, D., "Economic Coercion and Reprisals by 
States", op.cit.. pp.9-10. See also, Malanczuk, P., "Counter- 
Measures and Self-Defence as Circumstances precluding 
Wrongfulness in International Law Commission's Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility", in 43 Zeitschrift fur Auslandlisches 
offentlichesrecht und volkerrecht (1983), p.737.
139 See Y.I.L.C. II (1979), Part 2, p.118, para.11.
140 Ibid.
141 See Y.I.L.C. . Vol.I (1980), p.184.
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(5) G.C.C. Practice
(i) Regarding collective self-defence
As a result of the abortive coup d'etat in Bahrain in
1981 the G.C.C. regarded the incident as aggression directed
at the sovereignty of all G.C.C. member states. In a
statement for the G.C.C. Ministerial Council on 7 February
1982, the Council declared:
"During its meeting the Council reviewed the recent 
events in the State of Bahrain and declared its full 
support for the State of Bahrain in safeguarding its 
safety and stability and protecting its sovereignty 
and its determination to resist the acts of sabotage 
that are carried out by Iran with the aim of 
undermining security and stability, spreading chaos 
and confusion and threatening the interests of 
citizens on the basis of the G.C.C.'s fundamental 
principles which view any aggression against any 
G.C.C. member as an aggression against all G.C.C. 
members, and which stress that the region's security 
and stability is a collective responsibility that 
falls on all G.C.C. countries."142
The Supreme Council summit held in Doha in November 1983
declared in its final communique, inter alia, the G.C.C.
commitment to deter any attempt directed against G.C.C. member
states' security and stability.
"The G.C.C. Supreme Council reviewed the progress 
of military coordination among the G.C.C. countries 
in implementation of the resolution adopted at its 
third session held in Bahrain in November 1982 - 
resolutions aimed at building the strength of the 
G.C.C. member countries and coordinating among them 
so that the G.C.C. countries will be able to rely 
on themselves in defending their security and
142 FBIS-MEA-V-81-026. 8 February 1982, pp.C5-C6. See
also the press conference held by Bahrain Foreign Minister who 
confirmed the idea of collective security. Ibid.. 10 February 
1982, pp.Cl-C3.
429
safeguarding their stability.”143
In fact Kuwait has raised the issue of collective self- 
defence under the Joint Defence and Economic Treaty as a 
result of increasing attacks against its ships in the Gulf 
war. The Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs made it clear 
that his country will request the Arab League Secretariat to 
include the issue in the agenda of the League Council.144
The Fundamental Statute of the G.C.C. does not include 
any provision on collective self-defence. This is due in part 
to the fact that most G.C.C. member states are parties to the 
Arab Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty concluded 
in 1950. However, G.C.C. member states, in the absence of 
defence and security agreements within their arrangement, 
adopted two documents on security and defence. The security 
strategy which includes general principles of cooperation in 
various aspects of security and defence strategy which focuses 
on the mutual obligation between G.C.C. member states to repel 
any aggression directed against G.C.C. members. The latter 
strategy also deals with regular manoeuvres and military 
cooperation among the members.145
143 Ibid. . 9 November 1983, p.C3.
Qatar News Agency Bulletin. 2 June 1984, p.18.
145 An interview conducted by the author with Dr. Al- 
Hamaad, the G.C.C. Secretary General Assistant for Political 
Affairs Office, on 31 January 1988. One should state, 
however, that under international law G.C.C. member states are 
not deprived of their right of collective self-defence in the 
absence of any kind of defence arrangements. See infra, note 
151. The G.C.C. member states, except Oman, seem to have 
adhered to the Joint Defence and Economic Treaty. Their 
ratification and accession occurred on the following dates:
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Article 2 of the Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty 
provides:
"The contracting states consider any act of armed 
aggression made against any one or more of them or 
their armed forces, to be directed against them all. 
Therefore, in accordance with the right of self- 
defence, individually and collectively, they 
undertake to go without delay to the aid of the 
state or states against which such an act of 
aggression is made, and immediately to take,
individually and collectively, all steps available 
including the use of armed force, to repel the
aggression and restore security and peace. In 
conformity with Article 6 of the Arab League Pact 
and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the 
Arab League Council and U.N. Security Council shall
be notified of such act of aggression and the means
and procedure taken to check it."
However, the member states of the Arab League in disputes 
involving alleged aggression or threat of aggression, have not 
invoked the application of the League's collective defence 
provision. Instead, they have relied either on the United
Saudi Arabia, 19 August 1952, Kuwait, 12 August 1961, Bahrain, 
14 November 1971, Qatar, 14 November 1971. Oman does not seem 
to have acceded to the treaty according to Bowman, M. and 
Harris, D., Multilateral Treaties. Index and Current Status. 
Butterworth, London (1984), p.161. Oman, however, is party 
to the Arab League Pact, 1945, which provides in Article 6: 
"In case of aggression or threat of aggression by a state 
against a member state, the state attacked or threatened with 
attack may request an immediate meeting of the Council." It 
appears that the concept of collective self-defence as such 
was not established under the pact. For the text see 70 
U.N.T.S. 238. See also Hassouna, H. , The League of Arab 
States and Regional Disputes. Oceana Publications, New York
(1975), p. 13. Kuwait in fact in 1984 declared that it will 
request the members of the Arab League to fulfil its 
obligations and apply the Joint Defence and Economic 
Cooperation Treaty. The Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs 
made it clear that his country will request the Arab League 
Secretariat to include the issue in the agenda of the League 
Council in its session. This request followed the increasing 
attacks against Kuwaiti ships in the Gulf War. See Qatar News 
Agency Bulletin. 2 June 1984, p.18.
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Nations collective security system, or on external assistance 
in pursuance of the right of collective self-defence. Thus 
Sudan in its dispute with Egypt in 1958 on border issues, 
resorted to the United Nations. The crisis between Egypt and 
the Sudan broke out in February 1958 when the Egyptian 
Government, in a note dated February 1, 1958, protested to the 
Sudanese Government against the fact that the latter had 
included some areas in the Sudanese electoral districts in 
contravention to the provisions of the Anglo-Egyptian 
Agreement of 1899. The Sudanese Government based its case on 
the contention that those areas were Sudanese territory and
they were the basis on which Sudan obtained her
independence.146 Kuwait in its dispute with Iraq in 1961, 
Yemen in its internal crisis in 1962, and Lebanon in its 
dispute with the United Arab Republic in 1958, all invoked the 
right of collective self-defence in requesting foreign 
assistance.147
On 9 September 1982, the League of Arab States issued a 
resolution on the Gulf War at the end of the 12th Arab Summit 
at Fez, by which it stressed the need for Arab solidarity and 
unity of ranks, while realising their commitments toward the 
provisions of Article 6 of the Arab League's Charter and
Article 2 of the Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation
146 • •Hassouna, ibid.. pp.48-49.
147 Ibid. . pp.379-380.
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Treaty.148
It further declared its commitment to defend all Arab
territory and to consider any aggression against any Arab
country as an aggression against all Arab countries.149
Yet, according to the prevailing opinion, collective
self-defence would be admissible, without prior treaty
commitments or regional arrangements. Bowett maintains:
"...that a state resorting to force not in defence 
of its own rights, but in the defence of another, 
must justify its action as being in the nature of 
a sanction and not self-defence, individual or 
collective... The requirements of the right of 
collective self-defence are two in number: firstly
that each participating state has an individual 
right of self-defence, and secondly that there 
exists an agreement between the participating states 
to exercise their rights collectively."150
However, he accepts that the geographical proximity of
the states, where their interests are so essentially bound up
with each other, is such that defence by one state to another
attacked state is truly self-defence.151
148 See FBIS-MEA-V-82-176. 10 September 1982, pp.A20-A21.
149 Ibid. . 10 September 1982, p.A18.
150 Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law, o p .cit. . 
p. 207.
151 Bowett, "Collective Self-Defence Under the Charter of 
the United Nations", 32 B.Y.I.L. (1955-6), pp.133-34. See 
also Higgins, The Development of International Law through the 
Political Organs of the United Nations, op.cit.. p.209. For 
the opposite view, see Dinh, N., "La legitime defense d'apres 
la Charte des Nations Unies", 1152 R.G.D.I.P. (1948), p.244 
et seq. Akehurst, M. does not accept Bowett*s view and widens 
the interpretation of Article 51. He points out that in the 
right of collective self-defence, a state may defend another 
state against attack, even though the attack on the second 
state does not endanger the defending state. See his article 
"Reprisals by Third States", 44 B.Y.I.L. (1970), p.4.
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Yet the distinction between the right of collective self- 
defence under Article 51 of the Charter and the same right 
under Article 2 of the Arab Joint Defence and Economic Treaty, 
should be observed. While under Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter self-defence is only a right under Article 2 
of the Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty self- 
defence is both a right and an obligation. The reason for the 
difference lies in the fact that the latter treaty is based 
on a commitment of mutual assistance between the members of 
the Arab League.152
As such, the wording of Article 51, as it is in 
permissive form, legitimises the obligatory collective self- 
defence provided for in the Joint Defence Treaty.
We have already argued above that Article 51 permits 
self-defence in response to indirect aggression, therefore it 
follows that a response to indirect aggression under the Joint 
Defence Treaty is equally legitimised by Article 51.
Neither the right of self-defence under the UN Charter 
nor the right under the Arab Joint Defence Treaty require the 
prior authorisation of either the Security Council or the Arab
• • 153League Defence Council respectively.
152 t . • . »A similar view is expressed m  the relation between 
the UN Charter and the Rio Treaty of the OAS. See Francisco, 
A., "The Rio de Janeiro Treaty: Genesis, Development and
Decline of a Regional System of Collective Security", 17 
Inter-American Law Review (1985), pp.11-2.
153 Article 6 of the Joint Defence and Economic 
Cooperation Treaty between the states of the Arab League 
should not be interpreted as an authorisation is needed to 
the right of collective self-defence: "A Joint Defence 
Council under the supervision of the Arab League Council shall
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Nevertheless, an obligation of collective self-defence
upon the parties of the Arab Joint Defence Treaty cannot be
established without observance of Article 6 which requires
explicitly the prior consultation of the parties in order to
reach binding decision on the implementation of the right of
collective self-defence.154
However, if the Arab League Defence Council intends to
carry out enforcement measures instead of exercising their
right of collective self-defence, then Article 53 of the UN
Charter imposes restrictions on the Council, requiring it to
obtain the authorisation of the Security Council. Kelsen
comments on Article 53:
"... The wording of the Charter does not exclude 
organisation of collective self-defence through 
regional arrangement even as substitute... for 
collective security... and the rule of Article 53, 
that no enforcement action shall be taken without 
the authorisation of the Security Council, does not 
apply to the exercise of the right of collective 
self-defence organised in the regional arrangement,
be formed to deal with all matters concerning the 
implementation of the provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of 
this treaty. It shall be assisted in the performance of its 
task by the Permanent Military Commission referred to in 
Article 5. The Joint Defence Council shall consist of the 
Foreign Ministers and the Defence Ministers of the contracting 
states or their representatives. Decisions taken by a two- 
thirds majority shall be binding on all contracting states." 
See the treaty in Peaslee, International Government 
Organisations. Vol.2, o p .cit.. pp.1122-1124.
154 See the Article, ibid.. This interpretation may 
explain Syria*s reservation on the decision taken by the Arab 
League Council in its extraordinary meeting, 23-25 August 
1987. The reservation states that Iraq has violated the Joint 
Defence Economic Treaty by starting a war with Iran without 
consultation with the rest of the Arab League states. Private 
information of the author.
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because this rule is restricted by Article 51.1,155
(ii) Regarding the Gulf War
G.C.C. member states from the outbreak of the war have 
been involved in concerted efforts on various international 
levels to stop the fighting between Iraq and Iran and protect 
its interests,156 but all these efforts met with a lack of
155 Kelsen, H., f,Is the North Atlantic Treaty a Regional 
Arrangement?", 45 A.J.I.L. (1951), p.164. For a similar view 
see Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law, o p .cit.. p.223? 
Liang, Y . , "Regional Arrangements and International Security", 
Trans. Grotius Soc.. Vol.31 (1946), p.216 at p.228.
156 For the efforts of the G.C.C., see G.C.C. draft 
resolution on Gulf tanker war, submitted to the United Nations 
Security Council, 21 May 1984, S/16594. The states had 
requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the 
"Iranian aggression on the freedom of navigation" en route to 
and from the ports of their countries, S/16574. In their 
letter of 21 May to the Council President, they stated that 
"such aggression constitutes a threat to the stability and 
security of the area and has serious implications to 
international peace and security". The resolution was adopted 
at the fifth meeting of a series that began on 25 May. Iran 
did not take part in the debate. See Official Records of the 
Security Council, Thirty-ninth year, Supplement for April, May 
and June 1984, Document S/6582, incorporated in the record of 
the 2 541st meeting. On the Arab League level see the decision 
of the League Council (Ministers of Foreign Affairs) dated 25 
August 1987 (Arabic) . Both Syria and Libya made their 
reservation on this decision on the ground of their rejection 
of the existence of American vessels in the Arabian Gulf to 
protect Kuwaiti commercial ships. They also made reservations 
on para.(7) of the decision which calls on the Security 
Council to take effective measures according to the UN Charter 
to implement Security Council Res. 598 issued on 20 July 1987. 
Syria claimed that the end of the war does not depend on 
international resolutions nor on the existence of foreign 
military vessels, but rather on exclusive strategy within the 
Arab nation which does not turn Iran to an enemy to the Arabs. 
Another decision issued on 20 September 1987 dealt with the 
same matter. See also the statement of the League of Arab 
States at the 12th Arab summit conference at Fez, Morocco, 9 
September 1982, FBIS-MEA-V-81-176. 10 September 1982, p.A18. 
League of Arab States Gulf War. Another resolution of the 
Arab League Council distributed as Security Council document 
issued on 26 March 1986, Security Council Records S/17951, 27 
March 1986. On the Organisation of Islamic Conference level
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response on Iran's part.157
The six G.C.C. member states were equally alarmed at the 
escalation of the fighting in the Gulf war. Iran, however, 
issued threats of its own, implying that only a change of 
attitude could save the Gulf states from Iranian and "Islamic 
revenge". As usual, therefore, the fears of the member states 
found expression in the communique issued with a neutral tone 
after the Foreign Ministers meeting in June 1982, appealing 
to Iran to respond to peace initiatives, and support the 
efforts of the UN, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Islamic
• ■ 158Conference Organisation (ICO).
Realising the determination of Iran to intervene by all 
means in their internal affairs and rejecting all attempts to 
put an end to the war, the G.C.C. member states decided to
see the Resolution of the Conference No.10/5/S/A.A during the 
fifth session held in Kuwait (Arabic). See also Resolution 
12/15 regarding the Gulf war dated 22 December 1984 held in 
North Yemen. It is to be noted that some of those resolutions 
are obtained by the author from G.C.C. Foreign Offices.
157 See Kuwait Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for 
Foreign Affairs speech in Security Council, 1 June, on the 
attack on ships in the Gulf, UN Chronicle. Vol.21 (1984),
pp.6-7. It is reported that G.C.C. member states were willing 
to offer Iran an amount between $10 and $25 for construction, 
if a ceasefire was to take place. See in this regard 
Khadduri, The Gulf War, o p .cit.. p.152. For a detailed and 
official position of the Islamic Republic of Iran on Security 
Council Res. 598 (1987) annexed to Security Council Document 
S/19031, II, August 1987, reprinted in 16 ILM (1987), p.1481. 
During the extremely prolonged UN debates on the definition 
of aggression several states were in favour of including the 
refusal to comply with a binding Security Council decision in 
the definition of aggression, but this was not adopted. See 
Gray, C. "The British Position in regard to the Gulf 
Conflict", I.C.L.O. (1988), p.428.
158 See Nonneman, G., op.cit.. pp.48-50.
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abandon their tenuous strict neutrality and adopt a position
• • # • • 159of "qualified neutrality" and support Iraq financially.
Under traditional rules of neutrality, the government of 
a neutral state must refrain from participating in war, 
including the obligation to prevent a belligerent from using 
neutral territory as a base.160
159 • # • •The position of a state that refrains from some active 
participation in hostility but nevertheless resorts -due to 
collective security policies - to discriminatory measures 
against a belligerent has been termed "qualified neutrality". 
See Tucker, R . , The Law of War and Neutrality at Sea. The 
United States Government Printing Office, Washington (1957), 
p.174. For the evidence that G.C.C. member states supported 
Iraq financially see the interview with the Saudi Deputy 
Minister of Defence and Aviation, Al-Shara-al-Awsat (London), 
27 April 1985, p.10, as translated in FBIS-MEA-V-85-84. 2 May 
1985, pp.C1-C2. Saudi Radio commentary reflected this support: 
"There is no way to thwart those (Iranian) plans and foil them 
except by supporting Iraq financially and militarily in order 
to destroy the Iranian war machine", 10 November 1982, in 
BBC/SWB/ME. 12 November 1982 (A/6). The "Report on Iran-Iraq 
War and Navigation in the Gulf", in ILM. o p .cit. . p. 1430. The 
Iranian letter to the Security Council, 25 March, which stated 
that "some states in the area and beyond attempted to impose 
an unacceptable situation on Iran. They poured extensive 
financial and material resources into Iraq...", UN Chronicle 
XXI (1984), p.5. The letter from the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of Iran addressed to the UN Secretary General dated 
22 July 1987 as a response to resolution 598 (1987), Security 
Council Dist. General. S/18993, 24 July 1987. The G.C.C.
Secretary-General impliedly indicated such support in an 
interview with a Qatari newspaper on 16 January 1982, 
translated by FBIS-MEA-V-82-013. 20 January 1982. For the 
reports of G.C.C. member states' shares in financial aid see 
Nonneman, G., "Iraq, The Gulf states and the War", o p .cit.. 
pp.95-104.
160 Article 6 of the Convention concerning the Rights and 
Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War prohibits the direct and 
indirect supply to a belligerent power of ammunition or any 
war material. See the text in 2 A.J.I.L. (1908), Supp. , 
pp.202-216. Article 15(B) of the Convention on Maritime 
Neutrality as well forbids a neutral state from granting 
loans, or to open credit during the time of war, 22 A.J.I.L. 
(1928), Supp., pp.151-57. Hague Convention respecting the 
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War 
on Land, October 18, 19907, 2 A.J.I.L. (1908), Suppl., pp.117-
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Neutrality in the traditional sense means that certain 
rights are conferred upon non-participants and certain duties 
are imposed on them. Four general duties are imposed:
(1) The duty to act impartially towards the belligerent.
(2) The duty to abstain from furnishing belligerents with any
assistance for prosecution of war.
(3) The duty to prevent the commission of hostile acts within
neutral jurisdiction as well as to prevent the use of 
neutral jurisdiction as a base for belligerent 
operations; and
(4) The duty to acquiesce in certain respective measures.161
The two pillars of the laws of neutrality, therefore, are
• • • • • • • 1A ?non-participation and non-discrimination. Thus, effective 
neutrality is maintained only if it has been regarded by 
neutral governments. Disrespect for the duties of neutrals 
will suspend their rights.163
127. For the meaning of neutrality in the abstract sense, see 
Wilson, R. , "Non-Belligerency in Relation to the Terminology 
of Neutrality", 35 A.J.I.L. (1941), pp.122-123. Oppenheim, 
International Law. II, op.cit.. p.690? Castren, E., Present 
Law of War and Neutrality. Helsinki, Suomalaisen Kirjallisuden 
Seuran Kirjapainonoy (1954), pp.440-42? Greenspan, M . , The 
Modern Law of Land Warfare. Berkeley and Los Angeles (1959), 
p.534? Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and 
Applied bv the United States, o p .cit.. pp.3336-44? Tucker, 
op.cit.. pp.196-199.
161 Tucker, op.cit. . pp. 197, 202-3.
162 Komarnicki, T. , "The Place of Neutrality in the Modern 
System of International Law", 80 Recueil des Cours I (1952), 
pp.395-406.
163 Oppenheim, International Law. 7th ed., Lauterpacht,
H. (ed.) (1952), p.695, n.l? Greenspan, The Modern Law of
Land Warfare, op.cit.. pp.189-197; Delupis, J . , The Law of 
War. Cambridge University Press (1987), p.141? Williams, W . ,
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However, the law of neutrality does not oblige the states 
to observe economic neutrality in favour of belligerents or 
treat them equally in terms of economy and commerce.164 A 
neutral state may deliver ordinary commodities in the way of 
commerce to a belligerent power.165 This appears to be the 
case with some of the financial assistance by G.C.C. member 
states to Iraq, part of which was due to prior arrangements 
concluded before the outbreak of the war.166
Writers such as Oppenheim asserted that non-participants 
in a conflict were entitled to adopt a stance of "qualified
"Neutrality in Modern Armed Conflicts: A Survey of the
Developing Law", 90 Military Law Review (1980), p.40; 
Castren, o p .cit.. pp.462-63. However, Greenwood, C., 
maintains that the right of a combatant state to take action 
against a non-combatant if it exists, depends on a reasonable 
measure of self-defence, "The Concept of War in Modern 
International Law", 36 I .C.L.O. (1987), p.298.
164 Komarnicki, op.cit. . p.510. For the obligations of 
the G.C.C. member states to observe strict neutrality, see 
supra. pp.436-37. As for the right of self-defence, see 
infra, pp.441-43.
165 Castren, op. cit. . p.477. See also Lalive J., 
"International Organisation and Neutrality", B.Y.I.L. (1947), 
p. 75. Professor Whitton also justified it by the lack of 
obligation of neutrals to maintain a strictly equal balance 
between the belligerents in the import and transport of goods, 
"La Neutralite et la Societe des Nations", Recueil des Cours, 
II (1972), p.500.
166 See the Report on Iran-Iraq War in ILM. op.cit. . 
p.1430. It states that the United States does not consider 
Kuwait a belligerent partly because Kuwait provides financial 
support to Iraq as do many Arab states. Its port, pursuant 
to a 1972 agreement that long predates the war, is open to 
cargo bound for Iraq; so are the ports of some other Arab 
countries. Another reason which will be discussed later in 
the report is that the security and stability of the G.C.C. 
member states depends on whether Iraq collapses before Iran 
or not.
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neutrality" on the ground that "the historic foundation of 
neutrality as an attitude of absolute impartiality has 
disappeared with the renunciation and the abolition of war as 
an instrument of national policy".167
It has also been argued that even in a war the law of 
neutrality is incompatible today because states have a right, 
if not a duty, to discriminate between the aggressor and the 
victim in a conflict. This is due to the fact that war and 
neutrality, to which the concept of war may give rise, is 
incompatible with Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.168 
Nevertheless, the practice does not support the view that the 
concept of war has been legally irrelevant as the result of 
the U.N. Charter provisions.169 In fact, state practice 
provides ample evidence that the state of war and neutrality
167 Oppenheim, L., International Law. A Treatise. 
Lauterpacht (ed.), Longman Green & Co., London, Vol.II (1952), 
p.221. Furthermore, Oppenheim maintains that "whether or not 
a third state will adopt an attitude of impartiality at the 
outbreak of war is not a matter for international law but for 
international politics. Therefore, unless a previous treaty 
stipulates it expressly, no duty exists for a state, according 
to international law, to remain neutral when war breaks out", 
ibid.. p.653.
168 See Feinberg, N. , The Legality of a "State of War" 
After the Cessation of Hostilities under the Charter of the 
United Nations and the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem (1961), pp.7- 
86? Lauterpacht, E., "The Legal Irrelevance of a State of
War" (1968) 62 Proc.Am.Soc. Int.Law, pp.58-68.
169 See Baxter, R. , "The Legal Consequences of the 
Unlawful Use of Force Under the Charter", 62 Proc. Am.Soc.Int. 
Law (1968), p.68; Stone, J., Of Law and Nations. Between 
Power Politics and Human Hopes. William S. Hein & Co. Inc.
Buffalo, New York (1974), pp.427 et seq.
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still exists today.170
In the Gulf war the position has worsened as the G.C.C.
member states were directly involved in the war and Iran's
attacks increased indiscriminately against them, and
consequently the threat of military intervention was imminent
as soon as Iraq might collapse.171 As some observed:
"If Iran wins the war all the Gulf states are 
finished... Iran will simply dispatch its chosen 
governor at the head of an army of 10,000 
revolutionary guards to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain and so on, and who will dare to fight them?
It will be the Ottoman conquest all over again."172
As far as the G.C.C. is concerned, the position was to
take positive action immediately rather than await the
consequences of further Iranian aggression. Oppenheim writes:
170 See Greenwood, C. , o p .cit. . pp.290-94, who gives some 
examples, e.g. the Middle East war, the Falklands war, the 
Iran-Iraq war, 1965 hostilities between India and Pakistan. 
See also, some references to the war in the Egypt-Israel 
Treaty of Peace (1979) XVII I .L.M. 362, and the unratified 
Israel-Lebanon Treaty (1983) XXII I .L.M.. p.708. There have 
been also numerous references to the state of neutrality in 
the Middle East, the Gulf War and the Indo-Pakistan conflict. 
See Norton, P., "Between the Ideology and the Reality: The 
Shadow of the Law of Neutrality", 117 Harvard Int.L.J. (1976), 
pp.249, 257-262? Shihata, "Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: 
Its Legality Under International Law", o p .cit.. pp.155, 173 
et seq.
171 For the direct attack by Iran against the interests 
of some G.C.C. member states, see Al-Oabas newspaper, 2 3 
October 1987, issue S548. See also the statement of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kuwait, Al-Watan newspaper, issue 
4547, 18 October 1987. For the incidents of attacking 
shipping, see Lloyd's Lists, issued regularly. For a legal 
discussion of these attacks, see Al-Awadi, B., "The Attitude 
of International Law to Iranian Attacks against Kuwait" in the 
G.C.C. Quarterly Magazine Cooperation. August 1988, pp.21-42.
172 • • • •Quoted m  Patrick Bishop and Simon O'Dwyer, Sunday 
Telegraph. 23 January 1987. A not dissimilar view is found 
in "If Iran Wins", The Economist. 24 January 1987, pp.14-15.
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"The general view... is that neutral states are 
entitled to disregard their obligations as neutral 
vis-a-vis aggressor states, simply because 
aggression is illegal."173
In 1940 the U.S. government was prepared to discriminate
openly against Germany and abandon its strict neutrality by
transferring destroyers to Great Britain.174 Its
justification, apparently, was that:
"... the obligation of abstinence must be deemed to 
depend upon the unwavering condition that non­
participation is compatible with and not subversive 
of, the requirement of self-defence."175
In fulfilment of the obligation of neutrality, it is
required first that a belligerent abstain from all actions on
its own part in derogation of the sovereignty or the peace and
stability of another state.176
173 Oppenheim, o p .cit. . pp. 637-52.
174 For US change of attitude see Komarnicki, o p .cit. . 
p. 456 et seq. See also Fenwick, C. who justifies America's 
attitude towards Britain and against Germany that the latter 
violated the neutrality of Denmark, Norway, Holland and 
Belgium, undermining the foundation of neutrality. His 
article, "Neutrality on the Defensive", 34 A.J.I.L. (1940), 
p.698. See also, Wright, Q., "The Present Status of 
Neutrality", in ibid. p. 393 who maintains that the word 
"neutrality" in such circumstances is hardly appropriate. 
Another article by Wright, "The Lend Lease and International 
Law" A.J.I.L. (1941), p.305 considers discrimination between 
the participants in the war is justified under international 
law.
175 Hyde, International Law (1945), o p .cit. . p.2236. See 
also Secretary of State Hall before the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, 15 January 1941, Dept, of State Bulletin. 18 
January 1941, pp.89-90.
176 Curtis, R. , "The Law of Hostile Military Expeditions 
as Applied by the United States", 8 A.J.I.L. (1914), pp.5-6.
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G.C.C. member states did not resort to the use of force 
exercising the right of self-defence, but instead used 
alternative means, mainly financial, to support Iraq. The mere 
supply of funds to Iraq undoubtedly cannot amount to a use of 
force.177
The G.C.C. recourse to this type of self-defence is
justified under international law. Bowett explains:
"Just as a legitimate claim of self-defence may 
justify unilateral measures involving force which 
would otherwise be illegal under Article 2(4) of the 
Charter, a state may justify unilateral economic 
measures which might otherwise be illegal if it can 
show that these measures are taken in self-defence.
Of course, the essential of self-defence must be 
proved. The state would have to show that it was 
reacting to a delict by another state, posing an 
immediate danger to its security or independence in 
a situation affording no alternative means of 
protection and, lastly, that the reaction was 
proportionate to the harm threatened."178
The G.C.C. acts can be described as necessary, immediate,
proportionate to the policy of indirect aggression and there
was no other possible means to eliminate the imminent danger
• 179approaching them.
If, however, the aggression was directed against some of
Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua, oo.cit.. p.119, para.228.
178 •Bowett, "Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States", 
op.cit. . p.7. See also Akehurst, M. , "Reprisals by Third 
States", XLIV, B.Y.I.L. (1970), p.15 who states that reprisals 
by third states are limited to (1) enforcement of judicial 
decisions, (2) Article 60(2) of the Vienna Convention 1969 
(termination of treaty due to essential breach by one party),
(3) violation of rules prohibiting or regulating the use of 
force."
179 • • • • •Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities 
In and Against Nicaragua, o p .cit.. p.122.
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the G.C.C. member states, as was the case then, then mutual 
defence arrangement is sufficient for the rest to depart from 
the rules of neutrality. As to the requirement found in 
Article 51 of the UN Charter, by which the state claiming to 
use the right of individual or collective self-defence must 
report that to the Security Council, one may observe that the 
acts of the G.C.C. member states have fallen short of use of 
force. Thus the report to the Security Council of financial 
assistance given to Iraq by the G.C.C. states cannot be 
envisaged under Article 51. The aim of the report, according 
to this article, is to enable the Security Council to 
"maintain or restore international peace and security", a role 
that cannot extend to this form of self-defence.
(iii) Regarding Security Council Resolutions on the Gulf War 
With the adoption of the UN Charter and its outlawing of 
war, the law of neutrality has been greatly affected. The 
collective security system of the UN Charter, obliging member 
states to take positive action against aggression, sought to
eliminate a situation in which nations could assume strict
• # 1 8 0  neutrality toward armed conflict.
The Security Council, in accordance with Article 24 of
the UN Charter, assumes "primary responsibility for the
180 Norton, P., "Between the Ideology and the Reality: 
The Shadow of the Law of Neutrality", 17 Harvard Int. L.J.
(1976), pp.249-51. See also Lobel, J . , "The Rise and Decline 
of the Neutrality Act: Sovereignty and Congressional War
Powers in United States Foreign Policy", 24-25 Harvard 
International Law Journal (1983-84), p.47? Kunz, J. , "The Law 
of War", 50 A.J.I.L. (1956), pp.313, 326-327.
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maintenance of international peace and security". Article
2(5) further states that all members of the United Nations
shall provide every assistance to any United Nations actions
in accordance with the Charter, and "refrain from giving
assistance to any state against which the United Nations is
taking preventive or enforcement action".
Article 39 of the UN Charter charges the Security Council
with the duty to determine the existence of a threat to, or
breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression. It provides:
"The Security Council shall determine the existence 
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression and shall make recommendations, 
or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance 
with Article 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security."
The Security Council is therefore competent to assess the 
legality of each state's action in the initiation of a 
belligerency, that is, which state, if any, is the aggressor. 
Once the Security Council has determined the origin and nature
of the aggression, it may direct members of the United Nations
• • 181 • to apply sanctions under Article 41 or it may resort to the
• • # • • 182use of military force as outlined m  Article 42 through 47
181 Article 41 lists a number of sanctions which the 
Security Council might apply, including "complete or partial 
interruptions of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, 
postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, 
and the severance of diplomatic relations."
182 Article 42 gives the Security Council authority to 
employ air, sea and land forces of member nations to undertake 
demonstration, blockades or "other operations". Article 43 
provides for agreements between the Security Council and 
members of the United Nations to have armed forces designed 
for Security Council use. Article 44 gives any member state 
whose armed forces are to be used with a Security Council 
enforcement measure, the right to participate in the Security
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in order to restore the peace.
Action under Article 42 would be effected by armed forces 
provided by member states in accordance with agreements
between the member states and the Security Council. The
failure to conclude agreements under Article 43 would not
prevent member states from agreeing ad hoc to place forces at 
the disposal of the Security Council, though the agreement
• 183could provide for better guarantees of peace and security. 
This is in fact how the United Nations command was established 
in Korea in 1950 and the U.N. force in the Congo subsequently 
constituted.184 Yet in the absence of such agreements, it is 
accepted that "the legal obligations of members do not extend 
to supplying the Council with armed forces on other than a
• 185voluntary basis".
However, collective security under the UN system has
Council*s decision. Article 45 supplements the provision of 
Article 43 regarding ready forces for security use. Articles 
46 and 47 outline procedure for the creation of a military 
staff committee to assist the Security Council in its use of 
force. On the issue of neutrality under the UN Charter, see 
Oppenheim, International Law. Vol.II/ o p .cit.. pp.645-652.
183 •It is to be noted that no such agreements have ever 
been concluded. See Bowett, The Law of International 
Institutions, o p .cit.. p.41. See also, Higgins, R., United 
Nations Peacekeeping. 1946-1967. Documents and Commentary. 2 
Asia, .Oxford University Press (1970), pp.176-78.
m  Bowett, ibid. For the relevant resolutions see 
Uniting for Peace Resolution, Resolution 337(V), November 13, 
1950, G.A.O.R.. 15th session, Supp.20, p.10, Security Council 
Resolution, *July 14, 1960, S.C.O.R.. 15th year, Supp. for
July-Sept., 1960, p.16.
185 •Goodrich, Hambro, Simons, Charter of the United 
Nations, op.cit.. p.316? Pogany, I., The Security Council and 
the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Gower, England (1984), p.12.
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• • IfiX
proved ineffective.
In the Gulf war the Security Council called upon the 
belligerents to cease hostilities, and to respect freedom of
• • t 187 • • •navigation m  the Gulf. The Security Council did not
declare either Iran or Iraq as an aggressor according to 
Article 39 of the UN Charter. As Louis Henkin explains, this
may be due to the fact that neither the USA nor the Soviet
• • • 188 Union would permit such a thing to be declared. The
question of determining who is the aggressor according to
Article 39 seems a matter of international politics rather
than international law.
Yet, as Professor Henkin further states, in the absence
of a Security Council declaration that one party was the
aggressor, the UN Charter would be a guide on the law on this
186 See Rifaat, A., o p .cit. . pp.207-16. See also, 
William, W . , "Neutrality in Modern Armed Conflicts: A Survey
of the Developing Law", o p .cit.. pp.25-26. See also Jenkins, 
M. , "Air Attacks on Neutral Shipping in the Persian Gulf: The
Legality of the Iraqi Exclusion Zone and Iranian Reprisals", 
8 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 
(1985), p.524; Tucker, o p .cit.. p.15.
187 Security Council Resolutions 479 (1980), 514 (1982), 
540 (1983), 552 (1984), 598 (1987), 588 (1986), 598 (1987)
called respectively for cessation of hostilities and an 
immediate ceasefire. See Security Council Official Records: 
S/INF/36 (1980), pp.23-24; S/INF/37 (1981), p.10; S/INF/38
(1982), pp.19-20; S/INF/39 (1983), pp.6-7; S/INF/40 (1984), 
pp.14-15; S/INF/41 (1985); S/INF/42 (1986), p.13; S/INF/43
(1987), pp.5-6.
188 See "The Persian/Arabian Gulf Tanker War: 
International law or International Chaos", Conference Report 
sponsored by the Council on Ocean Law and the Law of the Sea 
Institute, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
Building, in 19 Ocean Development and International Law
(1988) , p.310.
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subject.189
If the Security Council declares either party an 
aggressor, the claim by other parties to neutrality cannot be 
sustained. Under Article 39 of the UN Charter member states 
are obliged to refrain from aiding the aggressor and to 
discriminate against it. This appears to contradict the 
traditional rules of neutrality as regards abstention and
• • • 190impartiality.
The Security Council does not merely grant a right to a 
non-participant to discriminate against an aggressor 
belligerent but is also competent to assess the legality of 
neutral acts.
According to Article 39 of the UN Charter, the Council 
is charged with the duty to determine the existence of threats 
to, or breaches of the peace. In the Gulf war, the Security 
Council clearly condemned the attacks on ships bound to or 
from neutral ports and demanded that such attacks cease.
The Security Council, after having considered the letter 
dated 21 May 1984 from the representatives of Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
complaining of Iranian attacks on commercial ships, issued its
1fi9 Idem. See also Rousseau, C., "Iraq et Iran. 
Evolution du different arme entre les deux etats due ler aout 
au 31 decembre 1983", 88 R.G.D.I.P. (1984), p.270? Ronzitti, 
N., "La Guerre de Golfe, le deminage et la circulation des 
navires", in 33 Annuaire Francais de Droit International
(1987), pp.647-662. Amerie, F. , Iran-Iraa War and the Freedom 
of Navigation, partial fulfilment of LL.M. degree, Hull (1985) 
(unpublished), pp.1-45.
190 .Tucker, o p .cit.. p.204.
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resolution 552 (1984).191
Resolution 552(1984) in its operative paragraph affirmed 
the non-participation of the littoral states in the Gulf. It 
states:
”2. Reaffirms the right of free navigation in 
international waters and sea lanes for shipping en 
route to and from all ports and installations of the 
littoral states that are not parties to the 
hostilities.
3. Calls upon all states to respect the territorial 
integrity of the states that are not parties to the 
hostilities...
4. Condemns the recent attacks on commercial ships 
en route to and from the ports of Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia.
5. Demands that such attacks should cease forthwith 
and that there should be no interference with ships 
en route to and from states that are not parties to 
the hostilities.”
The Security Council furthermore, in its Resolution 540
(1983) affirmed the need to respect "the integrity of the 
littoral state" (i.e. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) since they were
• • • 19?not parties to the hostilities.
Non-participation in the hostility rather than neutrality 
is the term the Security Council has adopted in the above 
resolution to describe the attitude of G.C.C. member states.
As Francis Russo points out, the descriptive category 
"not parties to the hostilities"
"... is akin to, and one suspects the equivalent of,
191 • • . • • .Official Records of the Security Council. Thirty-ninth 
year, Supplement for October, November and December 1984. 
Adopted at the 254th meeting by 13 votes to none, with 2 
abstentions (Nicaragua and Zimbabwe).
192 • • • •Security Council Resolution S/RCS/540, op.cit.
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the 'non-participation' standard suggested by 
Professor Tucker for assessing the legal status of 
a state relative to a conflict. So worded, the 
resolution makes no distinction between the level 
of rights and protection which may be enjoyed by 
ships trading with states that are neutral in the 
traditional sense and states pursuing a policy of 
non-belligerency. "193
Professor Tucker explains a neutral state may take
actions which fail to comply with strict neutrality, but which
fall short of direct participation. However, such a situation
does not deprive a neutral state of its neutral status:
"The traditional law clearly does recognise this 
position (non-belligerency), and precisely for the 
reason that it does attach to it certain legal 
consequences (e.g. reprisals),. In fact, it would 
seem that what writers actually have in mind when 
they declare that the traditional law does not 
recognise a condition of non-belligerency is that 
this law does not grant neutral states a right to 
depart from the duties otherwise imposed upon non­
participants, a right in the sense that the injured 
belligerent is obliged to permit these acts and 
refrain from taking reprisals."194
Francis Russo criticises such a conclusion. He states 
that reprisal applies only as between belligerents. A 
belligerent's resort to force in response to a breach of 
neutrality is limited to those means and objects necessary to 
obtain neutral compliance. As such he concludes that Iran's 
limited right as a belligerent to enforce neutral state 
compliance with its obligations in response to Saudi and 
Kuwaiti tankers forfeiting the protections of a neutral
193 • • •See Russo, F. , "Neutrality at Sea m  Transition: 
State Practice in the Gulf War as Emerging International 
Customary Law", 19 Ocean Development and International Law
(1988), pp.395-396.
194 .Tucker, op.cit.. p.199.
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"constitute a possible legal justification for its attacks
• • • 195
upon Saudi tankers and Kuwait/Saudi port facilities".
The above view can only be accepted if the acts of some
G.C.C. member states did not involve the exercise of the right 
of self-defence.
It has been suggested that nothing in the UN Charter 
precludes the member states individually or collectively from 
discrimination against a belligerent if the act involves the 
right of self-defence.
Lauterpacht points out that the exercise of the right of 
self-defence vitiates any claim of breaching neutrality. He 
states:
"There is nothing in the Charter which obliges them 
to take an attitude of full neutrality in such 
cases. In the first instance, provided that there 
has been a case of armed attack, they may in the 
exercise of the right of collective self-defence 
under Article 51 of the Charter take such action as 
they deem fit, including. . . the denial of the 
ordinary benefits of neutrality and measures of 
discrimination against the aggressor."196
Furthermore, the above view undermines the binding effect
of the Security Council resolutions on the Gulf war which
attached great significance to the peace and security of the
littoral states in order to protect them from further attacks.
The Iranian attacks on some G.C.C. member states'
interests were more in the nature of armed reprisal and
backing subversive activities inside and outside the
195 •Russo, o p .cit.. p.394.
196 •Oppenheim, International Law. II, 7th ed., o p .cit..
p.651.
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territories of the G.C.C. states.197 Kuwait, for instance, 
came under continuous Iranian air raids on its territory, 
installations, ships and its embassy in Tehran.
As a result of those frequent attacks and in accordance 
with Articles 33-34 of the UN Charter, which call on the 
parties to any dispute to resort to pacific settlement of 
disputes, Kuwait has taken the following procedures:
1. It handed the Iranian charge d'affaires protest notes 
against the above acts.
2. Expelled five of the Iranian diplomatic staff in 
Kuwait as persona non grata.
3. Warned the Iranian government about reconsidering 
the whole diplomatic relations between the two countries.
4. It has notified the Security Council of the above
incidents and requested urgent measures in accordance with
Article 35 of the UN Charter. Article 35 provides:
"Any member of the United Nations may bring any 
dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to 
in Article 34, to the attention of the Security 
Council or of the General Assembly."
5. Finally Kuwait has intensified its diplomatic 
campaign through international conferences, the Arab League
• 19fiand the G.C.C. against such acts.
197 • • • •See Al-Awadi in the G.C.C. magazine Cooperation. 
op.cit.. p.24. For the attacks on G.C.C. institutions and 
citizens as a form of indirect aggression, see supra, pp.409- 
12, and supra notes 98, 100 and 101.
198 ibid.
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The law of neutrality was breached throughout the Gulf
war by states which supported both Iraq and Iran, in that they
failed to follow the traditional rules of neutrality and the 
UN Charter.199
The UK, for instance, from the start refused to allow
the supply of lethal equipment to Iraq and Iran. From
December 1984 the government applied certain guidelines on the
sale of arms and made public in October 1985:
” (i) We should maintain our refusal to supply any
lethal equipment to either side.
(ii) Subject to that overriding consideration, we should 
attempt to fulfil existing contracts, and obligations.
(iii) We should not in future approve orders for any 
defence equipment which, in our view, would
significantly enhance the capacity of either side 
to prolong or exacerbate the conflict.
(iv) In line with this policy, we should continue 
to scrutinise rigorously applications for export 
licences for the supply of defence equipment to Iran 
and Iraq.”200
However, these limitations do not reflect the position 
of strict neutrality as the traditional rules require active 
abstention and impartiality.
Therefore there has been some criticism of the above
guidelines for being too broad. The term "lethal equipment"
was broadly interpreted by the British government to allow 
sale of spare parts for tanks and aircraft to the
For this view see Henkin, in Ocean Development and 
International Law, op.cit.. p.31.
200 H.C. Hansard. Vol.84, col.450, 29 October 1985,
reprinted in "UKMIL", 56 B.Y.I.L. (1985), p.534.
454
bel 1 igerents.201
In 1987, however, the British government tightened its
rules, following the Iranian attack on the British tanker
202Gentle Breeze and the government ordered the closure of the 
Iranian Military Procurement Office which had continued to 
operate in London during the war. The UK government 
maintained that there was close observance of the transactions
• • • • • • 203of the office and that its activities were illegal. 
Nevertheless, Britain described its position from the 
beginning of the Gulf war as neutral and impartial.204
Other states, most notably China, the USSR and France, 
continued to supply arms to the belligerents while at the same
201 • • • • •Gray, C., "The British Position m  regard to the Gulf
Conflict", o p .cit.. p.422.
202 See FCO Press Release, 24 September 1987.
203 H.L. Weekly Hansard. Vol. 488, cols. 1282-1287, 21 July
1987.
204 See the government replies to parliamentary questions 
in H.C. Hansard. Vol.20, col.297, 23 March 1982, reprinted in 
United Kingdom Materials in International Law (UKMIL) 53 
B.Y.I.L. (1982), p.559; H.C. Hansard. Vol.36, col.991, 9
February 1983, reprinted in UKMIL, 54 B.Y.I.L. (1983), P.549;
H.C. Hansard. Vol.451, col.622, 2 May 1984, reprinted in
UKMIL, 55 B.Y.I.O. (1984), p.597; H.C. Hansard Vol.84, 
col.450, 29 October 1985, reprinted in UKMIL, 54 B.Y.I.L.
(1985), p.534. In the Security Council speeches on the 
adoption of SC Resolution 275 of 20 July 1987, the British 
Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe made it clear that "every 
single member of the international community should avoid any 
action which might increase tension in the region. .. Any state 
failing to do so, or which stands in the way of its 
implementation, takes a heavy responsibility on itself", 
Security Council document S/PV.2750, pp.16-17.
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time claiming their neutrality.205
A certain number of states took an official position 
either for one party or the other. Their assistance took 
different forms which ranged from diplomatic support to the 
supply of arms and military equipment, and also other means 
of economic and political help. Thus, at different degrees, 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Mauritania, Yemen, Kuwait, and 
Egypt took side with Iraq, while Syria, Libya, China and North 
Korea gave support to Iran.206
Since 1981, the supplies of arms for Iran came from 
Libya, North Korea, Taiwan and Israel. For Iraq, East
• • 207European countries, Brazil, France, Italy and Jordan. From 
1982 it appears that the USSR and the United States sold arms
pno t # #
or spare parts to Iraq. Apparently Iran received military 
materials from Brazil, China and Vietnam209 and in November 
1986 it emerged that the United States had been secretly
Gray, o p .cit. . p.422. See also the claims of
neutrality by some countries supplying arms openly, such as 
China, in S/PV.2750, ibid.
206 Keesina' s (1981), p.31010.
207 Ibid. (1982), p.31521.
208 Ibid. (1981), p.31851. See also ibid. (1983),
p.32100.
209 Ibid. (1982), p.31519, (1983), p.32100, (1987),
p.35160. Concerning the apparent contradiction between the 
supply of Soviet arms to Iraq and the supply of North Korean, 
Vietnamese, Syrian and Libyan arms to Iran, see Le Soir 
(Brussels), 4 August 1987, p.3. See also Le Monde. 4 August 
1987, p.3 and ibid.. 13 August 1987, p. 4.
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• • 210 sending arms to Iran since summer 1985.
All these actions clearly undermined the call stipulated
in the first Resolution 579 (1980) of the Security Council
and reappearing in all the resolutions concerning the
conflict, that:
"Calls upon all other states to exercise the utmost 
restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead 
to a further escalation and widening of the 
conflict."
There is little doubt, therefore, that many states, 
including the five permanent members, supplied openly large 
quantities of arms and spare parts to both belligerents.
If the Council had wanted to put an embargo on the supply 
of arms to the belligerents, it would have said so 
specifically,211 or it could have required strict application 
of the old rules of neutrality.
Erick David points out that if we take literally the ban 
of the Security Council regarding attacking neutral states' 
ships and if we consider the resolution in a restrictive way, 
limited to only the neutral states, it could be considered
that the third states which give help to the belligerents -
• 212 which are not neutral - would not be protected by the ban.
210 Keesina1 s (1987), pp.35160 and 35182; Chronique 
Rousseau, R.G.D.I.P. (1987), p.183.
2 1 1 * • David, E., "La Guerre du Golfe et le Droit
International", XX Revue Belae de Droit International (1987)
1, pp.171-72.
212 Ibid. . p.179.
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This view seems to have the effect of the old law of 
neutrality which is not supported by the wording of the 
Security Council that "the littoral states are not parties to 
the hostilities”213 and their integrity must be respected.214
The whole situation may represent a conflict between the 
old laws of neutrality and the law of the Charter, that the 
Security Council is responsible for maintaining peace and 
security.
Francis Deak's observation is that if
"... the obligations of those Hague Conventions 
conflict with member states* obligations under the 
Charter., therefore, pursuant to Article 103, the 
Charter obligations prevail. Consequently, member 
states could not avail themselves of the right and 
are not required to observe the obligations of 
neutral powers set forth in the Hague Conventions 
whenever the Security Council decided on measures 
to be taken to maintain or restore international 
peace and security. (Article 39 of the Charter)
This argument may be supported... by reference to 
Article 2(5) of the Charter."215
Nevertheless, one should admit that to a great extent 
both the old rules and the new rules of the Charter have been 
eroded in the Gulf war.216
213 See the operative paragraphs 2 of the Security Council 
Resolution 552, 1984, o p .cit.
214 . • .See the operative paragraph 4 of the Security Council 
Resolution 540 (1983), op.cit.
215 . . .Deak, F. , "Neutrality Revisited", in Transnational 
Law in a Changing Society, ed. by Friedman, Henkin and 
Lissitzyn, Columbia University Press, New York and London 
(1972), pp.143-144.
216 For this view see Henkin in Ocean Development and
International Law, op.cit.. pp.308-310.
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION
The G.C.C. was born as a result of a number of 
contributing factors, the most important of which related to 
security. The eruption of the Iranian revolution in 1979 and 
the outbreak of the war between Iraq and Iran in 1980 called 
for even greater security.
The organisation was established by the executive power 
in each member state, except in the case of Kuwait whose 
parliament has approved the government decision to be party 
to the G.C.C.
(1) Article 19 of the Fundamental Statute
In international law there is no rule requiring 
ratification to bring a treaty into force. It is a matter of 
the constitutional law of the states to provide the necessary 
measures to bring the treaty into force. The Fundamental 
Statute was adopted in each member state according to the 
constitutional requirements of that country. Since most 
parties had to go through the ratification process, it would 
seem that the Fundamental Statute could not have entered into 
force by virtue of Article 19 alone.
(2) Is the G.C.C. a Confederation?
The G.C.C. should not be described as a confederation, 
a title which is sometimes incorrectly used in the legal
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literature to describe certain universal and regional 
organisations. The common features of a confederation differ 
in various respects from those of international organisations. 
This is especially the case with respect to the concept of 
legal personality which the older confederations lacked. A 
confederation is an association of independent states bound 
together by international treaty, mainly to harmonise their 
external affairs. It originally came into existence as a 
military alliance. It was subject to the constitution of the 
confederation, while the constitution of a regional 
organisation must be compatible with the purpose and 
principles of the UN (Article 52 of the UN Charter).
(3) Implementation of the UEA Depends on Domestic Laws
Although the Unified Economic Agreement is incorporated 
into the national law of each member state, the gradual 
implementation of the agreement requires further decisions by 
the Supreme Council of the G.C.C. For these decisions to take 
effect a member state must take municipal measures which would 
be binding on national institutions and private individuals.
The G.C.C., like other similar traditional organisations, 
distinguishes between the obligations of the member states on 
the international plane and the obligations of internal 
institutions. On the international plane, states are 
generally bound by their commitments and cannot evade them on 
the ground of a plea of municipal law, while the internal 
institutions and private individuals are bound, on the 
domestic plane, according to their constitutional
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arrangements.
The measures are various and range from ministerial 
decisions to decrees. The diversity of these forms does not 
reduce the effectiveness of the incorporation process, since 
every member state complies with its own constitutional 
requirements.
(4) Is the G.C.C. a Military Alliance?
Judging by the objectives of the G.C.C. in the 
Fundamental Statute, the UEA and state practice of the member 
states, it would be difficult to maintain that the G.C.C. 
constitutes a military alliance. The G.C.C. fulfils the 
conditions provided by the UN Charter (Articles 52-54) for 
a regional organisation as it seeks to maintain international 
peace and security and to achieve economic integration for the 
welfare of its member states. The establishment of the Joint 
Command Forces does not in any way contradict the above 
conditions, as Article 51 of the UN Charter permits collective 
self-defence through regional organisations.
(5) Provisions for Membership
The Fundamental Statute is silent on the question of 
expulsion, suspension and withdrawal. This is a matter which 
may well be understood by looking at the small size of the 
organisation and the degree of homogeneity among its member 
states. The inclusion of such provisions would undermine the 
very objectives in establishing the organisation, namely the 
achievement of permanent unity among the members.
The law and state practice are against suspension or
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expulsion of a member without explicit authorisation from the 
treaty. The only exception, which is supported by the legal 
commentators and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(Article 60) is the situation which involves a material breach 
of membership obligations. This view is further supported by 
the I.C.J. ruling in the Namibia Case (1971) which emphasised 
the right to terminate the mandate in case of "a deliberate 
and persistent violation” of the obligation by South Africa 
in spite of the fact that the treaty is silent on such right.
Similarly, unilateral withdrawal by a G.C.C. member state 
would be against the spirit and intent of the Fundamental 
Statute and does not find support in the law of treaties or 
in state practice of the UN.
(6) The Supreme Council Decisions Are Not Binding Per Se
The Supreme Council could be considered the most 
important organ of the G.C.C., having capacity to take final 
decisions in matters which concern the general policy of the 
organisation. However, its decisions are not binding per se 
as is the case with the vast majority of international 
organisations. The legal nature of the G.C.C. Supreme Council 
decisions depends mainly on their character. Decisions 
pertaining to the structure and operation of the G.C.C. do not 
raise much dispute as to their binding effect since the 
Supreme Council is authorised by the provisions of the 
Fundamental Statute to issue them and therefore they give rise 
to obligations. Decisions concerning the interpretation of 
the Fundamental Statute by the Commission of the Settlement
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of Disputes could only be authoritative if they are accepted 
unanimously by the Supreme Council.
Decisions pertaining to the application of the UEA are 
of two kinds. One type of decision clearly has binding force, 
since it implements the provisions of the UEA as stipulated 
by the agreement. These decisions are the result of an 
agreement between the member states. The second type of 
decision is not binding per se. but the G.C.C. member states 
nonetheless tend to apply such decisions consistently in the 
form of subsequent practice. Those decisions could be 
regarded as a guide to infer the intention of the member 
states as to whether they consider such decisions as binding. 
The subsequent practice of the G.C.C. member states in 
applying the UEA may, if followed in a concordant, common and 
consistent manner with opinio juris present, pave the way for 
the establishment of regional customary international law as 
far as the Supreme Council decisions are concerned. At 
present it is difficult to identify such a clear practice. 
Certain decisions of the Supreme Council remain mere 
recommendations. They have no binding effect and hence do not 
specify precise obligations on the member states and are left 
entirely to the national institutions to apply them with very 
broad discretion.
The Supreme Council and the Ministerial Council, however, 
tend to adopt their decisions through the practice of 
consensus. And yet both consensus and unanimity go to 
procedure, but cannot change the legal effect of the decisions
463
of the G.C.C., which depend on other factors.
(7) G.C.C. Lacks Compulsory Jurisdiction
It should be emphasized that the G.C.C., like similar 
regional organisations, lacks the mechanism for judicial 
settlement with a compulsory jurisdiction. The Commission of 
settlement of Disputes is based on ad hoc consent and cannot 
effectively settle disputes of any kind among the member 
states. The need for an effective mechanism to settle 
disputes between the member states and to give authoritative 
opinion is clearly evidenced in every aspect of G.C.C. 
cooperation. It certainly determines the degree of progress 
the G.C.C. would make in achieving its objectives.
(8) G.C.C. Eniovs Legal Personality
Legal personality is a concept which indicates the 
capacity of possessing international rights and duties. Such 
capacity is deduced explicitly or impliedly from the 
constituent instrument of the organisation.
The G.C.C. enjoys legal personality on the international 
plane as well as on the national plane. The G.C.C. 
Fundamental Statute has equipped the organisation with the 
capacity of incurring obligations and obtaining rights as a 
consequence of the tasks given to its organs. The Agreement 
on Privileges and Immunities among G.C.C. member states 
creates rights and duties between each member state and the 
organisation.
According to the UEA, which is legally linked to the 
Fundamental Statute, the member states and not the G.C.C. as
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an organisation are competent to conclude agreements. 
However, in practice such capacity was demonstrated in the 
agreement concluded between the G.C.C. and EEC.
The unanimity rule the G.C.C. adopts to pass its 
decisions does not prevent the G.C.C. from having legal 
personality and the volonte distincte could be realised in the 
form of those decisions.
The G.C.C. Joint Command Forces is another indication of 
legal personality. However, the legal personality the G.C.C. 
enjoys on the international plane is limited within the 
jurisdiction of the member states. For the G.C.C. to acquire 
legal personality in non-member states it has to conclude an 
agreement to fulfil such purpose. However, the G.C.C. as 
international organisation needs to strengthen its legal 
personality through further practice, especially by concluding 
treaties with third parties.
On the municipal plane the G.C.C. agreement on privileges 
and immunities is incorporated into the legal system of the 
member states and paved the way for the legal personality to 
operate in the territories of the member states.
The UEA includes forms of integration from the free 
movement of trade to economic union. But it is doubtful that 
the institutions of the G.C.C. have the capacity to carry out 
the objectives involved in these forms. Both the Fundamental 
Statute and the UEA reveals a lack of real powers conferred 
upon the G.C.C. institutions.
(9) Conflict Between the UEA and Treaties with Third Parties
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The possibility of conflict between the UEA, concluded 
in 1982, and the Arab League Economic Agreement (1964) is a 
real one. The obligations of the United Arab Emirates and 
Kuwait under the Arab Economic Agreement override their 
obligation under the UEA. According to the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (1969) the earlier treaty of 1964 
should govern the rights and obligations of Kuwait and the 
United Arab Emirates, should conflict occur with the UEA. At 
the same time both the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait are 
entitled to invoke Article 60.2(b) and (c) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties in order to terminate the 
earlier treaty on the ground of a material breach, otherwise 
a de facto termination is a possibility.
As regards the obligations of G.C.C. member states to the 
GATT, Kuwait is the only GATT contracting party which is under 
an obligation to promptly inform the GATT of its membership 
of the G.C.C. The G.C.C. members who apply the GATT rules de 
facto. on the other hand, owe the GATT no obligations.
(10) Supervision of the UEA
The lack of effective supervision within the G.C.C. could 
be regarded as the real dilemma facing the exercise of 
economic integration. None of the G.C.C. institutions enjoys 
effective powers to observe the implementation or the 
interpretation of the UEA. This is a matter of great concern 
and it could determine the degree of success of the G.C.c. 
economic objectives. The absence of judicial supervision 
coupled with the fact that the decisions of the Supreme
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Council are not binding per se left the G.C.C. member states 
with very broad discretion to apply and interpret provisions 
of the UEA unilaterally. This problem is evident in the 
complaints of governments and private individuals to the 
Secretariat, which do not receive legal answers that can 
properly set out the rights and obligations of the parties 
concerned.
To fulfil the objectives of any economic integration 
treaty, the provisions must be carefully scrutinised when they 
are applied and interpreted. In this regard an integrationist 
approach must prevail in the process of interpreting and 
applying the UEA provisions in order to cover many loopholes 
in the agreement. As such the examination of possible 
violations should address not only the explicit provisions but 
rather also the intent and purpose of the conclusions of these 
kind of treaties (e.g. a governmental subsidy should not be 
sustained without proper guidelines).
(11) Locus Standi of Individuals
Private individuals in G.C.C. member states not only have 
interests, as is often the case under international law rules, 
but rights which could be pursued before the national courts, 
especially since the UEA has been incorporated into the 
municipal system of the member states. The UEA, like the EEC 
Treaty, aims at the establishment of a Gulf community, and 
therefore should not be confined to the exchange of obligation 
between governments, but should also be taken to confer rights 
on individuals. The access of the individuals to the national
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courts remains the only guarantee for the individuals to 
obtain a remedy and at the same time for the treaty to be 
properly observed in its application and interpretation.
(12) The Legal Position of Federal Constitutions Within the
G.C.C.
As a rule well-established under international law, the 
Federal Government of the United Arab Emirates cannot plead 
constitutional arrangements to evade its international 
obligations on the ground that there are some reserved areas 
of jurisdiction for the individual Emirates.
As far as the constitution of the United Arab Emirates 
is concerned, state practice clearly shows that the federal 
government has strictly observed the constitutional 
requirements in ratifying the UEA. In fact the ratification 
of the UEA by the Supreme Council of the United Arab Emirates 
can be held as an enactment of legislation. The only ground 
the federal government of the United Arab Emirates may have 
to exclude fishing from the domain of Article 8(3) of the UEA 
is to argue that its interpretation of the Supreme Council 
decision concerning Article 8(3) does not amount to a 
violation of the agreement. This view is tenable since there 
is no effective authorised body stipulated in the treaty to 
decide whether the United Arab Emirates has failed to fulfil 
its obligations under the agreement.
(13) Safeguard Clauses in the UEA
Safeguard clauses in the UEA are meant to deal with 
economic difficulties or political crises. Therefore, there
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must always be objective conditions placed upon recourse to 
these clauses which cannot be simply unilaterally invoked by 
a member state, otherwise the very objective of the economic 
integration process may be undermined.
Since it is left for diplomatic courtesy to determine 
when to invoke this type of provision, possibilities of 
retaliation in case of dissatisfaction would increase and the 
affected party who needs the exemption would suffer as a 
result.
(14) The Claim of Self-Defence and the Gulf War
In international law a state cannot invoke Article 51 of 
the UN Charter for use of armed force in self-defence on the 
ground that its vital interests abroad have been harmed. 
Economic coercion as such does not amount to a violation of 
the UN Charter, and particularly Article 2(4).
Iran is bound by the obligation in Article 2(4) to 
refrain directly or indirectly in its relations "from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence" of the G.C.C. member states. It may 
also be bound by the principle of non-intervention as stated 
in various UN Declarations which could be regarded as evidence 
of customary international law.
Iran's substantial involvement in sending individuals or 
groups of individuals to perform subversive activities in the 
G.C.C. member states constitutes unlawful use of force 
according to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. These acts also 
meet the requirement in paragraph (g) of the definition of
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aggression.
It is difficult to maintain that the Iranian assistance 
to the subversive elements in Bahrain was not on a significant 
scale.
According to the judgment in the Nicaragua Case (1988), 
the act of the G.C.C. member states in funding Iraq cannot 
readily be regarded as an act of self-defence in response to 
Iran's indirect aggression. As to the nature of Iran's acts 
one may consider them an armed attack, viewing their gravity 
and devastating effect on the security of a state such as 
Bahrain. However, the judgment requires the state which is 
the victim of an armed attack to make a request permitting the 
exercise of collective self-defence.
According to Article 51 of the UN Charter, states 
claiming to use the right of collective self-defence are 
required to report that to the Security Council. Both 
procedural requirements apparently have not been met. 
However, the latter requirement may not be relevant since the 
response of the G.C.C. member states has fallen short of the 
use of force and consisted solely of financial assistance to 
Iraq. The purpose of Article 51 of the UN Charter is to 
enable the Security Council to "maintain or restore 
international peace and security". The Council is to enquire 
into activities involving the use of force to discover whether 
it justifies the right of self-defence.
G.C.C. member states could not sustain the position of 
strict neutrality since they were subjected to various acts
of indirect aggression. For those who were not under attack, 
regional defence arrangements are sufficient for them to 
depart from the strict rules of neutrality.
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APPENDICES
THE FUNDAMENTAL STATUTE OF THE COOPERATION COUNCIL 
FOR THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF
The States of 
United Arab Emirates 
State of Bahrain 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
Sultanate of Oman 
State of Qatar 
State of Kuwait
Being fully aware of their mutual bonds of special relations, 
common characteristics and similar systems founded on the 
Creed of Islam? and
Based on their faith in the common destiny and destination 
that link their people; and
In view of their desire to effect coordination, integration 
and interconnection between them in all fields; and 
Based on their conviction that coordination, cooperation and 
integration between them serve the higher goals of the Arab 
nations? and
In order to strengthen their cooperation and reinforce their 
common links? and
In an endeavour to complement efforts already begun in all 
vital scopes that concern their peoples and realise their 
hopes for a better future on the path to unity of their 
States ? and
In conformity with the Charter of the League of Arab States 
which calls for the realisation of closer relations and 
stronger bonds ? and
In order to channel their efforts to reinforce and serve Arab 
and Islamic causes:
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE ONE
Establishment of Council
A council shall be established hereby to be named The 
Cooperation Council for the Arab States, of the Gulf 
hereinafter referred to as Cooperation Council.
ARTICLE TWO
Headquarters
The Cooperation Council shall have its headquarters in Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia.
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ARTICLE THREE
Cooperation Council Meetings
The Council shall hold its meetings in the state where it has 
its headquarters, and may convene in any member state.
ARTICLE FOUR
Objectives
The basic objectives of the Cooperation Council are:
1. To effect coordination, integration and interconnection 
between member states in all fields in order to achieve 
unity between them.
2. Deepen and strengthen relations, links and scopes of 
cooperation now prevailing between their peoples in 
various fields.
3. Formulate similar regulations in various fields including 
the following:
a. Economic and financial affairs.
b. Commerce, customs and communications
c. Education and culture
d. Social and health affairs
e. Information and tourism
f. Legislation and administrative affairs.
4. Stimulate scientific and technological progress in the 
fields of industry, mineralogy, agriculture, water and 
animal resources; the establishment of scientific 
research centres, implementation of common projects and 
encourage cooperation by the private sector for the good 
of their peoples.
ARTICLE FIVE
Council Membership
The Cooperation Council shall be formed of the six states that 
participated in the Foreign Ministers' meeting held at Riyadh 
on 4 February 1981.
ARTICLE SIX
Organisations of the Cooperation Council
The cooperation Council shall have the following main 
organisations:
1. Supreme Council to which shall be attached the Commission 
for Settlement of Disputes.
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2. Ministerial Council.
3. Secretariat-General.
Each of these organisations may establish branch organs as 
necessary.
ARTICLE SEVEN
Supreme Council
1. The Supreme Council is the highest authority of the
Cooperation Council and shall be formed of heads of 
member states. its presidency shall be rotatory based 
on the alphabetical order of the names of the member 
states.
2. The Supreme Council shall hold one regular session every 
year. Extraordinary sessions may be convened at the
request of any member seconded by another member.
3. The Supreme Council shall hold its session in the
territories of member states.
4. A Supreme Council*s meeting shall be considered valid if 
attended by two thirds of the member states.
ARTICLE EIGHT
Supreme Council's Functions
The Supreme Council shall endeavour to achieve the objectives
of the Cooperation Council, particularly as concerns the
following:
1. Review matters of interest to the member states.
2. Lay down the higher policy of the Cooperation Council and 
the basic line it should follow.
3. Review the recommendations, reports, studies and common 
projects submitted by the Ministerial Council for 
approval.
4. Review reports and studies which the Secretary-General 
is charged to prepare.
5. Approve the bases for dealing with other states and 
international organisations.
6. Approve the rules of procedures of the Commission for 
Settlement of Disputes and nominate its members.
7. Appoint the Secretary-General.
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8. Amend the Charter of the Cooperation Council.
9. approve the Council's Internal Rules.
10. Approve the budget of the Secretariat-General.
ARTICLE MINE
Voting in Supreme Council
1. Each member of the Supreme Council shall have one vote.
2. Resolutions of the Supreme Council in substantive matters 
shall be carried by unanimous approval of the member 
states participating in the voting, while resolutions on 
procedural matters shall be carried by majority vote.
ARTICLE TEN
Commission for Settlement of Disputes
1. The Cooperation Council shall have a commission called 
"Commission for Settlement of Disputes" and shall be 
attached to the Supreme Council.
2. The Supreme Council shall form the Commission for every 
case separately based on the nature of the dispute.
3. If a dispute arises over interpretation or implementation 
of the Charter and such dispute is not resolved within 
the Ministerial Council or the Supreme Council, the 
Supreme Council may refer such dispute to the Commission 
for Settlement of Disputes.
4. The Commission shall submit its recommendations or 
opinion, as applicable, to the Supreme Council for 
appropriate action.
ARTICLE ELEVEN
Ministerial Council
1. The Ministerial Council shall be formed of the Foreign 
Ministers of the member states or other delegated 
Ministers. The Council's presidency shall rotate among 
members every three months by alphabetical order of the 
states.
2. The Ministerial Council shall convene every three months 
and may hold extraordinary sessions at the invitation of 
any member seconded by another member.
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3. The Ministerial Council shall decide the venue of its 
next session.
4. A Council's meeting shall be deemed valid if attended by 
two thirds of the member states.
ARTICLE TWELVE
Functions of the Ministerial Council
The Ministerial Council's functions shall include the
following:
1. Propose policies, prepare recommendations, studies and 
projects aimed at developing cooperation and coordination 
between member states in the various fields and adopt 
required resolutions or recommendations concerning 
thereof.
2. Endeavour to encourage, develop and coordinate activities 
existing between member states in all fields. 
Resolutions adopted in such matters shall be referred to 
the Ministerial Council for further submission, with 
recommendations, to the Supreme Council for appropriate 
action.
3. Submit recommendations to the Ministers concerned to 
formulate policies whereby the Cooperation Council's 
resolutions may be put into action.
4. Encourage means of cooperation and coordination between 
the various private sector activities, develop existing 
cooperation between the member states' chambers of 
commerce and industry, and encourage the flow of working 
citizens of the member states among them.
5. Refer any of the various facets of cooperation to one or 
more technical or specialised committee for study and 
presentation of relevant proposals.
6. Review proposals related to amendments to this Charter 
and submit appropriate recommendations to the Supreme 
Council.
7. approve the Ministerial Council's Rules of Procedures as 
well as the Rules of Procedures of the Secretariat- 
General .
8. Appoint the Assistant Secretaries-General, as nominated 
by the Secretary-General, for a renewable period of three 
years.
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9. Approve periodic reports as well as internal rules and 
regulations related to administrative and financial 
affairs proposed by the Secretary-General, and submit 
recommendations to the Supreme Council for approval of 
the budget of the Secretariat-General.
10. Make arrangements for the Supreme Council? ' s meetings and 
prepare its agenda.
11. Review matters referred to it by the Supreme Council.
ARTICLE THIRTEEN
Voting at Ministerial Council
1. Every member of the Ministerial Council shall have one 
vote.
2. Resolutions of the Ministerial Council in substantive 
matters shall be carried by unanimous vote of the member 
states present and participating in the vote, and in 
procedural matters by majority vote.
ARTICLE FOURTEEN
Secretariat-General
1. The Secretariat-General shall be composed of a Secretary-
General who shall be assisted by assistants and a number 
of staff as required.
2. The Supreme Council shall appoint the Secretary-General,
who shall be a citizen of one of the Cooperation Council 
states, for a period of three years which may be renewed 
for one time only.
3. The Secretary-General shall nominate Assistant
secretaries-General.
4. The secretary-General shall appoint the Secretariat
General's staff from among the citizens of member states, 
and may not make exceptions without the approval of the 
Ministerial Council.
5. The secretary-General shall be directly responsible for
the work of the Secretariat-General and the smooth flow
of work in its various organisations. He shall represent 
the Cooperation Council with other parties within the 
powers vested in him.
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ARTICLE FIFTEEN
Functions of the Secretariat-General
The Secretariat-General shall undertake the following
functions:
1. Prepare studies elated to cooperation and coordination, 
and to integrated plans and programmes for member states' 
common action.
2. Prepare periodic reports on the Cooperation Council*s 
work.
3. Follow up the execution by the member states of the 
resolutions and recommendations of the Supreme Council 
and Ministerial Council.
4. Prepare reports and studies ordered by the Supreme 
Council or Ministerial Council.
5. Prepare the draft administrative and financial 
regulations commensurate with the growth of the 
Cooperation Council and its expanding responsibilities.
6. Prepare the Cooperation Council's budget and closing 
accounts.
7. Make preparations for meetings and prepare agenda and 
draft resolutions for the Ministerial Council.
8. Recommend to the Chairman of the Ministerial Council the 
convocation of an extraordinary session of the Council 
whenever necessary.
9. Any other tasks entrusted to it by the Supreme Council 
or Ministerial Council.
ARTICLE SIXTEEN
The Secretary-General and the Assistant Secretaries-General 
and all the Secretariat General's staff shall carry out their 
duties in complete independence and for the common interest 
of the member states.
They shall refrain from any action or behaviour that is 
incompatible with their duties and from divulging the secrets 
of their jobs either during or after their tenure of office.
ARTICLE SEVENTEEN
Privileges and Immunities
1. The Cooperation Council and its organisations shall enjoy 
on the territories of all member states such legal
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competence, privileges and immunities as require to 
realise their objectives and carry out their functions.
2. Representatives of the member states of the Council, and 
the Council's employees, shall enjoy such privileges and 
immunities as are specified in agreements to be concluded 
for this purpose between the member states. A special 
agreement shall organise the relation between the Council 
and the state in which it has its headquarters.
3. Until such time as the two agreements mentioned in item 
2 above are prepared and put into effect, the 
representatives of the member states in the Cooperation 
Council and its staff shall enjoy the diplomatic 
privileges and immunities established for similar 
organisations.
ARTICLE EIGHTEEN
Budget of the Secretariat-General
The Secretariat-General shall have a budget to which the 
member states shall contribute equal amounts.
ARTICLE NINETEEN
Charter Implementation
1. This Charter shall go into effect as of the date it is 
signed by the heads of states of the six member states 
named in this Charter's preamble.
2. The original copy of this Charter shall be deposited with 
Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs which shall 
act as custodian and shall deliver a true copy thereof 
to every member state, pending the establishment of the 
Secretariat-General at which time shall become 
depository.
ARTICLE TWENTY
Amendments to Charter
1. Any member state may request an amendment of this 
Charter.
2. Requests for Charter amendments shall be submitted to the 
Secretary-General who shall refer them to the member 
states at least four months prior to submission to the 
Ministerial Council.
3. An amendment shall become effective if unanimously 
approved by the Supreme Council.
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ARTICLE TWENTY-ONE
Closing Provisions
No reservations may be voiced in respect of the provisions of 
this Charter.
ARTICLE TWENTY-TWO
The Secretariat General shall arrange to deposit and register 
copies of this Charter with the League of Arab States and the 
United Nations, by resolution of the Ministerial Council.
This Charter is signed on one copy in Arabic language at Abu 
Dhabi City, United Arab Emirates, on 21 Rijab 1401 
corresponding to 25 May 1981.
United Arab Emirates 
State of Bahrain 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
Sultanate of Oman 
State of Qatar 
State of Kuwait
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THE COOPERATION COUNCIL FOR THE ARAB 
STATES OF THE GULF RULES OF PROCEDURES 
OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL
ARTICLE ONE
Definitions
These regulations shall be called Rules of Procedures of the 
Supreme Council of the Gulf Arab States Cooperation Council 
and shall encompass the rules that govern procedures for 
convening the Council and the exercise of its functions.
ARTICLE TWO
Membership
1. The Supreme Council shall be composed of the heads of 
state of the Cooperation Council member states. The 
Presidency shall be rotatory based on the alphabetical 
order of the states' names.
2. Each member state shall notify the Secretary-General of 
the names of the members of its delegations to the 
Council meeting, at least seven days prior to the date 
set for opening the meeting.
ARTICLE THREE
With due regard to the objectives of the Cooperation Council 
and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Council as specified in 
ARticles 4 and 8 of the Charter, the Supreme Council may 
perform the following:
1. Form technical committees and select their members from 
member states' nominees who specialise in the committee's 
respective fields.
2. Call one or more of its members to a specific subject and 
submit a report thereon to be distributed to the members 
sufficiently in advance of the meeting set for discussing 
that subject.
ARTICLE FOUR
Convening the Supreme Council
l.a The Supreme Council shall hold one regular session every 
year, and may hold extraordinary sessions at the request 
of any one member seconded by another member.
b The Supreme Council shall hold its sessions at the heads 
of state level.
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c The Supreme Council shall hold its sessions in the member 
states territories.
d Prior to convening the Supreme Council, the Secretary- 
General shall hold a meeting to be attended by delegates 
of the member states for consultation on matters related 
to the session's agenda.
2.a The Secretary General shall set the opening date of the 
Council's session and suggest a closing date.
b The Secretary-General shall issue the invitations for 
convening a regular session no less than thirty days in 
advance, and for convening an extraordinary session, 
within no more than five days.
ARTICLE FIVE
1. The Supreme Council shall at the start of every session 
decide whether the meetings shall be secret or public.
2. A meeting shall be considered valid if attended by heads 
of state of two thirds of the member states. its 
resolutions in substantive matters shall be carried by 
unanimous agreement of the member states present and 
participating in the vote, while resolutions in 
procedural matters shall be carried by majority vote. 
Any member abstaining shall document his being not bound 
by the resolution.
ARTICLE SIX
1. The Council shall hold an extraordinary session based on: 
a - Resolution issued in a previous session.
b - Request of a member state seconded by another state. 
In this case, the Council shall convene within no more 
than five days from the date of issue of the invitation 
for holding the extraordinary session.
2. No matters may be placed on the extraordinary session's 
agenda other than those for which the session was 
convened to discuss.
ARTICLE SEVEN
1. Presidency of the Supreme Council shall, at the opening 
of each regular session, go to a head of state by 
rotation based on the alphabetical order of the member 
states' names. The President shall continue to exercise 
the functions of the Presidency until such functions are 
entrusted to his successor at the beginning of the next 
regular session.
2. The head of a state that is party to an outstanding
513
dispute may not preside over a session or meeting called 
to discuss the subject of the dispute. In such case, the 
council shall designate a temporary president.
3. The President shall declare the opening and closing of 
sessions and meetings, the suspension of meetings, and 
closures, and shall see that the Cooperation Council 
Charter and these Rules of Procedures are dully complied 
with, he shall give the floor to speakers based on the 
order of their requests, submit suggestions for 
acceptance by the membership, direct voting procedures, 
give final decisions on points of order, announce 
resolutions, follow up on works of committees, and inform 
the Council of all incoming correspondence.
4. The President may take part in deliberations and submit 
suggestions in the name of the state which he represents 
and may, for this purpose, assign a member of his state's 
delegation to act on his behalf in such instances.
ARTICLE EIGHT
Supreme Council Agenda
1. The Ministerial Council shall prepare a draft agenda for 
the Supreme Council, and such draft agenda shall be 
conveyed by the Secretary-General, together with 
explanatory notes and documentation, to the member states 
under cover of the letter of convocation at least thirty 
days before the date set for the meeting.
2. The draft agenda shall include the following:
a - A report by the Secretary-General on the Supreme 
Council's activities between the two sessions, and 
actions taken to carry out its resolutions, 
b - Reports and matters received from the Ministerial 
Council and the Secretariat-General.
c - Matters which the Supreme Council had previously 
decided to include on the agenda.
d - Matters suggested by a member state for necessary 
review by the Supreme Council.
3. Every member state may request inclusion of additional 
items on the draft agenda provided such request is tabled 
at least fifteen days prior to the date set for opening 
the session. Such matters shall be listed in an 
additional agenda which shall be sent, along with 
relevant documentation, to the member state, at least 
five days before the date set for the session.
4. Any member state may request inclusion of extra items on 
the draft agenda as late as the date set for opening a 
session, if such matters are considered both important 
and urgent.
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5. The Council shall approve its agenda at the start of 
every session.
6. The Council may, during the session, add new items that 
are considered urgent.
7. The ordinary session shall be adjourned after completion 
of discussions of the items placed on the agenda. The 
Supreme Council may decide to suspend the session's 
meetings before completion of discussions on agenda 
items, and resume such meetings at a later date.
ARTICLE NINE
Office and Committees of Supreme Council
1. The Supreme Council Office shall be formed, in every 
session, of the Council President, the Chairman of the 
Ministerial Council and the Secretary General. The 
Office shall be headed by the Supreme Council President.
2. The Office shall carry out the following functions:
a - Review the text of resolutions passed by the Supreme 
Council without affecting their contents, 
b - Assist the President of the Supreme Council in 
directing the activities of the session in a general way. 
c - Other tasks indicated in these Rules of Procedures 
or other matters entrusted to it by the Supreme Council.
ARTICLE TEN
1. The Council may, at the start of every session, create 
any committees that it deems necessary to allow adequate 
study of matters listed on the agenda. Delegates of 
member states shall take part in the activities of such 
committees.
2. Meetings of committees shall continue until they complete 
their task, with due regard for the date set for closing 
the session. The resolutions shall be carried by 
majority vote.
3. Every committee shall start its work by selecting a 
chairman from among its members. The rapporteur of the 
committee shall act for the chairman in directing the 
meeting in the absence of the chairman. The chairman, 
or the rapporteur in the chairman's absence, shall submit 
to the Council all the explanations that it requests on 
the committee's reports. The chairman may, with the 
approval of the session's President, take part in the 
discussions, without voting if he is not a member of the 
Supreme Council.
4. The Council may refer any of the matters included in the 
agenda to the committees, based on their specialisation
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for study and reporting. Any one item may be referred 
to more than one committee.
5. Committees may neither discuss any matter not referred 
to them by the Council, nor adopt any recommendation 
which, if approved by the Council, may produce a 
financial obligation, before the committee receives a 
report from the Secretary-General regarding the financial 
and administrative results that may ensure from adopting 
the resolution.
ARTICLE ELEVEN
Progress of Deliberations and Suggestions
1. Every member state may participate in the deliberations 
and committees of the Supreme Council as stipulated in 
these Rules of Procedures.
2. The President shall direct discussion of the items as 
presented in order on the meeting's agenda and may, when 
necessary, call the Secretary-General or his 
representative to the meeting to explain any point as 
necessary.
3. The President shall give the floor to speakers in the 
order of their requests. He may give priority to the 
chairman or rapporteur of a committee to submit a report 
or explain specific points.
4. Every member may, during deliberations, raise points of 
order which the President shall resolve immediately and 
his decisions shall be valid unless contradicted by a 
majority of the Supreme Council member states.
ARTICLE TWELVE
1. Every member may, during the discussion of any subject, 
request suspension or adjournment of the meeting or 
discussion of the subject, or closure. Such requests may 
not be discussed but the President shall put them to the 
vote, if duly seconded, and decision shall be by majority 
of the member states.
2. With due regard to provisions of item 4 of the preceding 
Article, suggestions indicated in item 1 of this Article 
shall be given priority over all others based on the 
following order:
a - Suspend the meeting 
b - Adjourn the meeting
c - Postpone discussion of the matter on hand, 
d - Closure of discussion of the matter on hand.
3. Apart from suggestions concerning language or procedural 
matters, draft resolutions and substantive amendments
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shall be submitted in writing to the Secretary-General 
or his representative who shall distribute them as soon 
as possible to the delegations. No draft resolution may 
be submitted for discussion or voting before the text 
thereof is distributed to all the delegations.
4. A proposal that has already been decided upon in the same 
session may not be reconsidered unless the council 
decides otherwise.
ARTICLE THIRTEEN
The President shall follow the activities of the committees, 
inform the Supreme Council of correspondence received, and 
formally announce before members all the resolutions and 
recommendations arrived at.
ARTICLE FOURTEEN
Voting
Every member state shall have one vote and no state may 
represent another state or vote for it.
ARTICLE FIFTEEN
1. Voting shall be by calling the names in the alphabetical 
order of the states1 names, or by raising hands. Voting 
shall be secret if so requested by a member by decision 
of the President. The Supreme council may decide 
otherwise. The vote of every member shall be documented 
in the minutes of the meeting if voting is effected by 
calling the names. The minutes shall indicate the result 
of voting, if the vote is secret or by show of hands.
2. A member may abstain from a vote or express reservations 
over a procedural matter or part thereof, in which case 
the reservation shall be read at the time the resolution 
is announced and shall be duly documented in writing, 
members may present explanations about their stand in the 
voting after voting is completed.
3. Once the President announces that voting has started, no 
interruption may be made unless the matter relates to a 
point of order relevant to the vote.
ARTICLE SIXTEEN
1. If a member requests amendment of a proposal, voting on 
the amendment shall be carried out first. If there are 
more than one amendment, voting shall first be made on 
the amendment which in the President's opinion is 
farthest from the original proposal, then on the next 
farthest, and so on until voting is completed on all 
proposed amendments. If one or more such amendments is
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passed, then voting shall be made on the original 
proposal as amended.
2. Any new proposal shall be deemed as an amendment to the 
original proposal if it merely entails an addition to, 
omission from or change to a part of the original 
proposal.
ARTICLE SEVENTEEN
1. The Supreme Council may create technical committees
charged with giving advice on the design and execution
of Supreme Council programmes in specific fields.
2. The Supreme Council shall appoint the members of the
technical committees from specialists who are citizens
of the member states.
3. The technical committees shall meet at the invitation of 
the Secretary-General and shall lay down their work plans 
in consultation with him.
4. The Secretary-General shall prepare the committee's 
agendas after consultation with the chairman of the 
committee concerned.
ARTICLE EIGHTEEN
Amendment of Rules of Procedures
1. Any member state may propose amendments to the Rules of 
Procedures.
2. No proposed amendments may be considered unless the 
relevant proposal is circulated to the member states by 
the Secretariat-General prior to tabling with the 
Ministerial Council by at least thirty days.
3. No basic changes may be introduced to the proposed 
amendment mentioned in the preceding item unless the text 
of such proposed changes have been circulated to the 
member states by the Secretariat-General before tabling 
with the Ministerial Council by at least fifteen days.
4. Except for items based on the provisions of the Charter, 
and with due regard to preceding items, these Rules of 
Procedures shall be amended by a resolution of the 
Supreme Council approved by majority of the members.
ARTICLE NINETEEN
Effective Date
These Rules of Procedures shall go into effect as of the date
of approval by the Supreme Council and may not be amended
except in accordance with procedures set forth in the
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preceding Article.
These Rules of Procedures are signed at Abu Dhabi City, United 
Arab Emirates on 21 Rajab 1401 AH corresponding to 25 May 1981 
AD.
United Arab Emirates 
State of Bahrain 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
Sultanate of Oman 
State of Qatar 
State of Kuwait
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COOPERATION COUNCIL 
FOR THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF 
RULES OF PROCEDURES OF THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL
ARTICLE ONE
1. These regulations shall be called Rules of Procedures of
the Ministerial Council of the Gulf Arab States
Cooperation Council and shall encompass rules governing 
Council meetings and exercise of its functions.
2. The following terms as used in these shall have the
meanings indicated opposite each:
Cooperation Council
Charter
Supreme Council
The Gulf Arab States 
Cooperation Council
Statute establishing the 
G u l f  A r a b  S t a t e s  
Cooperation Council
The highest body of the 
G u l f  A r a b  S t a t e s  
Cooperation Council
Council Ministerial Council of the
G u l f  A r a b  S t a t e s  
Cooperation Council
Secretary-General The Secretary-General of
the Gulf Arab States 
Cooperation Council
Chairman The Chairman of the
Ministerial Council of the 
G u l f  A r a b  S t a t e s
Cooperation Council
ARTICLE TWO
State Representation
1. The Ministerial Council shall be composed of the member 
states* Foreign Ministers or other delegated Ministers.
2. Every member state shall, at least one week prior the
convening of every Ministerial Council*s ordinary 
session, convey to the Secretary-General a list of the 
names of the members of its delegation. For
extraordinary sessions, the list shall be submitted three 
days before the date set for the session.
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ARTICLE THREE
Convening the Sessions
1. The Ministerial Council shall decide in every meeting the 
venue of its next regular session.
2. The Secretary-General shall decide, in consultation with 
the member states, the venues of extraordinary sessions.
3. If circumstances should arise that preclude the convening 
of an ordinary or extraordinary session at the place set 
for it, the secretary-General shall so inform the member 
states and shall set another place for the meeting after 
consultation with them.
ARTICLE FOUR
Ordinary Sessions
1. The Council shall convene in ordinary session once every 
three months.
2. The Secretary-General shall set the date for opening the 
session and suggest the date of its closing.
3. The Secretary-General shall address the invitation to 
attend a Council ordinary session at least fifteen days 
in advance, and shall indicate therein the date and place 
set for the meeting, as well as attach thereto the 
session's agenda, explanatory notes and other 
documentation.
ARTICLE FIVE
Extraordinary Sessions
1. The Council shall hold an extraordinary session at the
request of any member state seconded by another member.
2. The secretary-General shall address the invitation to the
Council's extraordinary session and attach a memorandum 
containing the request of the member which asked for the 
meeting.
3. The Secretary-General shall specify in the invitation the
place, date and agenda of the session.
ARTICLE SIX
1. The Council may itself decide to hold extraordinary
sessions, in which case it shall specify the agenda, time 
and place of the session.
2. The secretary-General shall send out to the member states
the invitation to attend the Council's extraordinary
meeting, along with a memorandum containing the council's
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decision to this effect, and specifying the date and 
agenda of the session.
3. The extraordinary session shall be convened within a
maximum of five days from the date of issue of the 
invitation.
ARTICLE SEVEN
No matters, other than those for which the extraordinary 
session was called, may be included on the agenda.
ARTICLE EIGHT
Agenda
The Secretary-General shall prepare a draft agenda for a
Council's ordinary session and such draft shall include the 
following:
1. The Secretary-General1s Report on the Cooperation 
Council's work.
2. Matters referred to him by the Supreme Council.
3. Matters which the Council had previously decided to 
include on the agenda.
4. Matters which the Secretary-General believes should be 
reviewed by the Council.
5. Matters suggested by a member state.
ARTICLE NINE
Member states shall convey to the Secretary-General their 
suggestions on matters they wish to include on the Council's 
agenda at least thirty days prior to the date of the Council's 
ordinary session.
ARTICLE TEN
Member States or the Secretary-General may request the 
inclusion of additional items on the Council's draft agenda 
at least ten days prior to the date set for opening an 
ordinary session. Such items shall be listed on an additional 
schedule which shall be conveyed along with relevant 
documentation to the member states at least five days prior 
to the date of the session.
ARTICLE ELEVEN
Member states or the Secretary-General may request inclusion 
of additional items on the Council ordinary session's agenda 
up to date set for opening the session if such matters are
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both important and urgent.
ARTICLE TWELVE
The Council shall approve its agenda at the beginning of every 
session.
ARTICLE THIRTEEN
A Council's ordinary session shall end upon completion of 
discussion of matters listed on the agenda. The Council may, 
when necessary, decide to suspend its meetings temporarily 
before discussion of agenda items is completed and resume its 
meetings at a later date.
ARTICLE FOURTEEN
The Council may defer discussion of certain items on its 
agenda and decide to include them with the others, when 
necessary, on the agenda of a subsequent session.
ARTICLE FIFTEEN
Council's Chairmanship
1. Chairmanship of the council shall be entrusted every six 
months to a head of delegation on rotation based on the 
alphabetical order of the member states' names and, if 
necessary, to the next in order.
2. The Chairman shall exercise his functions until he passes 
his post on to his successor.
3. The Chairman shall, as well, preside over the 
extraordinary sessions.
4. The representative of a state that is party to an
outstanding dispute may not chair the session or meeting 
assigned for discussing such dispute, in which case the 
Council shall name a temporary Chairman.
ARTICLE SIXTEEN
1. The Chairman shall announce the opening and closing of 
sessions and meetings, the suspension of meetings and 
closure of discussions, and shall see that the provisions 
of the Charter and these Rules of Procedures are duly 
respected.
2. The Chairman may participate in the Council's
deliberations and vote in the name of the state he 
represents. He may, for such purpose, delegate another
member of his delegation to act on his behalf.
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ARTICLE SEVENTEEN
Council's Office
1. The Council Office shall include the Chairman, secretary- 
General and heads of working subcommittees which the 
Council decides to form.
2. The Council Chairman shall preside over the Office.
ARTICLE EIGHTEEN
The Office shall carry out the following tasks:
1. Help the Chairman direct the session's proceedings.
2. Coordinate the work of the Council and the subcommittees.
3. Supervise the drafting of the resolutions passed by the 
Council.
4. Other tasks indicated in these Rules of Procedures or 
entrusted to it by the Council.
ARTICLE NINETEEN
Subcommittees
1. The Council shall utilise preparatory and working 
committees to accomplish its tasks.
2. The Secretariat-General shall participate in the work of 
the committees.
ARTICLE TWENTY
1. The Secretary-General may, in consultation with the 
Chairman of the session, form preparatory committees 
charged with the study of matters listed on the agenda.
2. Preparatory committees shall be composed of delegates of 
member states and may, when necessary, seek the help of 
such experts as they may deem fit.
3. Each preparatory committee shall meet at least three days 
prior to the opening of the session by invitation of the 
Secretary-General. The work of the committee shall end 
at the close of the session.
ARTICLE TWENTY-ONE
1. The Council may, at the start of each session, form 
working committees and charge them with specific tasks.
2. The work of the working committees shall continue until 
the date set for closing the session.
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ARTICLE TWENTY-TWO
1. Each subcommittee shall start its work by electing a 
chairman and a rapporteur from among its members. When 
the chairman is absent, the rapporteur shall act for him 
in directing the meetings.
2. The chairman or rapporteur of each subcommittee shall 
submit a report on its work to the Council.
3. The chairman or rapporteur of a subcommittee shall 
present to the Council all explanations required about 
the contents of the subcommittee's report.
ARTICLE TWENTY-THREE
1. The Secretariat-General shall organise the technical 
Secretariat subcommittees of the Council.
2. The Secretariat-General shall prepare minutes of meetings 
documentating discussions, resolutions and 
recommendations. Such minutes shall be prepared for all 
meetings of the Council and its subcommittees.
3. The Secretary-General shall supervise the organisation 
of the Council's relations with the information media.
4. The Secretary-General shall convey the Council's 
resolutions and recommendations and relevant 
documentation to the member states within fifteen days 
after the end of the session.
ARTICLE TWENTY-FOUR
The Council's Secretariat and subcommittees shall receive and 
distribute documents, reports, resolutions and recommendations 
of the council and its subcommittees and shall draw up and 
distribute minutes and daily bulletins, as well as safeguard 
the documents and carry out any other tasks required by the 
Council's work.
ARTICLE TWENTY-FIVE
Texts of resolutions or recommendations made by the Council 
may not be announced or published except by decision of the 
Council.
ARTICLE TWENTY-SIX
Deliberations
Every member state may take part in the deliberations of the 
Council and its subcommittees in the manner prescribed in 
these Rules of Procedures.
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ARTICLE TWENTY-SEVEN
1. The Chairman shall direct deliberations on matters in 
hand in the order they are listed on the Council*s 
agenda.
2. The chairman shall give the floor to speakers in the 
order of their requests. Priority may be given to the 
chairman or rapporteur of a certain committee to present 
its report or explain certain points therein. The floor 
shall be given to the Secretary-General or his 
representative whenever it is necessary.
3. The Council Chairman may, during deliberations, read the 
list of the names of members who requested the floor, and 
with the approval of the council, close the list. The 
only exception is exercise of the right of reply.
ARTICLE TWENTY-EIGHT
The Council shall decide whether the meetings shall be open
or secret.
ARTICLE TWENTY-NINE
1. Every member may raise a point of order which the 
chairman shall resolve immediately and his decision shall 
be final unless opposed by majority of the member states.
2. A member who raises a point of order may not go beyond 
the point he raised.
ARTICLE THIRTY
1. Every member may, during discussion of any matter, 
suggest the suspension or adjournment of the meeting, or 
discussion of the matter on hand or closure. The 
Chairman shall in such cases submit the suggestion to the 
vote directly, if the suggestion is seconded by another 
member, and it requires the approval of the majority of 
the member states to pass.
2. With due regard to the provisions of the preceding item, 
suggestions indicated therein shall be submitted to the 
vote in the following order.
a. Suspension of meeting
b. Adjournment of meeting
c. Postponement of discussion of the matter in hand
d. Closure of discussion of the matter in hand.
ARTICLE THIRTY-ONE
1. Member states may suggest draft resolutions or
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recommendations, or amendments thereto, and may withdraw 
such suggestions unless they are voted on.
2. Drafts indicated in the preceding item shall be submitted 
in writing to the Secretariat-General for distribution 
to delegations as soon as possible.
3. Except for suggestions concerning language or procedures, 
drafts indicated in this Article may not be discussed or 
voted upon before their texts are distributed to all 
delegations.
4. A suggestion already decided upon in the same session may 
not be reconsidered unless the Council decided otherwise.
ARTICLE THIRTY-TWO
The Chairman shall follow the work of the Committees, inform
the Council of incoming correspondence, and formally announce
before members the resolutions and recommendations that have
been arrived at.
ARTICLE THIRTY-THREE
Voting
1. The Council shall pass its resolutions with the unanimous 
approval of the member states present and participating 
in the vote, while decisions in procedural matters shall 
be passed by a majority vote. The member abstaining from 
the vote shall document his nonsubscription to the 
decision.
2. If members of the Council should disagree on the 
definition of the matter being put to the vote, the 
matter shall be settled by majority vote of the member 
states present.
ARTICLE THIRTY-FOUR
1. Every member state shall have one vote.
2. No member state may represent another state or vote for 
it.
ARTICLE THIRTY-FIVE
1. Voting shall be by calling the names in the alphabetical 
order of the states' names, or by raising hands.
2. Voting shall be by secret ballot if so requested by a 
member or by decision of the Chairman. The Council, 
however, may decide otherwise.
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3. The vote of every member shall be documented in the 
minutes of the meeting if voting is effected by calling 
the names. The minutes shall indicate the result of 
voting if the vote is secret or by show of hands.
4. Member states may explain their positions after the vote 
and such explanation shall be written down in the minutes 
of the meeting.
5. Once the Chairman announces that voting has started, no 
interruption may be made except for a point of order 
relating to the vote or its postponement in accordance 
with the provisions of this Article and the next Article.
ARTICLE THIRTY-SIX
1. The Council Chairman with the help of the Secretary- 
General shall endeavour to reconcile the stands of member 
states on disputed matters and obtain their agreement to 
a draft resolution before submitting it to the vote.
2. The Council Chairman, the Secretary-General or any member 
state may request postponement of a vote for a specific 
period during which further negotiations may be made 
concerning the item submitted to the vote.
ARTICLE THIRTY-SEVEN
1. If a member requests amendment of a proposal, voting on 
the amendment shall be carried out first. if there are 
more than one amendment, voting shall first be made on 
the amendment which the Chairman considers to be farthest 
from the original proposal, then on the next farthest, 
and so on until all proposed amendments have been voted 
upon. If one or more amendments are passed, then voting 
shall be made on the original proposal as amended.
2. A new proposal shall be deemed as an amendment to the 
original proposal if it merely entails an addition to, 
omission from, or change to a part of the original 
proposal.
ARTICLE THIRTY-EIGHT
1. Any member state or the Secretary-General may propose 
amending these Rules of Procedures.
2. No proposed amendment to these Rules of Procedures may 
be considered unless the relevant proposal is circulated 
to the member states by the Secretariat-General at least 
thirty days before submission to the Council.
3. No basic changes may be introduced to the proposed 
amendment mentioned in the preceding items unless the
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texts of such proposed change have been circulated to the 
member states at least fifteen days prior to submission 
to the Council.
4. Except for items based on provisions of the Charter, and 
with due regard to preceding items, these Rules of 
Procedures shall be amended by a resolution of the 
Council approved by majority of its members.
ARTICLE THIRTY-NINE
Effective Date
These Rules of Procedures shall go into effect as of the date 
of approval by the Council and may not be amended except in 
accordance with procedures set forth in the preceding article.
Thus, these Rules of Procedures are signed at Abu Dhabi City, 
United Arab Emirates, on 21 Rajab 1401 AH corresponding to 25 
May 1981 AD.
United Arab Emirates 
State of Bahrain 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
Sultanate of Oman 
State of Qatar 
State of Kuwait
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THE UNIFIED ECONOMIC AGREEMENT AMONG THE 
COUNTRIES OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL
With the help of the God Almighty?
The Governments of the Member States of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council;
In accordance with the Charter thereof, which calls for closer 
reapproachment and stronger links? and
Desiring to promote, expand and enhance their economic ties 
on solid foundations, in the best interest of their people? 
and,
Intending to coordinate and unify their economic, financial 
and monetary policies, as well as their commercial and 
industrial legislation, and customs regulations? Have agreed 
as follows:
TRADE EXCHANGE
Article 1
1. The Member States shall permit the important and 
exportation of agricultural, animal, industrial and 
natural resource products that are of national origin. 
Also, they shall permit exportation thereof to other 
member states.
2. All agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource 
products that are of national origin shall receive the 
same treatment as national products.
Article 2
1. All agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource 
products that are of national origin shall be exempted 
from customs duties and other charges having equivalent 
effect.
2. Fees charged for specific services such as demurrage, 
storage, transportation, haulage or unloading, shall not 
be considered as customs duties when they are levied on 
domestic products.
Article 3
1. For products of national origin to qualify as national 
products, the value added ensuring from their production 
in member states shall not be less than 40% of their 
final value. In addition, the share of the member 
states* citizens in the ownership of the producing plant 
shall not be less than 51%
2. Every item to be exempted hereby shall be accompanied by
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a certificate of origin duly authenticated by the 
government agency concerned.
Article 4
1. Member states shall establish a uniform minimum customs 
tariff applicable to the products of the third countries.
2. One of the objectives of the uniform customs tariff shall 
be the protection of national products from foreign 
competition.
3. The uniform customs tariff shall be applied gradually 
within five years from the date of entry into force of 
this agreement. Arrangements for the gradual application 
shall be agreed upon within one year from the said date.
Article 5
Member states shall grant all facilities for the transit of 
any member states' goods to other member states, exempting 
them from any duties and taxes, whatsoever, without prejudice 
to the provisions of Paragraph 2 of Article 2.
Article 6
Transit shall be denied to any goods that are barred from 
entry into the territory of a member state by its local
regulations. Lists of such goods shall be exchanged between 
the customs authorities of the member states.
Article 7
Member states shall coordinate their commercial policies and 
relations with other states and regional economic groupings 
and blocs with a view toward creating balanced trade relations 
and favourable circumstances and terms of trade therewith.
To achieve this goal, the member states shall make the 
following arrangements.
1. Coordinate import/export policies and regulations.
2. coordinate policies for building up strategic food
stocks.
3. Conclude economic agreements collectively when and if the 
common benefit of the member states is realised.
4. Work for the creation of a collective negotiating force
to strengthen their negotiating position vis-a-vis 
foreign parties in the field of importation of basic 
needs and exportation of major products.
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MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL, CITIZENS AND 
EXERCISE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES
Article 8
The member states shall agree on the executive rules which 
would ensure that each member state shall grant the citizens 
of all other member states the same treatment granted to its 
own citizens without any discrimination or differentiation in 
the following fields:
1. Freedom of movement, work and residence.
2. Right of ownership, inheritance and bequest.
3. Freedom of exercising economic activity.
4. Free movement of capital.
Article 9
The member states shall encourage their respective private 
sectors to establish joint ventures in order to link their 
citizens* economic interest in the various spheres.
COORDINATION OF DEVELOPMENT
Article 10
The member states shall endeavour to achieve coordination and 
harmony among their respective development plans with a view 
to achieving economic integration between them.
Article 11
1. The member states shall endeavour to coordinate their 
policies with regard to all aspects of the oil industry 
including extraction, refining, marketing, processing, 
pricing, exploitation of natural gas, and development of 
energy sources.
2. The member states shall endeavour to formulate unified 
oil policies and adopt common positions vis-a-vis the 
outside world, and int he international and specialised 
organisations.
Article 12
To achieve the objectives specified in this Agreement, the 
member states shall perform the following:
1. Coordinate industrial activities, formulate policies and 
mechanisms aiming at the industrial development and the
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diversification of their productive bases on an 
integrated basis.
2. Standardise their industrial legislation and regulations 
and guide their local production units to meet their 
needs.
3. Allocate industries between member states according to 
relative advantages and economic feasibility, and 
encourage the establishment of basic as well as ancillary 
industries.
Article 13
Within the framework of their coordinating activities, the 
member states shall pay special attention to the establishment 
of joint ventures in the fields of industry, agriculture and 
services, and shall support them with public, private or mixed 
capital in order to achieve economic integration, productive 
interface, and common development on sound economic basis.
TECHNICAL COOPERATION
Article 14
The member states shall collaborate in finding spheres for 
common technical cooperation aimed at building a genuine local 
base founded on encouragement and support of research and 
applied sciences and technology as well as adapting imported 
technology to meet the regionfs progress and development 
objectives.
Article 15
Member states shall set rules, make arrangements and lay down 
terms for the transfer of technology, selecting the most 
suitable or introducing such changes thereto as would serve 
their various needs. member states shall also, whenever 
feasible, conclude uniform agreements with foreign governments 
and scientific or commercial firms to achieve these 
objectives.
Article 16
The member states shall formulate policies and implement 
coordinate programmes for technical, vocational and 
professional training and rehabilitation at all levels and 
stages. They shall also up-grade educational curricula at all 
levels to link education and technology with the development 
needs of the member states.
Article 17
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The member states shall coordinate their manpower policies and 
shall formulate uniform and standardised criteria and 
classifications for the various categories of occupations and 
crafts in different sectors in order to avoid harmful 
competition among themselves and to optimise the utilisation 
of available human resources.
TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION
Article 18
The member states shall accord means for passenger and cargo 
transportation belonging to citizens of the other member 
states, when transiting or entering its territory, the same 
treatment they accord to the means of passenger and cargo 
transportation belonging to their own citizens, including 
exemption from all duties and taxes, whatsoever. However, 
local transportations are excluded.
Article 19
1. The member states shall cooperate in the fields of land 
and sea transportation and communications. They shall 
also coordinate and establish infrastructure projects 
such as seaports, airports, water and power stations, 
roads, with a view to realising common economic 
development and linking their economic activities with 
each other.
2. The contracting states shall coordinate aviation and air 
transport policies among them and promote all spheres of 
joint activities at various levels.
Article 20
The member states shall allow steamers, ships and boats and 
their cargoes, belonging to any member state to freely use the 
various ports facilities and grant them the same treatment and 
privileges granted to their own in docking or calling at the 
ports as concerns fees, pilotage, and docking services, 
haulage, loading and unloading, maintenance, repair, storage 
of goods and other similar services.
FINANCIAL AND MONETARY COOPERATION
Article 21
The member states shall seek to unify investment in order to 
achieve a common investment policy aimed at directing their 
internal and external investments towards serving their 
interest, and realising their peoples' aspirations in 
development and progress.
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Article 22
The member states shall seek to coordinate their financial, 
monetary and banking policies and enhance cooperation between 
monetary agencies and central banks, including an endeavour 
to establish a common currency in order to further their 
desired economic integration.
Article 23
Member states shall seek to coordinate their external policies 
in the sphere of international and regional development aid.
CLOSING PROVISIONS
Article 24
In the execution of the Agreement and determination of the 
procedures resulting therefrom, consideration shall be given 
to differences in the levels of development between the member 
states and the local development priorities of each. Any 
member state may be temporarily exempted from applying such 
provisions of this Agreement as may be necessitated by 
temporary local situations in that state or specific 
circumstances faced by it. Such exemption shall be for a 
specified period and shall be decided by the Supreme Council 
of the Gulf Arab States Cooperation Council.
Article 25
No member state shall give to any non-member state any 
preferential privilege exceeding that given herein.
Article 26
1. This Agreement shall enter into force four months after 
its approval by the Supreme Council.
2. This Agreement may be amended by consent from the Supreme 
Council.
Article 27
In case of conflict with local laws and regulations of member 
states, execution of the provisions of this Agreement shall 
prevail.
Article 28
Provisions herein shall supersede any similar provisions 
contained in bilateral agreements.
Drawn up at Riyadh on 6 Sha'ban 1401 Corresponding to 8 June 
1981.
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THE COOPERATION COUNCIL FOR THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF
RULES OF PROCEDURES
COMMISSION FOR SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
PREAMBLE
In accordance with the provisions of Article Six of the 
Charter of the Gulf Arab States Cooperation Council? and 
In execution of the provision of Article Ten of the 
Cooperation Council Charter,
A Commission for Settlement of Disputes, hereinafter referred 
to as The Commission shall be set up and its jurisdiction and 
rules for its proceedings shall be as follows:
ARTICLE ONE
Terminology
Terms used in these Rules of Procedures shall have the same 
meanings established in the Charter of the Gulf Arab States 
Cooperation Council.
ARTICLE TWO
Commission's Seat and Meetings
The Commission shall have its headquarters at Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia, and shall hold its meetings on the territory of the 
state where its headquarters is located, but may hold its 
meetings elsewhere, when necessary.
ARTICLE THREE
Jurisdiction
The Commission shall, once installed, have jurisdiction to 
consider the following matters referred to it by the Supreme 
Council:
1. Disputes between member states.
2. Differences of opinion as to the interpretation or
execution of the Cooperation Council Charter.
ARTICLE FOUR
Commission's Membership
1. The Commission shall be formed of an appropriate number 
of citizens of member states not involved in the dispute 
as the Council selects in every case separately depending 
on the nature of the dispute, provided that the number 
shall not be less than three members.
2. The Commission may seek the advice of any such experts 
as it may deem necessary.
3. Unless the Supreme Council decides otherwise, the
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Commission's task shall end with the submission of its 
recommendations or opinion to the Supreme Council which, 
after the conclusion of the Commission's task, may summon 
it at any time to explain or elaborate on its 
recommendations or opinions.
ARTICLE FIVE
Meetings and Internal Procedures
1. The Commission's meeting shall be valid if attended by 
all members.
2. The Secretariat-General of the Cooperation Council shall 
prepare procedures required to conduct the Commission's 
affairs, and such procedures shall go into effect as of 
the date of approval by the Ministerial Council.
3. Each party to the dispute shall send representatives to 
the Commission who shall be entitled to follow 
proceedings and present their defence.
ARTICLE SIX
Chairmanship
The Commission shall select a chairman from among its members.
ARTICLE SEVEN
Voting
Every member of the Commission shall have one vote, and shall 
issue its recommendations or opinions on matters referred to 
it by majority of the members. In case of a tie, the party 
with the Chairman's vote shall prevail.
ARTICLE EIGHT
Commission's Secretariat
1. The Secretary-General shall appoint a recorder for the
Commission, and a sufficient number of employees to carry 
out secretarial work.
2. The Supreme Council may create an independent
organisation to carry out the Commission's secretarial 
work when the need arises.
ARTICLE NINE
Recommendations and Opinions
1. The Commission shall issue its recommendations or
opinions in accordance with the Cooperation Council's 
Charter, international laws and practices, and the 
principles of Islamic Shari'ah. The Commission shall 
submit its findings on the case in hand to the Supreme 
Council for appropriate action.
537
2. The Commission may, while considering any dispute
referred to it and pending the issue of its final
recommendations thereon, ask the Supreme Council to take 
interim action called for by necessity or circumstances.
3. The Commission's recommendations or opinions shall spell
out the reasons on which they were based and shall be
signed by the chairman and recorder.
4. If an opinion is passed wholly or partially by unanimous 
vote of the members, the dissenting members shall be 
entitled to document their dissenting opinion.
ARTICLE TEN
Immunities and Privileges
The Commission and its members shall enjoy such immunities and 
privileges in the territories of the member states as are 
required to realise its objectives and in accordance with 
Article Seventeen of the Cooperation Council Charter.
ARTICLE ELEVEN
Commission's Budget
The Commission's budget shall be considered part of the 
Secretariat General's budget. Remunerations of the
Commission's members shall be established by the Supreme 
Council.
ARTICLE TWELVE
Amendments
1. Any member state may request for amendments of these 
Rules of Procedures.
2. Requests for amendments shall be submitted to the 
Secretary-General who shall relay them to the member 
states by at least four months before submission to the 
Ministerial Council.
3. An amendment shall be effective if approved unanimously 
by the Supreme Council.
ARTICLE THIRTEEN
Effective Date
These Rules of Procedures shall go into effect as of the date 
of approval by the Supreme Council.
These Rules of Procedures were signed at Abu Dhabi City,
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United Arab Emirates on 21 Rajab 1401 AH corresponding to 25 
May 1981 AD.
United Arab Emirates,
State of Bahrain 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
Sultanate of Oman 
State of Qatar 
State of Kuwait
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FINAL DECLARATION OF THE FIRST REGULAR SESSION
OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE COOPERATION
COUNCIL FOR THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF
With the help of God Almighty and in response to the 
invitation of is Highness the President of the United Arab 
Emirates, a meeting convened in Abu Dhabi in the period 
between 21 to 22 Rajab 1401 Hirjiah corresponding to 25-26 May 
1982 encompassing Their Majesties and Highnesses:
His Highness al-Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan A1 Nahyan the 
President of the United Arab Emirates;
His Highness al-Shaikh Issa bin Selman A1 Khalifah the 
Ruler of the State of Bahrain;
His Majesty King Khaled bin Abd al-Aziz A1 Saud the King 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;
His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin said the Sultan of Oman; 
His Highness al-Shaikh Khalifah bin Hamad A1 Thani the 
Ruler of the State of Qatar;
His Highness al-Shaikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah 
the Ruler of the State of Kuwait.
Departing from the spirit of brotherhood prevailing 
between these States and its peoples; and in complementing 
efforts already begun by its leaders in their search for an 
ideal formula to amalgamate their States and to permit their 
cooperation and coordination; and based on their faith in the 
importance of cooperation between these States; and in 
response to the desires and aspirations of their peoples for 
increased cooperation; and to work for a better future; and 
in accordance with what was achieved at the meetings of their 
Foreign Ministers in both Muscat on 2 January 1981 and Riyadh 
on 4 February 1981:
Their Majesties and Highnesses have agreed between them 
to set up a Council to unite their States called The 
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf and have 
proceeded in signing the Charter of the Council which aims at 
developing cooperation between these States and to expand 
their relations and to effect coordination, integration, and 
interconnection, and to deepen and strengthen ties and 
relations existing between their peoples in various fields and 
to establish joint projects and to formulate comparable 
regulations in all economic, educational, media, social and 
legal fields in order to serve their interests and strengthen 
their power to adhere to their beliefs and values.
Their Majesties and Highnesses also agreed to appoint 
Abdulla Yacoub Bishara the Secretary-General of the 
Cooperation Council and to make Riyadh in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia the permanent headquarters of the Council.
Being fully aware of the inevitability of economic
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integration between their States and social amalgamation 
between their people, they see that the present circumstances 
which their States live in and the similar cases and problems 
they face in addition to their comparable economic and social 
systems necessitates laying down foundations and setting up 
institutions and establishing systems which will make this 
integration and social amalgamation an obvious reality.
In realising and in carrying out these objectives in 
accordance with Article Four of the Charter they have agreed 
to set up specialised committees as detailed in the working 
paper which was decided upon by the Supreme Council.
Their Majesties and Highnesses reviewed the current 
situation in the area and reaffirmed that the security and 
stability of the area is the responsibility of its peoples and 
States and that this Council is but an expression of the will 
of these States and their rights to defend their security and 
safeguard their independence. They also affirmed their total 
rejection of any foreign interference in the area whatever its 
origin and called for the necessity of isolating the whole 
area from international conflicts and in particular keeping 
away military fleets and foreign bases for their interest and 
that of the world.
They declared that the guarantee for stability in the 
Gulf is connected with the realisation of peace in the Middle 
East which confirms the necessity of a just solution to the 
Palestinian case which will ensure the legitimate rights of 
the Palestinian people including their right to return to 
their homeland and establish their independent State and which 
ensures Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab land, with 
Jerusalem at the forefront.
Their Majesties and Highnesses examined the dangerous 
situation resulting from the escalation of Zionist aggression 
on the Arab nation and discussed in a spirit of national 
responsibility the continuing Israeli violation of the 
sovereignty and independence of Lebanon and the barbaric 
bombing of Lebanese cities and villages and Palestinian camps 
and Israel's war of attrition against the Palestinians and its 
attacks on the Arab Defence Armies and threats against Syria. 
They affirmed their standing by and full support of Syria and 
they called upon all parties in Lebanon to discard their 
differences and to stop the bloodletting on Lebanese soil and 
to commence peace negotiations within the framework of 
Lebanese sovereignty.
Their Majesties and Highnesses backed the efforts spend 
on putting an end to the Iraq-Iran War as it is considered a 
problem which threatens the security of the area and increases 
the likelihood of foreign intervention in it and they affirmed 
the necessity of doubling efforts to find a final solution to 
the conflict.
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Their Majesties and Highnesses also affirmed their 
commitment to the Charter of the League of Arab States and the 
decisions arising from the meetings of the Arab Summit and 
renewed their support of the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference and their commitment to its decisions and expressed 
their adherence to the principles of non-alignment and the 
Charter of the United Nations.
At the invitation of His Majesty King Khaled bin Abd al- 
Aziz the King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia it was decided 
to hold the second meeting in Riyadh in Muharam 1402 which 
corresponds to the first half of November 1981.
Issued in Abu Dhabi 
22 Rajah 1401 Hirjiah 
Corresponding to 26 May 1981
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FINAL DECLARATION OF THE SECOND REGULAR SESSION
OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL FOR THE ARAB STATES
OF THE GULF
With the help of God Almighty and in response to the 
invitation of is Majesty King Khaled bin Abd al-Aziz, the King 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the second regular session of 
the Supreme Council of the Cooperation Council for the Arab 
States of the Gulf was held in the period between 14-15 
Muharam 1402 Hirjiah corresponding to 10-11 November 1981 in 
the present of Their Majesties and Highnesses:
His Highness al-Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan A1 Nahyan the 
President of the United Arab Emirates;
His Highness al-Shaikh Issa bin Selman A1 Khalifah the 
Ruler of the State of Bahrain;
His Majesty King Khaled bin Abd al-Aziz A1 Saud the King 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;
His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said the Sultan of Oman; 
His Highness al-Shaikh Khalifah bin Hamad A1 Thani the 
Ruler of the State of Qatar;
His Highness al-Shaikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah 
the Ruler of the State of Kuwait.
The Council reviewed the political, economic and security 
situation in the Gulf area in light of current developments 
and declared its resolve to continue coordination in these 
spheres so as to confront the dangers surrounding the area and 
to increase contact between the States of the council in order 
to ward off these dangers.
The Council also discussed all the attempts by other 
powers to create positions for themselves in the gulf area to 
threaten its security and sovereignty. The Council announced 
its rejection of these attempts which are dangerous to the 
area and its people and whose aim is to safeguard the 
influence of foreign powers in the area.
It reaffirmed that the security and stability of the Gulf 
is the responsibility of the Gulf States and expressed its 
opposition to the attempts of the great powers to interfere 
in the affairs of the area which will involve it in a conflict 
not in accord with the interests of its States and the will 
of its people. It also affirmed the necessity of isolating 
the whole area from international rivalries, in particular the 
presence of military fleets and foreign bases for their 
interests and the interest of security and world peace.
The Council examined the situation in the Middle East and 
reaffirmed its total support for the struggle of the 
Palestinian people for its right to decide its own destiny and 
set up its own independent State on its land under the 
leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. The
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Council renewed its faith that there is no way to achieve a 
just peace in the Middle East except by the withdrawal of 
Israel from all occupied Arab land including Jerusalem and the 
removal of Israeli settlements which are being erected on Arab 
land.
The Council reviewed the Arab and international reactions 
to the peace proposals announced by the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia concerning a just and comprehensive solution to the 
Palestinian case and the Council agreed to the request from 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to include it on the agenda of the 
twelfth Arab Summit which is to be held in al-Maghreb with the 
objective of formulating a unified Arab stance on the 
Palestinian case.
The Council reviewed the current Arab situation in 
keeping with its national responsibilities concerning the 
necessity of achieving Arab solidarity and the removal of 
disagreements between the brotherly Arab States and the 
repudiation of divisions and the affirmation of unified 
efforts and in conformity with the principles of the Charter 
that the Cooperation Council is part and parcel of the Arab 
nation.
The Council decided that the member States shall carry 
out wholehearted attempts at securing the unity of the Arab 
rank and file.
The Council discussed the ongoing conflict between Iraq 
and Iran and the threats to the security and stability of all 
the area which emanate from it. it expressed hope that 
peaceful endeavours will prove successful and affirmed its 
support for all such endeavours among which are the Islamic 
attempts emanating from the Islamic Conference and the efforts 
of the non-aligned States and those of the United Nations.
The Council reviewed the situation in AFghanistan and the 
dangers it poses not just for the security of the region and 
its independence but for world peace and it affirmed its 
adherence to the decisions of the Islamic conference in this 
context.
The Council reviewed the Economic Agreement which the 
Financial and Economic Ministers had signed in Riyadh on 8 
June 1981 and which was examined and agreed upon by the 
Ministerial Council at their meeting in al-Taif during the 
period 2-3 Thu al-Kadah 14 01 Hijriah corresponding to 1 
September 1981.
The Supreme Council in taking this important step 
according to the citizen's wishes in removing barriers between 
Member States and in strengthening links between the people 
of the area basing them on solid foundations leading to the 
unity of the area, realises that it is the ideal way to ensure
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advancement and prosperity for all the States in the Council.
The Council also reviewed the subject of military 
cooperation between its States and decided to call the 
Ministers of Defence to a meeting in order to delineate the 
preliminaries which the States of the Cooperation Council need 
in order to safeguard its independence and sovereignty.
The Council decided to hold the Third Regular Session of 
the Supreme Council in Bahrain in the third week in the month 
of Muharam 1403 Hijriah corresponding to the first week of 
November, 1982.
The Council expressed its thanks, appreciation and 
gratitude to His Majesty King Khaled bin Abd al-Aziz and to 
his Crown Prince Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz and the Government of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for their generous hospitality and 
pleasant reception by which Heads and members of the 
participating delegations were met with during their 
attendance at the meetings which had a beneficial effect on 
the successful outcome of this brotherly meeting wishing His 
Majesty and his Crown Prince continued health and to the Saudi 
people continued opulence, advancement and prosperity.
Issued in Riyadh 
15 Muharam 1402 Hijriah 
corresponding to 11 November 1981
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FINAL DECLARATION OF THE THIRD REGULAR SESSION
OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE COOPERATION COUNCIL
FOR THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF
With the help of God Almighty and in response to the 
invitation of His Highness al-Shaikh Issa bin Selman A1 
Khalifah, the Ruler of the State of Bahrain, a meeting of the 
third regular session of the Supreme Council of the 
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf convened 
in Manama in the period between 23-25 Muharam 1403 Hijriah 
corresponding to 9-11 November 1982 in the presence of Their 
Majesties and Highnesses:
His Highness al-Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan A1 Nahyan the 
President of the United Arab Emirates;
His Highness al-Shaikh Issa bin Selman A1 Khalifah the 
Ruler of the State of Bahrain?
His Majesty King Khaled bin Abd al-Aziz A1 Saud the King 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;
His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said the Sultan of Oman? 
His Highness al-Shaikh Khalifah bin Hamad A1 Thani the 
Ruler of the State of Qatar?
His Highness al-Shaikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah 
the Ruler of the State of Kuwait.
During this session the Supreme Council reviewed the 
political and economic ties between the member States as well 
as the political and security situation in the Gulf region in 
light of current events.
In reviewing the ties between Member States, the Council 
expressed its satisfaction with the level of coordination 
reached between Member States in the realisation of the letter 
and spirit of the principles contained in the Council's 
Charter and with the Member States' efforts aimed at 
strengthening various aspects of cooperation and enhancing 
ties between them for the purpose of realising integration and 
the aspirations of their peoples for a better future.
The Council was also pleased with what had been 
accomplished by laying the groundwork and securing the 
fundamental structure for collective action which had paved 
the way to joint Gulf activity in attaining its practical 
objective and highest goal.
The Council urged the various instruments and committees 
of cooperation to carry on towards the third stage of 
collective action and to take steps towards enacting the 
programme of cooperation agreed upon to serve the citizens in 
the States of the Council and to consecrate their membership 
in the larger entity on the basis of equality between them in 
rights and duties to carry out their important role in 
maintaining the spirit of the cooperation movement and to push
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it towards the delineated goal and in the area of examining 
the aspects of military coordination between the States of the 
Council.
Coordination in the Area of Defence.
The Council decided upon the recommendations of the 
Defence Ministries of the States of the Council on building 
an independent force for the member States and on coordination 
which will achieve self-reliance for the States of the region 
in defending their security and maintaining their stability.
The Council reviewed the decision of the Ministers of the 
Interior during their meeting in Riyadh on 30 Thi al-Hijjah 
corresponding to 17 October 1982 concerning the agreement on 
total security and it agreed to the request of the Ministers 
of the Interior for a continuation of research on the studies 
they required.
Iran-Iraq War
The Council discussed with great concern the development 
of the war between Iran and Iraq, in particular the recent 
dangerous developments which were exemplified by Iran crossing 
the international border between it and Iraq, by what these 
developments hold for the peace of the Arab nation and by how 
they threaten its security and the violation of its 
sovereignty.
In light of these latest developments which occurred at 
a time during which the Arab nation is working to affirm its 
solidarity and gather its strength for the purpose of 
confronting the increasing Zionist hostility and what that 
requires from joint efforts by the Islamic States, the Council 
affirms its support of Iraq in its attempts to put an end to 
this war by peaceful means and to secure the attempts of the 
Committee arising from the Islamic Conference and the efforts 
of the non-aligned States and the UN and requests Iran to 
reciprocate.
Aden and the Sultanate of Oman
The Council also reviewed the results of the commendable 
attempts which the State of Kuwait and the United Arab 
Emirates carried out to put an end to the dispute between the 
sultanate of Oman and the People's Democratic Republic of 
Yemen.
The Council extols the efforts of the State of Kuwait and 
the United Arab Emirates and the spirit of perseverance which 
marked these efforts, it greets the positive attitude shown 
by the Sultanate of Oman and the People's Democratic Republic 
of Yemen and the way they exhibited an honest desire to remove 
all causes of disagreement and separation from between the 
sons and people of the two brotherly States.
the success of these benevolent attempts is but proof of
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the constructive role carried out by the Council in bringing 
about peace in the region and the establishment of brotherly 
relations and good neighbourly policy between their States.
Arab-Israeli Conflict
The Council studied the developments connected to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and affirmed its support of the 
decisions and declarations which were taken at the twelfth 
Arab Summit in Fez in Morocco.
It reviewed the results of the first contacts carried out 
by the Committee of Seven which emanated from the Fez 
Conference headed by His Majesty King al-Hassan al-Thani, the 
King of Morocco, and it expressed its support of all attempts 
that realise Arab objectives as delineated by the Fez 
Conference.
It renewed its belief that thee is no way to achieving 
a just and durable peace in the Middle East except by the 
withdrawal of Israel from all occupied Arab land including 
Jerusalem and the removal of all Zionist settlements which 
were erected and are being erected on occupied Arab land and 
the establishment of a Palestinian State on its national soil 
under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, 
the one and only legitimate representative of the 
Palestinians.
Protect the Security of Lebanon
It also affirmed its full support for Lebanon in 
protecting its security, sovereignty, independence and the 
unity of its land. And it calls for the immediate and 
unconditional withdrawal of Israel from all Lebanese soil.
The Unified Economic Agreement
The Council also reviewed the developments which had 
taken place concerning the implementation of the terms of the 
Unified Economic Agreement and expressed its feelings of 
happiness at starting the implementation of the first stage 
of the Agreement on 1 March 1983 where the citizen will feel 
the beginning of economic integration which the Economic 
Agreement seeks to achieve.
Agreement was reached to set up a Gulf Investment 
cooperation with an estimated capital of two billion one 
hundred million United States dollars.
The Council also agreed to finance the conversion of the 
Arab-Saudi Organisation for Specifications and Measurements 
into a Gulf organisation specialising in specifications and 
measurements for the States of the Council.
The Council expressed its thanks, appreciation and 
gratefulness to His Highness al-Shaikh Issa bin Selman A1 
Khalifah the Ruler of the State of Bahrain and his Government
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for the generous hospitality and pleasant reception with which 
the Heads and members of the participating delegations were 
met during their attendance at the meetings and which had the 
best effect on the success of his brotherly meeting wishing 
His Highness everlasting health and happiness and to the 
Bahraini people everlasting opulence, advancement and 
prosperity.
The Council decided to hold the fourth regular Session 
in the State of Qatar in the month of Sifr 1404 Hijriah 
corresponding to November 1983.
Issued in Bahrain 
25 Muharam 1403 Hijriah 
corresponding to 11 November 1982
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RESOLUTION 514 (1982)
of 12 July 1982
The Security Council.
Having considered again the question entitled "The 
situation between Iran and Iraq".
Deeply concerned about the prolongation of the conflict 
between the two countries, resulting in heavy losses of human 
lives and considerable material damage and endangering peace 
and security.
Recalling the provisions of Article 2 of the Charter of 
the United Nations, and that the establishment of peace and 
security in the region requires strict adherence to these 
provisions.
Recalling that by virtue of Article 24 of the Charter the 
Security Council has the primary responsibility for 
maintenance of international peace and security,
Recalling its resolution 479(1980), adopted unanimously 
on 28 September 1980, as well as the statement of the 
President of the Security Council of 5 November 1980,
Taking note of the efforts of mediation pursued notably 
by the Secretary-General and his representative, as well as 
by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Organisation 
of the Islamic Conference,
1. Calls for a cease-fire and an immediate end to all 
military operations;
2. Calls further for a withdrawal of forces to 
internationally recognised boundaries?
3. Decides to dispatch a team of United Nations 
observers to verify, confirm and supervise the cease-fire and 
withdrawal, and requests the Secretary-General to submit to 
the Security Council a report on the arrangements required for 
that purpose?
4. Urges that the mediation efforts be continued in a 
coordinated manner through the Secretary-General with a view 
to achieving a comprehensive, just and honourable settlement, 
acceptable to both sides, of all the outstanding issues, on 
the basis of the principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations, including respect for sovereignty, independence, 
territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of states?
5. Requests all other states to abstain from all actions 
that could contribute to the continuation of the conflict and 
to facilitate the implementation of the present resolution?
6. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the 
Security Council within three months on the implementation of 
the present resolution
Adopted unanimously at the 
2383rd meeting 
(Security Council Official Records (1981)) S/INF/38)
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RESOLUTION 522 (1982)
of 4 October 1982
The Security Council.
Having considered again the question entitled "The 
situation between Iran and Iraq",
Deploring the prolongation and the escalation of the 
conflict between the two countries, resulting in heavy losses 
of human lives and considerable material damage and 
endangering peace and security,
Reaffirming that the restoration of peace and security 
in the region requires all Member States strictly to comply 
with their obligations under the Charter of the United 
Nations,
Recalling its resolution 479 (1980), adopted unanimously 
on 28 September 1980, as well as the statement of the 
President of the Security Council of 5 November 1980,
Further recalling its resolution 514 (1982), adopted
unanimously on 12 July 1982, and the statement of the 
President of the Security Council of 15 July 1982,
Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of 15 
July 1982,
1. Urgently calls again for an immediate cease-fire and 
an end to all military operations;
2. Reaffirms its call for a withdrawal of forces to 
internationally recognised boundaries;
3. Welcomes the fact that one of the parties has already 
expressed its readiness to cooperate in the implementation of 
resolution 514(1982) and calls upon the other to do likewise;
4. Affirms the necessity of implementing without further 
delay its decision to dispatch United Nations observers to 
verify, confirm and supervise the cease-fire and withdrawal;
5. Reaffirms the urgency of the continuation of the 
current mediation efforts;
6. Reaffirms its request to all other states to abstain 
from all actions which could contribute to the continuation 
of the conflict and to facilitate the implementation of the 
present resolution;
7. Further requests the Secretary-General to report to 
the Security Council on the implementation of the present 
resolution within seventy-two hours.
Adopted unanimously at the 
2399th meeting.
(Security Council Official Records (1982) S/INF/38
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RESOLUTION 540 (1983)
Adopted bv the Security Council at its 2493rd meeting
on 31 October 1983
The Security Council.
Having considered again the question entitled "The 
situation between Iran and Iraq",
Recalling its relevant resolutions and statements which, 
inter alia, call for a comprehensive cease-fire and an end to 
all military operations between the parties,
Recalling the report of the Secretary-General of 20 June 
1983 (S/15834) on the mission appointed by him to inspect
civilian areas in Iran and Iraq which have been subject to 
military attacks, and expressing its appreciation to the 
Secretary-General for presenting a factual, balanced and 
objective account,
Also noting with appreciation and encouragement the 
assistance and cooperative given to the Secretary-General's 
mission by the Governments of Iran and Iraq,
Deploring once again the conflict between the two 
countries, resulting in heavy losses of civilian lives and 
extensive damage caused to cities, property and economic 
infrastructures,
Affirming the desirability of an objective examination 
of the causes of the war,
1. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his 
mediation efforts with the parties concerned, with a view to 
achieving a comprehensive, just and honourable settlement 
acceptable to both sides;
2. Condemns all violations of international humanitarian 
law, in particular, the provisions of the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 in all their aspects, and calls for the immediate 
cessation of all military operations against civilian targets, 
including city and residential areas;
3. Affirms the right of free navigation and commerce in 
international waters, calls on all states to respect this 
right and also calls upon the belligerents to cease 
immediately all hostilities in the region of the Gulf, 
including all sea-lanes, navigable waterways, harbour works, 
terminals, offshore installations and all ports with direct 
or indirect access to the sea, and to respect the integrity 
of the other littoral states;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to consult with the 
parties concerning ways to sustain and verify the cessation 
of hostilities, including the possible dispatch of United 
Nations observers, and to submit a report to the Council on 
the results of these consultations;
5. Calls upon both parties to refrain from any action 
that may endanger peace and security as well as marine life
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in the region of the Gulf?
6. Calls once more upon all other states to exercise the 
utmost restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead 
to a further escalation and widening of the conflict and, 
thus, to facilitate the implementation of the present 
resolution?
7. Requests the Secretary-General to consult with the 
parties regarding immediate and effective implementation of 
this resolution.
(S/RES/540 (1983), 31 October 1983)
Security Council Official Records S/INF/39)
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LETTER DATED 21 MAY 1984 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF 
BAHRAIN. KUWAIT. OMAN. QATAR. SAUDI ARABIA AND 
THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ADDRESSED TO THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Decisions
At its 2541st meeting, on 25 May 1984, the Council 
decided to invite the representatives of Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Panama, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, the United Arab 
Emirates and Yemen to participate, without vote, in the 
discussion of the item entitled "Letter dated 21 May 1984 from 
the representatives of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates addressed to the President 
of the Security Council (S/16574).
At the same meeting, the Council also decided at the 
request of the representative of Kuwait, to extend an 
invitation to Mr. Chedli Klibi under rule 39 of the 
provisional rules of procedure.
At its 2542nd meeting, on 25 May 1984, the Council
decided to invite the representatives of Ecuador, Jordan, 
Somalia and the Sudan to participate, without vote, in the 
discussion of the question.
At its 2543rd meeting, on 29 May 1984, the Council
decided to invite the representatives of the Federal Republic 
of German, Japan, and Morocco to participate, without vote, 
in the discussion of the question.
At its 2545th meeting, on 30 May 1984, the Council
decided to invite the representatives of Djibouti, Mauritania, 
Tunisia and Turkey to participate, without vote, in the
discussion of the question.
At it 2546th meeting, on 1 June 1984, the Council decided 
to invite the representative of Liberia to participate, 
without vote, in the discussion of the question.
(Security Council Official Records. S/INF/40)
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RESOLUTION 552 (1984
of 1 June 1984
The Security Council.
Having considered the letter dated 21 May 1984 from the 
representatives of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi ARabia 
and the United Arab Emirates complaining against Iranian 
attacks on commercial ships en route to and from the ports of 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,
Noting that Member States pledges to live together in 
peace with one another as good neighbours in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations,
Reaffirming the obligations of Member States with respect 
to the principles and purposes of the Charter,
Reaffirming also that all Member States are obliged to 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State,
Taking into consideration the importance of the Gulf 
region to international peace and security and its vital role
to the stability of the world economy.
Deeply concerned over the recent attacks on commercial 
ships en route to and from the ports of Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia,
Convinced that these attacks constitute a threat to the 
safety and stability of the area and have serious implications 
for international peace and security.
1. Calls upon all states to respect, in accordance with 
international law, the right of free navigation;
2. Reaffirms the right of free navigation in
international waters and sea lanes for shipping en route to 
and from all ports and installations of the littoral States 
that are not parties to the hostilities?
3. Calls upon all States to respect the territorial 
integrity of the States that are not parties to the
hostilities and to exercise the utmost restraint and to 
refrain from any act which may lead to a further escalation 
and widening of the conflict;
4. Condemns the recent attacks on commercial ships en
route to and from the ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia?
5. Demands that such attacks should cease forthwith and 
that there should be no interference with ships en route to 
and from States that are not parties to the hostilities?
6. Decides, in the event of non-compliance with the 
present resolution, to meet again to consider effective
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measures that are commensurate with the gravity of the
situation in order to ensure the freedom of navigation in the
area;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to report on the 
progress of the implementation of the present resolution;
8. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Adopted at the 2 54 6th 
meeting by 13 votes to 
none, with 2 abstentions 
(Nicaragua and Zimbabwe)
(Security Council Official Records, S/INF/40)
